



## **Country Reports A-C**

Principal investigator: Steffen Kailitz

Contact: [steffen.kailitz@mailbox.tu-dresden.de](mailto:steffen.kailitz@mailbox.tu-dresden.de)

Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies, Dresden

Research assistance (at various points in time):

Natalia Bachmann, Maximilian von Boehm-Bezing, Naomi Braun, Tobias Genswein, Andre Günther, Pauline Degirmenci, Dora Gergis, Nicole Husemann, Lisa-Marie Lucke, Luisa Meier, Katharina Mette, Ines Meyer, Philipp Nulsch, Jakob Ochsenkühn, Priscilla Pirschle, Leonhard Pitz, Paula Schrank, Johannes Wichert, Malina Witzentrath

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## Overview

The following country reports are part of the Va-PoReg supplementary materials. We provide these materials to transparently trace how we have classified political regimes between 1900 and the present. For details on regime classification, please consult the codebook. The countries and territories covered by the dataset are listed in alphabetical order in the document. In each case, the history of political regimes in the named territory from 1900 to the most recent cut-off date (currently 07/01/2024, whereby the dates follow the format MM/DD/YYYY) is listed. The description begins in each case with an entry starting 01/01/1900. This is followed in each case by the regime type at that time. The time at which this regime began is indicated in square brackets behind it. All following entries indicate the end of a regime and the start of a new regime. The entries conclude with a note indicating which regime was continued at the last cut-off date, specifically 07/01/2024. Please note that regime periods that begin after 07/01 of year x and end before 07/01 of the following year appear in the following regime narratives but not in the country-year dataset. If the regime type is mentioned in brackets after the protectorate, this always refers to the country that is a protectorate. If after colony a regime type is mentioned in brackets, this always refers to the colonizing country.

### Acronyms for datasets used in the following country reports:

AF	Anckar and Fredriksson (2020, Political Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0) Regimes of the World Dataset, v.2.0
BMR	Boix, Miller, and Rosato
BR	Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)
CEI	Clean Elections Index (V-Dem)
CGV	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
EF&FI	Elections Free and Fair Index (V-Dem)
FH	Freedom House
GWF	Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018)
LIED	Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy, dataset v6.4 (2022)
MCM	Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013, Autocracies of the world)
PCLI	Political Civil Liberties Index (V-Dem)
REIGN	Rulers, Elections and Irregular Governance Dataset

RoW	Regimes of the World
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy

### **Other abbreviations**

EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

**Abyssinia** see **Ethiopia**

### **Afghanistan**

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 05/31/1880]: From 1747 on Afghanistan was a sovereign state.<sup>1</sup> On 05/26/1879 the Afghani rulers signed the Peace of Gandamak Treaty by which Afghanistan became a protectorate of Great Britain (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). On 05/31/1880 the monarchy was founded by Abdur Rahman who accepted British tutelage after defeating domestic rivals. The monarchy of Afghanistan was subject to a British protectorate from this date on until 08/08/1919, therefore consequently also at the time of our start date on 01/01/1900. Power was passed to his son Habibullah Khan, who was assassinated in February 1919. Afterwards his son, Amanullah, took over (Barfield 2010). Based on our observations, no multiparty, executive, or legislative elections were held during this period, in accordance with the observations of LIED.

08/08/1919 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: Afghanistan reached independence through the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919. Already on 02/28/1919 Amanullah proclaimed himself Emir. From this date to 06/09/1926 he ruled as Emir, after that date as King until 01/14/1929. In 1919, King Amanullah Khan established Afghanistan's inaugural constitution, eliminating slavery, establishing a legislative body, ensuring secular education,

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<sup>1</sup> <https://rulers.org/rula1.html>

and implementing equal rights for both men and women.<sup>2</sup> According to our observations and LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The constitution was approved and ratified on 04/11/1922 by 872 tribal elders and government officials.<sup>3</sup> Along with the constitution, Amanullah supported several other “Western style”-reforms, as for example his 1928 plan to incorporate a legislative reform on the emancipation of women, which enraged the Muslim religious leaders.<sup>4</sup> On 11/14/1928, the Shinwari tribe in Jalalabad began to revolt against Amanullah’s ideas on the emancipation of women. This marked the beginning of the Afghan Civil War. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the years 1901 and 1902 V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1903-1922, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In this regime period per LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were absent.

12/14/1928 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Personalist Autocracy: One month later, on 12/14/1928, a concurrent Saqqawist revolt, led by Habibullah Kalakani, attacked Kabul.<sup>5</sup> They succeeded in capturing Kabul on 01/17/1929. Next to the Saqqawists in Kabul, a rival government in Jalalabad led by Ali Ahmad Khan emerged and was defeated by the former on 02/09/1929. Nevertheless, they were not able to defeat King Amanullah and Nadir Khan. The latter, however, left the country on 05/23/1929. Following Nadir Khan's departure, Habibullah Kalakani continued to rule in Kabul. However, his authority was increasingly challenged, and the country remained in a state of civil war. Eventually, Nadir Khan’s troops managed to push back and capture the Presidential Palace in Kabul. This marked on 10/13/1929 the end of the Afghan Civil War and the fall of Habibullah Kalakani's rule.<sup>6</sup> Although short-lived, this regime phase can only be characterized as the personalist autocracy of Habibullāh Kalakāni. Different

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<sup>2</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>3</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amanullah\\_Khan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amanullah_Khan)

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Amanullah-Khan>

<sup>5</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habibull%C4%81h\\_Kalak%C4%81ni](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habibull%C4%81h_Kalak%C4%81ni)

<sup>6</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1928%E2%80%931929\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_Civil_War_(1928%E2%80%931929))

from the Pashtun aristocracy Kalakāni was an ethnic Tajik and came from a rather poor family.<sup>7</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Political liberties remained absent per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

10/13/1929 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On 10/10/1929 tribal forces led by Mohammad Nadir Khan and his brothers seized Kabul after defeating insurgents who had ousted the previous hereditary monarch, a distant relative of Nadir.<sup>8</sup> After the end of the Afghan Civil War on 10/13/1929, Nadir began to reign over Afghanistan on 10/15/1929. On 11/01/1929, he executed Habibullah Kalakani, who had taken over Amanullah's monarchy, by firing squad. Some of his family members as well as his inner circle were also executed. Nadir abolished most of Amanullah's reforms. Like in the GWF dataset the monarchy is counted as a new regime because Khan ousted the previous hereditary monarch and was only a distant relative of the former monarch (Baxter 1997, Herb 1997: 287). The previous constitution and all voting rights were removed. From 1929-1932 he faced a number of revolts and uprisings. Meanwhile, religious, and tribal forces were becoming stronger in Afghanistan. In September 1930, a cabinet of ten members, which had been named by Nadir Kahn and consisted mainly of his family members, confirmed Nadir's accession to the throne. In 1931, Nadir Kahn introduced a new constitution, which was approved by the National Council consisting of 105 members (Kakar/Schiwal 2021: 5). The constitution named sharia law as an alternative to statutory law and used heavily religious language and. Additionally, the constitution gave real power to the clergy. Power was vested both in the monarch and in the ulema (Kakar/Schiwal 2021). A number of constitutional concessions were made to the religious and conservatives which empowered the ulema. Additionally, important cabinet positions were given to religious conservatives which placed the judiciary, especially, in conservative hands for a generation. While the constitution did establish a National Consultative Assembly and vested the power in it to approve the conclusion of treaties and conventions and the granting of concessions (Art. 46), the King held the prerogative to declare war and conclude peace and all treaties (Art. 7) (Nations 1953: 3). This period is not coded as a constitutional monarchy because popular

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<sup>7</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habibull%C4%81h\\_Kalak%C4%81ni](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habibull%C4%81h_Kalak%C4%81ni)

<sup>8</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad\\_Nadir\\_Shah](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Nadir_Shah)

participation was an illusion, and the constitution created a de facto absolute monarchy.<sup>9</sup> On 11/03/1933, Nadir Khan was assassinated. This however had no significant impact on the regime, as his son Mohammed Zahir Shah was immediately proclaimed King and accepted by all ministers, the ulemas and the tribal leaders.<sup>10</sup> On 03/10/1963 a policy dispute resulted in the forced resignation of the prime minister and direct rule of the royalty under Zahir Shah. In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a constitution which provided for two chambers. However, “there [was] little collective decision-making in the lower house and “sessions [were] frequently marked by curious and confusing practices” (Weinbaum 1972), therefore we do not classify this period a Constitutional Monarchy. It is, however, worth noting, that with the constitution universal suffrage was introduced and in the 1965 parliamentary elections six women in total were elected into the parliament, four in the lower and two in the upper chamber (Emadi 2008). The constitution was abrogated in 1973, when Mohammed Daoud Khan succeeded in his coup.<sup>11</sup> According to V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties were absent until 1963. Between 1964 and 1973, the index indicates that political liberties were minimal or only marginally present. According to LIED political liberties were absent for the whole period. Until 1963, according to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Between 1964 and 1972, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the period 1930-1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1964-1972, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1973, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1929 to 1931, from 1932 to 1963 only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held, from 1964 to 1972 only multiparty legislative elections were held.

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<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad\\_Nadir\\_Shah#cite\\_note-LD-8](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Nadir_Shah#cite_note-LD-8)

<sup>10</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933\\_in\\_Afghanistan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933_in_Afghanistan)

<sup>11</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

07/17/1973 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Personalist Autocracy: Army general and prince Mohammed Daoud Khan led a successful military coup against his cousin King Mohammed Zahir Shah on this date (Baxter 1997, Craddock 2011, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). Zahir Shah formally abdicated on 08/24/1973, remaining in Italy in exile. Despite his affiliation with the Musahiban Barakzai dynasty, Daoud Khan chose to dismantle the monarchy, opting instead to establish a new republic. In doing so, he proclaimed himself as both the head of state and head of government.<sup>12</sup> The earlier constitution, which instituted a parliament with elected representatives and a division of powers, got replaced by a predominantly appointed loya jirga (meaning "grand assembly"). As a result, the parliament was disbanded.<sup>13</sup> In 1975, he founded his own political party, the National Revolutionary Party, intending it to be the focal point of all political activities. The aim was to ensure that his former supporters in the PDPA were kept out of political power. Although the party was designated to approve candidates for the upcoming election under the new constitution, Daoud Khan personally appointed the party's central committee in advance, bypassing any consultation process. Consequently, the committee ended up being filled with his close associates. In January 1977, a loya jirga endorsed a new constitution, introducing several new articles and revising others, including the establishment of a government with a presidential one-party system.<sup>14</sup> The classification of the regime is disputed. HTW and MCM classify the regime as a military regime, while GWF and AF subsume it under the category personalist regime. LIED categorizes it from 1973 on as a one-party autocracy which seems problematic since a one-party regime came de jure only in existence in 1977. In this case we would argue that indeed the party founded in 1975 was solely an instrument of the ruler with no real power, which could be seen in its internal structure. Therefore, the regime is classified as a personalist autocracy. Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls into the not free category in our interpretation. According to V-Dem's PCLI and LIED there were no political liberties for that period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For almost the entire relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1978, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE

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<sup>12</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973\\_Afghan\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Afghan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>13</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad\\_Daoud\\_Khan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Daoud_Khan)

<sup>14</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad\\_Daoud\\_Khan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Daoud_Khan)

is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held until 1976, in 1977 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

04/27/1978 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date, a coup by a revolutionary faction of the army allied with the Communist People's Democratic Party ousted Daoud Khan. A new regime under the control of Nur Muhammad Taraki and his Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took over and established a ruling Revolutionary Council.<sup>15</sup> On 03/27/1979 as the civil war in Afghanistan grew in intensity, the Soviet-led authority forced Taraki out of the executive (Baxter 1997, Newell 1997). On 12/27/1979 after suffering a strain in relations, the USSR carried out a coup against President Amin and replaced him with Kamal.<sup>16</sup> De facto the regime was a mixture between an indirect rule occupation regime and a communist ideocracy. However, different from HTW this regime period is not coded as an occupation regime in this dataset. It might also be disputed if the regime is rightly classified as a communist regime since the PDPA in its final years moved away from Marxism–Leninism and towards Afghan nationalism. The PDPA sought to modernize the country through socialist reforms, which met strong resistance from Afghan society, leading to permanent instability and conflict. However, the instability was not merely a result of internal ethnic and ideological divisions in Afghanistan but was deeply shaped by international geopolitical struggles, particularly the Cold War. The Soviet intervention in 1979 exacerbated the situation, triggering a prolonged civil war. Afghanistan in this period is a prime example of a weak state caught in global power struggles (Rubin 2002). After the After National Reconciliation talks in 1987, the official name of the country reverted to the Republic of Afghanistan as it was known before 1978 (Hippler 1997). Under the leadership of Mohammad Najibullah in 1990, the party was renamed the Homeland Party and much of the party's symbols and policies were altered or removed. Karmal, who developed the ideology of the moderate wing of the PDPA, believed that Afghanistan was not developed enough for a Leninist revolutionary approach and instead sought a patriotic and anti-imperialist united front to take the next steps toward revolution.<sup>17</sup> FH classifies the country as not free with a score between 11 and 14 during this period and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. Between 1989 and 1991, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the year 1979,

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<sup>15</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s\\_Democratic\\_Party\\_of\\_Afghanistan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Democratic_Party_of_Afghanistan);  
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nur-Mohammad-Taraki>

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan>

<sup>17</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parcham>



V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1980-1987, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1988-1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held from 1978 to 1984, in 1985 and 1986 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, from 1987 to 1991 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The legislative body, the National Assembly, collapsed in 1992 ending our classification of legislative elections in accordance with LIEDs observations. According to V-Dem's PCLI and LIED political liberties were absent in that period.

04/16/1992 End Communist Ideocracy/Start No Central Authority: On this date, the government of Mohammad Najibullah was ousted by the Mujaheddin insurgency. Afghanistan is from this point on coded as a case with no effective central government. On 06/28/1992 battles between Islamic insurgents forced President Mojadidi to resign (Rais 1993: 910, Ewans 2001: 178, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39).<sup>18</sup> FH classifies the country as not free with a score between 11 and 14 during this period and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. 09/27/1996 End No Central Authority/Start Islamist Ideocracy: The Islamist Taliban captured Kabul, forced the government of Rabanni to flee and a new regime led by Omar enforced strict Islamic rule (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). The Taliban leaders quickly renamed the country as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Advocating for the primacy of Islamic law, they chose not to introduce a new constitution.<sup>19</sup> Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls into the not free category in our interpretation. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited,

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<sup>18</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Civil-war-mujahideen-Taliban-phase-1992-2001>

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Finance#ref306629>

indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Since 1992 political liberties were still not present per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

11/13/2001 End Islamist Ideocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]: The USA invaded Afghanistan beginning on 10/07/2001. On 11/13/2001 the Taliban government in Kabul was defeated (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39).<sup>20</sup> According to LIED, during this period, no popular multiparty executive and legislative elections took place. Therefore, we code this period as a direct occupation regime. In June 2002 Hamid Karzai was voted into office by the Emergency Loya Jirga (Casey et al. 2020: 27, Derpanopoulos et al. 2016, Suhrke 2011: 164, 179-80). FH classifies the country as not free with a score between 11 and 14 during this period and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were somewhat present from 2002 on, while LIED still considers them absent. In 2004 universal suffrage was reintroduced.<sup>21</sup>

10/09/2004 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]: On 10/09/2004, presidential elections under universal suffrage were held (LIED). Therefore, we code this period as an indirect rule occupation regime. In 2004, the country was classified as not free by FH, with a score between 11 and 14, which aligns with our interpretation as not free. From 2005 to 2007, the country's score ranged between 9 and 10, indicating a rather non-free status in our interpretation. In 2008, the country was once again classified as not free, with a score between 11 and 14. On 09/18/2005, multiparty parliamentary elections were held. According to LIED only executive elections were held in 2004, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 2005 onward. For 2005 and 2006, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. During the rest of this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Political liberties were still not present (LIED, V-Dem PCLI).

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<sup>20</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/afghanistan/191350.htm>

<sup>21</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

08/20/2009 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: The occurrence of fraudulent presidential elections is recognized as the event that signified some degree of independence for the government of Hamid Karzai from U.S. influence (Casey et al. 2020: 27, Derpanopoulos et al. 2016, Suhrke 2011: 164, 179-80, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). In November 2009, the Afghan attorney-general announced that 15 current and former cabinet members were under investigation for alleged corruption (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). By 2014, the Afghan state had almost no legitimacy, and violence blanketed the country as a resurgent Taliban gained ground. President Karzai left office that year at the end of his second term, and U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan came to a close, with the United States transitioning to an advise-and-support role for Afghan forces (Murtazashvili 2022). Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has consistently categorized Afghani elections as not competitive. The EF&FI drops down to speaking of ambiguity when it comes to the freedom and fairness of elections. The 2014 presidential election was mired in so much corruption that the actual winner was hard to identify. V-Dem's CEI drops back down to rating the cleanliness of elections as none at all, after having assessed it as not really clean between 2005 and 2014. The elections in September 2019 were the first time in Afghanistan's history that power was democratically transferred.<sup>22</sup> On 09/28/2019 Aschraf Ghani was declared winner of the presidential elections. In May 2020 Ghani and Abdallah signed a sharing agreement.<sup>23</sup> Following Ghani's 2019 election, the V-Dem EF&FI score plummets back down to calling the election not really free or fair. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. From 2014 to 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For 2010-2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

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<sup>22</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014\\_Afghan\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Afghan_presidential_election)

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52699158>

08/16/2021 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Islamist Ideocracy: In April 2021 US-President Joseph Biden announced a complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by 09/11/2021 (Murtazashvili 2022). Afghan Government collapsed on this date after President Ashraf Ghani fled the country into exile following territorial gains of the Taliban throughout the country. From 2021 onward V-Dem's PCLI states that no political liberties exist. According to LIED political liberties were also not present. With the Taliban again in power, the regime is coded as an Islamist ideocracy. Based on our observations, no multiparty, executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

Islamist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Arjomand 2008, Baxter 1997, Blood 1997, Craddock 2011, Dorronsoro 2005, Enterline/Greig 2008, Ewans 2001, Halliday/Tanin 1998, Hippler 1997, Newell 1997, Rais 1993, Sarbi 2001)

## **Albania**

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1431]: The Ottoman Empire established power in Albania in 1431.<sup>24</sup> Even though the Ottomans claimed rule of all Albanian lands, most Albanian ethnic territories were still governed by medieval Albanian nobility who were free of Ottoman rule. This circumstance led to uprising and revolts against the Ottomans until the last town Himara was captured by them in 1509. Only the region of Mirdita in the north of Albania could never be fully invaded, and Ottomans had to ensure the right of autonomy for this region. In 17<sup>th</sup> century Islamization increased in the invaded regions and converted Albanians would eventually dominate the Ottoman power structures disproportionately. As Ottoman central authority weakened, a period of the semi-independence started for local Albanian rulers in Balkans in the 1750s with the era of the so called Independent Albanian Pashas. These de facto independent Albanian Pashaliks would extend from Bosnia to today's southern Greece.<sup>25</sup> Those pashas created separate states within the Ottoman state until they were overthrown by the sultan in 1831. As a result, power passed

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<sup>24</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albania\\_under\\_the\\_Ottoman\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albania_under_the_Ottoman_Empire)

<sup>25</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albania\\_under\\_the\\_Ottoman\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albania_under_the_Ottoman_Empire)

to tribal chieftains called ‘bajraktars’, who presided over given territories with rigid patriarchal societies that were often torn by blood feuds.<sup>26</sup> The Albanian League was founded in 1878 to assert Albanian national interest. Its aim was to establish an autonomous state within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. The Albanian League was suppressed in 1881, because they were alarmed by its strong nationalistic orientation. This circumstance was current around our start date on 01/01/1900. When the Ottomans ignored their commitments to Albanians to institute democratic reforms and to grant autonomy, Albanians embarked on an armed struggle in 1910, which at the end of three years forced the Ottomans to agree, in effect, to grant their demands.<sup>27</sup> On 08/1-11/1912 Albanian nationalist and Ottoman government representatives held negotiations, during which the Albanian presented a list of fourteen demands to the Ottoman government.<sup>28</sup>

11/28/1912 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date, Albanian nationalists led by Ismail Kemal Bey proclaimed the independence of Albania from the Ottoman Empire in the port of Valona (Vlorë) on 11/28/1912 (Lansford 2021:18). Bey took office as president of the provisional government in Valona (Vlorë) on 04/12/1912. From 1912 to 1914 V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous and LIED as absent. The Ottoman Empire formally relinquished its sovereignty over Albania only on 05/30/1913.<sup>29</sup> However, de facto from this date on, Albania was independent. In December 1912, shortly after the declaration of independence, the Assembly of Vlora was convened. This assembly was not elected but consisted of representatives from various Albanian regions. For 1912 and 1913, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1914, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1912, in 1913 only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held.

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<sup>26</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Albania/Medieval-culture>

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Albania/Albanian-nationalism>

<sup>28</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/euoperussiacentral-asia-region/ottoman-empire-1905-1913/>

<sup>29</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/euoperussiacentral-asia-region/ottoman-empire-1905-1913/>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian\\_Declaration\\_of\\_Independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_Declaration_of_Independence)

03/07/1914 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of the “Great Powers”]: The Principality of Albania (Albanian: Principata e Shqipërisë) denotes the brief monarchy in Albania led by Wilhelm, Prince of Albania. This monarchy persisted from the Treaty of London in 1913, concluding the First Balkan War, up until the invasions of Albania during World War I.<sup>30</sup> Prince Wilhelm reached his provisional capital of Durrës in Albania on 03/07/1914, along with the Royal family. The security of Albania was to be ensured by an International Gendarmerie led by Dutch officers. In this regime period there were no elections for parliament. Albania in this period was de facto a protectorate of the Great Powers (United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, and Italy), as in the Conference of London Albania was proclaimed "an autonomous, sovereign and hereditary principality" by virtue of primogeniture, assured by the six Powers. The sovereign will be appointed by these six Powers.<sup>31</sup> Albania accepted this decision on 07/29/1913. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time.

09/03/1914 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of the “Great Powers”]/Start No Central Authority: Amidst the onset of World War I, political chaos engulfed Albania, prompting Prince Wilhelm's departure from the country on 09/03/1914. In the aftermath, central and northern Albania saw control fall to various tribal chiefs and self-styled warlords, while in the south, leaders renounced the Protocol of Corfu and seized power. Prince William's exit from Albania occurred against this backdrop, highlighting the fragmented state of governance amidst the turmoil.<sup>32</sup> The Albanian people split along religious and tribal lines after the prince's departure, as Muslims demanded a Muslim prince and looked to the Ottoman Empire as the protector. Albania's political confusion continued in the wake of World War I. The country lacked a single recognized government and Albanians feared, that Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece would succeed in extinguishing Albania's independence.<sup>33</sup> In 1914, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

10/27/1914 End No Central Authority/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [partly by Allied Powers (Greece, Italy, Serbia, Montenegro, France) and partly by Central Powers (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria) and partly by Italy (neutral)]: Greek forces entered southern Albania after receiving the approval of the Great Powers and established a military administration in this

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<sup>30</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Albania)

<sup>31</sup> [http://www.albanianhistory.net/1913\\_Conference-of-London/index.html](http://www.albanianhistory.net/1913_Conference-of-London/index.html)

<sup>32</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_War\\_I\\_in\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_in_Albania)

<sup>33</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Albania)

territory by 10/27/1914.<sup>34</sup> As a reaction to the Greek occupation, Italy occupied Vlorë and on 10/31/1914 the Italians seized the strategic island of Sasaneo. Serbia and Montenegro occupied parts of northern Albania until a Central Powers (United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Ottoman Empire) offensive scattered the Serbian army.<sup>35</sup> According to LIED, there was no male suffrage during this period, therefore this period is coded as a direct occupation regime. During 1915 political liberties did not really exist according to V-Dem's PCLI. In this period there were de facto at least two clearly separate occupation regime, one by the Allied Powers (Greece and Italy) and one by the Central Powers. Before 11/05/1915, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, as members of the Central Powers, primarily occupied the central region of Albania. This area, largely rural and interior, was targeted for military administration. Meanwhile, Serbian and Montenegrin forces controlled the northern parts, and Greek and Italian troops held the south. The exact boundaries were fluid due to ongoing military developments at the time. Until Italy officially switched sides on 05/23/1915, when it declared war on Austria-Hungary and joined the Allied Powers, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, it did not join the Central Powers when the war broke out. The partial occupation of northern Albania by Serbian and Montenegrin forces is generally considered to have ended on 11/05/1915, when a Central Powers offensive forced their withdrawal. The withdrawal of both Greek and Italian occupying forces from southern Albania also was completed on 11/05/1915. This date marks the point at which the Central Powers' offensive led to the decisive withdrawal of the earlier foreign administrations from the region. On 02/09/1916, the capital Tirana was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.<sup>36</sup> With the occupations V-Dem PCLI indicates that political liberties were in an ambiguous state and LIED considers them as absent for the entire time. The evacuation of the Serbian army from Albania was completed on 02/10/1916. In the Serb's wake came the armies of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria and they occupied further about two-thirds of the country. They would occupy most of Albania until the Vardar Offensive of 09/1918.<sup>37</sup> After WWI, left without any political leadership or authority, the country was in chaos, and its very fate hung in the balance. At the Paris Peace Conference after the war, the extinction of Albania was averted largely through the efforts of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who vetoed a plan by Britain,

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<sup>34</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_War\\_I\\_in\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_in_Albania)

<sup>35</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Albania)

<sup>36</sup> [https://en.Awikipedia.org/wiki/Albania\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_I#Austro-Hungarian\\_occupation\\_of\\_Albania\\_\(1916%E2%80%931918\)](https://en.Awikipedia.org/wiki/Albania_during_World_War_I#Austro-Hungarian_occupation_of_Albania_(1916%E2%80%931918))

<sup>37</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Albania)

France, and Italy to partition Albania among its neighbors.<sup>38</sup> For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

10/03/1918 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Austria, Constitutional Monarchy; Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy; Bulgaria, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On 09/09/1917 Bulgarian occupation in parts of the east of Albania ended, when French troops captured Pogradec from the Bulgarian army. After that the territory went back to Macedonia and Albania remained under Austro-Hungarian occupation.<sup>39</sup> Austro-Hungarian troops announced their withdrawal from Albania on 10/03/1918.<sup>40</sup> On 12/25/1918 a provisional government was elected by a congress in Dürres.<sup>41</sup> For this time political liberties remained ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI and absent following LIED. For 1919, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. During the rest of this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held in 1918 and 1919, in 1920 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

04/21/1921 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the first parliamentary elections in the country's history were held.<sup>42</sup> However, this data does not line up with Pearson (2007: 162) who finds, that in December 1920 Ilias Bej Vrioni became prime minister of the first properly elected parliament in Albania. Pearson (2007: 180) also finds that in December 1921 Aqif Pasha Elbasani and his supporters engineered a coup d'état, leading to the collapse of Pandeli Evangjeli's government. Only days later, Ahmet Zog marched toward Tirana and, over the next time, seized more and more control over parliament.<sup>43</sup> In 1922, Prime Minister Zog formed a robust coalition government amidst frequent crises and shifts caused by unstable parliamentary factions (Nève 2010). Based on our observations,

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<sup>38</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Albania/Collapse-of-communism>

<sup>39</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian\\_occupation\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_occupation_of_Albania)

<sup>40</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_War\\_I\\_in\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_in_Albania)

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Albania.htm>

<sup>42</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1921\\_Albanian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1921_Albanian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>43</sup> See the country report on Albania by Vanderbilt within the CHISOLS dataset.



multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/24/1924 Continuation Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: Ahmet Zog took control following an armed rebellion supported by Yugoslavia in December 1924. Formerly the commander-in-chief of the armed forces until December 1921, he assumed the roles of minister of the interior and prime minister the following year. On this date, he ousted the government of Fan Noli, declaring himself president on 01/31/1925 and acquiring dictatorial powers. The Albanian Republic was proclaimed. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1924, from 1925 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held. In accordance with LIED's observations, elections during this time were not competitive. Since 1921, V-Dem's EF&FI scored the freedom and fairness of Albanian elections as ambiguous. For the time after Zog's declaration, the EF&FI scores what we interpret as ambiguous freedom and fairness under his rule. The same goes for the CEI, which previously scored the cleanliness of elections as not existent for the whole regime period. LIED classifies political liberties as absent and according to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1925, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. During the rest of this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

09/01/1928 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date Zog crowned himself king without any royal connections. In this way "King" Zog is a case similar to self-proclaimed "Emperor" Jean-Bédél Bokassa in Central Africa. The ruling elite did not change between the time when Ahmed Muhtar bey Zogolli, taking the name Ahmet Zog, was president and when he crowned himself king (Swire 1937: 92, 94-95, Lentz 1999: 13, Austin 2012: 92, 94-95, Mëhilli 2017: 17). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. While the partially elected parliament remained and had the power to elect a prime minister, we agree with Polity's assessment, that Zog operated with de facto unlimited authoritarian control. For this reason, we classify legislative elections as present and executive elections as absent in this period, contradicting the observations of LIED. According to LIED executive and

legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. For 1929-1937, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1938 and 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI for the whole regime period.

04/07/1939 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, before the outbreak of World War II, Fascist Italy invaded and rapidly overrun and occupied Albania. Its ruler King Zog I went into exile in neighboring Greece, and the country was made a part of the Italian Empire as a protectorate in personal union with the Italian Crown.” (Mëhilli 2017: 17, Casey et al. 2020: 1-2).<sup>44</sup> No political liberties were present (V-Dem PCLI, LIED). The regime is a borderline case between being part of another country and an occupation regime. Parliament and the Albanian Fascist Party “held nominal power in Albania” in this period.<sup>45</sup> According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not multiparty. For 1940-1942, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1943, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/08/1943 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: After the armistice and the Italian exit from the Axis, German military forces entered Albania and it came under German occupation, creating the client-state, the Albanian Kingdom.<sup>46</sup> Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

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<sup>44</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian\\_invasion\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_invasion_of_Albania)

<sup>45</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian\\_Fascist\\_Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albanian_Fascist_Party)

<sup>46</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_occupation\\_of\\_Albania](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_occupation_of_Albania)

11/29/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date the last German forces expelled, and the Albanian state was re-established after Italian/German occupation. A provisional government under the leadership Enver Hoxha of the leader of the Communist Party of Albania took over power after the liberation of the country from German forces. In non-competitive elections on 12/02/1945 voters were presented a single list from the Democratic Front, which was organized by the Communist Party of Albania, which consequently won all seats in the parliament. From the start the regime was communist. However, the elections on 12/02/1945 were the first Albanian women could vote in.<sup>47</sup> On 01/11/1946 Albania was renamed in the People's Republic of Albania.<sup>48</sup> On 12/28/1976 Albania became the People's Socialist Republic of Albania (Sudetic 1994, Pearson 2006:221). The government of Albania rejected all other Communist nations, including China, as "revisionist" traitors to true communism. The Hoxha Regime was marked by systematic terror, repression, and violation of human rights. There existed no freedom of speech, movement and especially religious people were persecuted.<sup>49</sup> In 1976 the communist party declared Albania to be the first atheist state in the world.<sup>50</sup> Hoxha ruled until his death in 1985.<sup>51</sup> The People's Republic of Albania was marked by extreme isolationism, rigid state control, and the suppression of political liberties. Freedom of speech, assembly, and association were entirely restricted, with the ruling Party of Labour of Albania maintaining absolute power. Minority groups, including ethnic Greeks and others, had minimal political representation and faced systemic discrimination. The regime implemented strict surveillance and repression to eliminate any dissent, leading to widespread human rights violations. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties are classified by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI as not present. Hoxha was succeeded by Ramiz Alia as first secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor. On 12/11/1990, opposition parties were legalized. On 12/12/1990, the oppositional Democratic Party (PDS), was formed (Marshall 2018a). Until 1989, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In 1990, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's

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<sup>47</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>48</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver\\_Hoxha](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enver_Hoxha)

<sup>49</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/albania/166.htm>

<sup>50</sup> <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/28/how-albania-became-the-worlds-first-atheist-country/>

<sup>51</sup> <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/al-history-55.htm>

JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

03/31/1991 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the first parliamentary multi-party elections since 1923 were held. However, the communist party, the Albanian Party of Labor, dominated the system to an extent that the elections cannot be characterized as free and fair. The result was a landslide victory for the communist Party of Labour, which won 169 of the 250 seats.<sup>52</sup> The oppositional PDS was not competitive in elections given the brief period to organize for elections and government denial of competitive access to state-controlled media; it boycotted the opening session of the legislature in April 1991. LIED affirms that the election was not competitive. Moreover, V-Dem's CEI score indicates not really clean elections and the EF&FI signals according to our interpretation not really free and fair elections. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. Beginning in May 1991, hundreds of thousands of citizens participated in strikes and demonstrations to demand that the communists step down. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

06/01/1991 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date, the Communist-dominated National Assembly resigned in response to a popular uprising. Power was transferred to a coalition government to handle the transition, and Alia's loss of all but formal power. The transitional government led by the opposition established a new electoral law in February 1992 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39-40).<sup>53</sup> According to FH, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8 and falls under the rather not free category in our interpretation. In this period of transition, we classify multiparty, executive and legislative elections as absent, which contradicts the observations of LIED. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. However, this seems to be a miscoding since such elections only took place on 03/22/1992. Political liberties were still classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the

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<sup>52</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Albanian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Albanian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>53</sup> <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/al-history-55.htm>;

<https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/albanians-force-out-communist-government-1991>

executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

03/22/1992 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, multiparty elections were held.<sup>54</sup> There were few reports of irregularities and fraud in the parliamentary elections. The opposition Democratic Party won a majority of the seats, defeating the Socialist (formerly the Communist) Party. However, there were reports on infringing on the rights of the Socialist Party through harassment, detentions and the withholding of food aid to areas where Socialists won in the year's local elections. According to FH, the country is classified as partly free during this period, scoring between 6 and 7 and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive. However, V-Dem's EF&FI scores the countries electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not clean. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1993, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1994-1996, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In this period the regime was a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

05/26/1996 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Elections on this date were considered by observers as not meeting the standards of free and fair elections. However, the regime change was an event that marked the tipping point of a gradual autocratization over time. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. 1996 is the only year after 1992, where LIED does not categorize the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score the elections as not really free, fair or clean. Almost all opposition parties boycotted the second round of the elections. The PDS gained almost 90 % of seats in the legislature. Albania became almost a one-party state under President Berisha. At the following parliamentary elections on 06/29/1997 the norms for free and fair elections were also not met. FH categorizes Albania as partly free until 1997 with a score of 8 and falls under the rather not free category in our interpretation. Subsequently, the country is

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<sup>54</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Albanian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Albanian_parliamentary_election)

classified as not free until 2000, with a score between 9 and 10 which is categorized as rather not free in our framework. From 2001 onwards the country scores between 6 and 7 as partly free and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present until 1998 and as present from 1999 onward. LIED classifies political liberties as absent. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. An exception is the year 2003, where V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. While the regime in the period is classified as an electoral hybrid regime it is a borderline case between an electoral autocracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

07/03/2005 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: The 2005 parliamentary elections in Albania marked an improvement in the quality of elections compared to previous years. Per FH's classification, the country scores between 6 and 7 as partly free and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI first entered the range of ambiguous cleanliness in 2005 and has remained at this level since. EF&FI also improved from 2005, moving up to somewhat free and fair elections. These elections were seen as a significant step forward, with the opposition Democratic Party winning the majority. International observers, including the OSCE, noted improvements in the electoral process, such as better adherence to democratic standards and a reduction in the level of irregularities compared to earlier elections. However, the elections were not without issues, as serious concerns remained regarding the transparency and fairness of the process. Since 2011 elections in Albania are rated as competitive, free and fair with no considerable restrictions on political parties by the BTI.<sup>55</sup> However, the electoral process in Albania is deeply flawed. Nevertheless, according to LIED electoral competitiveness is given. However, CEI and EF&FI remained on the same level as mentioned above. Procedural irregularities increasingly exacerbate the contestation of results by the losing parties, leading to political distrust between the parties, political stalemate "Parliamentary activities are affected by the opposition relinquishing their mandates" and

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<sup>55</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ALB#pos4>

incidents of electoral violence (Lansford 2021).<sup>56</sup> Amendments of the Electoral Code in 2020, to further regulate the electoral process did not show any improvement. Instead, they permitted party leaders to contest parliamentary elections in as many as four districts simultaneously, providing them with an unjust advantage in comparison to other candidates.<sup>57</sup> As such, the electoral campaigns have become an arena for electoral violence and political polarization: For example, the 2021 multiparty elections led to incidents of public intimidation, injuries, even fatalities and incidents of electoral violence (Lansford 2021).<sup>58</sup> According to LIED, political liberties were absent in this regime period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For 2006-2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In 2023 our classification of V-Dem's LCE changes to "robust".

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Fischer 2006, Lansford 2015, Lansford 2021, Nève 2010, Osterberg-Kaufmann 2011, Pano 1968, Pano 1988, Pano 2009, Pearson 2006, Schmidt-Neke 2002, Skendi 1954, Sudetic 1994, Zickel/Iwaskiw 1992)

## Algeria

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 11/04/1848]: Prior to French occupation on 11/04/1848 Algeria was a semi-autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire (Choi 2016, Barclay/Chopin/Evans 2018). The Tafna Treaty promised Arab leader Abd'el Qadir control of the interior in exchange of recognizing French presence, but later France gradually annexed Algeria and made it officially a part of France in 1848 (Choi 2016, Barclay/Chopin/Evans 2018). Algeria was integrated into the administrative apparatus of the French state in 1848 under the auspices of a governor general, who reported back to the French Ministry of the Interior (Choi 2016, Barclay/Chopin/Evans 2018, Roberts 1986). This period is therefore coded as a direct rule colonial regime, instead of indirect rule.

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<sup>56</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ALB#pos4>

<sup>57</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>58</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/freedom-world/2022>; <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/ALB#pos4>

As agreed by the Tafna Treaty, Muslim Algerians had the status of non-citizens without self-government nor representation in government. They were ruled by French mayors and administrators who even handled matters of Muslim law (Roberts 1986). From the start of French colonial rule, so also for our start date on 01/01/1900, until 1903 Pacification of Algeria took place as a series of military operations after the French conquest of the Regency of Algiers that aimed to put an end to various tribal rebellions, razzias and massacres of French settlers that were held in the Algerian countryside. French forces engaged in a scorched earth policy against the Algerian population.<sup>59</sup> Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent for this period. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

11/10/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On 11/10/1946, French multiparty legislative elections were held in Algeria, introducing male suffrage (LIED).<sup>60</sup> Until independence, the EF&FI by V-Dem scores elections in Algeria's either not or ambiguously free and fair. Their CEI scores the elections consistently as not clean in this period. Political liberties were absent for this period according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1952 and no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1953. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

11/01/1954 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the National Liberation Front (FLN) initiated an armed struggle against French rule, marking the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence. During this period, political liberties were effectively suspended, and the colonial regime intensified direct military and administrative control. V-Dem's PCLI and LIED confirm the absence of political liberties for this period. The indigenous population's participation in governance was severely restricted, reverting Algeria back to direct rule until independence. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1954, in 1955 and 1956 only multiparty legislative elections were held, from 1957 to 1961 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For 1955-1956, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited,

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<sup>59</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacification\\_of\\_Algeria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacification_of_Algeria)

<sup>60</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November\\_1946\\_French\\_legislative\\_election\\_in\\_Algeria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_1946_French_legislative_election_in_Algeria)



while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. During the years 1957-1961, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

07/05/1962 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy [as independent country]: On 09/19/1958 the Algerian Republic was proclaimed. On 07/03/1962 French President Charles De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country and on 18/03/1963 a peace treaty was signed (Evian Accord).<sup>61</sup> However, 07/05 became a national holiday as Independence Day (Jackson 1977: 55-56, 70-73, 104, Marshall 2018b, Casey et al. 2020: 58). The FLN, which had led the fight for independence and established a provisional government, seized power among a chaotic transition (near civil war). The non-electoral transitional one-party regime became permanent. On its independence from France, Algeria granted equal voting rights to all men and women.<sup>62</sup> On 08/08/1962 a political crisis between Benkhedda and the more popular Ben Bella sparked a violent civil war which was resolved by the forced resignation of Benkhedda. On 09/25/1962 Algeria became the People's Democratic Algerian Republic. In the 1962 Algerian Constituent Assembly elections a single list of 196 National Liberation Front (FLN) candidates was put to voters to approve. Following the mass exodus of many Europeans in 1962, the FLN regime undertook extensive confiscation of property, including farms, homes, and businesses. (Casey et al. 2020: 59, Ruedy 2005: 198-99). Throughout his term, Ben Bella faced political conflicts with past leaders of the FLN, such as Mohammed Khider, Ferhat Abbas, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Hocine Aït Ahmed. Ahmed established the Front des Forces Socialistes (Socialist Forces Front) (FFS) as a means to oppose Ben Bella, and the remaining leaders joined in response to their dissatisfaction with Ben Bella's autocratic leadership.<sup>63</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Presidential elections, albeit unfree and -fair, were held in 1963. Therefore, based on our observations, only executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties remained absent per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI.

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<sup>61</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89vian\\_Accords](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89vian_Accords)

<sup>62</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>63</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed\\_Ben\\_Bella](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Ben_Bella)

According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

06/19/1965 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Houari Boumédiène overthrew Ben Bella's government on this date. Before the coup, Boumédiène was minister of defense and vice president in the government. Boumédiène took over the power as Chairman of a 26-member Revolutionary Council, eliminated the constitution and the institutions emplaced by the previous regime.<sup>64</sup> In 1976, his administration promulgated a National Charter and subsequently introduced a new constitution, both ratified through a referendum.<sup>65</sup> The document reaffirmed socialism as the unequivocal choice of the Algerian people and affirmed the exclusive legitimacy of the socialist party. On 12/29/1976, the president issued an executive order specifying principles and procedures for electing the Assembly. It seems this regime change has been overlooked by (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40). This explains the misclassification as a party regime. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties remained absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

06/27/1976 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date the referendum committed Algeria to socialism adapted to third-world conditions. It was, officially, approved by 98.4% of voters. While the regime elite was the same the legitimation of the regime became significantly different through this act. Until Algeria was a one-party state, with only the National Liberation Front being authorized as a political group. Since then, political parties have been allowed to form, but have faced restrictions and have needed to obtain government permits to operate legally (Lansford 2015). Both the EF&FI and CEI of V-Dem score elections during this time as not really free, fair or clean. Political liberties were absent for the entire period according to LIED, and did not really exist afterwards. V-Dem's PCLI is classified by

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<sup>64</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965\\_Algerian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Algerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Houari-Boumediene>

us as absent until 1988 and as not really present in 1989. From 1990 to 1992 the state of political liberties is classified as ambiguous by V-Dem PCLI. Until 1988, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Since 1989, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1977, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. During the years 1978-1988, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1989-1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. While presidential and legislative elections took place in 1976, pluralism and participation were heavily restricted. According to LIED only executive elections were held in 1976 and executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held from 1977 onward.

01/11/1992 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Concerned with the results of the national election which favored the Islamists, the military hindered the election. Benjedid was ousted. The High Council of State became the ruling body and the constitution was suspended (Metz 1994, Ruedy 2005:256,260).<sup>66</sup> While the military constituted a crucial support base for the regime prior to 1992, the following era is recognized as distinct due to the initial years post-coup, during which the FLN - the previously dominant party - was sidelined from exerting influence and holding office (Toth 1994, Bouandel 2003, Ruedy 2005:256,260, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40). On 07/02/1992, after the assassination of the nominal civilian head of government, the effective ruling power, the High State Committee military junta, emerged as the effective ruler by appointing General Nazzar as its figurehead and new effective leader of Algeria. Between 1992 and 1994, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Since 1995, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1992 to 1994, in 1995 and 1996 only executive elections were held. According to FH, the country is classified as not free during this period, scoring between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category

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<sup>66</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High\\_Council\\_of\\_State\\_\(Algeria\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Council_of_State_(Algeria))

in our interpretation. Political liberties remained absent according to LIED and ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

06/05/1997 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: A referendum was held on 11/28/1996. A new constitution was approved. It permitted political parties, but not if based on a separatist feature such as race, religion, sex, language or region (Lansford 2021:93). On 06/05/1997 elections took place, which cannot be considered free and fair.<sup>67</sup> After four consecutive terms, the loss of military backing played a significant role in Abdelaziz Bouteflika's resignation in 2019 after facing large popular protests (Hirak movement) (Lansford 2021).<sup>68</sup> He was replaced by Abdelkader Bensalah on an interim basis, however due to the influence of the military, army chief of staff General Ahmed Gaïd Salah was considered the de facto leader.<sup>69</sup> Before the elections in December five candidates were presented by the newly established National Authorities for Elections (ANIE) which had notably all served as ministers in Bouteflika's cabinet. Protests called for a different selection, and Bensalah met them with crackdowns and mass arrests. The elections were won by former prime minister Abdelmadjid Tebboune in an election with a turnout rate between 20 and 40%.<sup>70</sup> The army chief of staff continues to wield considerable influence under his presidency.<sup>71</sup> While a constitutional reform package intending to address some demands of the protest movement was passed in 2020 with 67% of voters participating, turnout was as low as 24%. Protest groups such as protesters for the autonomy of Kabylie region were criminalized and labeled terrorists.<sup>72</sup> The government continues to enforce laws threatening media freedom and restricting civil liberties, with protesters and journalists regularly facing arrests and prosecution.<sup>73</sup> FH classified Algeria as not free every year except from 1988 to 1990 when it classified the country as partly free. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores fluctuate between being ambiguous, not really free and fair and not at all free and fair. V-Dem's CEI consistently scores election as not really clean since 1997. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score

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<sup>67</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997\\_Algerian\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Algerian_legislative_election)

<sup>68</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President\\_of\\_Algeria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Algeria)

<sup>69</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2020>

<sup>70</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2020>

<sup>71</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>72</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/algeria>

<sup>73</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/algeria/freedom-world/2021>

between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 2020 and as not really present afterwards. According to LIED political freedoms were absent. Until 2003, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Afterwards, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the year 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Electoral (Military) Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Axtmann 1999, Bouandel 2003, Choi 2016, Lansford 2012a, Lorch/Bunk 2016, Moore 1970, Ruedy 2005, Toth 1994)

## **Andorra**

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [being jointly ruled by two external rulers from France and Spain] [Start: 09/07/1278]: Andorra was formally ruled as a constitutional monarchy during this period. Andorra was founded on 09/07/1278 by means of a treaty between the Bishop of Urgell and the Count of Foix.<sup>74</sup> In this period there were no multiparty legislative elections (LIED). LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem doesn't list Andorra. De facto in the period from 1900 on Andorra was jointly ruled by representatives of France and Spain, this circumstance also applies to our start date on 01/01/1900. Hence, it is a borderline case between a de facto joint colony/part of France and Spain and a ruling monarchy. While there was a council of representatives at the time, they were not elected. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

08/31/1933 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [being jointly ruled by two external rulers from France and Spain]/Start (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [being jointly ruled by two external rulers from France and Spain]: On this day the first parliamentary elections under universal male suffrage were held.<sup>75</sup> This was partially the result of a coup d'état

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<sup>74</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-Princes\\_of\\_Andorra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-Princes_of_Andorra)

<sup>75</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933\\_Andorran\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933_Andorran_parliamentary_election)

carried out by the so-called Young Andorrans.<sup>76</sup> Two opposing parties ran in the elections: The Unió Andorrana, a political party founded by the Young Andorrans, and the Integral Nationalist Group. The latter won with a vast majority of votes which brought an end to the Andorran revolution and kept the co-principality in place.<sup>77</sup> On 04/23/1970 Andorran women gained the right to vote.<sup>78</sup> However, no political parties were allowed to run in the elections. During an institutional reform process in 1982 the office of prime minister was created. The first prime minister was Òscar Ribas Reig.<sup>79</sup> FH provides data for the period between 1972 and 1976. Based on this data, FH classifies the country as partly free in 1972, with a score between 6 and 7, which is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. However, from 1973 onward, FH classifies the country as partly free with a score of 8, which falls under the rather not free category in our interpretation. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. The only regime dataset apart from this one that classifies Andorra's regime in this period is LIED. The classification as a one-party autocracy is not convincing, since it clearly was not a one-party regime in this period. According to our classification it has priority to the formal monarchical character of the regime that Andorra was not an independent country until 1993. We would classify it as a complicated form of a joint colony of France and Spain. Based on our observations, only executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

12/12/1993 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [being jointly ruled by two external rulers from France and Spain]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as joint protectorate of France and Spain]: A constitutional referendum was held concerning a draft constitution agreed upon by the co-princes. The draft included the separation of powers, parliamentary rule, civil and human rights.<sup>80</sup> The proposal was approved by 74% of the voters and enabled the parliamentary elections in the same year.<sup>81</sup> On 12/12/1993 the first free and fair parliamentary elections since gaining full sovereignty took place. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during since 1993, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties have been present since 1993 according to LIED. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. V-Dem's PCLI does not provide

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<sup>76</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andorran\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andorran_Revolution)

<sup>77</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andorran\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andorran_Revolution)

<sup>78</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/24/archives/the-women-of-andorra-receive-right-to-vote.html>

<sup>79</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%92scar\\_Ribas\\_Reig](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%92scar_Ribas_Reig)

<sup>80</sup> <https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ad011993>

<sup>81</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Andorran\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Andorran_constitutional_referendum);  
<https://history.state.gov/countries/andorra>

data for Andorra. However, amid unique circumstances as Andorran citizens constitute a minority within Andorra, leaving almost two thirds of the population without political representation.<sup>82</sup> Therefore, Andorra is only considered to be a defective democracy. Currently, the Bishop of Urgell and the president of France serve as co-princes.<sup>83</sup> Officially, the co-princes are the heads of state, however, de facto power lies with the head of government. The co-princes hold veto power concerning international treaties.<sup>84</sup> Since 12/12/1993 the government was authorized to generate income through taxation, establish an independent judiciary, grant citizens the freedom to establish political parties and trade unions, and manage foreign policy and participation in international organizations. The coprinces retained their constitutional roles as heads of state, primarily in a ceremonial capacity.<sup>85</sup> Andorra has since 1993 experienced regular peaceful transfers of power and held fair and free parliamentary elections in 2023. Nonetheless, while civil liberties and political rights are well established, more than 50% of the population are non-citizens and are thereby not eligible to vote.<sup>86</sup> Therefore, we classify the democracy as defective.

Defective Democracy [as joint protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy and Spain, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Marxer/Pállinger 2009, Mickoleit 2010)

## Angola

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 02/01/1575]: From 02/01/1575 on, Portuguese settlers gradually occupied the territories along the African west coast. In the 1900s, as on our start date on 01/01/1900, the colonial economy expanded despite domestic unrest.<sup>87</sup> Policies of civil administration in the colony were introduced by a governor general between 1907 and 1910. Colonial rule increasingly ensured a high dependence of Angola on metropolitan Portugal insofar that Lisbon held wide-ranging control over its colony (Oliver/Sanderson 2004). Portugal's approach to Angola during the 1930s and 1940s centered on the concept of national integration. In terms of economy, society,

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<sup>82</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Andorran\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Andorran_parliamentary_election);  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra\\_1993?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra_1993?lang=en)

<sup>83</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-Princes\\_of\\_Andorra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Co-Princes_of_Andorra)

<sup>84</sup> <https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ad011993>

<sup>85</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Andorra>

<sup>86</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/andorra/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>87</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900s\\_in\\_Angola](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900s_in_Angola)

and politics, the goal was for Angola to be seamlessly incorporated into the Portuguese nation (Roth 1979). There was no form of self-government through elections (LIED). Although nominal legislative bodies existed, they were dominated by Portuguese settlers and did not provide genuine representation for the indigenous population. Voting rights were restricted by literacy and property qualifications, effectively excluding most Angolans. In addition, the colonial parliament had little influence over policies, which were determined by the Portuguese government. Hence, any semblance of a parliament was a façade, and the colonial power ruled directly. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. This period is thus coded as direct colonial rule. Until the year 1972, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1973-1975 V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Angola became a Portuguese overseas province in 1953, while Liberation movements began forming in the late 1950s (Kaplan 1979). A civil war started when the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) started a guerrilla campaign against Portuguese rule on several fronts. They also fought with each other after the 1974 coup in Portugal (Kaplan 1979). On 10/23/1975, South Africa intervened in Angola (Dobert 1979, Oliver/Sanderson 2004, Keltie 2014b, Roth 1979, Kaplan 1979). Based on our observations, no multiparty, executive or legislative elections were held during this period, in accordance with the observations of LIED. The only exception are brief and limited legislative elections held in 1973 after the Portuguese passed the Organic Law for overseas territories, leading up to the civil war in 1975. Thus, in accordance with LIED, we classify legislative elections present in that two-year period.

11/11/1975 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Liberal Democracy]/Start No Central Authority: On this date, independence from Portugal was declared. This marked the beginning of the Angolan Civil War.<sup>88</sup> Following the Alvor Agreement<sup>89</sup>, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA agreed to a transitional government with equal representation and left Angola run by a provisional independence government headed by the leftist MPLA during the lead up to independence. The US-backed rightist and nationalist National Front for the Liberation of Angola insurgents broke the Alvor Agreement cease fire and drove the provisional Government

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<sup>88</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan\\_Civil\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War)

<sup>89</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvor\\_Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvor_Agreement)



out. Hence, at the date of independence Angola had no self-government to receive control from the Portuguese: High Commissioner Admiral Leonel Cardoso declined to relinquish power to the MPLA and opted to grant independence to the people of Angola. In response, the MPLA declared the establishment of its government in Luanda, naming the controlled territory the People's Republic of Angola. Meanwhile, FNLA and UNITA declared a distinct regime, headquartered in the southern city of Huambo, designating their territory as the Democratic People's Republic of Angola (Dobert 1979, Warner 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40). Universal suffrage was introduced with independence.<sup>90</sup> The MPLA was backed by the Soviet-Union and Cuba in the civil war (Valenta 1978). Political liberties remained absent (V-Dem PCLI, LIED). For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Based on our observations, no multiparty, executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

01/02/1976 End No Central Authority/Start Communist Ideocracy: After months of civil war, the MPLA established its rule over the entire country. After taking power, the MPLA set out to radically transform Angolan agriculture through villagization and collectivization of peasant farmers. Nationalization of property and companies began in 1976 within a year of taking power (Heywood 2000: 205-7, Scott 1988, Somerville 1984, Zafiris 1982, Casey et al. 2020: 60). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Moreover, following LIED and V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were still not present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. President Agostinho Neto died in 1979. In 1980 the members for the People's Assembly were elected, with the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as the sole legal party. José Eduardo dos Santos was elected as the 2nd president of Angola by the People's Assembly in 1980. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1978, in 1979 only executive elections were held, from 1980 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty were held.

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<sup>90</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Angola](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Angola)

11/09/1990 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (One-Party) Regime: On this date, the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly passed a resolution which established a commission tasked with the revision of the Angolan constitution (Amnesty International 1991). The new constitution was to abolish the one-party state and include elections and participation by all.<sup>91</sup> In April 1991 the MPLA denounced Marxism-Leninism in favor of social democracy.<sup>92</sup> On 05/06/1991, the National Assembly amended the constitution by passing law 12/91 which was aimed at eradicating the one-party state (Assembleia Nacional de Angola 1991). Per FH, Angola is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. In 1991 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free and is categorized as rather not free in our interpretation. No political liberties existed until 1991 per V-Dem's PCLI and are classified as not really present in 1992. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED considers political liberties as absent for the entire time. On 08/25/1992, constitutional revisions were enacted, the country was renamed Republic of Angola and all explicitly Marxist elements (including the words People's or Popular) were removed from the constitution and from the names of institutions (Lea/Rowe 2001, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40).<sup>93</sup> Based on our observations, executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were present during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED.

09/29/1992 End Non-Electoral Transitional (One-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Parliamentary elections on this date were endorsed by foreign observers and the UN as free and fair.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, an official observer reported that there was very little UN supervision, around 500.000 UNITA voters had been disenfranchised and there had been over 100 clandestine polling stations.<sup>95</sup> In the presidential elections the MPLA's José Dos Santos won 49.6% of the vote and UNITA's Jonas Savimbi 40.7%. The second round of elections never took place because Savimbi rejected the results as fraudulent. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were not competitive. Moreover, V-Dem's CEI indicates no clean elections. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the freedom and fairness of

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<sup>91</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Angola/Independence-and-civil-war>

<sup>92</sup> <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-timeline-events>

<sup>93</sup> <https://constitutionnet.org/country/angola>

<sup>94</sup> <https://www.eisa.org/wep/angoverview9.htm>

<sup>95</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan\\_Civil\\_War#1990s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War#1990s)

this election as ambiguous. Political liberties are absent in 1992 per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI.

10/31/1992 End Electoral Autocracy/Start No Central Authority: On this date, government troops attacked UNITA in Luanda.<sup>96</sup> A brutal war between the two camps followed. While the capital and parts of the territory were under the control of the MPLA, UNITA controlled the rest of the country.<sup>97</sup> In almost all datasets this period is classified as a multiparty autocracy (e.g. HWF, MCM). This is a misclassification. Parts of the country were ruled by one party, while the rest of the country was ruled by the opposing party. This does definitely not constitute a multiparty regime. However, an alternative approach from the coding as no central authority would be to code the regime in the MPLA and UNITA controlled territories separately as one-party regimes. In accordance with FH, the country is designated as not free, with a score between 11 and 14, and is thus categorized as not free in our analysis. Political liberties remained absent per LIED and not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Therefore, while the People's Assembly and the elected President continued their terms, the period cannot be classified as multiparty. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

11/20/1994 End No Central Authority/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (One-Party) Regime: On this date, the Lusaka Protocol was negotiated and signed in Lusaa, Zambia. It was a second peace agreement, similar to the Alvor Agreement of 1975. The accord aimed to bring peace between the Angolan government and the rebel group UNITA. As part of the agreement, former UNITA insurgents were to be integrated into the government and armed forces. UNITA was to be disarmed and demobilized. The agreement awarded UNITA politicians homes and offices. The agreement additionally created a joint commission consisting of officials from the Angolan Government, UNITA and the UN including the governments of Portugal, the United States and Russia in order to oversee the implementation of the protocol. All in all, the protocol integrated UNITA into a coalition government.<sup>98</sup> MONUA and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III spent \$1.5 billion on the oversight of the implementation. Nevertheless, the provisions aimed at the prevention of armed UNITA forces were largely disobeyed. Both the government and UNITA continued buying arms from abroad.<sup>99</sup> However, localized incidents

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<sup>96</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan\\_Civil\\_War#1990s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War#1990s)

<sup>97</sup> <https://www.eisa.org/wep/angoverview9.htm>

<sup>98</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lusaka\\_Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lusaka_Protocol)

<sup>99</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lusaka\\_Protocol#Implementation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lusaka_Protocol#Implementation)

of violence and fighting resumed in 1995. Nevertheless, this period is coded as non-electoral transitional [one-party] regime and not as “no central authority” because overall, the cease fire was respected. The period following the Lusaka Protocol saw attempts at creating a coalition government, integrating UNITA into the political framework. This integration, including the provision of homes and offices for UNITA politicians and the creation of a joint commission, indicates an effort towards a transitional regime rather than a one-party autocracy by MPLA. The presence of international oversight, including the United Nations and other foreign governments, further suggests a transitional nature. It can be considered as an attempt at a transition to peace with an integrated coalition government. After an incident, where UNITA fighters shot down a government helicopter in March 1995 dos Santos and Savimbi met four times to secure the peace. Dos Santos offered the vice-presidency to Savimbi on each of these occasions. Savimbi declined the vice-presidency that was offered to him and again renewed fighting on 12/04/1998.<sup>100</sup> The Angolan military launched a large-scale offensive in 1999, which resulted in the destruction of UNITA’s conventional military capabilities and the recapture of major cities previously held by Savimbi’s forces. Following this, Savimbi declared that UNITA would resort to guerrilla tactics, causing continued turmoil throughout the country.<sup>101</sup> On 04/04/2002 a ceasefire between UNITA and the MPLA was negotiated after government troops had killed Jonas Savimbi (UNITA) and on 02/22/2002. UNITA’s new leadership declared the rebel group a political party and officially demobilized its armed forces in August 2002. The civil war ended.<sup>102</sup> Nevertheless, the government had to deal with separatist movements in the oil-rich region of Cabinda, a conflict which intensified in 2004. A peace agreement was reached in 2006.<sup>103</sup> While the political situation in Angola started to stabilize, it was not until the 2008 elections that regular electoral processes were fully established in the country.<sup>104</sup> Between 09/29&30/1992 and 09/06/2008 there have been no elections in Angola. Hence, it seems problematic that LIED, MCM and AF classify the regime as multiparty/electoral. The political process was dominated from the violent conflict between MPLA and UNITA. However, the regime was non-electoral and apart from a short period the MPLA ruled alone. While the legitimation of power came largely from the transitional aspect this arrangement de facto failed. In accordance with FH, the country is designated as not free,

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<sup>100</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lusaka\\_Protocol#Implementation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lusaka_Protocol#Implementation);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan\\_Civil\\_War#1990s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War#1990s); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonas\\_Savimbi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonas_Savimbi)

<sup>101</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Angola](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Angola)

<sup>102</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan\\_Civil\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Civil_War)

<sup>103</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Angola/Independence-and-civil-war>

<sup>104</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola>

with a score between 11 and 14, and is thus categorized as not free in our analysis. After 2002, we interpret V-Dem's PCLI as reflecting an ambiguous situation regarding political liberties. LIED still codes them as absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Given the absence of regular elections in this period, based on our observations no multiparty, executive or legislative elections were present during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

09/06/2008 End Non-Electoral Transitional (One-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the first elections since the end of the civil war were held, securing the MPLA's hegemony with 82% of the vote (Roque 2009). In 2010, direct presidential elections were abolished by the constitution, instead the leader of the national list of the political party that gets the highest outcome is entitled to the Presidency, without any confirmation process by the elected legislature. The powers of the president are broad and the parliament is very weak, acting "largely as a rubber stamp in approving the president's policies".<sup>105</sup> The country has been ruled by the same party (MPLA) since independence in 1975 "and the president is expected to consult routinely with the party's political bureau."<sup>106</sup> Although a multiparty electoral system exists since 1991, the regulation of political parties is very strict (Lansford 2015). There was no transition of power to the opposition until the most recent elections on 08/24/2022 and although parliamentary elections are held regularly, they are neither free nor fair. Government authorities have consistently suppressed political dissent. Corruption, violations of due process, and misconduct by security forces persist as prevalent issues.<sup>107</sup> Angola was at rank #121 out of 180 in the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2023.<sup>108</sup> Based on our observations multiparty, executive and legislative elections can at least formally be classified as present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has never classified any election in the country as competitive. While V-Dem's EF&FI classifies the freedom and fairness of elections as ambiguous, the CEI indicates that the elections were not really clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds

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<sup>105</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/angola/freedom-world/2022>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola\\_2010?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010?lang=en)

<sup>106</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/angola/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>107</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/angola/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>108</sup> <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/ago>

to our interpretation of not free. LIED classifies political freedoms as absent for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were ambiguous until 2017 and somewhat present from 2018 onward. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 2009-2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Since the year 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Clemente-Kersten 1999a, Collelo 1989, Dobert 1979, Kaplan 1979, Keltie 2014a, Macmillan 2022, Oliver/Sanderson 2004, Roth 1979)

## **Anguilla**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1650]: Anguilla was first colonized by English settlers from Saint Kitts beginning in 1650.<sup>109</sup> During the colonial period, Anguilla was administered by the British through Antigua. In 1825, it was replaced under the administrative control of nearby Saint Kitts and Nevis as crown colony.<sup>110</sup> This was also the case on our start date of 01/01/1900. On 02/27/1967, British authorities definitively stroke Anguilla to Saint Kitts-Nevis and granted the territory the status of an associated state”, with its own constitution and a considerable degree of self-government. But many Anguillians objected to the continuing political subservience to Saint Kitts<sup>111</sup>.

05/30/1967 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: As a reaction insurgents expelled the Saint Kitts police and installed a “Peace-keeping Committee” as the government on 05/30/1967. The provisional government under Ronald Webster unilaterally seceded Anguilla from St. Kitts-Nevis on 06/16/1967.<sup>112</sup> The provisional government requested United States administration, which was declined.<sup>113</sup> The provisional government and had this actuated by a referendum on

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<sup>109</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anguilla>

<sup>110</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Anguilla](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Anguilla)

<sup>111</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Anguilla](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Anguilla)

<sup>112</sup> <https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=ai011967>

<sup>113</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Anguilla](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Anguilla)

07/11/1967, that was approved by 99,72% of voters. The following day the separation was declared and an independent republic proclaimed, thus known as Anguillan Revolution. The ultimate goal of the Anguillan Revolution was not independence per se, but rather independence from Saint Kitts and Nevis and a return to being a British colony.<sup>114</sup> The new government under Ronald Webster was not recognized by either St. Kitts-Nevis or Great Britain, which was reluctant to interfere in the internal politics of Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla.<sup>115</sup> On 02/06/1969 a constitutional referendum was held.<sup>116</sup> The republican constitution was put forward and approved by 99.71% of voters. On 03/11/1969, the British government sent William Whitlock, a junior minister, as a diplomatic envoy to Anguilla in an effort to resolve the conflict and establish an interim British administration. Whitlock's proposal was rejected in part because of his treatment of the local Anguillans. British troops returned to occupy the island on 03/19/1969.<sup>117</sup>

03/19/1969 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime [as independent country]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]: British authority was restored on 03/19/1969 and Anthony Lee was installed as Her Majesty's Commissioner.<sup>118</sup> British paratroopers stayed on the island until 09/14/1969 to maintain security. Eventually, the islanders were content with the political situation and no more civil strife took place following the operation.<sup>119</sup>

07/10/1971 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]: The restoration of authority was confirmed by the Anguilla Act on 07/10/1971 and placed Anguilla directly under British control.<sup>120</sup>

02/20/1976 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Anguilla was granted a constitution and was finally allowed to formally secede from Saint Kitts and Nevis and become a standalone UK Dependent Territory, following the Anguilla Act. Anguilla operates as an electoral democracy within the framework of the British parliamentary system. Since 2002 Anguilla is a British overseas territory.<sup>121</sup> Universal suffrage

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<sup>114</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anguilla>

<sup>115</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967\\_Anguillian\\_separation\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Anguillian_separation_referendum)

<sup>116</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969\\_Anguillian\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969_Anguillian_constitutional_referendum)

<sup>117</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Sheepskin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sheepskin)

<sup>118</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Anguilla](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Anguilla)

<sup>119</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Sheepskin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sheepskin)

<sup>120</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anguilla-Act>

<sup>121</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anguilla>

is granted to all those aged above 18. Anguilla has a unicameral legislative branch (the House of Assembly). Fair and free elections are held in regular five-year intervals. The judiciary operates independently from the rest of the governing institutions and the British Crown remains the de jure chief of state.<sup>122</sup> On 06/29/2020 general elections were held and won by the Anguilla progressive movement, that secured seven seats while the Anguilla United Front won four seats. This is a significant change to the precedent election in 2015, where the AUF won six out of seven seats, only losing one district to an independent candidate (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 2020). This indicates a competitive political landscape with peaceful transitions of power. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Anguilla. Based on our observations multiparty, executive, legislative elections are present during this period. (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Antigua and Barbuda**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1632]: Antigua and Barbuda were colonized by Great Britain already in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century. It belonged to the British Leeward Islands, which Britain concerned in 1671. Besides Antigua and Barbuda, the Leeward Islands included the British Virgin Islands, Dominica (until 1940), Montserrat and Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla.<sup>123</sup> This division was also current at the time of our start date on 01/01/1900. Governance was conducted by British-appointed officials. A legislative council existed but was largely controlled by the colonial administration. Voting was restricted by property and income qualifications, disenfranchising most of the indigenous population. In addition, the parliament had minimal influence, serving more as an advisory body. LIED only starts to provide data for Antigua since 1951.

12/20/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime: On this date, the first elections under universal adult – male and female - suffrage took place (LIED).<sup>124</sup> However, less than 20% of the population was registered to vote during the 1950s.<sup>125</sup> Antigua and Barbuda boasts a rich legacy of conducting free and fair elections, with three instances culminating in the peaceful transition of governmental authority.<sup>126</sup> On 01/03/1958, the colonial islands were absorbed into the Federation of the West Indies. The Federation was, however,

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<sup>122</sup> <https://www.countryreports.org/country/Anguilla/government.htm>

<sup>123</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_Leeward\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Leeward_Islands)

<sup>124</sup> <http://www.caribbeanelections.com/ag/education/history.asp>

<sup>125</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Antigua\\_and\\_Barbuda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Antigua_and_Barbuda)

<sup>126</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Antigua\\_and\\_Barbuda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Antigua_and_Barbuda)



short lived and disintegrated on 05/31/1962. The parliament gained more influence over internal affairs, and local political leaders emerged. While the colonial governor retained significant powers, the elected parliament played a meaningful role in governance, marking a shift toward indirect rule. The parliament was effective in shaping domestic policies, though foreign affairs and defense remained under British control. Besides, political liberties were absent (LIED). According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period.

02/27/1967 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]: On this date Antigua and Barbuda became a self-governing entity. However, democratic elections took place already on 11/29/1965.<sup>127</sup> In 1969 Antigua joined the West Indies Associated States as an internally self-governing territory (Lansford 2021: 62). On 04/24/1980 general elections took place. They were won by the governing Antigua Labour Party. ALP leader Vere Bird was re-elected as Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda.<sup>128</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were competitive for the entire time. During the 1970s, Antigua witnessed the emergence of an independence movement led by Prime Minister George Walter. Walter advocated for complete independence for the islands and opposed the British plan of independence within a federation of islands. However, in the 1976 legislative elections, Walter was defeated by Vere Bird, who supported regional integration. In 1978, Antigua underwent a significant shift in its stance and announced its desire for independence. The negotiations for autonomy were complicated by Barbuda, which had long been dependent on Antigua but felt economically suppressed by the larger island and sought secession.<sup>129</sup> Political liberties are classified as absent for this period by LIED. V-Dem doesn't list Antigua and Barbuda.

11/01/1981 Continuation (Monarchical) Defective Democracy [as independent country]: On this date Antigua and Barbuda became independent, with Vere Bird as the first prime minister. However, it remained a commonwealth realm, with the British Crown as head of state. The first two decades of Antigua's independence were dominated politically by the Bird family and the ABLP, with Vere Bird ruling from 1981 to 1994, followed by his son Lester Bird from 1994 to 2004. The government was frequently accused of corruption, cronyism and financial

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<sup>127</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Antiguan_general_election)

<sup>128</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Antiguan_general_election)

<sup>129</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Antigua-and-Barbuda>

malfeasance.<sup>130</sup> In the election on 04/17/1984, the ALP swept all the Antiguan seats in the House of Representatives, with Bird forming a new government two days later (Lansford 2021:62). According to FH, the country was classified as free in 1982 with a score between 2 and 4 and subsequently falls under the free category in our analysis. From 1983 to 1990, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, falling under the rather free category in our framework. From 1991 onward, the country scores between 6 and 7 as partly free, and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Moreover, LIED considers the elections as not competitive during this time and regards political liberties as absent during this period. On 03/09/1989 the second elections of Antigua and Barbuda as an independent country were held, which were marred by serious irregularities and fraud (McColm 1992). Therefore, according to LIED electoral competitiveness was absent. Throughout this era, the monopolization of state media by the Bird family significantly obstructed the dissemination of opposition viewpoints and ideologies. Additionally, the ruling party's control over patronage restricted the ability of opposition parties to recruit new members and acquire financial backing. Although the judiciary maintained nominal independence, it faced significant manipulation by the ruling party. Nevertheless, civil liberties were upheld (House 2003). LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. HTW and LIED classified Antigua and Barbuda in the period 1981 to 1989 as a multiparty autocracy<sup>131</sup> in the coding of this dataset, while CGV classified it as a democracy. On 03/23/2004 general elections were held which were won by the oppositional United Progressive Party (UPP) and a peaceful transfer of power took place.<sup>132</sup> Antigua and Barbuda is a democracy that holds regular elections in a multi-party system with universal suffrage. The judiciary is independent from other branches of government<sup>133</sup> In the 2009 election, the UPP secured nine seats while the ALP secured seven seats. Before the election there were reports of irregularities in voter registration and calls for international election observers. Observers from Belize, Canada and Guyana were present for the election. Afterwards, a Judge of the High court nullified the elections of three UPP MPs on the terms of irregularities. This ruling was however overturned by the Supreme Court and the elections deemed correct.<sup>134</sup> In the following election of 2014, the ALP won back

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<sup>130</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1980_Antiguan_general_election);

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua\\_and\\_Barbuda\\_1981?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua_and_Barbuda_1981?lang=en)

<sup>131</sup> Coding rules are similar to the coding rules for an electoral autocracy in this dataset.

<https://ps.au.dk/en/research/research-projects/dedere/datasets>

<sup>132</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Antiguan_general_election)

<sup>133</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Antigua\\_and\\_Barbuda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Antigua_and_Barbuda)

<sup>134</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Antiguan_general_election)

the majority with a landslide victory that saw them win 14 seats while the UPP only won three. The Barbudan-nationalist BDM did not win the seat of Barbuda that it had won previously.<sup>135</sup> In the 2018 election, the ALP called 15 months early elections due to the proclaimed necessity of providing assurance to foreign investors. They improved their result, winning 15 out of 17 seats with the UPP and BDM winning one each. It was also the first election where there were more women elected than men (9/8).<sup>136</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 2004, LIED scored constant competitiveness. The elections held in 2023 marked a resurgence of the UPP with the ALP winning only a slim majority of nine seats. The UPP won seven seats and the BDM one.<sup>137</sup> This indicates that opposition to the ALP government is alive and well. Most regime datasets did not code Antigua and Barbuda due to its small size. In accordance with the findings of FH, Antigua and Barbuda was classified from 2004 on as free with a score between 2 and 4, and thus falls under the free category in our analysis. However, there is an exception between 2009 and 2011, where the country is classified as free with a score of 5 and falls under the rather free category in our interpretation.<sup>138</sup> LIED classified political liberties as absent until 2020 and as present since 2021. Since 2004 the country is a borderline case between a defective and a liberal democracy.

(Monarchical) Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Hillebrands/Schwehm 2005a)

## Argentina

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 07/09/1816]: On 07/09/1816 Argentina declared independence from Spain. Universal male suffrage was instituted in 1853.<sup>139</sup> The Sáenz Peña Law, also known as the General Election Law of 1912, granted universal, secret, and mandatory suffrage to male citizens over the age of 18. This law was a result of a power-sharing agreement between conservative President Roque Sáenz Peña and the UCR (Radical Civic Union) in response to social unrest in 1911/12. While the law confirmed the already existing universal male suffrage, it introduced the significant change of secret voting. The key impact of the pact

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<sup>135</sup> <https://data.ipu.org/parliament/AG/AG-LC01/election/AG-LC01-E20140612/>

<sup>136</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Antiguan_general_election)

<sup>137</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_Antiguan\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Antiguan_general_election)

<sup>138</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/antigua-and-barbuda>

<sup>139</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#)

and the Sáenz Peña Law was the establishment of truly competitive elections, breaking away from the previously prevalent central control and widespread manipulation of elections.<sup>140</sup> Therefore, the period between 1912 and 1930 is often referred to as Argentina's "first experience of liberal representative government" (Rock 1972: 233). Important for the justification of the classification as an electoral oligarchy is that the 'universal' scope of the Sáenz Peña Law only included native men and therefore excluded not only women but male immigrants. In Buenos Aires for example "the non-voting immigrants outnumbered the natives at this time by about 9 to 4" (Rock 1972: 234).<sup>141</sup> The quantitative indicator according to Vanhanen supports the classification. In 1904 only 2%, in 1910 only 2,8% and in 1916 (the first election under Sáenz Peña Law) 8,8% of the population participated (Vanhanen 2019). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections are present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the election as not competitive until 1911. For the remaining years competitiveness was achieved. V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI indicate that the elections were somewhat free and fair as well as clean. Political liberties were somewhat present (V-Dem PCLI). LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1900 to 1912, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

02/04/1916 End Electoral Oligarchy/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date general elections were held under the new rules. Voters elected the President, legislators, and local officials. They were the first secret-ballot presidential elections in the nation's history, they were mandatory and had a turnout of 62.8%. The turnout for the Chamber of Deputies election was 65.9%.<sup>142</sup> The period spanning from 1916 to 1930 in Argentina is known as the Radical Phase (Spanish: Etapa Radical), as it began with the election of the Radical Civic Union candidate Hipólito Yrigoyen, ending the conservative Generation of '80's domination on

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<sup>140</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A1enz\\_Pe%C3%B1a\\_Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A1enz_Pe%C3%B1a_Law);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Argentina\\_\(1916%E2%80%931930\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Argentina_(1916%E2%80%931930))

<sup>141</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A1enz\\_Pe%C3%B1a\\_Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%A1enz_Pe%C3%B1a_Law)

<sup>142</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1916\\_Argentine\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1916_Argentine_general_election)

politics.<sup>143</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections are present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI scores stay at the level of somewhat clean, free and fair elections. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were present. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. The regime is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

09/06/1930 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General José Félix Uriburu overthrew the elected government of President Hipólito Yrigoyen (Radical Civic Union). The coup was supported by the Nacionalistas, a far-right nationalist movement (Lewis 2003: 83f).<sup>144</sup> In this period Uriburu acted as "President of the Provisional Government". He planned to structure the regime along corporatist and fascist lines.<sup>145</sup> However, more traditional forces behind the coup were opposed to this direction. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Regarding the political liberties they were classified as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as being in an ambiguous state according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

11/08/1931 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: On this date elections were held. Justo, supported by a coalition comprising the conservative National Democratic Party, the Independent Socialist Party, and the anti-personalist faction of the Radical Party (later known as the Coalition of Parties for Democracy), ran for president. With the Yrigoyen faction excluded from the elections and its supporters opting for a strategy of "revolutionary abstention," Justo secured a straightforward victory.<sup>146</sup> The regime employed a combination of direct and indirect military control, along with fraudulent elections that effectively prevented opposition candidates from participating, guaranteeing victory for the regime's candidates in election (Rock 1993: 173-74, 177-81, 208, Lentz 1999: 21, Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2013:

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<sup>143</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Argentina\\_\(1916%E2%80%931930\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Argentina_(1916%E2%80%931930))

<sup>144</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9\\_F%C3%A9lix\\_Uriburu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_F%C3%A9lix_Uriburu)

<sup>145</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1930\\_Argentine\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1930_Argentine_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>146</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agust%C3%ADn\\_Pedro\\_Justo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agust%C3%ADn_Pedro_Justo)

131, Finchelstein 2014: 26). Justo's rule was characterized by prioritizing commercial interests, promoting fraud in elections, and implementing significant public works projects. However, the urban and industrialized social landscape of Argentina posed challenges for the ruling Concordance, an alliance dominated by the conservative National Autonomist Party. The Radical Civic Union (Ilsley), led by Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear, emerged as a significant force after its boycott of the 1931 elections. Negotiations between Justo and Alvear resulted in the lifting of the UCR's boycott, and the party achieved victories in various elections, including the election of Amadeo Sabattini as Governor of Córdoba Province.<sup>147</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. The EF&FI and CEI both drop down one level during this era, rating election freedom and fairness as ambiguous and cleanliness as not really present. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. From 1931 to 1932 V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties did not really exist. From 1933 to 1942 political liberties PCLI can be interpreted as an ambiguous state of political liberties (V-Dem PCLI). On 09/05/1937 elections were held. Alvear became the UCR's presidential candidate in 1937, with Enrique Mosca as his running mate. However, Alvear faced opposition from certain progressive factions and failed to secure the endorsement of influential groups like FORJA. Additionally, the resignation of Lisandro de la Torre from the Senate and the prevalence of corruption and impunity further shaped the political climate. Justo, influenced by British commercial interests, nominated Roberto Ortiz as his party's candidate, with Ramón Castillo as his running mate. The elections were marred by intimidation, ballot stuffing, and voter roll tampering, leading to a clear victory for Ortiz. The system of "patriotic fraud" prevalent during the "Infamous Decade" was evident in the 1937 elections, which Governor Manuel Fresco described as one of the most fraudulent in history.<sup>148</sup> LIED as well as V-Dem's EF&FI did not change their scores. At the beginning of this regime period from 1932 until 1936, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. From 1937 to 1942 based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the year 1932, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the period 1934-1942, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as

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<sup>147</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1937\\_Argentine\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1937_Argentine_presidential_election)

<sup>148</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1937\\_Argentine\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1937_Argentine_presidential_election)

indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1943, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are again both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

06/04/1943 End Electoral (Military) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup by ultra-nationalist officers from Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU)<sup>149</sup> led by General Pedro Pablo Ramírez occurred, resulting in the removal of the conservative civilian government and the establishment of a military junta (Rock 1993: 174-75, 221, Levitsky 2003: 38, Finchelstein 2014: 30, Casey et al. 2020: 2, Potash 1996:573, : 40-41Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40).<sup>150</sup> The coup was directed against the corruption and perceived ineffectiveness of the civilian government. The military junta that followed prioritized nationalistic and corporatist policies, which set the stage for the eventual rise of Colonel Juan Perón to power within the government. V-Dem's PCLI scores concerning the political liberties decreased back to not really present, while LIED's outcome stayed absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the years 1944 and 1945, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

02/24/1946 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The Argentine general elections of 1946 were considered to be free and fair. Voters chose both the president and the parliament (Lewis 1990: 98-99).<sup>151</sup> The elections of 1946 were the last in Argentine in which only men were enfranchised. In this election Juan Domingo Perón (Labour Party) became president. The Sáenz Peña Law was amended to include female citizens in 1947 but became effective in 1952.<sup>152</sup> While the 1946 elections were conducted with voters choosing both the president and their legislators, the broader political context included elements of authoritarianism, such as suppression of opposition and control over political life, which leads us to characterize the regime as an electoral hybrid regime. Peron “was bidding for undisputed power, based on the support of the underprivileged laborers and on his popularity and authority

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<sup>149</sup> <https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/GOU>

<sup>150</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1943\\_Argentine\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1943_Argentine_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>151</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_Argentine\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Argentine_general_election)

<sup>152</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

in the army”.<sup>153</sup> However, during his presidency the autocratic elements became more clearly visible. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive. The V-Dem CEI and EF&FI increased again to levels of somewhat cleanliness, freedom and fairness during this period. Political liberties were classified as ambiguous until 1950 according to V-Dem’s PCLI. LIED codes political liberties as absent for this period. Since 1948, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1946, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1947, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

09/28/1951 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the Peronist government, suspended constitutional guarantees and allowed detention without trial. In the months leading up to the November 1951 election, the government intensified its harassment and manipulation tactics against the opposition. By late September, they escalated these efforts by arresting key opposition leaders and soon after excluded opposition deputies from the legislature, solidifying the regime's shift toward autocracy (Ilsley 1952: 229, 240, Potash 1996: 133, Brooker 1995: 175, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40). MCM coded the regime as military because Peron had a prominent military background and inserted military officers into other positions of power as candidates (Magaloni/Chu/Min 2013: 15). According to the coding rules of this dataset the regime does not fulfil the coding rules of a military regime. We also disagree with the classification of CGV of this regime period as democratic. Political liberties were classified as not really existent according to V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. LIED classifies political liberties as absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that

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<sup>153</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juan-Peron>



legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

09/23/1955 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by General Eduardo Lonardi ousted the Peronist government (Potash 1996: 575, Brooker 1995: 181, Lewis 2001: 110-111). Peron fled the country and Lonardi established himself as the head of a military junta.<sup>154</sup> Furthermore, political liberties were still coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present following V-Dem's PCLI. For the years 1956 and 1957, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

02/23/1958 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In the Argentine general election voters chose both the president and their legislators. The election was competitive "but the largest party, the PJ, was banned" (O'Donnell 1973: 166-192, Potash 1996:228, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41), hence, the regime is coded as an electoral autocracy. The military actively wielded veto power over economic policy decisions, ministerial appointments, and prohibited the Peronist Party from participating in elections (O'Donnell 1973: 166-192, Finer 1975: 153, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED again classifies the elections as competitive. The CEI and EF&FI did not change during this time. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat existent for this period. LIED codes political liberties as absent. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

03/29/1962 End Electoral Autocracy/Start (Indirect Rule) Military Autocracy: On this date Army Chief of Staff General Rual Poggi surrounded the presidential palace and arrested President Frondizi. The military dissolved congress and set up a government with José María Guido as the interim president.<sup>155</sup> During Guido's presidency, the military held significant sway, and although he was a civilian, his role was largely to provide a constitutional façade for

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<sup>154</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo\\_Lonardi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_Lonardi)

<sup>155</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Argentina/The-conservative-restoration-and-the-Concordancia-1930-43>

what was effectively military rule. Since, the military in this period named a president to their liking and kept the parliament dissolved the regime is classified as a military autocracy. However, because there was a civilian president it is classified as an indirect rule military regime. LIED still codes political liberties as absent. According to V-Dem's PCLI the state of political liberties can be interpreted as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

07/06/1963 End (Indirect Rule) Military Autocracy/Start (Military) Electoral Autocracy: On this date multiparty executive elections were held. However, the military continued to exert significant political influence, most notably in the enforced ban of the Peronist Party and its leader, Juan Domingo Perón. Arturo Umberto Illia was elected president.<sup>156</sup> On 03/14/1965 multiparty legislative elections were held, with the same official constraints. Despite military pressure on Illia to ban the Popular Union Party as well, which styled itself pro-peronian, but he refused,<sup>157</sup> demonstrating the militaries declined influence. Despite the continued military constraints V-Dem's PCLI indicates political freedoms as somewhat present. Following LIED, they are classified as absent. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. After 1962, LIED classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections as present in this period. For the years 1964 and 1965, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1966, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

06/28/1966 End (Military) Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup mainly organized by General Julio Alsogaray and military led by Lieutenant-General Pistarini ousted President Arturo Illia. Indirect military rule was replaced with direct military rule and General Juan Carlos Onganía took over the presidency (Gallo 1969: 497-498, 501, Potash 1996: 160-161, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). For that period the classification of political liberties by V-Dem's PCLI ranged between none, not really and ambiguous while

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<sup>156</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1963\\_Argentine\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1963_Argentine_general_election)

<sup>157</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965\\_Argentine\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Argentine_legislative_election)

LIED's outcomes still scored their absence. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In the timeframe 1967-1972, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the year 1973, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

03/11/1973 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, free and fair presidential elections took place. The Peronist party was allowed to run and won (Arceneaux 2001b: 68, Lewis 2001: 149-51, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). Perón's surrogate candidate, the left-wing Peronist Hector Cámpora, won the presidential elections and assumed office on 05/25/1973. Following a month of his presidency, Perón returned from Spain. However, Cámpora's tenure was marred by political and social unrest, leading to his resignation alongside Vice President Vicente Solano Lima in July 1973. On 06/20/1973, the Ezeiza Massacre took place, which marked the starting point for the violent conflict within the Peronist movement. Subsequently, new elections were called, this time with Perón as the nominee of the Justicialist Party. Perón emerged victorious in the 10/12/1973 election, with his wife Isabel Perón elected as vice president.<sup>158</sup> The period was marred by a raging violent conflict between the left and right wing of the Peronist party, with right wing death squads - supported by the minister of social welfare José López Rega and some sectors of the federal police and military<sup>159</sup> - and leftist guerilla groups committing a myriad of atrocities.<sup>160</sup> From 1974 to 1983, as part of Operation Condor and the so called Dirty War, parts of the military and security forces, along with death squads such as the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA, or Triple A), systematically targeted political dissidents and individuals suspected of affiliations with socialism, left-wing Peronism, or the Montoneros movement. Between 22,000 to 30,000 people were killed or disappeared during this period, with many impossible to formally document due to state terrorism.<sup>161</sup> Despite the occurrence of two free and fair elections held under universal suffrage during this period, the state-sponsored repression targeting left-wing Peronists, coupled with a cycle of violence, renders it untenable to characterize Argentina between 1973

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<sup>158</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina#Per%C3%B3n's\\_return\\_and\\_death](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina#Per%C3%B3n's_return_and_death)

<sup>159</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentine\\_Anticommunist\\_Alliance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentine_Anticommunist_Alliance)

<sup>160</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isabel\\_Per%C3%B3n#Presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isabel_Per%C3%B3n#Presidency)

<sup>161</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_War)

and 1976 as a democracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, LIED classifies the elections as competitive and the V-Dem EF&FI reached its highest score to date, scoring elections as free and fair. The CEI scored at the level of somewhat clean elections. V-Dem's PCLI classifications concerning political liberties from 1973 to 1976 range from somewhat to none. According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. In accordance with FH, the country was designated as free in 1973, with a score between 2 and 4. This categorization aligns with our interpretation of the country's status. From 1974 onward, the country's score ranged between 6 and 7, indicating a classification of partly free and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For most of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 1976, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to our classification this is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

03/23/1976 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by General Jorge Rafael Videla ousted democratically elected President Isabella Peron and established a military junta headed by Videla (Balmaseda 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41).<sup>162</sup> The country was ruled by a three-man junta comprising the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The military regime aimed to restore order and stability, which they believed were undermined by economic difficulties, social unrest, and political violence. The regime was notorious for its widespread human rights abuses, including forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Thousands of political opponents, activists, and suspected dissidents were abducted and "disappeared" in what is known as the "Dirty War" (Guerra Sucia). Political parties were banned, and political activities were heavily suppressed. The junta dissolved the National Congress and suspended the constitution, effectively erasing any remaining democratic institutions (Munck 1985). The regime implemented neoliberal economic policies, including privatization, deregulation, and opening the economy to foreign investment. These policies were overseen by Economy Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz. The military regime imposed strict censorship on the press and other media, controlling the flow of

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<sup>162</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26516.htm>

information and suppressing any criticism of the government. Educational institutions were purged of suspected leftist influences, and the regime promoted a nationalist and conservative curriculum. By the early 1980s, the regime's popularity waned due to economic problems and growing domestic and international pressure. Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. The disastrous Falklands War (Guerra de las Malvinas) in 1982 further weakened the junta. Moreover, while political liberties stayed absent (LIED), V-Dem's PCLI scores dropped back to a range that we interpret as the absence of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1977 to 1982, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1983, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED.

10/30/1983 End Military Autocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, free and fair elections were held (Rock 1995:189, Arceneaux 2001a: 114-140, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). Since then, Argentina can be characterized as a democracy with competitive elections, a free media, and vibrant civil society sectors. Nevertheless, significant challenges persist, including economic instability, governmental and judicial corruption, and drug-related violence.<sup>163</sup> Ex-president Fernández de Kirchner was accused and found guilty of corruption charges in 2022. While civil liberties are generally guaranteed, the institutions meant to safeguard them are plagued by corruption. Additionally, while a free press and freedom of expression is enshrined in law, journalists are frequently harassed when reporting sensitive issues such as drug-related criminality<sup>164</sup>, which could lead to self-censorship. Argentina is a presidential representative republic, featuring a bicameral legislative branch. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI both score elections as free, fair and clean. In accordance with FH, the country receives a score between 6 and 7 in 1983, indicating a status as partly free. Our framework categorizes the country as rather free. From 1984 to 1991, the country is classified as free, with a score between 2 and 4. From 1992 to 1997, the country is still classified as free with a score

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<sup>163</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>164</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2023>

of 5, falling under the rather free category in our interpretation. In 1998, the country once again achieved a score between 6 and 7. In 1999, the country is classified as free with a score of 5 and in 2000 it was classified as free with a score between 2 and 4. From 2001 to 2002, it scored between 6 and 7 as partly free. From 2003 onward, it was classified as free with a score between 2 and 4. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present from 1984 onward and LIED as present from 1986 onward. The president of Argentina is both the head of state as well as head of government. Elections are held regularly and within a multi-party framework.<sup>165</sup> Presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2023 were deemed fair and free by independent observers and turnout was over 70%. The right-wing candidate Javier Milei won the presidency with 36% of the vote while the Union for the Homeland (UxP) coalition hold the majority of parliamentary seats (102 in the Chamber of Deputies, 33 in the Senate). Mass protests that erupted as a response to reforms which caused inflation to spike considerably, and restricted protests slightly were conducted peacefully.<sup>166</sup> Milei, however, is pursuing a strategy of power centralization and trying to dismantle the system of democratic oversight. In a reform package, he proposed the declaration of an "economic emergency" that would grant him the power to govern by decree for one year, effectively sidestepping the legislative and judiciary.<sup>167</sup> He previously used supposed emergency decrees to legislate without the approval of parliament, while commentators called him out for inventing an urgency that does not exist.<sup>168</sup> Argentinian democracy seems under pressure once more and it remains to be seen how it develops under Javier Milei. During this regime period, according to Polity5's categorization, various periods regarding executive constraints can be identified. From 1984-1988, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. From 1989 to 2014, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since 2015, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During the years 1984-1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. For the years 1990 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while

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<sup>165</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Argentina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Argentina)

<sup>166</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>167</sup> <https://www.boell.de/en/2024/06/20/germany-must-not-ignore-dismantling-democracy-argentina>

<sup>168</sup> <https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/opinion-and-analysis/unconstitutional-experts-critics-slam-mileis-massive-reform-plan.phtml>

V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1999 to 2015, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the three years 2016-2018, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2019-2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Allub 1973, Alvarez 2003, Brooker 1995, Brown 2010, Carreras 2002, Cavarozzi 1986, Cavarozzi 2001, Domínguez 2002, Finer 1975, Gallo 1969, Ilsley 1952, Levitsky 2008, Lewis 1990, Lewis 2001, López-Alves 2000, Munck 1985, O'Donnell 1973, Peruzzotti 2001, Potash 1996, Rock 1995, Smith 1974, Smith 1978, Thibaut 1996, Thiery 2002, Waldmann 1995)

## **Armenia**

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1453]: From 1453 until 1829 western Armenia was a part of the Ottoman Empire. Eastern Armenia, consisting of Yerevan and Nakhichevan khanates of Iran, was under Persian control.<sup>169</sup> In the aftermath of the Russo-Persian War (1826–1828) the parts of Eastern Armenia were incorporated into Russia after Qajar Persia's forced ceding in 1828 per the Treaty of Turkmenchay.<sup>170</sup> This territorial division was also current on our start date on 01/01/1900. Eastern Armenia remained part of the Russian Empire until its collapse in 1917.<sup>171</sup> Western Armenia on the other hand remained a part of the Ottoman Empire until its dissolution.<sup>172</sup>

04/22/1918 End Part of Other Country [Ottoman Empire, Ruling Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country (TDFR): Armenia became a founding member of the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR).

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<sup>169</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian\\_Armenia\\_\(1502%E2%80%931828\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Armenia_(1502%E2%80%931828))

<sup>170</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Armenia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Armenia)

<sup>171</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian\\_Armenia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Armenia)

<sup>172</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenians\\_in\\_the\\_Ottoman\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenians_in_the_Ottoman_Empire)

05/28/1918 End Part of Other Country (TDRF)/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: As provided for in the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russian Armenia became an independent republic under German auspices before emerging as the core of a revived Greater Armenia under the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres (Lansford 2021: 78).

06/21[&23]/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On these dates, the first direct parliamentary elections were held under universal suffrage – every person over the age of 20 had the right to vote regardless of gender, ethnicity or religious beliefs and three women were elected as members of parliament. The election was boycotted by the Hunchaks and Populists. The government was held by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnaksutiun).<sup>173</sup> The First Republic of Armenia, established in 1918, faced significant challenges due to its geopolitical position. Surrounded by hostile neighbors and caught in the broader context of regional conflicts, Armenia struggled to maintain its territorial integrity and security. These external threats impacted the country's internal political processes, making the establishment and maintenance of democratic norms and institutions a difficult endeavor. The situation was further complicated by the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide and the influx of refugees, which added to the internal turmoil and humanitarian crisis. characterized by a strong atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty among the various political parties. The parliamentary elections in 1919 further demonstrated the ARF's dominance, where it won a substantial majority of the seats. This landslide victory highlighted the ARF's influential position in the government but also indicated a lack of significant opposition within the parliament.<sup>174</sup> The state of emergency, which was declared in May 1920, is an indicator of the fact that democratic civil rights were not fully realized. As a result of the state of emergency, the parliament gave up its rights in favor of the executive.<sup>175</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

12/02/1920 End Defective Democracy/Start Communist Ideocracy [as (de facto) Protectorate of the USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: Due to the threat of a Soviet ultimatum the Armenian government transferred power to the Communists.<sup>176</sup> A (semi-)independent socialist soviet republic was established.

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<sup>173</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1919\\_Armenian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1919_Armenian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>174</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Republic\\_of\\_Armenia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Republic_of_Armenia)

<sup>175</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Republic\\_of\\_Armenia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Republic_of_Armenia)

<sup>176</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Republic\\_of\\_Armenia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Republic_of_Armenia)



12/30/1922 End Communist Ideocracy [as (de facto) Protectorate of the USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: The Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia became a founding republic of the USSR. Western Armenia returned to Turkey” (Lansford 2021: 78). Armenia became part of the Transcaucasian SFSR.<sup>177</sup> Since Armenia became part of another country a regime change has to be coded in the dataset. However, at the same time it was basically a continuation of the communist regime spell starting on 12/02/1920. LIED only starts to provide data for Armenia since 1991.

09/21/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date independence was regained. Immediately before the official date of independence on 10/17/1991 the first presidential elections took place, which were won by Levon Ter-Petrosyan.<sup>178</sup> The opposition Union for National Self-Determination, led by Paruyr Hayrikyan, claimed “that there were violations during the campaign, including an act of violence against him and his supporters”.<sup>179</sup> Initially, ideas and goals about democracy and pluralism were expressed, but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demanded all attention and a national unity. As a result, not only did the democratic demands and processes fade into the background, but also the gradual elimination of potential opponents by the incumbent government.<sup>180</sup> The classification of the regime is highly disputed. The classifications range from clearly autocratic to clearly democratic. GWF and HTW classify the period 1991-1994 as democratic, RoW as an electoral democracy, BMR as non-democratic, MCM and LIED as a multiparty autocracy and CGV as a civilian autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED elections were not competitive during this time, whereas V-Dem’s EF&FI and CEI indicate that elections in this period were free, fair and somewhat clean. Per FH’s classification, the country scores between 6 and 7 as partly free and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies the existence of political liberties as present in 1991 and as somewhat present from 1992 to 2017 and as present from 2018 onwards again. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. We classify the regime between 09/21/1991 and 12/31/1994 as a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime and afterwards as a clear case of an electoral hybrid regime. Severe deficits in the electoral process have been present, even if it was possible for the opposition to participate. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this

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<sup>177</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian\\_Soviet\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic)

<sup>178</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Armenian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Armenian_presidential_election)

<sup>179</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paruyr\\_Hayrikyan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paruyr_Hayrikyan)

<sup>180</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c014.html>

period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. On 12/31/1994 according to GWF the elected Ter-Petrosian government crossed the line between democracy and dictatorship in suspending the largest opposition party (Dashnak, HHD) to prevent its participation in the July 1995 parliamentary election, and in subsequent months it disqualified multiple other parties and more than a third of the candidates (Bremmer 1997: 86-87, Lansford 2012b: 65-73, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41-42). Ter-Petrosian's coalition originally included nearly all non-communist Armenians. The coalition narrowed over time but always included people from multiple regions. On 02/04/1998 Ter-Petrosian and numerous other top officials of the HSh stepped down due to widespread public demonstrations and a decline in support from significant political figures, resulting in the Kocharian government assuming power (Libaridian 2006: 9-10). Since the accession of Kocharian, the leadership has been dominated by individuals from Nagorno Karabakh; the HSh is no longer in government (Journal 1998, Usher 1999:20, Libaridian 2006: 9-10, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41-42). However, different from GWF it is not coded in this dataset as a new regime but a continuation of the electoral hybrid regime. In 2015, voters approved constitutional changes that, among other things, transformed the country from a problematic quasi-presidential to a parliamentary form. The president, previously directly elected for a maximum of two five-year terms, would now be selected by the parliament for a singular seven-year term. Additionally, a significant transfer of executive power to the prime minister would occur, with the prime minister also being chosen by a parliamentary majority.<sup>181</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were not competitive according to LIED since 1994. During this period, V-Dem's EF&FI scores Armenian election freedom and fairness first as ambiguous and since 2003 as not really the case. Their CEI calls the elections largely not clean. In 1995, Armenia is classified as partly free by FH, with a score of 8. Our analysis, however, categorizes Armenia as rather not free. In 1996 and 1997, the country receives scores between 9 and 10 as not free and is categorized as rather not free in our interpretation. From 1998 to 2003, the country is classified as partly free, with a score of 8. From 2004 onward, the country's score once again fell within the not free range, scoring between 9 and 10. Between 1995 and 1997, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Since then, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the timeframe 1992-2007, V-

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<sup>181</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/armenia/freedom-world/2022>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia\\_2015?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2015?lang=en)

Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. During 2008 and 2009, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2010-2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since then, our interpretation of V-Dem's JCE alternates between the indications of judicial constraints on the executive being moderate (2018, 2020, 2022-2023) and robust (2019, 2021). From 2018 to 2021, V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. For the years 2022 and 2023, V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. On 12/09/2018 a series of anti-government protests in Armenia from April to May 2018 staged by various political and civil groups led by a member of the Armenian parliament – Nikol Pashinyan (head of the Civil Contract party) occurred. Protests and marches took place initially in response to Serzh Sargsyan's third consecutive term as the most powerful figure in the government of Armenia and later against the Republican Party-controlled government in general. Pashinyan declared it a Velvet Revolution.<sup>182</sup> The parliamentary elections on 12/09/2018 “were markedly freer and fairer than elections in previous years”. Local and international observers also deemed the snap parliamentary elections on 06/20/2021 “to be competitive, well organized, and fairly administered”. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED, for the first time ever, rates Albanian elections as competitive in 2018. The V-Dem EF&FI as well as CEI now classify Armenian elections as free, fair and clean. The OSCE assessed the election as meeting international standards.<sup>183</sup> As per FH, for this regime period, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. While civil liberties are mostly upheld, the judiciary grapples with systemic political interference, while judicial institutions suffer from corruption. Judges are purportedly pressured to collaborate with prosecutors in securing convictions, resulting in notably low acquittal rates.<sup>184</sup> In September 2022 Azerbaijani forces crossed into Armenian territory and

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<sup>182</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018\\_Armenian\\_revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Armenian_revolution)

<sup>183</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Armenian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Armenian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>184</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/armenia/freedom-world/2023>

armed conflict was initiated in a dispute over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in up to 200 casualties.<sup>185</sup>

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Arjomand 2008, Bremmer 1997, Blood 1997, Curtis/Suny 1995, Grotz/Rodriguez-McKey 2001, Journal 1998, Lansford 2012b, Libaridian 2006, Luchterhandt 1996, Sehring/Stefes 2010, Usher 1999)

## **Artsakh**

[also known as Nagorno-Karabakh]

07/07/1923 Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: The Soviet Union established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) as an autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic with its capital Stepanakert. The region has been populated by Christian Armenians while the surrounding regions have mostly been settled by Muslim Azeris.<sup>186</sup> Having been a source for conflict for centuries, the incorporation into the Soviet Union served to calm the conflict for about 60 years. In 1988, however, Armenians within the NKAO called for a transfer of administrative authority from the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic to the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic. This demand was heavily opposed by the Azeris.<sup>187</sup>

10/18/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of other country [Azerbaijan, One-Party Autocracy]: On this day Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union and became an independent country, taking with it Nagorno-Karabakh. On 11/27/1991 the new Azerbaijani parliament revoked the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh, triggering a campaign for independence amongst the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.

01/06/1992 End Part of Other Country [Azerbaijan, One-Party Autocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime [as (de facto) Protectorate of Armenia, Defective Democracy]: On this day, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) declared its independence from Azerbaijan following a public referendum which saw immense support for independence. This declaration has only ever been recognized by Armenia. Instead of developing an own constitution, the NKR declared

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<sup>185</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/armenia/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>186</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh\\_Autonomous\\_Oblast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_Autonomous_Oblast)

<sup>187</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh>

the application of Armenian law within its territory, as well as the declaration of independence to be the law of the land.<sup>188</sup> We therefore classify it as a de facto protectorate of Armenia. This classification follows the argument of Stefania Kolarz, that neither Baku, Yerevan nor Stepanakert can legitimately or effectively represent the NKR on the international stage (Kolarz 2019: 45f) and therefore we do not see it as a sovereign entity. On 01/31/1992 the Azeri military launched an offensive to reestablish Azeri control over Nagorno-Karabakh, sparking the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. With Armenia supporting the militias of Nagorno-Karabakh, they managed to take control over all of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as surrounding territories. They thereby linked the enclave to Armenia via a significant land border.<sup>189</sup> On 05/13/1994 Russia, as well as other neighboring countries, managed to mediate a ceasefire agreement between Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. This ceasefire was largely stable for over a decade with some small-scale breaches in the form of border skirmishes (European Parliament 2018). In this time, the NKR held several elections and in 2006 a national referendum approving the first constitution of the NKR. This constitution also established the names Republic of Artsakh and Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh to be identical. It also changed the political system from a semi-presidential to a presidential one.<sup>190</sup> The 2020 elections were the first to take place after an electoral revamp in 2019 that abolished voting districts in favor of proportional representation based on party votes. It saw multiple parties compete and several of them winning substantial shares of the vote. The Democratic Party of Artsakh and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, who had been amongst the biggest political forces in Artsakh previously, lost greatly in the 2020 elections.<sup>191</sup> These developments are indicative of at least some democratic competitiveness between the parties. FH always rated the Republic of Artsakh as partly free, with the highest ever achieved score being 37/100. Amongst the main reasons for this are corruption and limited civil rights.<sup>192</sup> These are the reasons why we label the Republic of Artsakh an electoral hybrid regime. The elections and the independence of the Republic of Artsakh have never been recognized by any country other than Armenia. The Republic of Artsakh stayed entirely dependent on Armenia for economic, military and political support. Without Armenian support, the Republic of Artsakh could not have sustained itself. For this reason, we continue to classify it as a de facto protectorate of Armenia. After a long period of

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<sup>188</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Artsakh#cite\\_ref-Constitution\\_12-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Artsakh#cite_ref-Constitution_12-2)

<sup>189</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325>

<sup>190</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20221027224732/http://www.nkr.am/en/chapter-I-foundations-of-constitutional-order>

<sup>191</sup> <https://evnreport.com/spotlight-karabakh/artsakh-presidential-race-goes-to-second-round-in-historically-competitive-election/>

<sup>192</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nagorno-karabakh/freedom-world/2023>

relative quiet, on 09/27/2020 the ceasefire was broken by an Azeri offensive, that was able to swiftly crush the Armenian and Artsakh resistance. The second Nagorno-Karabakh war lasted 44 days and was overshadowed by reports of war crimes on both sides.<sup>193</sup> On 11/09/2020 Armenia had to sign a peace deal with Azerbaijan in which it had to withdraw all military from Artsakh and agree to have Russian peacekeeper units stationed in Artsakh to guard the peace. Azerbaijan also took all territories that had not been part of the NKAO during the Soviet Union, leaving one single street in the Lachin-corridor the only land connection between Artsakh and Armenia.<sup>194</sup> Emboldened by the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan started a blockade of this street in December of 2022, by sending soldiers disguised as ecological activists to blockade the Lachin corridor. Later on, Azerbaijan dropped the facade and had the street blockaded by the army. This blockade led to serious starvation, lack of basic necessities within the Republic of Artsakh and marked a clear breach of the peace deal signed with Armenia. The Russian peacekeepers did not intervene.<sup>195</sup> LIED and V-Dem do not list Artsakh in their datasets. According to FH's classification for 1993 to 1997, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's evaluation for 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 1999-2001, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to FH, for the years 2002 to 2009, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Per FH, for the years 2010 and 2011, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation for 2012-2022, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free.

09/19/2023 End Electoral Hybrid Regime [as (de facto) Protectorate of Armenia, Defective Democracy]: On this day, a renewed offensive, sometimes called the third Nagorno-Karabakh war,<sup>196</sup> of Azerbaijan managed to take the entirety of Artsakh within 24 hours. It gave the ethnically Armenian residents the choice to either take on Azeri citizenship or be expelled. Almost all of the ethnically Armenian population fled into Armenia, becoming over 100.000 refugees.<sup>197</sup> According to FH's classification for 2023, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. The president of the Republic of

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<sup>193</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War\\_crimes\\_in\\_the\\_Second\\_Nagorno-Karabakh\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_crimes_in_the_Second_Nagorno-Karabakh_War)

<sup>194</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18270325>

<sup>195</sup> <https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/the-significance-of-the-lachin-corridor-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict>

<sup>196</sup> <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-09-20/third-karabakh-war>

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict-armenia/armenia-struggles-cope-exodus>

Artsakh, Samvel Shahramanyan, declared the formal dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh and the cessation of its existence for the 01/01/2024.<sup>198</sup>

01/01/2024 End Artsakh [Electoral Hybrid Regime]

## **Aruba**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1636]: The initial inhabitants of the island were Arawak Indians, who left behind red cave drawings, clay pottery, and stone tools. Following Spain's claim on Aruba in 1499, it became a hub for piracy and illicit trade. In 1636, the Dutch took control of the island, which was subsequently administered by the Dutch West India Company. Aruba temporarily fell under British rule during the Napoleonic Wars but was restored to Dutch authority in 1816.<sup>199</sup> In August 1947, Aruba drafted its inaugural Staatsreglement (constitution) to establish Aruba's autonomous status as a self-governing entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, driven by the initiatives of Henny Eman, a prominent Aruban statesman.<sup>200</sup>

12/15/1954 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Part of Netherland Antilles as Protectorate of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: In 1954, the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands was introduced, laying out a structure for the connections between Aruba and the remainder of the Kingdom. This led to the formation of the Netherlands Antilles, bringing together all Dutch Caribbean colonies into a single administrative system. Nevertheless, this new arrangement was met with dissatisfaction among many Arubans, who felt it was primarily controlled by Curaçao.<sup>201</sup> In March 1983, Aruba secured a formal arrangement with the Kingdom for its eventual independence, with a progression of steps granting greater autonomy as approved by the Crown. In August 1985, Aruba formulated a constitution that received unanimous approval.<sup>202</sup> Aruba conducted general elections on 11/22/1985 to choose the members of the Island Council. These elections took place shortly before Aruba's separation from the Netherlands Antilles and its establishment as a 'land' (country) within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.<sup>203</sup> Therefore, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period.

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<sup>198</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/28/europe/nagorno-karabakh-officially-dissolve-intl/index.html>

<sup>199</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Aruba>

<sup>200</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#20th\\_and\\_21st\\_centuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#20th_and_21st_centuries)

<sup>201</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#20th\\_and\\_21st\\_centuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#20th_and_21st_centuries)

<sup>202</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#Autonomy>

<sup>203</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985\\_Aruban\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_Aruban_general_election)

01/01/1986 Continuation Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: Aruba separated from the Netherlands Antilles and formally became a constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with complete independence planned for 1996. During a convention held in The Hague in 1990, upon the request of Aruba's Prime Minister Nelson Oduber, the governments of Aruba, the Netherlands, and the Netherlands Antilles decided to indefinitely delay Aruba's move toward full independence. The article outlining Aruba's ultimate independence was revoked in 1995, but it was agreed that the possibility of resuming the process could be considered following another referendum.<sup>204</sup> Aruba possesses self-governing authority. The Netherlands handles matters like foreign affairs and defense. Aruba's political system consists of a 21-member parliament (Staten) and an eight-member Cabinet. The 21 members of parliament are directly elected by the people to serve four-year terms. The governor of Aruba is appointed by the monarch for a six-year term, and the prime minister and deputy prime minister are indirectly elected by the Staten for four-year terms.<sup>205</sup> The latest elections to the Aruban parliament have taken place in 2021. They were won by the PEM party, that took the first place from the AVP party for the first time since 2009. The former strongest party came in second.<sup>206</sup> This is indicative of a competitive democratic regime with regular exchanges of power. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Aruba. Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Australia**

01/01/1900 Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 01/26/1788]: The British government determined on settling New South Wales in 1786, and colonization began on 01/26/1788.<sup>207</sup> In the period from 1788 to 1901 there were six British colonies on the Australian continent: New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. In 1894 universal suffrage was granted in the colony of South Australia and in the colony of Western Australia in 1899. Since legislative multiparty elections took place during this period, we code this period as an indirect rule colonial regime. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate

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<sup>204</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#Autonomy>

<sup>205</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aruba#Government>

<sup>206</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Aruban\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Aruban_general_election)

<sup>207</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Australia/History>



caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

01/01/1901 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start (Male) (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: On this date, the six British colonies on the Australian continent became independent from the United Kingdom. The transition to democracy in Australia began with the Federation in 1901, uniting these six British colonies under a single constitution.<sup>208</sup> This federation resulted in the creation of the Australian Parliament and marked the start of the nation's journey as a representative democracy, where Australians elect members of parliament to make laws and decisions on their behalf. On 03/29 & 30 the first federal national elections for a parliament took place.<sup>209</sup> From 1901 immigration was restricted by a series of historical policies that were enacted by the Australian government to restrict non-European immigration to Australia. These policies were implemented in the early 20th century and were a defining feature of Australia's immigration laws until the mid-20th century (White Australia Policy). LIED classifies political liberties as absent in 1900 and as present in 1901. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. From this period onwards, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present, which aligns the observations of LIED.

06/12/1902 Continuation as (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: The transition of Australia from a penal colony to a federation saw the establishment of autonomous parliamentary democracies in the British colonies from the mid-19th century. The British monarch still served as the ceremonial head of state. This period was also marked by the gradual weakening and diminishing of Aboriginal people due to diseases and conflicts with colonists.<sup>210</sup> With the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 from this date Australia granted universal vote for non-indigenous people.<sup>211</sup> Indigenous Australian women (and men) were granted the vote in South Australia in 1895, but this right was revoked in 1902 for any Aboriginal person not already

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<sup>208</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Australia\\_1985?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Australia_1985?lang=en)

<sup>209</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901\\_Australian\\_federal\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901_Australian_federal_election)

<sup>210</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Australia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Australia)

<sup>211</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth\\_Franchise\\_Act\\_1902](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_Franchise_Act_1902)

enrolled. Indigenous Australians were not given the right to vote in all states until 1962.<sup>212</sup> In 1902, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Commonwealth Franchise Act, extending federal voting rights to men and women across all states of Australia. However, the Act explicitly excluded Aboriginal natives of Australia, Asia, Africa, or the Pacific Islands (excluding New Zealand) who did not already possess voting rights in state elections at the time of the Act.<sup>213</sup> For this reason, Australia is until 1962 classified as a defective democracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During the entire time competitive elections were held (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scored cleanliness since 1902, and V-Dem's EF&FI declares free and fair election conditions except between 1917 and 1918 somewhat freedom and fairness was scored. LIED classifies political liberties as absent from 1914-1918, as well as from 1939-1945. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present since 1900. According to FH, Australia in the whole regime period is classified as free.<sup>214</sup> While almost all indicators we use point in the direction of a liberal democracy according to our coding rules the denial of voting rights to Aborigines at the federal level until 1962 is such a significant democratic deficit that we classified Australia as a defective democracy. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

05/21/1962 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date the Commonwealth Electoral Act stipulated that Indigenous Australians possessed the right to register and cast their votes in federal elections, encompassing those held in the Northern Territory; however, enrollment was not mandatory. Any attempt to coerce Indigenous individuals into either enrolling or abstaining from voting through undue influence or bribery was considered an offense under the Act.<sup>215</sup> Australia is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral system. A governor-general, appointed upon the prime minister's suggestion, serves as the representative of the United Kingdom's monarch as the head of state. The monarchy's powers are greatly constrained.<sup>216</sup> Today Australia's democratic quality is reflected in its robust electoral system, respect for rule of law, civil liberties, political stability, inclusiveness, strong social policies, transparency, and active civil society. While historically there were significant

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<sup>212</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>213</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting\\_rights\\_of\\_Indigenous\\_Australians#Queensland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_rights_of_Indigenous_Australians#Queensland)

<sup>214</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>215</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting\\_rights\\_of\\_Indigenous\\_Australians#Queensland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_rights_of_Indigenous_Australians#Queensland)

<sup>216</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2023>

issues with inclusivity, particularly regarding Indigenous Australians and immigrants, Australia has made considerable progress. The revocation of the White Australia Policy and legal reforms have moved towards a more inclusive society. The High Court of Australia, established in 1903, plays a crucial role in interpreting the constitution and ensuring that laws comply with democratic principles.<sup>217</sup> Australia generally ranks well in global indices measuring corruption and transparency. Efforts to maintain high standards of public service and government accountability contribute to the quality of its democracy. Australia has developed a comprehensive welfare system, including healthcare, education, and social security, reflecting a commitment to social justice and equity. On 05/21/2022 a federal election was held. After nearly a decade in opposition the Labor Party regained power by securing 77 seats in the House of Representatives, allowing them to form a majority government. An independent federal agency, the Australian Electoral Commission, is responsible for organizing federal elections, referendums, defines electoral boundaries and keeps the electoral rolls. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has always characterized elections as competitive. Elections and electoral laws have always been deemed clean, free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI. Compulsory voting requires registered voters to participate, and not voting may result in a small fine.<sup>218</sup> According to FH, the country is classified as free with a score between 2 and 4 and falls under the free category in our interpretation. Political liberties are classified as present by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

Additional sources (Bolton 1900, Butler 1976, Hughes 2004, Macintyre 1999)

## **Austria**

[For the time from 1900 to 11/11/1918, Austria refers to the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Empire.]

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<sup>217</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline\\_of\\_Australian\\_history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Australian_history)

<sup>218</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2023>

01/01/1900 Constitutional Monarchy [Start: 08/11/1804]: On 08/11/1804 the Austrian Empire was proclaimed. The Austrian part of the empire was a constitutional monarchy under the Habsburg dynasty. The emperor held significant executive power, but there was also a parliament (Reichsrat) which had legislative authority. Officially known as the Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Council, this part of the empire was often referred to as Cisleithania, distinguishing it from the Hungarian part (Transleithania). The Austrian part was ethnically diverse, including Germans, Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Slovenes, Italians, and others. This diversity created a complex societal fabric, with various linguistic and cultural influences. In 1861 men gained the right to vote. Women were first allowed to vote in 1907.<sup>219</sup> Nationalist tensions among various ethnic groups posed significant challenges, with calls for more autonomy and rights. The political landscape was fragmented, with numerous parties representing different ethnic and interest groups. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held until 1913, from 1914 to 1916 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and in 1917 only multiparty legislative elections were held.

11/11/1918 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date, Emperor Karl I signed his abdication. On 11/12/1918 the republic was announced, the law of state and government reform was introduced. Article 9 of the reform mentioned that suffrage for the election of the Austrian Parliament should be universal, regardless of gender.<sup>220</sup> Since the period started after 07/01/1918 and ended before 07/01/1919 it does not appear in the country-year-version of the dataset. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period of transition, which aligns the observations of LIED. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present in 1918 and are present in 1919. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

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<sup>219</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage\\_in\\_Austria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Austria)

<sup>220</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage\\_in\\_Austria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Austria)

02/16/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, free and fair founding elections were held for the Constituent Assembly. The elections were the first election in which all women were granted the right to vote. German citizens living in Austria, as well as Sudeten-Germans living in Czechoslovakia were allowed to participate in the elections. The Social Democratic Workers Party (SPÖ) won the majority with 72/170 seats. In September 1919 the Treaty of Saint-Germain was signed, finalizing the end of WWI, and officially breaking up the Habsburg Empire. The coalition resulting from the elections between the SPÖ and the conservative Christian Social Party (CS) with Karl Renner as Chancellor, passed the first constitution for the First Austrian Republic on 10/01/1920. During this time the elections were competitive. V-Dem's CEI scores full cleanliness until 1930, before switching to somewhat cleanliness. Moreover, V-Dem's EF&FI underlines free and fair elections until 1929, before somewhat freedom and fairness is scored. V-Dem's PCLI categorization states a period of presence of political liberties from 1919 to 1932. According to LIED political liberties were absent. Since 1920, according to Polity5, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. The regime period is a borderline case between a liberal and defective democracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED. For the year 1920, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1921-1932, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1933, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/27/1933 End Liberal Democracy/Start Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy: Engelbert Dollfuss, holding a ministerial position, assumed the role of prime minister through standard procedures on 05/20/1932. In October, his government began to rule by emergency provisions and forced judges to resign. This purging of judges was completed by 05/27/1933. The Austrofascist corporative state closely followed the ideal of a Christian corporative state as developed by Pope Pius XI in the 1931 encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*. After Dollfuss was assassinated in 1934, his successor Kurt Schuschnigg continued the regime and maintained (Kitchen 1980: 5, 41, 110, Lentz 1999: 40-42, Casey et al. 2020: 2). Since 1934, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal

limitations during this time. For 1934-1937<sup>221</sup>, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Furthermore, political liberties were not present according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores dropped back to ambiguous in 1933 and to present from 1934 onwards. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

03/12/1938 End Right-Wing (Corporative) Autocracy/Start Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: German troops, accompanied by Hitler himself, entered Austria on this date (Hochman 2016: 237, Casey et al. 2020: 2). However, due to the strength of the national-socialist movement in Austria the period is not classified as an occupation, but as a new fascist ideocracy (by the Nazi movement). For instance, Vienna had already had a national-socialist mayor with Hermann Neubacher.

04/10/1938 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy [as independent country]/Start Part of Other Country [Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date a plebiscite regarding the Anschluss to Germany was held. The result of 99 per cent pro annexation appears highly questionable. LIED codes political liberties as absent in this period. V-Dem does not provide data for Austria for that period. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

04/27/1945 End Part of Other Country [Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Allied Forces]: Allied occupation of Austria and Restoration of the Republic of Austria. Austria was divided into four occupation zones and jointly occupied by the United Kingdom, the USSR, the USA, and France.

11/25/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Allied Forces]/Start Defective Democracy: Austria between 11/25/1945 and 10/25/1955 is a borderline case between a democracy and occupation. Parliamentary elections on 11/25/1945 were free and fair. On 06/28/1946 the 'Second Control Agreement' was signed by the Allies. The agreement intended to gradually loosen their dominance over the Austrian government. The Austrian government continued to exist after parliamentary elections and was able to govern by democratic means, but the Allies retained the possibility of undermining government decisions through veto rights. In turn Soviet vetos were routinely canceled by Western opposition.<sup>222</sup> While the country was

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<sup>221</sup> Both indicators do not provide a value for 1938, although the invasion of German troops only occurs after the reference date (January 1<sup>st</sup> of the respective year).

<sup>222</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied\\_Austria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied-occupied_Austria)

still formally occupied it was largely sovereign regarding domestic policy. However, the occupying troops only left Austria on 10/25/1955. Since the Allies did not compete with the government for power and internal political autonomy prevailed, it is coded as a democracy from the time of the parliamentary elections on 11/25/1945. However, given the veto power of the Allies Austria is classified as a defective democracy until the end of the occupation. LIED categorizes political liberties as not present until 1955. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI already indicates full political liberties since 1946. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Based on our observations, since this period, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present, which aligns the observations of LIED. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were present from 1947 onward.

10/26/1955 End Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date, the Austrian National Council passed the Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria. Austria is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral system consisting of the National Council (Nationalrat) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat). The president serves as head of state and the head of government is the chancellor.<sup>223</sup> Generally, elections in Austria are free and fair (Pelinka 2009).<sup>224</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Austrian elections after World War II have consistently been scored as competitive by LIED and clean, free and fair by V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI. Political parties operate freely in a competitive environment. The judiciary operates independently. FH classifies Austria for the whole regime period as free with a score between 2 and 4.<sup>225</sup> LIED categorizes political liberties as present from 1956 onward. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were present in the whole regime period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was in the whole regime period on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For 1956-1980, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 1981, V-Dem's JCE is classified by

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<sup>223</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Austria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Austria)

<sup>224</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/austria/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>225</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/austria/freedom-world/2024>

us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. On 09/29/2019, snap elections were held for Austria's National Council following accusations of attempted corruption against the FPÖ leader and vice-chancellor. A leaked video showed him conspiring with a fake Russian oligarch's wife to take over a major Austrian newspaper, which made international headlines.<sup>226</sup> Sebastian Kurz, among others, took center stage in the election campaign. ÖVP, his party, emerged as a clear winner. Backing for the FPÖ crumbled, resulting in the party losing 20 seats in the National Council. The ÖVP secured 71 seats, the highest among all parties but insufficient for a governing majority. The SPÖ obtained 40 council positions, the FPÖ secured 31, and the liberal NEOS garnered 15. After a two-year absence from parliament, the Green Party made a comeback and secured 26 seats.<sup>227</sup> A ÖVP-Green government took office with Kurz as chancellor. After corruption allegations, Kurz had to resign in October 2021. After Kurz resigned, Alexander Schallenberg followed him as chancellor for a few weeks. Then Karl Nehammer took over in December.<sup>228</sup> Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Benedikt 1977, Carsten 1978, Gerlich/Campbell 2000, Grass 1969, Gulick 1976, Kitchen 1988, Pelinka 2009, Poier 2010, Strong 1974, Sweet 1950, Tálos 2001, Tálos et al. 1995, Weinzierl/Skalnik 1983a, Weinzierl/Skalnik 1983b)

## **Azerbaijan**

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 02/28/1828]: Following a series of conflicts between the Russian Empire and Iran, the treaties of Golestān (Gulistan; 10/24/1813) and Turkmenchay (Torkmānchāy; 02/28/1828) redefined the border between the two empires. As a result, Russia gained control of Baku, Shirvan, Ganja, Nakhichevan (Naxçıvan), and Yerevan. Notably, there was no distinct Azerbaijani state before 1918, and the Muslim population in Transcaucasia, instead of identifying with a continuous national tradition like the Georgians and Armenians, considered themselves part of the broader Muslim world, known as the ummah. The Russians referred to them as “Tatars,” and the term Azerbaijani (azərbaycanlı) only gained prominence among urban nationalist intellectuals in the

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<sup>226</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/20/austria-ibiza-scandal-sting-operation-what-happened-why-does-it-matter>

<sup>227</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/austria/freedom-world/2020>

<sup>228</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/austria/freedom-world/2023>



pre-revolutionary era. It was during the Soviet period that this ethnonym became the official and widely recognized name for this group of people.<sup>229</sup>

04/22/1918 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Ruling Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [TDFR]: The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) existed briefly in the Caucasus, from 04/22/1918 to 05/28/1918. It encompassed the majority of the modern territories of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, along with portions of Russia and Turkey. However, the republic's existence was short-lived, as Georgia declared independence after just a month, followed closely by Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>230</sup>

05/28/1918 End Part of Other Country [TDFR]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: On this date the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic gained independence. The Azerbaijani National Council was the first delegated legislative body of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) from 05/27 May/1918 to 06/17/1918 and again from 11/16/1918 to 12/03/1918. Universal suffrage was introduced, making Azerbaijan the first Muslim-majority country to enfranchise women.<sup>231</sup> Elections for a constituent assembly were planned but did finally not take place.

04/28/1920 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: This date marked the end of statehood by Soviet invasion. Preparing independence on 09/08/1991 presidential elections with Mutalibov from the Communist Party being the only candidate were held.<sup>232</sup> Before the year 1991 Azerbaijan does not appear in LIED data. V-Dem provides data for Azerbaijan since the year 1990. For 1990 and 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

10/18/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date “under the leadership of the Communist Party and Mutalibov” independence was regained (Nichol 1995, Lansford 2012c: 90, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 42). Although the communist party ruled during this period, this regime is not classified as a communist ideocracy because of the party's ideological distancing from Marximus-Leninism. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's

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<sup>229</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Azerbaijan/Russian-suzerainty>

<sup>230</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian\\_Democratic\\_Federative\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcaucasian_Democratic_Federative_Republic)

<sup>231</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women\\_in\\_Azerbaijan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_in_Azerbaijan);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration\\_of\\_Independence\\_of\\_Azerbaijan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_Independence_of_Azerbaijan)

<sup>232</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Azerbaijani\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Azerbaijani_presidential_election)

JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Political liberties are absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

03/06/1992 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: After suffering great losses to the Armenians in battle, armed opposition party Azerbaijan Popular Front protesters seized government buildings on 03/06/1992. Elements of the military participated but the leadership refused to evict the mobs. The popular uprising ousted Mutalibov, leading to control by the National Assembly, which contained about half communist successor deputies and half opposition deputies (Altstadt 1992: 109, Lansford 2012c: 90, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 42). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions.

06/07/1992 End Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date the first competitive presidential election took place, which was won by Abulfaz Elchibey of the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP).<sup>233</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was considered as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI scored ambiguous electoral cleanliness. Whereas, according to V-Dem's EF&FI free and fair election conditions were given. As classified by FH, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free and is categorized as rather not free in our interpretation. Besides, LIED classifies the political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/04[-15]/1993 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military (Transitional) Autocracy: A militia led by military commander Surat Huseynov overthrew President Elchibey and brought Heydar Aliyev to power.<sup>234</sup> On 06/16/1993 "the elected president fled the capital in the face of rebellion by a faction of the military" (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 42). The leader of the military rebellion agreed to allow Aliyev, speaker of parliament to replace the ousted president, while the military leader became prime minister in the new government (Nichol 1995, Lansford

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<sup>233</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Azerbaijani\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Azerbaijani_presidential_election)

<sup>234</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Azerbaijani\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Azerbaijani_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

2012c: 92).<sup>235</sup> As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Based on our observations, executive and legislative elections were absent during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation.

10/03/1993 End Military (Transitional) Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, presidential elections were held. Heydar Aliyev of the New Azerbaijan Party received most votes and was elected president in polls marked by fraud and irregularities. Political power was concentrated in the hands of Aliyev and his extended family, corruption is rampant, and human rights violations are severe.<sup>236</sup> After Aliyev's death in 2003, a cult of personality formed around him, which has persisted to this day.<sup>237</sup> On 10/15/2003 upon Heydar Aliyev's demise, power transitioned to his son, Ilham, signaling the initial dynastic transfer of power within the post-Soviet realm.<sup>238</sup> On 09/26/2018 a constitutional referendum extended presidential terms to seven years and created two vice presidents. It also gave the president the ability to suspend the legislature. Aliyev named his wife, Mehriban Alyeva, as one of the new vice presidents. Aliyev was re-elected president on 04/11/2018, with 86 percent of the vote. The OSCE and other international groups condemned the balloting as unfree and unfair, and several major opposition groups boycotted it (Lansford 2021). Presidential elections were held on 02/07/2024. Incumbent president Ilham Aliyev won his fifth consecutive term with over 92% of the vote, defeating his closest competitor Zahid Oruj, who obtained just 2% of the vote. The election occurred within an authoritarian context characterized by repression of the opposition and independent media in Azerbaijan. The two main opposition parties, Musavat and Popular Front, decided not to field candidates and urged voters to boycott the election due to its undemocratic nature. Additionally, many candidates featured on the ballot had previously expressed admiration for Aliyev, leading to the absence of genuine opposition contenders amidst the crackdown on independent media and journalists. GWF and AF classify the regime as personalist, HWF, LIED and RoW as an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED states that elections were not competitive. V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI have scored elections in this period as neither free. In accordance with FH, the country is categorized as not free, with a score between 11 and 14 and is classified as such in our

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<sup>235</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/AZE>

<sup>236</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilham\\_Aliyev](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilham_Aliyev)

<sup>237</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heydar\\_Aliyev](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heydar_Aliyev)

<sup>238</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/AZE>

analysis. An exception can be identified between the years 1979 and 1999, during which the country is classified as not free with a score between 9 and 10 and falls into the rather not free category in our interpretation. LIED categorizes political liberties as absent since its independence. According to V-Dem's PCLI, political liberties have been not really present, except for the years 1992 and 1993, for which the presence of political freedoms was classified as ambiguous. In 1994, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. Since 1995, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Although Azerbaijan exhibits characteristics of a personalist regime during this period, the existence of elections to the executive and legislative branches of government places it in the category of electoral autocracies with the subtype personalist.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Altstadt 1992, Grotz/Motika 2001, Hale 2005, Lansford 2012c)

### **[The] Bahamas**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 07/26/1718]: Starting in 1629 the English had expressed an interest in the Bahamas. It was not until 1648 that the first English settlers arrived on the islands. Britain made the Bahamas a crown colony in 1718.<sup>239</sup> Woodes Rogers was officially appointed as Captain-General and Governor in Chief over the Bahama Islands by King George I on 02/06/1718, and he arrived at Nassau on 07/26/1718.<sup>240</sup> The political decolonization of the Bahamas took place with the gradual democratization of electoral law after 1959 and the gradual transfer of powers from the British colonial power to the differentiating system of government.<sup>241</sup> It was not until 1953 that the first political parties were founded, starting with the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). Before that, legislative elections only accounted for a part of the representatives in the local legislative council, while the rest were British appointed. According to LIED only

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<sup>239</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Bahamas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Bahamas)

<sup>240</sup> <http://www.bahamasnationalarchives.bs/governors.html>

<sup>241</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

multiparty legislative elections were held. Regarding the political liberties, they were coded as absent for the entire time (LIED).

11/26/1962 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: From 1958 onwards, all men could vote equally in the Bahamas. Bahamian women could vote for the first time on 11/26/1962.<sup>242</sup> Political liberties were absent for this period (LIED). V-Dem doesn't list The Bahamas. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period.

01/07/1964 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date internal self-governance was granted. Since the features of a democracy were already fulfilled before, Bahamas is classified as a democracy starting from the date of internal self-governance. LIED classifies political liberties as present from 1964 onward. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

07/10/1973 Continuation (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: On this date, the Bahamas gained independence from the United Kingdom (Nohlen 1993), but remained in the Commonwealth with the British Crown as head of state. Since 1964 the Bahamas are a stable multiparty democracy where political rights and civil liberties are generally respected.<sup>243</sup> Executive power is held by the cabinet, the British monarch has no effective political power. The government form is parliamentarism and, hence, the prime minister is the head of government. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, according to LIED, competitive elections were held since the country's independence. In accordance with FH, the country is classified as free between the years 1973 and 1986 with a score ranging from 2 to 4. Our interpretation aligns with this classification as a free country. In the subsequent period from 1987 to 1991, the country is classified as free with a score of 5 and thus falls under the rather free category in our interpretations. From 1992 onward, the country once again exhibits a score between 2 and 4. LIED states that political liberties have been present since 1964. The judiciary is independent from political influences. Nonetheless, government corruption remains a problem, most recently in 2022 regulators were accused of colluding in the bankruptcy proceedings of FTX. Additionally, ongoing issues concerning societal freedoms, such as protection against domestic violence remain a serious

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<sup>242</sup> <https://cob-bs.libguides.com/wsb>

<sup>243</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahamas/freedom-world/2022>

problem. Migrants and Haitian-Bahamians face discrimination and their freedom of movement is inhibited by their lack of Bahamian identity documents.<sup>244</sup> In August 2022 it was announced that the government would seek to amend the Bahamas Nationality Act to increase gender equality for its citizens.<sup>245</sup> <sup>246</sup> V-Dem doesn't list the Bahamas. (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Hillebrands/Schwehm 2005b)

## **Bahrain**

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 07/23/1783]: After the Portuguese had controlled Bahrain between 1521 and 1602, Bahrain was ruled by the tribal Khalifa family from 1783 who rejected “claims of suzerainty from Persia and the Ottoman Empire” (Turner 1999). After the invasion of Bahrain on 07/23/1783 Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Khalifa became the first Hakim of Bahrain.<sup>247</sup> With British assistance, Bahrain was able to resist Ottoman control and signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Britain in 1861 (Sluglett 2007, Turner 1999). The country’s British-protected status dates from 1861, with the completion of a treaty named “Perpetual Truce of Peace and Friendship”<sup>248</sup> by which the sheikh agreed to refrain from “the prosecution of war, piracy, or slavery.”<sup>249</sup> Thus, Britain assumed responsibility for the defense of Bahrain and for the conduct of its relations with other major powers.<sup>250</sup> Further treaties were signed in 1882 and 1892, practically transferring responsibility of Bahraini defense and foreign policy to Britain. This meant that the tribal chiefs of Bahrain agreed not to cede or transfer any portion of their territories except to Britain and to manage their relations with other powers through the British government. In return, Britain aimed at containing growing French interests in the region (Sluglett 2007). This period is coded as protectorate because the Bahraini rulers only delegated the conduct of foreign affairs to the British by a consensual treaty, while they maintained internal autonomy. For this time, both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI classified political liberties as

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<sup>244</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahamas/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>245</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahamas/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>246</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahamas/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>247</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bani\\_Utbah\\_invasion\\_of\\_Bahrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bani_Utbah_invasion_of_Bahrain)

<sup>248</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Bahrain\\_\(1783%E2%80%931971\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bahrain_(1783%E2%80%931971))

<sup>249</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bahrain/Cultural-life#ref93660>

<sup>250</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Bahrain\\_\(1783%E2%80%931971\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bahrain_(1783%E2%80%931971))

absent. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

08/15/1971 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: On this date Bahrain and Britain agreed on a new treaty of friendship which granted independence to Bahrain and nullified all earlier treaties. Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa became the Emir with the Council of State as a cabinet. In June 1973, a constitution was ratified providing for a National Assembly of 30 members, together with all members of the cabinet who were appointed by the Amir (Turner 1999).<sup>251</sup> On 12/12/1973 under the 1973 constitution, general elections in Bahrain were held. The National Assembly had thirty members elected by a franchise restricted to male citizens, with an additional 14 ministers of the royally appointed government becoming ex officio members.<sup>252</sup> Because the right to elect representatives to the lower house of parliament was not inclusive, this brief period is coded as an autocratic autocracy. In 1973 universal suffrage was introduced, although parliament was suspended and dissolved in 1975 for approximately 30 years. Non-Sunni Muslims could not vote.<sup>253</sup> V-Dem's EF&FI scores the elections as somewhat free and fair, Their CEI as somewhat clean. In 1971 and 1972, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. From 1973 onward, the executive faced slight limitations on power. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1971, from 1972 onward only multiparty legislative elections were held. However, on 12/01/1972 there were only elections for a constituent assembly<sup>254</sup> The constituent assembly was tasked with drafting and approving a constitution. Hence, the coding by LIED seems to be a coding error. Per FH, Bahrain is classified as not free until 1973 with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. In 1974 the country is designated as partly free with a score of 8 and falls under the rather not free category in our interpretation. Per LIED's political liberties remained absent, while V-Dem's PCLI outcomes switched to a range that we interpret in the way that political liberties were not really present. The results of the 1973 elections were abrogated by Shaikh Isa in 1975. He dissolved the national assembly, suspended the constitution and started ruling by decree (Turner 1999).<sup>255</sup> Bahrain was governed under emergency laws from 1975 to 2002. During this time, "the worst human rights violations and

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<sup>251</sup> [https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/mideast/BH/bahrain-constitution-1973/at\\_download/file](https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/mideast/BH/bahrain-constitution-1973/at_download/file)

<sup>252</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973\\_Bahraini\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Bahraini_general_election)

<sup>253</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>254</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972\\_Bahraini\\_Constituent\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Bahraini_Constituent_Assembly_election)

<sup>255</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State\\_Security\\_Law\\_in\\_Bahrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Security_Law_in_Bahrain);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973\\_Constitution\\_of\\_Bahrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Constitution_of_Bahrain)

torture were said to have taken place”.<sup>256</sup> In 2002, Bahrain changed its official name to Kingdom of Bahrain and the Emir declared himself King.<sup>257</sup> Ever since the Khalifa family acquired power in 1783, they have dominated all state institutions. The parliament in Bahrain was reconvened in 2002 after a long hiatus. This reopening was part of the political reforms initiated by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. From 1975 until 1992, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Since 1993, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. According to the FH classification, the country is classified as not free until 1988 with a score between 9 and 10 and falls into the category rather not free in our interpretation. From 1989, the score is between 11 and 14 and is classified as not free. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held from 1975 onward, which aligns with the observations of LIED. On 02/14/2002, Bahrain was officially declared a kingdom, and the first parliamentary elections since 1975 were held on 10/24/2002, marking the parliament's return to operation. Since 2002 general elections are regularly held but they are not considered to be free and fair. The elections were not competitive per LIED. The V-Dem EF&FI classifies the freedom and fairness of elections as ambiguous and later not present. Their CEI does the same for electoral cleanliness. In 2002, the constitution granted the king authority over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The monarch has the power to appoint and remove the prime minister and cabinet members, who are accountable to him rather than to the legislative.<sup>258</sup> The uncle of king Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, served as the country's sole prime minister from independence from Britain in 1971 until his passing in 2020. Hence, after 2002 Bahrain was a borderline case between a constitutional and an autocratic monarchy. In 2011, a prodemocracy movement was violently repressed by security forces and the authorities have methodically eradicated a wide spectrum of political rights and civil liberties, dismantled political opposition, and suppressed persistent dissent, particularly concentrated among the Shiite population.<sup>259</sup> Following his death, the crown prince and eldest son of the king, Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, assumed the role of prime minister, which he retained after a cabinet reshuffle subsequent to the parliamentary elections of November 2022.<sup>260</sup> On 11/12/2022 and 11/19/2022 elections for the

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<sup>256</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State\\_Security\\_Law\\_in\\_Bahrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Security_Law_in_Bahrain)

<sup>257</sup> <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/ruling-bahrain-part-i-emir-declares-himself-king>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain\\_2017?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain_2017?lang=en)

<sup>258</sup> <https://www.constituteproject.org/countries/Asia/Bahrain>

<sup>259</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahrain/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>260</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahrain/freedom-world/2023>



lower house were held.<sup>261</sup> However, the electoral process lacked competitiveness as major opposition groups were banned from participating. The performance of political societies overall was weak in the 2022 elections, with the majority of seats being won by independent candidates, including Sunni Islamists, due to a law enacted in 2018 that barred individuals from running for office if they were associated with dissolved political societies, had previously boycotted or been expelled from parliament, or had served a prison sentence of six months or longer. The political system features a bicameral structure, with the king appointing the 40-member Consultative Council as the upper house of the National Assembly. The lower house, known as the Council of Representatives, is comprised of 40 elected members serving four-year terms. While formal political parties are prohibited, individuals affiliated with “political societies” have been allowed to participate in elections. The electoral framework is criticized for being unfair, primarily due to the deliberate underrepresentation of Shiites, who make up the majority of the citizen population but have never secured majority representation in parliament. Furthermore, the body responsible for administering elections is not an independent body. It is headed by the justice minister, who is appointed by the crown prince. The political landscape is characterized by a monopoly on political power of the ruling family, with the constitution not allowing for a change in government through elections.<sup>262</sup> Civil liberties and political rights are severely restricted in Bahrain. For instance, courts have been convicting people and sentencing them to death based on trials that clearly weren’t fair. These verdicts were mostly based on confessions that were supposedly forced out of people through torture and harsh treatment.<sup>263</sup> As classified by FH for period between 2002 and 2008, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2008 onwards, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. LIED categorizes political liberties as absent for the entire regime period. V-Dem’s PCLI concurs with LIED on the absence of political liberties, except for brief periods where V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present in 1972, 1973, and 2002, and being in an ambiguous state from 2002 to 2010. Between 2002 and 2011, as per Polity5’s categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Since 2012, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power.

Autocratic Monarchy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>261</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_Bahraini\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Bahraini_general_election)

<sup>262</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bahrain/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>263</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/bahrain>

Additional sources (Herb 1999, Herb 2003, Herb 2004)

## Bangladesh

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [Part of British India, United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 06/23/1757]: The British East India Company, established in 1600 as a trading company attained wide-ranging control over large areas of the Indian subcontinent (see India). In 1757, following a battle in the town of Plassey between forces led by British and the Mughal nawab (viceroy), the East India Company emerged as the dominant political power in Suba Bangalah on 06/23/1757.<sup>264</sup> Bangladesh was under British colonial rule until 1947.

08/14/1947 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Pakistan, Electoral Oligarchy]: On this date, the Dominion of Pakistan was established. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General, had pledged to establish a new state that would uphold religious freedom and a secular democracy.<sup>265</sup> Even though the Dominion of Pakistan consisted of two geographically separated areas, it was governed as one entity. In 1956 however, it was split into West Pakistan and East Pakistan.<sup>266</sup> East Pakistan, the territory that later became Bangladesh, was both politically and economically dependent on West Pakistan. In the newly established state, Pakistan, the populace of Bangladesh, were denied access to positions of power and the accompanying privileges (Ahmed 2001: 516). Many of the positions in both civil service and the ministries were held by people from West Pakistan (Sayeed 1972: 389). The Pakistani ruling elites resorted to intimidation and force to retain their authority. During Pakistan's first general elections in 1970, the Awami League (BAL), a party based in East Pakistan that mobilized against Pakistani governance, secured a significant majority of seats in the federal legislatures. Additionally, it claimed victory in nearly all seats in the provincial assembly. Instead of transferring authority to the BAL, however, the military leaders in Pakistan initiated a conflict against East Pakistan on 03/26/1971 (Ahmed 2001: 516). LIED only starts to provide data for Bangladesh since 1971.

04/10/1971 End Part of Other Country [Pakistan, Military Autocracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On 03/26/1971, the Bangladesh Liberation War started, in which the Mukti Bahini fought a guerilla war against the Pakistani forces. In early December,

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<sup>264</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Plassey>

<sup>265</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#History>

<sup>266</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion\\_of\\_Pakistan#Partition\\_and\\_independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion_of_Pakistan#Partition_and_independence)

India intervened in the conflict, supporting the Bangladesh efforts.<sup>267</sup> On 04/10/1971, a Provisional Government of Bangladesh was established, after the Pakistani government newly elected in 1971 was never inaugurated. The reason that Pakistani officials did not want the new government to take office, was the victory of an East Pakistan party, the Awami League, which gained a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. This, in combination with Operation Searchlight, led to civil unrest and ultimately the civil war.<sup>268</sup> Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, also known as Sheik Mujib or simply Mujib, the leader of the Awami League, was arrested on 03/25. However, a had been formed with Sheikh Mujib as its president with the senior Awami League leaders who had attended the Mujib-Yahya talks as cabinet members. Tajuddin presented himself as the prime minister.” The Indian government allowed this provisional Bangladesh government to operate from within their borders. This government issued a declaration of independence on 04/10, which acted as a constitution for Bangladesh until 1972. The declaration announced the creation of a constituent assembly, composed of elected legislators, and proclaimed Bangladesh as a people's republic with its fundamental principles centered on "equality, human dignity, and social justice."<sup>269</sup> The parliament consisted of the elected Bengali members of Pakistan’s assemblies and they build the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh was divided into administrative units, which were governed by elected legislators.<sup>270</sup> On 12/16/1971 the Bangladesh Liberation War ended. The Provisional Government of Bangladesh under Mujibur took over and started to transform “East Pakistan’s state apparatus into an independent Bangladeshi state”.<sup>271</sup> While the Awami League had participated in elections in Pakistan prior to the country’s dissolution, the Mujib administration did not permit opposition parties or conduct fair elections (Blood 1988, Lansford 2012g). Universal suffrage was introduced upon Bangladesh’s independence in 1971.<sup>272</sup> On 07/10/1972, the constituent assembly formally adopted the constitution of Bangladesh, delineating the nation's structure as a secular, multiparty parliamentary democracy. Following this constitutional milestone, Bangladesh proceeded to join prominent international organizations, including the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Non-Aligned Movement.<sup>273</sup> As classified by FH for this

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<sup>267</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#First\\_parliamentary\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#First_parliamentary_era)

<sup>268</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970\\_Pakistani\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Pakistani_general_election)

<sup>269</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional\\_Government\\_of\\_Bangladesh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_Bangladesh)

<sup>270</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional\\_Government\\_of\\_Bangladesh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_Bangladesh)

<sup>271</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#First\\_parliamentary\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#First_parliamentary_era)

<sup>272</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>273</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#First\\_parliamentary\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#First_parliamentary_era);  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh\\_2014?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2014?lang=en)

regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. V-Dem's PCLI classifies the presence of political liberties as ambiguous in 1971 and as somewhat present in 1972 und 1973, while they were absent following LIED. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the year 1972, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

03/07/1973 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the first parliamentary elections were held. The elections were not free and fair. Opposition candidates were sometimes prevented from participating by abduction, and vote counting was abruptly halted in constituencies where opposition candidates were in the lead. Bangladesh Awami League won 293 of the 300 seats. This resulted in an electoral autocracy which was de facto extremely close to a one-party autocracy.<sup>274</sup> Under Mujibur's rule, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini was formed, a para-military force, which had to goal to crack down on left wing insurgencies. The group committed numerous human rights abuses without facing consequences. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED point out the absence of competitive elections. During these years, the V-Dem EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. According to FH, for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. V-Dem's PCLI scores political liberties as somewhat present in 1973 and 1974 and as not really present in 1975. According to LIED political liberties were not present in this period. In 1974, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/25/1975 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, Mujibur Rahman declared a state of emergency, after unrest arouse after the 1974 famine. He subsequently

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<sup>274</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973\\_Bangladeshi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Bangladeshi_general_election)

banned in a self-coup all other political parties and gave himself more power. The only legal party became the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL).<sup>275</sup> BAKSAL was a political front comprising Bangladesh Awami League, the Communist Party of Bangladesh, the National Awami Party (Muzaffar) and Jatiyo League. All civilian government employees, professionals, and trade union leaders were pressed to join the party.<sup>276</sup> According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period and continue to be absent until 1979, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

08/15/1975 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Shortly after declaring himself a practical dictator, a group of disgruntled military junior officers led by Major Syed Faruque Rahman violently overthrew and killed president Sheikh Mujibur. The officers devised a plan to substitute Rahman's secular government with an Islamic one.<sup>277</sup> Brigadier General Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, one of the junior officers leading the coup, was appointed as president (Blood 1988, Lansford 2012d:108).<sup>278</sup> In November 1975, martial law was declared. Tajuddin Ahmad, the country's initial prime minister, along with four other leaders of the independence movement, were assassinated during that time. Following the assassinations, Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem assumed the presidency under military rule.<sup>279</sup>

11/03/1975 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Major General Khaled Mosharraf took place to remove the assassins of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from power. Mosharraf put Major General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief of Army Staff, who was not believed to have supported the August coup, under house arrest.<sup>280</sup> As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1975, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

11/07/1975 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A coup led by socialist officers along with a mutiny by NCOs ousted on this date the military government and killed or arrested senior officers, among them Major General Khaled Mosharraf (Blood 1988,

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<sup>275</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970s\\_in\\_Bangladesh#Sheikh\\_Mujibur\\_Rahman\\_administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970s_in_Bangladesh#Sheikh_Mujibur_Rahman_administration)

<sup>276</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh\\_Krishak\\_Sramik\\_Awami\\_League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Krishak_Sramik_Awami_League)

<sup>277</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_coups\\_in\\_Bangladesh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_coups_in_Bangladesh)

<sup>278</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3\\_November\\_1975\\_Bangladesh\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3_November_1975_Bangladesh_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>279</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#Presidential\\_era\\_\(1975%E2%80%931991\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#Presidential_era_(1975%E2%80%931991))

<sup>280</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military\\_coups\\_in\\_Bangladesh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_coups_in_Bangladesh)

Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43).<sup>281</sup> Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem was made chief martial law administrator and presided over a cabinet headed by the three chiefs of the armed forces. Ziaur Rahman, the chief of the Army, became a deputy chief martial law administrator along with the two other chiefs of the Navy and Air force.<sup>282</sup> However, Bangladesh's constitution did not have any provision for these arrangements. On 04/21/1977 Ziaur Rahman, assumed the presidency replacing Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem, after the latter resigned on health grounds.<sup>283</sup> As President Rahman founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1978.<sup>284</sup> On 05/30/1977 voters were asked in a referendum "Do you have confidence in President Major General Ziaur Rahman?" and his adopted policies and programs was held, the result saw 98.9% vote yes, with a turnout of 88.1%. Although there is no serious challenge to the validity of the referendum, the critics are suspicious of such massive victory.<sup>285</sup> During his tenure, Rahman lifted martial law, reintroduced multiparty politics, privatized industries and newspapers, created BEPZA, and organized the country's second general election in 1979.<sup>286</sup> In the presidential elections of 1978, he was elected president by 76.6% of the vote.<sup>287</sup> "This was the result of the popularity that he enjoyed at that time among the masses who extolled his sincerity and dedication to the business of the state" (Khan 1979: 1035). According to FH's classification for the period between 1975 and 1977, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH's scoring for 1978, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties by V-Dem's PCLI can be interpreted as not really present and were classified as absent by LIED until 1979. Until 1977, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1978, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the years 1976 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative

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<sup>281</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7\\_November\\_1975\\_Bangladesh\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7_November_1975_Bangladesh_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>282</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency\\_of\\_Ziaur\\_Rahman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Ziaur_Rahman)

<sup>283</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency\\_of\\_Ziaur\\_Rahman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Ziaur_Rahman)

<sup>284</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziaur\\_Rahman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziaur_Rahman)

<sup>285</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977\\_Bangladeshi\\_presidential\\_confidence\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1977_Bangladeshi_presidential_confidence_referendum)

<sup>286</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh#History>

<sup>287</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978\\_Bangladeshi\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Bangladeshi_presidential_election)

constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1975 to 1977, in 1978 only executive elections were held. 02/18/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections were held. The announcement of the elections divided the opposition. Part of the opposition raised demands that should be met by the president so that the elections would not be boycotted. Rahman fulfilled many of these demands, such as the restoration of civil rights, which had been suspended by the emergency order of December 1974, and the commitment to release political prisoners. This led to the participation of almost all opposition parties (Khan 1979). The result was a victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which won 207 of the 300 seats.<sup>288</sup> The participation of nearly all parties led observers to consider the elections as credible.<sup>289</sup> After the elections, however, the opposition raised accusations of manipulation, an allegation for which there was never any real evidence. However, there were irregularities in the by-elections, which in turn lent credibility to the allegations of manipulation (Khan 1979). FH noted, “[t]he shadow of the violent military rule of the recent past still hangs over election processes and parliamentary independence” (Gastil 1980: 219). On 05/30/1981 Rahman was assassinated by military officers. Vice president Abdus Sattar succeeded him as acting president.<sup>290</sup> He was elected on 11/15/1981. AF, BR, HTW and MCM all classify this period still as military autocracy, at least until 1981, GWF and REIGN as personal and LIED as multiparty autocracy. We designate this era as an electoral autocracy due to the general elections of 1979, coupled with preceding concessions. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive according to LIED. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present in 1979 and 1980 and as ambiguous in 1981. According to LIED they were absent for this period. As per Polity5’s categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

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<sup>288</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Bangladeshi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Bangladeshi_general_election)

<sup>289</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Bangladeshi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Bangladeshi_general_election)

<sup>290</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981\\_Bangladeshi\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Bangladeshi_presidential_election)

03/24/1982 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On the specified date, a military coup orchestrated by General Hossain Ershad, the army chief of staff, deposed the BNP government and instituted a government under martial law (Blood 1988, Lansford 2012d, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43). Ershad suspended civil rights and the constitution, dissolved the parliament and banned all political parties.<sup>291</sup> In 1983 he assumed the presidency, promised presidential elections for the following year and legislative elections for the year after that. However, it took until 1986 for the elections to take place.<sup>292</sup> Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Per FH's evaluation for 1982, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1983 and 1984 the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1985 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

05/07/1986 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the government of Hussain Muhammed Ershad, who seized power in a military coup in 1982, lifted the ban on political parties and conducted a general election (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 14). The parliamentary elections on 05/07/1986 were won by Ershad's newly founded Jatiya Party with 153 of 300 seats. The BNP boycotted the elections, other opposition parties participated. International Journalist considered the elections a farce, and opposition parties raised allegations of manipulation.<sup>293</sup> On 10/15/1986 presidential elections were conducted. Ershad won with 84% of the vote. However, all major opposition parties boycotted the elections. Again, international newspapers reported widespread fraud and irregularities. In July 1987 mass protests under the lead of a united opposition occurred. In response, Ershad declared a state of emergency and dissolved the parliament on 12/06/1987. In 03/06/1988 parliamentary elections were held, which were boycotted by all major opposition parties. Contrary to the secular constitution, his party declared Islam as the state religion in 1988.<sup>294</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with

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<sup>291</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982\\_Bangladeshi\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_Bangladeshi_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>292</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986\\_Bangladeshi\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Bangladeshi_presidential_election)

<sup>293</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986\\_Bangladeshi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Bangladeshi_general_election)

<sup>294</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986\\_Bangladeshi\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Bangladeshi_presidential_election)



the observations of LIED. LIED underlines no electoral competitiveness for this time. Moreover, the V-Dem EF&FI scores elections under this regime as not really free or fair. Their CEI scores them as not clean. As classified by FH until 1988, Bangladesh scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For 1989, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/06/1990 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: Transition: Opposition parties and groups backed by students brought the economy and most of the country to a standstill leading to the ousting of Ershad. Power was handed over to Ahmed, the chief justice of the supreme court.<sup>295</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The miscoding issue appears to be linked to the brief duration of this regime.

02/27/1991 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, relatively free and fair elections were held, in which the BNP emerged as the largest party in parliament (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 14-15). Numerous international observers characterized the elections as both free and fair, with their outcome playing a crucial role in strengthening democracy following the anti-government protests of the late 1980s.<sup>296</sup> This marks the first time, that LIED classified elections in the country as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. According to FH, until 1992 under analysis, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. For the period from 1993 to 2001, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH, from 2002 onwards, the country receives a score of 8, which

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<sup>295</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990\\_Mass\\_Uprising\\_in\\_Bangladesh](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Mass_Uprising_in_Bangladesh)

<sup>296</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Bangladeshi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Bangladeshi_general_election)

we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. V-Dem's PCLI scores political liberties as somewhat present from 1991 onward. According to LIED political liberties were absent. In response to escalating lawlessness, the government deployed around 40,000 army personnel in an anti-crime initiative starting in October 2002, which extended into 2005. Although initially popular due to public concern over rising crime rates and perceived impunity for criminals, both domestic and international critics have denounced the police and army for their excessive actions during operations. Despite these efforts, lawlessness persisted, compounded by the escalating threat of Islamist extremism across most of the nation. On 08/17/2005, nearly 500 small bombs exploded in 63 out of 64 districts, primarily targeting government buildings, courts, and press clubs. Political violence also surged following August 2004, when a series of grenades detonated at an AL rally in Dhaka, resulting in 22 fatalities and numerous injuries, including several prominent party leaders. Although the government pledged an independent commission to investigate the attacks, concerns arose regarding its impartiality, and the perpetrators remain at large without facing justice (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006: 69). Furthermore, the two biggest parties, the BNP and the AL, have disrupted the legislative process through prolonged parliamentary boycotts while in opposition. In recent times, political violence during demonstrations and general strikes has resulted in hundreds of fatalities and thousands of injuries in major urban centers. Additionally, law enforcement frequently resorts to excessive force against opposition demonstrators (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006). According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For almost the entire relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Only for the year 2007, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

01/11/2007 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: The military installed a civilian caretaker government (Alamgir 2009: 47, Lansford 2012d: 109). In 2007, the interim government took action against corruption and bribery allegations targeting the leaders of the two major political parties, as well as some of their top aides. The aim was to address the issue of corruption in the country, which had gained

a reputation for being highly corrupt.<sup>297</sup> According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. V-Dem's PCLI categorizes political liberties as ambiguous for that period. LIED still codes them as absent. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For this transitional period, according to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were absent, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

12/29/2008 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, more or less free and fair parliamentary elections were held. The winning party took over power (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections were somewhat free and fair while the CEI indicates that regarding cleanliness the elections were ambiguous. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. LIED views political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI categorizes the presence of political liberties for this period as ambiguous with the exception of somewhat present in 2009. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the years 2010-2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2013, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

04/22/2013 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Hamid was elected president unopposed in 2013. During the parliamentary elections of 12/30/2018, the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) headed by Sheikh Hasina gained the majority with 257 seats. The

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<sup>297</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006%E2%80%932008\\_Bangladeshi\\_political\\_crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006%E2%80%932008_Bangladeshi_political_crisis)

electoral process was marred by incidents of violence against dissent that saw thousands of people and several political candidates arrested, threats, harassment of the opposition and allegations of electoral irregularities were raised.<sup>298</sup> The Bangladesh Awami League was re-elected in 2014 in polls boycotted by the opposition and marred by violence (Lansford 2021: 129). On 12/30/2018, the Awami League won most seats in elections defined by violence, electoral irregularities and accused of vote rigging.<sup>299</sup> On 02/07/2018, Hamid was re-elected president since no other candidates chose to contend the balloting (Lansford 2021). According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 2013 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Between 2014 and 2017, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. From 2018 onwards, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED categorized political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 2017 and as not really present from 2018 onward. General elections were held in Bangladesh on 01/7/2024, as required by the constitution. The Awami League, led by incumbent Sheikh Hasina, won the election for the fourth consecutive time, with less than 40% of eligible voters participating, according to the Election Commission, which is controlled by the ruling political party. The Awami League secured 224 seats, while independent candidates, many of whom were Awami League members posing as competition, won 62 seats.<sup>300</sup> REIGN is the only dataset to classify the regime after 2014 as democratic, while BMR classifies it as non-democratic, BR as a civilian autocracy and RoW and LIED as an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has classified elections as not competitive since 2014. The V-Dem EF&FI and CEI have scored elections as not really free or fair and not clean since 2014. . In 2013, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. From 2014 to 2017, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>298</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bangladesh/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>299</sup> <https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/bangladesh/political-situation-48720>

<sup>300</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_Bangladeshi\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Bangladeshi_general_election)

Additional sources (Ahmed 2001, Heitzman/Worden 1988, Wagner 2008, Alamgir 2009, Blood 1988, Lansford 2012d, Maniruzzaman 1992)

## **Barbados**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 02/17/1627]: On 02/17/1627 the English expedition ship ‘William and John’ landed on Barbados.<sup>301</sup> Hence, Barbados became a British Colony in 1627.<sup>302</sup> From 1833 to 1885 Barbados was part of the Windward Islands (with the governor of Barbados also governor of the Windward Islands) and from 01/03/1958 to 05/31/1962 part of the Federation of the West Indies. According to LIED, universal male suffrage was absent. Political liberties were absent for this period according to LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 1944 and as somewhat present from 1945 onward. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Political parties did not arise until the 1950s. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held.

12/13/1951 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date parliamentary elections with universal adult suffrage took place (LIED), which were won by for the Barbados Labour Party (Lansford 2021:138). Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. Until 1954, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. On 02/01/1954 Grantley Herbert Adams became the first Premier of Barbados.<sup>303</sup> According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period.

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<sup>301</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Barbados/Cultural-life#ref54603>

<sup>302</sup> [https://www.barbadosparliament.com/main\\_page\\_content/show\\_content/13](https://www.barbadosparliament.com/main_page_content/show_content/13)

<sup>303</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951\\_Barbadian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1951_Barbadian_general_election)

12/04/1961 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date the first free and fair elections were held after Barbados was granted self-government in October 1961. The Democratic Labour Party (DLP) won the election in December of the same year.<sup>304</sup> Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. The British monarch was formally head of state with merely ceremonial functions. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period onwards, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

11/30/1966 Continuation (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: On this date Barbados became independent.<sup>305</sup> An election confirmed the dominant position of the DLP, whose leader, Errol Walton Barrow, had been named premier in 1961 and was reappointed prime minister in 1971 (Lansford 2021:138). Barbados is a democratic country that conducts regular competitive elections and protects civil liberties.<sup>306</sup> In November 2021, Barbados transitioned from a constitutional monarchy under the British crown to a republic. This change involved removing Queen Elizabeth II as the head of state and declaring full sovereignty, with the first President of Barbados being sworn in. FH classifies Barbados for the whole regime period as free.<sup>307</sup> In snap elections in 01/2022 the Barbados Labor Party won all 30 seats of the parliament in the elections, while voter turn-out fell to about 42%.<sup>308</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since its independence Barbados held competitive elections. V-Dem's CEI declares somewhat clean election until 1980. For the remaining years electoral cleanliness is achieved. Moreover, V-Dem's EF&FI underlines free and fair election conditions since 1966. According to FH, from 1972 onwards, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. LIED as well as V-Dem PCLI classify political liberties as present since 1966. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's

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<sup>304</sup> [https://www.babadosparliament.com/main\\_page\\_content/show\\_content/13](https://www.babadosparliament.com/main_page_content/show_content/13) ;

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961\\_Barbadian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Barbadian_general_election)

<sup>305</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Barbados/British-rule>;

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados\\_2007?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados_2007?lang=en)

<sup>306</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/barbados/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>307</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/barbados/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>308</sup> <https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BB/BB-LC01/election/BB-LC01-E20220119/>

JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. British monarch was formally head of state with merely ceremonial functions.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Hillebrands/Falk 2005)

## **Belarus**

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Russia, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 02/26/1797]: In 1797, the Belarusian territories which had been annexed by the Russian Empire during the rule of Catherine II were incorporated into the Belarusian Governorate. As Belarus was closely connected to the Commonwealth of Poland-Lituania, it was affected by the third partitioning of Poland following Austrian, Prussian and Russian parley on 10/24/1795 to dissolve Polish-Lituanian Commonwealth, with the three conquering powers signing a treaty to divide the region on 02/26/1797.<sup>309</sup> During the 1840s, Nicholas I initiated a Russification campaign that banned the use of the Belarusian language in public schools, suppressed Belarusian publications, and attempted to force individuals who had converted to Catholicism during the Polish rule to revert to the Orthodox faith.<sup>310</sup>

11/07/1917 Continuation as Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Russian Soviet Republic was proclaimed.<sup>311</sup>

02/21/1918 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date, Minsk was taken over by the Germans in the context of the First World War.<sup>312</sup> On 03/03/1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed. As per the conditions of this brief agreement, Russia relinquished a portion of what is now Belarus, as well as Ukrainian and Baltic territories, to Germany.<sup>313</sup> While negotiating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Belarus declared its independence on 03/25/1918,

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<sup>309</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third\\_Partition\\_of\\_Poland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Partition_of_Poland)

<sup>310</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarus#Russian\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarus#Russian_Empire)

<sup>311</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian\\_Soviet\\_Federative\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic)

<sup>312</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus)

<sup>313</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Belarus/History#ref33454>

under German occupation, establishing the Belarusian People's Republic.<sup>314</sup> On 12/03/1918, the German troops withdrew from Minsk.<sup>315</sup>

12/10/1918 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, Minsk was taken over by the Soviet troops. The Rada (Council) of the People's Republic of Belarus went into exile, initially relocating to Kaunas, and subsequently moving to Berlin before ultimately settling in Prague.<sup>316</sup>

01/01/1919 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) was proclaimed belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.<sup>317</sup> Under Soviet administration women in Belarus were granted universal suffrage on 02/04/1919.<sup>318</sup>

02/17/1919 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Lithuanian–Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, the BSSR was dismantled, and a period of power struggle began in Belarus. A portion of the territory was amalgamated with the Lithuanian SSR to create the Lithuanian–Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (LBSSR), commonly referred to as Litbel, with its capital in Vilnius. The Belarusian Democratic Republic, was a state proclaimed by the Council of the Belarusian Democratic Republic in its Second Constituent Charter on 03/09/1918 during World War I. The Council proclaimed the Belarusian Democratic Republic independent in its Third Constituent Charter on 03/25/1918 during the occupation of by the Imperial German Army. During this time, as the Belarus National Republic clashed with Litbel, external powers were preparing to reclaim territories they considered their own: Polish forces were advancing from the West, while Russian forces were approaching from the East. When Polish forces captured Vilnius on 04/17/1919, the capital of the Soviet puppet state Litbel was relocated to Minsk. However, on 07/17/1919, Lenin disbanded Litbel due to the mounting pressure from advancing Polish forces in the West.<sup>319</sup>

08/08/1919 End Part of Other Country [Lithuanian–Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Poland, Defective

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<sup>314</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarus#Russian\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belarus#Russian_Empire)

<sup>315</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus)

<sup>316</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus)

<sup>317</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_Soviet\\_Republic\\_of\\_Byelorussia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Soviet_Republic_of_Byelorussia)

<sup>318</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage); [https://data.ipu.org/node/16/elections/historical-data-on-women?chamber\\_id=13335](https://data.ipu.org/node/16/elections/historical-data-on-women?chamber_id=13335)

<sup>319</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus)



Democracy]: On this date, Polish troops captured Minsk. Józef Piłsudski, the leader of Poland, had a vision of creating an Intermarium federation in Central and Eastern Europe to act as a buffer against both Germany in the west and Russia in the east. In pursuit of this goal, Poland initiated a Kiev offensive into Ukraine in 1920. However, this move triggered a counter-offensive by the Red Army of the Soviet Union, which advanced deep into Polish territory, coming perilously close to Warsaw. Additionally, the Soviet Red Army recaptured Minsk on 07/11/1920.<sup>320</sup>

07/31/1920 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Poland, Defective Democracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]: On 07/11/1920, Minsk was captured by the Red Army. On 07/31, the new Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was declared.<sup>321</sup> The following year, with the Treaty of Riga signed on 03/18/1921 and stating the end of the Polish-Soviet War, Belarus was partitioned between Poland and Russia.<sup>322</sup>

03/18/1921 End Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Russia, Communist Ideocracy and Poland, Defective Democracy]: With the Treaty of Riga and the following partition of Belarus, the country was controlled by two powers. Western Belarus was given to the Second Polish Republic. During this time, Belarusians were subject to the government's effort of Polonization. Their language, teachings and cultural practices were discriminated against.<sup>323</sup> Eastern Belarus fell under the administration of the RSFSR. In 1922, the SSRB was one of the founding members of the Soviet Union and became known under BSSR.<sup>324</sup>

09/17/1939 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy and Poland, Electoral Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date, soviet troops invaded Poland and consequently, Western Belarus became part of the BSSR.

06/28/1941 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On 06/22/1941, the Axis powers invaded the Soviet Union. On 06/28/1941, Minsk was captured by German troops and all present-day Belarus was captured within the end of August. The German occupation was marked by violence and death. Altogether, during World War II, Belarus suffered the loss of a quarter of its population before the war, including virtually its entire intellectual elite.<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus)

<sup>321</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus#)

<sup>322</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Riga](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Riga)

<sup>323</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western\\_Belorussia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Belorussia)

<sup>324</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byelorussian\\_Soviet\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byelorussian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic)

<sup>325</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus#)

09/02/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: With the end of the Second World War and the victory of the Allies, the BSSR became part of the USSR again.<sup>326</sup> LIED and V-Dem only starts to provide data for Belarus since 1991.

08/25/1991 End Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start (de facto) One-Party Autocracy: On this date the Belarussian parliament, still dominated by the Communist party (302 from 328 seats), declared independence from the USSR. The Supreme Soviet was elected prior to independence in an election that excluded the major opposition parties (Zaprudnik/Helen 1995, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43). The small opposition faction called the Belarussian Popular Front (BNF) was allowed to compete and managed to secure 26 seats. However, opposition was very limited and faced significant institutional restrictions. In December, Belarus, along with Russia and Ukraine, participated in the Alma Ata Declaration, leading to the complete dissolution of the USSR. Following an extended struggle, the still-prevalent former communist party consented to a new constitution and multiparty elections in 1994 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 15). As classified by FH for the regime period in 1992, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. In 1993 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were somewhat present in 1991 and present from 1992-1994. Whereas LIED codes them as absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. Since the elections in 1990 were not multiparty elections and the opposition in the parliament formed only after the election the regime is classified as a one-party autocracy. It is a borderline case between a communist ideocracy and a one-party autocracy. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present in this period. However, because meaningful opposition was not possible and elections continued to be dominated by the Communist Party, we still code this period as a one-party autocracy.

07/10/1994 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date there was a presidential election (second round)<sup>327</sup>, which was not won by the government

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<sup>326</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belarus#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belarus#)

<sup>327</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus\\_2004?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus_2004?lang=en)

candidate, but Alexander Lukashenka<sup>328</sup> (Korosteleva 1998:35-45, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43).<sup>329</sup> Nonetheless, the process of becoming more authoritarian commenced shortly after Lukashenka's election on 07/21/1994. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. His election marks the only ever competitive election according to LIED. One of his initial actions involved delaying parliamentary elections, allowing those who had been elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1990 to remain in office. The harassment of the opposition began only days after his election (Silitski 2003: 44-46, Marshall/Gurr/Jaggers 2010, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43-44). This assessment is founded on the notable limitations imposed on electoral politics, as well as attempts to circumvent both the legislature and the constitutional court by issuing executive decrees (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 72). Having previously ranked the elections of Belarus as somewhat free and fair since 1990, the V-Dem EF&FI dropped to scoring the elections as neither free nor fair since 2000. Their CEI similarly scores the elections as not clean. As classified by FH for 1995, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 1996 onwards, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED classifies political freedoms as absent since independence. According to V-Dem's PCLI political freedoms were somewhat present in 1995 and 1996, ambiguous from 1997 to 2001 and not really present from 2002 to 2015. V-Dem's PCLI codes a period of ambiguous presence of political freedoms from 2016 to 2019 and as absent since 2020. In 1995, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. Since 1996, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For 1995, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1996, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. During the rest of the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. In the 2008 parliamentary election, the government won all seats, maintaining its political control. Despite domestic and international calls for reform, Lukashenka remained defiant. He secured

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<sup>328</sup> Also transliterated as Lukashenko (Russian version of the name).

<sup>329</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander\\_Lukashenko](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Lukashenko)

another presidential term in 2010, which was marred by allegations of vote rigging by the opposition and international observers. He was reelected again in 2015 with accusations of irregularities. The 2019 parliamentary elections resulted in the opposition failing to win any seats, allowing Lukashenka's government to continue its hold on power. His reelection in 2020 was once again marred by irregularities and repression of the opposition. Following the sham election, the largest mass protests against the regime since its inception in 1994 erupted, with hundreds of thousands taking to the streets. The regime responded with violent crackdowns, prosecuting and sentencing countless opposition leaders to decades in prison.<sup>330</sup> A referendum held on 02/27/2022 allows the president to rule until 2035 and guarantees him impunity even after leaving office.<sup>331</sup>

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Fedor 1995, Korosteleva 1998, Ó Beacháin 2011, Sahn 2010, Silitski 2003, Steinsdorff 2010, Way 2005)

## **Belgium**

01/01/1900 (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 02/07/1831]: On 10/04/1830 Belgium proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands. From 08/25/1830 until 07/21/1831 the Belgium Revolution took place. On 02/07/1831 Belgium became the Kingdom of Belgium. On 04/19/1839 independence was recognized by the Netherlands. As parties emerged, initially beginning as representative clubs, the king's sway over cabinet formation and policy experienced a consistent decline. Subsequent to 1848, the monarch managed to dismiss the prime minister only on two occasions (in 1871 and 1884), despite the prime minister enjoying parliamentary support (Trefz 2010: 271). While the 1893 electoral reforms in Belgium were progressive for their era and marked a departure from more elitist voting systems, the plural voting system meant that it was not a full democracy in the sense that we understand today. The principle of 'one person, one vote' was not yet realized, and significant segments of the population, including women and those without property or certain educational qualifications, were either excluded or had limited influence compared to wealthier and more educated males. All datasets including the one's with a separate category for ruling monarchies like AF classify Belgium from 1900 on as a democracy or semidemocracy. According to our coding scheme

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<sup>330</sup> <https://specials.dekoder.org/freiheit-protest/belarus/>

<sup>331</sup> <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/belarus-referendum-101.html>

Belgium is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral oligarchy. However, because no universal male suffrage was guaranteed we classify it as an electoral oligarchy, despite the percentage of the population participating in elections is above 15. LIED as well as V-Dem's PCLI code political liberties as present for this period. From 1900 to 1907, according to the Polity5 indicator the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1908, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

08/04/1914 End (Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]: As part of the Schlieffen Plan to attack France, Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914, and a significant portion of the Western Front fighting during World War I took place in the western regions of the country.<sup>332</sup> According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1914, from 1915 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were ambiguous from 1914 to 1917 and somewhat present in 1918.

11/11/1918 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy: In 1919 a new electoral law enacted universal equal and secret suffrage for men. However, the enfranchisement of women was prevented by Liberals and Socials because they feared a majority of women would vote for the Catholics (Trefs 2010). In 1918 universal census suffrage for all men aged 25 and above since 1893. Depending on education and amount of taxes paid, males could cast between one and three votes. Widows were also allowed to vote but lost their voting rights after remarrying. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1918.<sup>333</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The country held competitive elections during this time (LIED). Moreover, the elections were clean, free and fair (V-Dem CEI, V-Dem EF&FI). According to LIED political freedoms were present until 1932 and V-Dem's PCLI codes political freedoms as present for the whole regime

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<sup>332</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium#Independent\\_Belgium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium#Independent_Belgium)

<sup>333</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

05/10/1940 End (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: In May 1940, German forces invaded Belgium for a second time, resulting in the deaths of 40.690 Belgians, more than half of whom were Jews, during the occupation and Holocaust. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Moreover, political liberties are indicated as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI interprets them as not really present during the German occupation. Belgium was liberated by the Allies from September 1944 to February 1945.<sup>334</sup>

09/03/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date the German occupation of Belgium ended.<sup>335</sup> According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1944, from 1945 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. During this time elections were still competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scores full electoral cleanliness since 1947. Furthermore, since 1947 the overall election conditions were free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). According to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI political freedoms have been resurged after 1946. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. In 1948 universal suffrage for women was introduced.<sup>336</sup> For the year 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

06/27/1949 End (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this date, the first parliamentary election in which women participated took place.<sup>337</sup> On 03/12/1950 the Belgium monarchy referendum took place. Questionable was whether King Leopold III. should return to the country after his time abroad and resume his

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<sup>334</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium#Independent\\_Belgium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium#Independent_Belgium)

<sup>335</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German\\_occupation\\_of\\_Belgium\\_during\\_World\\_War\\_II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_occupation_of_Belgium_during_World_War_II)

<sup>336</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>337</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1949\\_Belgian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1949_Belgian_general_election)

rights and duties as a monarch. 57.68% voted in favor of the Kings return.<sup>338</sup> Belgium is a parliamentary (Monarchical) democracy with a bicameral system, consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives. Belgium has a multi-party system. The Belgian monarchy is predominantly ceremonial, though the king maintains constitutional authority to moderate the government formation process.<sup>339</sup> While the King acts as head of state, the Prime Minister is the head of government.<sup>340</sup> Elections are generally free and fair, and the political landscape is fragmented but broadly diversified. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1949, LIED has categorized elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI have consistently scored Belgian elections as free, fair and clean ever since. Freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly are generally guaranteed. Belgium's judiciary is independent, and equal treatment is guaranteed.<sup>341</sup> In the FH database, Belgium is listed for the whole regime period as free.<sup>342</sup> As per FH's classification for this regime period since 1972, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. Federal elections took place on 05/26/2019, alongside the European and regional elections. All 150 members of the Chamber of Representatives were elected from eleven multi-member constituencies. The right-wing Vlaams Belang (VB) experienced a resurgence in Flanders, and along with the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), parties advocating Flemish separatism and nationalism secured nearly 50% of the vote in Flanders. The Belgian coalition of N-VA, CD&V, MR, and Open VLD lost over a quarter of its seats, marking the most significant government punishment in 20 years. Furthermore, the far-left Workers' Party of Belgium (PVDA-PTB) and the green Ecolo party made gains in Wallonia. Overall, traditional parties faced losses in both regions.<sup>343</sup> This trend continued in the 2024 federal elections, with the right-wing flemish separatist parties New

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<sup>338</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950\\_Belgian\\_monarchy\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950_Belgian_monarchy_referendum)

<sup>339</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belgium/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>340</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Belgium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Belgium)

<sup>341</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belgium/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>342</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belgium/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>343</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019\\_Belgian\\_federal\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Belgian_federal_election)

Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and Vlaams Belang (VB) winning first and second place. Followed by the Wallonian Movement for Reform (MRV) and Socialist Party in Wallonia (PS). The Worker's Party of Belgium (PVDA-PTB) continued their upwards trend coming in fifth.<sup>344</sup> (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Redslob 1918, Woyke 2009)

## **Belize**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 01/01/1862]: First colonized in the early 17th century by English woodcutters and shipwrecked sailors, the territory was historically known as British Honduras. In 1862, Belize became a Crown dependency governed from Jamaica, and it was established as a separate colony in 1884. The country's western boundary was defined in an 1859 convention, which Guatemala repudiated in 1940 (Lansford 2021: 160). A parliament was introduced in 1935, although its members were initially nominated. However, with the enactment of the British Honduras Constitution on 03/25/1954, the parliament was defined as comprising a Speaker, three ex officio members, three nominated members (British subjects), and nine elected members.<sup>345</sup> After years of political struggle, universal adult suffrage was won in 1954 by the People's United Party (PUP) with the support of the people. On 04/28/1954, the first general elections were held, and the PUP won eight of the nine elected seats and 67 per cent of the vote.<sup>346</sup> LIED confirms the absence of multiparty legislative elections prior to 1954. LIED classifies political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI doesn't contain information about Belize. While limited legislative elections for the legislative council did occur before 1954, it was dominated by the governing country and elected officials held very limited powers. Political parties only existed informally. Until 1935, according to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held. From 1935 to 1954 we only classify non-legislative elections as present, which contradicts the observations of LIED. From 1954 onwards, we agree with LIED, that multiparty legislative elections were present.

01/01/1964 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom,

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<sup>344</sup> <https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BE/BE-LC01/election/BE-LC01-E20240609/>

<sup>345</sup> <https://www.nationalassembly.gov.bz/history-of-the-legislature-of-belize/>.

<sup>346</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Nationalist\\_Movement\\_\(Belize\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Nationalist_Movement_(Belize))



(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this day, Belize became a self-governing unity as a new constitution came into force that decreased the governor's powers, formed a cabinet headed by a premier, and established a bicameral parliament. Moreover, it declared that general elections were held every five years and granted complete internal self-rule.<sup>347</sup> In 1964, following the implementation of universal suffrage, the composition of the legislature shifted, with a majority of its members being elected rather than appointed. Specifically, of the eighteen seats in the legislature, thirteen were elected and five remained appointed. From 1964, the British government only controlled the defense, foreign affairs, internal security, and public service in British Honduras.<sup>348</sup> Political liberties have been present since 1964 according to LIED. In preparation for its independence, the official name was changed into Belize on 06/01/1973. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

09/21/1981 Continuation (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy [as independent country]: Price held the position of Belize's initial prime minister until his party faced defeat by the United Democratic Party (UDP), led by Manuel Esquivel, in December 1984. Belize gained official recognition as an independent sovereign nation from Guatemala in September 1991. Despite this acknowledgment, a lingering border dispute persisted and remained unresolved when Dean Barrow assumed the role of prime minister in February 2008 after the UDP secured a decisive victory. General elections took place in Belize on 11/11/2020, to elect the 31 members of the House of Representatives. The People's United Party won 26 seats, marking its first national election victory since 2003, while the incumbent United Democratic Party secured the remaining 5 seats, experiencing its worst result since 1998. Despite challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and a recent tropical storm, voter turnout in the 2020 general elections exceeded 81%, the highest since 1998. Notably, the election saw the participation of the first female party leader and Prime Ministerial candidate in Belizean general election history, Nancy Marin of the Belize People's Front.<sup>349</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1964 the elections are considered as competitive according to LIED. In Belize regular shifts in power have occurred through competitive electoral processes. Belize adopted its constitution from Westminster. Now, the country is striving to shed this post-colonial legacy. In 2022, the Belizean parliament enacted the People's Constitution Commission Act, initiating

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<sup>347</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/belize/69.htm>

<sup>348</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Belize](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Belize).

<sup>349</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020\\_Belizean\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Belizean_general_election)

a process aimed at creating a genuine constitution crafted by the citizens of Belize. The success of this endeavor hinges on the commission's capacity to sustain widespread, cross-party support and to present a fair and equitable draft constitution.<sup>350</sup> Belize generally upholds civil liberties, although concerns linger regarding government corruption and a notable prevalence of violent crime. Addressing persistent issues such as police brutality and human trafficking within the country's borders has been a slow process for the authorities.<sup>351</sup> Belize is listed for the whole regime period as free according to FH.<sup>352</sup> As per FH's classification for this regime period since 1982, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. LIED classifies political liberties as present. V-Dem does not list the country in its dataset.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Hillebrands/Ortiz Ortiz 2005)

## **Benin**

[Formerly known as Dahomey]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 10/17/1899]: Dahomey became a French protectorate on 01/01/1894. Since 10/17/1899 it was a colony as part of French West Africa. In 1956 universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). Elections with a significantly restricted franchise took place in 1925, 1928, 1932, 1934, and 1936. LIED classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections as absent during this period. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were absent during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. 12/15/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: Elections for the General Council in French Dahomey took place on 12/15/1946 and 01/05/1947. The Dahomeyan Progressive Union emerged victoriously, securing 20 out of the 30 available seats. Political liberties were

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<sup>350</sup> <https://constitutionnet.org/news/will-belize-get-peoples-constitution-prospects-and-challenges>

<sup>351</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belize/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>352</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/belize/freedom-world/2024>

absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. In the timeframe 1947-1951, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as limited, showing weak judicial oversight, while V-Dem's LCE shows no value, usually reflecting the absence of a parliament to constrain the executive. However, in this case, there was clearly a parliament that V-Dem might have overlooked. For the year 1952, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

04/12/1958 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date Dahomey became a self-governing unit within the French Community (Republic of Dahomey) (Lansford 2021: 164). LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties as not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held.

04/02/1959 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Multiparty) Regime [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, fairly competitive pre-independence elections took place. On 08/01/1960 Dahomey became fully independent (Lansford 2021: 164, Marshall 2018c). However, after independence a highly problematic winner-take-all system, which cannot be considered democratic, was introduced. The election in one national district led to one party (Dahomeyan Unity Party) taking all seats with 68.7 per cent of the vote and the other party (Dahomeyan Democratic Union) with 31.3 per cent of the vote was left with no seat at all. Since the elections were competitive, the regime is not classified as a one-party autocracy (Decalo 1973:458, Ronen 1973: 27-28, Carter 1963: 229-231, Mathews 1966:144). In the month before the elections, several opposition deputies were dismissed from parliament and opposition party activists were harassed, further limiting their ability to compete. In April-May 1961, repression intensified. The opposition party was dissolved, and its leaders arrested (Decalo 1973: 458, Ronen 1973: 27-28, Carter 1963: 229-231, Mathews 1966:144, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 44). According to LIED only multiparty

legislative elections were held in 1959, in 1960 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. In addition, no electoral competitiveness was present (LIED). V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI classify the elections during this period as somewhat free and fair but not really clean. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present in 1959 and as ambiguous in 1960 and 1961. LIED classifies political liberties as absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

05/31/1961 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, accusations of plotting a coup resulted in the arrest of Ahomadegbe and the prohibition of his political organization, the Union Democratique Dahomeenne. Consequently, Dahomey transitioned into a one-party state under the governance of the Parti Dahomeende l'Unite (Marshall 2018c). It remains unclear which specific features of the rule under Hubert Maga as head of government brought GWF and AF to classify the regime as personalist. V-Dem EF&FI and CEI maintain their scoring. PRC classified it as democratic, which seems clearly wrong, and MCM as single party, which is in line with our observation. As it is often the case with regimes in Africa, there is a lot of disagreement in the regime classification. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to our observations, non-multiparty legislative and executive elections are classified as present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, LIED scores political liberties still as absent and V-Dem's PCLI changed to what we interpret as an ambiguous presence.

10/27[&28]/1963 End One-Party Autocracy /Start Military Autocracy: Extensive protests and a widespread general strike compelled the military to depose Maga and take control to reinstate order. The military replaced a civilian leader with another, effectively establishing a de facto military regime (Decalo 1973: 458-459, Decalo 1976:52, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 44). On 12/22/1965 Congacou, the President of the National Assembly, was given power as provisional President by General Christophe Soglo, Army Chief of Staff, and had a constitutional mandate to hold elections quickly. However, Congacou failed to do so and was overthrown by Soglo. Following a coup, General Soglo assumed direct control of power (Decalo 1973: 459-460, Decalo 1976: 8, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 44). Since 1965, based

on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Besides, political liberties were coded as absent (LIED) and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. In 1964 a limited legislative election was held. Therefore, according to our observations, non-multiparty legislative elections were present in 1964, yet absent during the rest of this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

12/17/1967 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Another round of political crisis coupled with a devastating general strike promoted a group of junior officers to depose General Soglo from power. Major Kouandate took power and established a provisional military government. The regime elite differed fundamentally even if both regimes were military. While in the previous regime top officers from the South dominated, in the new regime lower ranked officers from the South reigned (Bebler 1973: 20-23, Decalo 1973:464, Decalo 1976:55, 64-66, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 44-45). The new regime created the Military Revolutionary Committee as a decision-making body, but the main decisions were made by an informal junta (Bebler 1973:23). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Regarding the political liberties the scores remained the same (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were absent during this period, lasting until 1980, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

12/10/1969 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Zinsou, the civilian president chosen by the military, demonstrated a level of independence beyond what was anticipated, prompting Kouandete to order his abduction. The remaining officer corps declined to endorse Kouandete as the government leader but instead replaced Zinsou with a Military Directorate accountable to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This Directorate included representatives from major regions and factions. While Kouandete remained a part of this structure, his authority was curtailed, and he no longer held the predominant role (Bebler 1973:

25, Decalo 1973: 469-470, Decalo 1976: 72, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 44-45). On 12/13/1969 a Military Directorate responsible to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces replaced Zinsou/Kouandete. The regime is coded as a different regime because the regional/ethnic and rank composition of the ruling group changed. “Fon officers who had previously been retired or arrested under the former regime, were reinstated and entrusted with influential positions in the new government (Decalo 1976: 72-73, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 45). Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Political liberties were coded absent by LIED and can be interpreted as being in an ambiguous state per V-Dem's PCLI.

05/07/1970 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: In March 1970 elections were held that were aborted (Decalo 1970: 445). The military turned power over to an unelected civilian Presidential Council representing the three major regionally based leaders and parties in the country. The Presidential Council was to serve as a transitional body with the presidency to rotate among the three leaders in preparation for new democratic elections. The military withdrew from politics and members of the presidential council agreed to rotate the presidency (Decalo 1973: 470-476, Decalo 1976: 76f, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 45). In 1970 and 1971, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. For 1971, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1972, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED continued to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI can be interpreted with an ambiguous presence of political liberties.

10/26/1972 End Non-Electoral Autocratic Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Presumably frustrated with the unstable nature of the rotating presidential system, General Mathieu Kérékou together with junior officers staged a coup and established himself as the head of a Military Committee for the Revolution.<sup>353</sup> They replaced the entire senior military establishment (Decalo 1973: 476-477, Decalo 1976-80, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014:

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<sup>353</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathieu\\_K%C3%A9r%C3%A9kouLI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathieu_K%C3%A9r%C3%A9kouLI)

45). According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were not really present in 1973 and absent in the following years until 1989. LIED identifies political liberties as absent. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

11/30/1974 End Military Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date, Commander Mathieu Kérékou declared that the country is communist. On 11/30/1975 Benin was named the People's Republic of Benin. Strikes and demonstrations from late 1989 to mid-1990 forced the Kerekou government to agree to a National Conference, which transformed itself into a transitional interim government (Soble 2007). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Until 1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the year 1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, for this period LIED and V-Dem's PCLI coded political liberties as absent. In the one-party system, unfree and fair legislative elections were staged in 1980. According to our observations, only non-multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

02/25/1990 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Liberalizing Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date the National Conference was opened. It declared sovereignty and appointed a transitional government. The role of Kerekou was reduced to a figurehead. He gave up the Defense Ministry and military provincial prefects were replaced by civilians. On 03/01/1990 Benin became the Republic of Benin. The transitional government was led by the opposition and rewrote the constitution (Englebert 2004: 67-68).<sup>354</sup> According to FH, for the

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<sup>354</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin\\_1990?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990?lang=en)

regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Political liberties according to V-Dem's PCLI were somewhat present for this period and still absent following LIED. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In this period of transition, according to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were absent, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

02/17/1991 End Non-Electoral Liberalizing Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date the first multi-party elections (for parliament) in the country since 1964 took place.<sup>355</sup> On 03/10+24/1991 multi-candidate presidential elections were held.<sup>356</sup> The elections were won by opposition politician Nieephore Soglo, who had headed the transitional government (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 16). Per FH's scoring until 1994, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. For the period from 1995 to 1998, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. In 1999, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework and in 2000 the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. Between 2001 and 2002 Benin is rated once again as free with a score of 5 (rather not free in our interpretation). From 2003 onwards, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4. Political liberties according to LIED were present from 1995 to 2017 and according to V-Dem's PCLI present from 1991 to 2018 and somewhat present from 2019 onward. Free and fair elections were the norm in Benin from 1991 to 2016 although there have been claims of electoral fraud in the 2001 presidential elections, leading to a boycott by the Renaissance Party of Benin (Gisselquist 2014: 137).<sup>357</sup> Freedom of expression and association were generally respected, although there were periods of restriction, such as the months-long ban on student association activities that began in late 2016. Additionally, corruption remained a challenge. While the executive branch generally acknowledged judicial independence, the courts operated with inefficiency and susceptibility to corruption. The procedures for nominating and advancing judges lacked transparency.<sup>358</sup> According to our observations, multiparty legislative

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<sup>355</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Beninese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Beninese_parliamentary_election)

<sup>356</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Beninese\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Beninese_presidential_election)

<sup>357</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3\\_November\\_1975\\_Bangladeshi\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3_November_1975_Bangladeshi_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat); <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BEN>; <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BEN>

<sup>358</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2018>



and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED and our observations the elections were competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the elections as somewhat free and fair while the CEI scores bounces between in our interpretation somewhat clean and elections with ambiguous cleanliness. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. From 1992 to 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2018, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. The following year, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

04/28/2019 End Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: The government under Talon elected in 2016 introduced a new electoral code in 2018 that required parties to obtain a threshold of 19 percent of the overall votes to win seats in the National Assembly and pay a deposit to put up candidates. Moreover, the national Constitutional Court declared further party assessments in February 2019, which were only passed by two parties.<sup>359</sup> The 2019 legislative elections were described as neither free nor fair. Only the Republican Bloc and the Progressive Union, both of which are assumed to be linked to incumbent President Patrice Talon, were registered to contest the elections, while the election commission disapproved the applications of the five other opposition groups.<sup>360</sup> Protests erupted following the elections demanding the President Talon's resignation. As a response, security forces arrested major opposition leaders and political journalists. In April 2021, President Talon was re-elected as president with 86 percent of the vote (Lansford 2021: 167).<sup>361</sup> In parliamentary elections on 01/08/2023 the pro-government parties emerged as winners, ensuring that the incumbent president, Patrice Talon, continued to lead the government, despite not being a member of either party. Talon enjoyed support from both the UPR and BR. Éric Houndété, leader of the opposition LD party, alleged instances of vote buying and ballot stuffing without providing evidence. He expressed dissatisfaction with the election results, claiming that they did not reflect the will of the people to make his party the leading political force in the country. Election observers, including the local organization Civic Academy for Africa's Future (CiAAF), noted that these elections were notably free from violence compared to previous elections in 2019 and 2021.<sup>362</sup> According to

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<sup>359</sup> <https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/africa/suicide-of-a-democracy-3438/>.

<sup>360</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019\\_Beninese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Beninese_parliamentary_election)

<sup>361</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2020>

<sup>362</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_Beninese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Beninese_parliamentary_election)

LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held. While our observations indicate that the elections were not free, fair, or transparent, they were nonetheless multiparty, thereby fulfilling the prerequisites for an electoral autocracy. Elections were not competitive per LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections were not really free or fair and their cleanliness was ambiguous per V-Dem's CEI. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 until 2020 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From 2021 onwards, the country is partly free per FF with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Moreover, regarding the political liberties they are absent since 2019 per LIED. We classify V-Dem's PCLI as dropping back to somewhat present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Carter 1963, Decalo 1990a, Hartmann 1999, Houngnikpo 2001, Lansford 2021, Magnusson/Clark 2005, Mathews 1966, Ronen 1973, Soble 2007)

## **Bermuda**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1684]: Bermuda was discovered in the early 1500s and had no indigenous population. In 1612 the Virginia Company established a colonial government of the settler colony under Richard Moore, the first Governor of Bermuda.<sup>363</sup> In 1615, the colony was passed on to the Somers Isles Company. In 1649 the British royalists ousted the Somers Isles Company's Governor and elected John Trimmingham as their leader.<sup>364</sup> In 1684 the colony became administered by the British crown, as crown colony.<sup>365</sup> As the Bermudians invested in smuggling and trade with America amid the War of Independence, the relationship between Bermuda and the United Kingdom began to break down. Upon the death of George Bruere in 1780, the governorship passed to his son, George Jr., an active loyalist. Under his leadership, smuggling was stopped, and the Bermudian colonial government was populated with crown loyalists. During the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States, the British attacks

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<sup>363</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Bermuda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Bermuda)

<sup>364</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bermuda>

<sup>365</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bermuda/History>

were planned and launched from Bermuda.<sup>366</sup> In 1815 the colonial capital was transferred from St. George to Hamilton on Main Island. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century the colony developed thriving industries in tourism and international finance. The U.S. government acquired lease for military bases in 1941, their military presence lasted until 1995. The British army garrison was withdrawn in 1957, a Canadian base closed in 1993, and a small remaining Royal Navy base ceased operating in 1995.<sup>367</sup> In 1960 universal adult suffrage and the development of a two-party political system was promulgated, before that suffrage was dependent on a certain level of property ownership. The first Bermudian political party, the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), organized in 1963, claimed to represent the non-white citizens.

06/02/1968 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Universal suffrage and a parliamentary democracy was adopted under the Bermuda Constitution Act 1967 of the United Kingdom, that came into effect on 06/02/1968. The constitution provides the island with formal responsibility for internal self-government, while the British Government retains responsibility for external affairs, defence, and security. The Bermudian Government is always consulted on any international negotiations affecting the territory.<sup>368</sup> It also gave strong powers to the elected head of the majority political party in the legislature. The elections of 05/1968 placed the multiracial United Bermuda Party (UBP) in power. Political tensions increased in 1973 when the governor, Sir Richard Sharples, was assassinated by local Black Power militants during a period of civil unrest. Resulting political unrest and rioting led to official efforts to end de facto racial discrimination and to begin independence talks. In a referendum held in August 1995, however, nearly three-fourths of those voting opposed independence. The PLP won the 1998 elections, and its leader, Jennifer Smith, became Bermuda's first PLP premier. On 05/21/2002 the British Overseas Territories Act changed the status of Bermuda to overseas territory with significant autonomy<sup>369</sup> and additionally granted full British citizenship to Bermudians, which would not automatically accrue to citizens of an independent Bermuda.<sup>370</sup> Bermuda officially is the oldest self-governing British Overseas Territory. In 2004 full independence from Great Britain was still an issue and the PLP government established a commission to reach independence, but they found no

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<sup>366</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bermuda>

<sup>367</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bermuda/History>

<sup>368</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Bermuda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Bermuda)

<sup>369</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/bermuda/82716.htm>

<sup>370</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bermuda/History>

support among the population.<sup>371</sup> Even though the PLP dominated the political landscape for much of this time, there have been peaceful transitions of power and changes in government.<sup>372</sup> Fair and free general elections were held in October 2023, with voter turnout at 55%. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period. The PLP maintained its dominance, securing 62% of the votes and 83% of parliamentary seats, David Burt became the acting premier of Bermuda.<sup>373</sup> FH, LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Bermuda.

Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Bhutan**

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 11/11/1865]: Bhutan fought with the British in 1864-65 over the so-called Duars region at the southern foothills of the Himalayas. Losing the war, the local rulers of Bhutan “Druk Desi”<sup>374</sup> ceded part of the territory (Sikkim, Assam and Bengal) to the British rulers (which became part of British India) in the framework of a treaty signed at Sinchhula on 11/11/1865. However, Bhutan was compensated by the British and its rulers retained full sovereignty (Gallenkamp 2011). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/17/1907 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy independent country]: On this date, the monarchy was established as the Kingdom of Bhutan, unifying the country under the control of the Wangchuck dynasty who was chosen as the hereditary ruler (Gallenkamp 2011).<sup>375</sup> In this time period, the monarchy of Bhutan came under de-facto guardianship of British India (Mehdi 1988). On 01/08/1910 the British tutelage over the Kingdom of Bhutan was formalized by a treaty in 1910, according to which the Bhutan rulers agreed that the Government of India (back then under British direct rule as British India) oversaw Bhutan’s foreign relations. In return, the Kingdom of Bhutan received guarantees of

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<sup>371</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bermuda>

<sup>372</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012\\_Bermudian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Bermudian_general_election)

<sup>373</sup> <https://bermudaelection.com/all/2020-general-election-results/>

<sup>374</sup> The Druk Desi was either a monk or a member of the laity—by the nineteenth century, usually the latter; he was elected for a three-year term, initially by a monastic council and later by the State Council.

<sup>375</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12641778>

protection from the north. By this agreement, the British maintained their influence in the region, towards China (Mehdi 1988). This period is coded as protectorate, since there was a consensual treaty in effect that allowed the British a substantial influence of the Kingdoms' foreign relations in exchange of protection. After India attained formal independence in 1949, it signed a new treaty of friendship with Bhutan on 08/08/1949, that affirmed Bhutan's independence but at the same time restricted Bhutan's status as an independent and sovereign state (Crawford 2006) and in which Bhutan agreed "to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations" (Crawford 2006).<sup>376</sup> Scholars are generally divided upon the status of Bhutan's sovereignty in presence of this agreement because Bhutan has delegated a certain degree of influence over its foreign relations to India. For example, Bhutan cannot establish diplomatic relations with another country without the consent from India (Mehdi 1988). However, from 2007 on it is undisputed that Bhutan is a fully sovereign country. While Bhutan established its first legislative body in 1953, the National Assembly, its representatives were government appointed or not elected directly. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held until 1953. From 1953 onwards, only non-legislative elections were held in this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Per FH's scoring for the period between 1972 and 1977, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1978 and 1988 Bhutan scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1989 onwards a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as absent until 1952, not really present from 1952 to 1999 and as ambiguous from 2000 to 2007. For the entire time political liberties are absent according to LIED. Between 1907 and 2004, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 2005 to 2007, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1908 to 1951, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1952, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1953 to 1997, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive

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<sup>376</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12641778>

were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1998-2007, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 2008, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/24/2008 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: Pursuant to a royal decree issued in June 2007, the first general elections to the new 47-member National Assembly – the lower Chamber of the parliament – were held on this date. They followed elections to the newly created upper chamber – the National Council – held in December 2007 and January 2008 (Gallenkamp 2011, Crawford 2006).<sup>377</sup> There is a dispute if Bhutan is in recent years a - democratic - ceremonial monarchy or a ruling constitutional monarchy. In March 2008, the first general elections to a newly established 47-member lower chamber of the parliament held. In the third National Council elections, 20 members (again, all independents) were elected in single-member constituencies on 04/20/2018. Five more members were appointed by the king. Two rounds of elections for Bhutan's National Assembly were held on 10/15&18/2018. The 47 seats were contested by four parties in the first round, with the two parties that won the highest number of votes progressing to the second round. In the second round the Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), led by Lotay Tshering, won 30 of the 47 seats with 55.0% of the vote against the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT; Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party), led by Pema Gyamtsho, which gained 17 seats and 45.0% of the vote. Turnout was 66.4% in the first round and 71.5% in the second. Bhutan's first formal constitution came into force on 07/18/2008, after a period of almost seven years of planning. Executive power is vested in the Council of Minister.<sup>378</sup> Bhutan functions as a constitutional monarchy featuring executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Druk Gyalpo serves as the head of state but is required to step down upon reaching the age of 65. While females are included in the line of succession, a male heir takes precedence, even if younger. The parliament consists of two chambers: the upper house, National Council, comprises 25 members (20 elected and five appointed by the king), and the lower house, National Assembly, has a maximum of 55 members (47 members as of March 4, 2020), elected through single-member constituencies. Both houses have five-year terms, but the

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<sup>377</sup> [http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2035\\_08.htm](http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2035_08.htm); <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12641778>

<sup>378</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bhutan\\_2008?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bhutan_2008?lang=en)

National Assembly can be dissolved early in the event of a political impasse, requiring a two-thirds majority from its members and the monarch's concurrence. The monarch can declare a state of emergency for up to 21 days, with an extension requiring a two-thirds vote from Parliament in a joint session (Lansford 2021:172). Bhutan is a borderline case between a constitutional monarchy and a ceremonial monarchy, in this case namely a monarchical defective democracy. Policies and legislation are mostly determined by elected officials; however, the monarch still has considerable influence.<sup>379</sup> In the 2023-2024 parliamentary elections, the People's Democratic Party won the majority, securing 30 out of 47 seats on the national assembly in a fair and free election that is becoming increasingly competitive. Voter turnout was at 65%.<sup>380</sup> However, despite notable democratic institutions, the monarch retains its special prerogatives. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED still identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that they have been somewhat present since 2008. Between 2008 and 2012, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. From 2013 to 2017, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. In 2018, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Constitutional Monarchy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Lehr 2001, Rizal 2015, Savada 1993)

## **Bolivia**

[officially known as the Plurinational State of Bolivia]

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 08/06/1825]: On 08/06/1825, after the Bolivian War of Independence from Spain, the Declaration of Independence was issued.<sup>381</sup> On 07/21/1844, its independence was recognized by Spain. From 1850 onward, direct elections with restricted suffrage became the norm. The criteria for voting encompassed possessing a minimum level of property, income, or engagement in one of the professions, while individuals

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<sup>379</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bhutan/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>380</sup> <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/bhutans-2024-elections-economic-complexities-and-regional-dynamics>

<sup>381</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1825\\_in\\_Bolivia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1825_in_Bolivia)

'in domestic service' were prohibited from voting. This effectively led to the exclusion of indigenous peoples from participating in the electoral process.<sup>382</sup> Another restriction was literacy, which had been enshrined in the constitution of 1826 and maintained up until the constitution of 1945 (Engerman/Sokoloff 2005: 912). According to our observations, only non-multiparty legislative elections were present until 1904 with the first presidential elections. From 1904 onwards, we classify multiparty legislative and executive elections as present which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores all elections up to this point as neither free nor fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. According to the consensus of BMR, RoW, LIED the electoral regime cannot be considered democratic. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and not really present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

07/11[&12]/1920 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Party) Regime: In a bloodless coup, the Republican Party overthrew President José Gutiérrez Guerra from the Liberal Party.<sup>383</sup> The Congress elected in May 1920 was prevented from taking office. Bautista Saavedra became president. Immediately after the coup, the Republican Party split into two new parties, the Republican Socialist Party led by Bautista Saavedra and the Genuine Republican Party, led by Daniel Salamanca.<sup>384</sup>

11/14/1920 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Party) Regime/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date, a new National Congress was elected. On 01/24 the National Congress elected Bautista Saavedra President of the Republic.<sup>385</sup> While the regime was an electoral autocracy it came close to a one-party autocracy. The Republican Party won 60 out of 63 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and all seats in the Senate. Saavedra expelled leaders from the Genuine Republican Party from the country and used extra-constitutional means to remain in power. Moreover, he annulled the 1925 elections due to technicalities and set up Hernando Siles and his own brother Abdón Saavedra for the repeated election. In 1926 Saavedra chose

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<sup>382</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Bolivia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Bolivia)

<sup>383</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1920\\_Bolivian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1920_Bolivian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>384</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bautista\\_Saavedra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bautista_Saavedra)

<sup>385</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/bolivia-1917-present/>;  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/December\\_1920\\_Bolivian\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/December_1920_Bolivian_legislative_election)



Hernando Siles, the founder of the Nationalist Party, as his successor.<sup>386</sup> The restricted voting rights continued to exist in this period. These included property, income, and literacy requirements (Engerman/Sokoloff 2005: 912).<sup>387</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores all elections up to this point as neither free nor fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

05/28/1930 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: In 1930 Siles tried to stay in office after his tenure expired.<sup>388</sup> This led to a military coup on this date led by General Carlos Blanco Galindo. He replaced Siles (Whitehead 1991: 513, Lentz 1999: 52-53, Casey et al. 2020: 2).<sup>389</sup> As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present.

03/05/1931 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date Blanco Galindo's regime ended after an election resulted in Daniel Salamanca's victory" (Lentz 1999: 53, Casey et al. 2020: 2). Despite his earlier championing of clean elections, Salamanca engaged in similar electoral fraud and manipulation as his predecessors. On 11/27/1934, during the disastrous Chaco War (July 1932- June 1935), the elected republican president Daniel Salamanca was overthrown in a military coup and replaced by his liberal Vice President José Luis Tejada. (Centeno 2002: 58, Klein 2011: 169, 171, 178-79, 181-82).<sup>390</sup> Moreover, the coup

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<sup>386</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bautista\\_Saavedra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bautista_Saavedra)

<sup>387</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Bolivia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Bolivia)

<sup>388</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hernando\\_Siles\\_Reyes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hernando_Siles_Reyes)

<sup>389</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Blanco\\_Galindo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Blanco_Galindo)

<sup>390</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Chaco-War>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel\\_Salamanca](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Salamanca)

effectively annulled the general elections held on 11/11/1934.<sup>391</sup> Voting rights remained restricted. The property requirements were only lifted in 1938, but literacy requirements remained (Engerman/Sokoloff 2005: 912).<sup>392</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The 1931 elections were the first Bolivian elections that LIED classifies as competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates no clean elections. Moreover, not really free and fair election conditions were achieved (V-Dem EF&FI). Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 1932 to 1935, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1936, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

05/17/1936 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: In a big labor strike, Germán Busch demanded Tejada Sorzano to be deposed. Shortly after the military overthrew the government of Tejada, a military junta was established in which Busch was interim president. On 05/22/1936 General David Toro became president of new junta.<sup>393</sup> On 07/13/1937, after a coup d'état, David Toro was deposed and Germán Busch became president of the junta.<sup>394</sup> However, this was a continuation of the military autocracy. The coup led by General David Toro resulted in the end of President Salamanca's term and the beginning of military rule in Bolivia. Colonel David Toro and Colonel German Busch ousted Tejada from power in May 1936.(Klein 2011: 181, 187, Casey et al. 2020: 3). On 04/15/1940, following Busch's suicide, the Army's high command, under General Carlos Quintanilla and having gradually sidelined 'radical' officers, orchestrated a transition back to civilian governance (Klein 2011: 194-95, Casey et al. 2020: 3). General Enrique Penaranda, backed by a coalition of traditional parties (Liberal-Republican alliance) opposing the left, emerged victorious in the 1940 elections. His administration subsequently shut down left-wing publications and suppressed labor organizing (Klein 2011: 196, 199-200, Casey et al. 2020: 3). According to

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<sup>391</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1934\\_Bolivian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1934_Bolivian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>392</sup>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Bolivia#Direct\\_elections\\_with\\_restricted\\_suffrage,\\_1839\\_and\\_1850-1938](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Bolivia#Direct_elections_with_restricted_suffrage,_1839_and_1850-1938)

<sup>393</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germ%C3%A1n\\_Busch#1936\\_coup\\_d'%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germ%C3%A1n_Busch#1936_coup_d'%C3%A9tat)

<sup>394</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germ%C3%A1n\\_Busch#1936\\_coup\\_d'%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germ%C3%A1n_Busch#1936_coup_d'%C3%A9tat)

the CHISOLS (Rice) report, all traditional parties endorsed General Enrique Penaranda, which is why we do not consider the elections free and fair and thus do not classify this regime period an Electoral Autocracy. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present after the 1953 elections. Before, we classify them as absent, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the year 1937, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1938 to 1942, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1943, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Moreover, political liberties were absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as not really present following V-Dem's PCLI.

12/20/1943 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A coup d'état of nationalist junior officers led by Major Gualberto Villarroel overthrew General Peñaranda and brought to power a junta headed by Villarroel (Klein 1969: 368-670, Corbett 1972: 403, Times 1943).<sup>395</sup> From March to December 1944, under US pressure, the MNR was barred from the cabinet, yet it maintained its alliance with the government and retained political significance (Klein 1969: 373, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 45-46). Junior officers executed a coup d'état, ousting Penaranda (Whitehead 1991: 526, Klein 2011: 201, Casey et al. 2020: 3). According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the years 1944 and 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Political liberties were absent per LIED and V-Dem PCLI indicates that they were not really present.

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<sup>395</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualberto\\_Villarroel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualberto_Villarroel)

07/21/1946 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: An enraged armed mob of civilians and some military elements stormed Villarroel's palace, brutally murdered him and hung him up on the street. The mob appointed Néstor Guillén to the role of acting president (Klein 1969: 382, Corbett 1972: 403, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 45-46). The civil junta consisted of labor, teacher, and student representatives as well as magistrates of the Superior District Court of La Paz.<sup>396</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/05/1947 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date general elections were held, which were won by the Republican Socialist Unity Party, which was despite its name a conservative party (Klein 1969: 382).<sup>397</sup> We agree with GWF that this period was oligarchic. There were severe suffrage limitations, that excluded illiterates. This prevented a huge part of the population from voting. It is estimated that in 1951 only 7% of the population or 28% of adult males were able to vote (Klein 1969: 404, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46). On 10/22/1949 José Enrique Hertzog Garaizábal was forced to resign by his own party after losing the parliamentary elections of 1949, officially for health reasons. His vice-president Mamerto Urriolagoitía Harriague took over. His presidency was characterized by harsh repression of the opposition.<sup>398</sup> He is regarded as the final constitutional president of the predominantly oligarchic social and political system.<sup>399</sup> On 05/06/1951 limited participation elections resulted in the victory of a leftist candidate Victor Paz Estenssoro (while remaining in exile in Argentina). He was the founder and leader of the National Revolutionary movement (MNR), which was officially banned at the time. According to our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores all elections up to this point as neither free nor fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making

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<sup>396</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Bolivia\\_\(1946%E2%80%931947\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Bolivia_(1946%E2%80%931947))

<sup>397</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947\\_Bolivian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1947_Bolivian_general_election)

<sup>398</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamerto\\_Urriolagoit%C3%ADa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamerto_Urriolagoit%C3%ADa);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enrique\\_Hertzog](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enrique_Hertzog)

<sup>399</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamerto\\_Urriolagoit%C3%ADa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamerto_Urriolagoit%C3%ADa)

power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/16/1951 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by General Hugo Ballivián Rojas took place. The military established a junta led by Roja and annulled the results of the election fearing that the leftist candidate Paz Estenssoro becomes president (Klein 1969: 399f, Marshall 2018d, Alexander 1982: 178-179, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46).<sup>400</sup> According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present.

04/09[-11]/1952 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: The MNR launched a three-day armed rebellion which ended with the defeat of General Ballivián and loyalist military forces. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the winner of the 1951 limited suffrage election, took over the presidency. Under the presidency of Paz Estenssoro, universal suffrage was granted by decree in 1952, suffrage was extended to women and illiterates before the next election. However, the regime is not coded as democratic because of violence against the opposition (Malloy 1971:124-131, Corbett 1972:403, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46). Furthermore, many civil rights were suspended (Zunes 2001).<sup>401</sup> On 06/17/1956 general elections were held. Hernán Siles Zuazo of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) was elected president with 84% of the vote, whilst the MNR won 61 of the 68 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and all 18 seats in the Senate.<sup>402</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED confirms the absence of electoral competitiveness. Elections between 1956 and 1964 are scored by V-Dem's EF&FI as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness, while their CEI continues to score them as not clean. V-Dem's PCLI codes political liberties as not really present until 1952 and being in an ambiguous state from 1953 to 1963. LIED views political liberties as absent in this period.

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<sup>400</sup> <https://www.onwar.com/data/bolivia1951.html>

<sup>401</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivian\\_National\\_Revolution#Controversy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bolivian_National_Revolution#Controversy)

<sup>402</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956\\_Bolivian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Bolivian_general_election)

Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/04/1964 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General and Vice President René Barrientos, former head of the army, along with General Alfredo Ovendo, the Commander of the Bolivian Air Forces, overthrew the MNR government (Corbett 1972:408-410, Wagner 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46). According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were not really present during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the year 1965, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For this time regarding to LIED the political liberties were still absent, while V-Dem's PCLI scores decreased into a range which we interpret as not really present. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

07/03/1966 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections which are not considered to be free and fair took place. The presidential election was won by Barrientos. Although he was a general, his government substantially civilianized (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46) and the regime is classified as an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Its elections, however, are scored as not competitive by LIED, not really free or fair by V-Dem's EF&FI and not clean by their CEI. V-Dem's PCLI as well as LIED code political liberties as absent for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/26/1969 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Frustrated with the civilian government and having presidential ambitions of his own, General Ovando disposed of the

Siles Salinas regime and the civilian institutions (Corbett 1972: 416). The coup led to a regime controlled by the Superior Council of the Armed Forces with a rotating chair (Corbett 1972: 416-419, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46-47). On 10/06/1970 armed uprisings persisted through the Ovando dictatorship and to the dismay of the rightist military commanders, Ovando frequently offered them concessions or amnesty rather than brutal defeat. The military forces launched a coup with the intention of replacing Ovand's policy of appeasement. A three-headed junta consolidated power for a brief period of time in the aftermath. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In 1969, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent.

10/07/1970 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: After the formation of the neutral junta, General Juan Torres overthrew it and established himself alone as president by using a violent left-wing splinter of the military. He was supported by different military factions. Political liberties were not really present and absent for this period according to LIED and our interpretation of V-Dem's PCLI. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

08/21/1971 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Colonel Hugo Banzer allied with the MNR, the FSB, and a rightist faction of the military launched a coup against military dictator General Juan José Torres. Banzer emerged as the head of a junta that outlawed unions and political parties (Corbett 1972: 424, Wagner 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 46-47). Stringent measures were taken to suppress any opposition. In 1974, he withstood two coup attempts and effectively quashed a peasant uprising.<sup>403</sup> On 07/21/1978 General Juan Perede Asbun won elections, but they were annulled due to fraud. Asbun overthrew Banzer and assumed the presidency. On 11/24/1978, a group of democratically oriented generals led by David Padilla rejected Asbun's leadership due to vagueness with regards to elections and his

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<sup>403</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hugo-Banzer-Suarez>

incompetence and overthrew him. After years of military rule, there was a peaceful transition to a civilian government in 1979 when General David Padilla opted to transfer power to whoever won the presidential elections 1979.<sup>404</sup> According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Per FH's evaluation for the years 1972 and 1973, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1974 and 1975 the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the years 1976 and 1977 under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In 1978 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to V-Dem's PCLI and LIED political liberties were absent from 1971 to 1978. Between 1970 and 1977, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. In 1978 and 1979, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1972 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the year 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

07/01/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, multiparty elections occurred after the military's return to barracks, with General David Padilla ensuring a freer process despite a tense and bitter atmosphere among the candidates.<sup>405</sup> No candidate won a majority, which required congress to choose the president. However, Congress was deadlocked and eventually chose the head of the Senate as interim president until a new election to be held in 1980 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 47). The democratic quality of the following is disputed. AF, BMR, BR, LIED and CGV classify the regime as democratic, RoW, LIED and PRC as an autocracy or namely an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classified the 1979 elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates an ambiguous state regarding the freedom and fairness of the elections. Their CEI indicates that they were not clean. Political liberties were not really present in 1979 according to V-Dem's PCLI and not present according to LIED. As per Polity5's categorization, the

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<sup>404</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Bolivian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Bolivian_general_election)

<sup>405</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979\\_Bolivian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1979_Bolivian_general_election)



executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. According to our coding rules the regime was an electoral autocracy.

11/01/1979 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Colonel Alberto Natusch, overthrew the interim government of Wálter Guevara. The coup was marked by significant violence, resulting in numerous deaths during the first week of November. Natusch remained in power for only 16 days due to widespread popular resistance, including a general strike, and a lack of support within the military. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

11/16/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, Natusch was forced to resign under popular pressure of a general strike and lack of support by the military. However, negotiations between the military and the congress ended in the compromise stepping down on condition that Congress must name a different interim president to oversee the transition. Lidia Tejada, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, was appointed as new interim president. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

07/17[&18]/1980 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: When the general elections results favored the leftists, a military group pressured President Lidia Gueiler to install (her cousin) General García Meza as Commander of the Army. On 07/18/1980, right wing elements of the army allied with the drug trade led by General Garcia Meza seized power in a violent coup (aka Cocaine Coup). Power was consolidated in a Junta of Commanders around General Meza (Wagner 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 47).<sup>406</sup> Many of the officers involved had been part of the Hugo Banzer dictatorship.<sup>407</sup> When portions of the citizenry resisted, as they had done in the failed putsch of November 1979, it resulted in dozens of deaths. Many were tortured. Allegedly, the Argentine Army unit Batallón de Inteligencia 601 participated in the coup.<sup>408</sup> Having suffered significant damage to its reputation due to the excesses of the 1980–82 dictatorship, the military confronted two choices: either call for fresh elections or acknowledge the results from 1980. However, it became increasingly apparent that

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<sup>406</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junta\\_of\\_Commanders\\_of\\_the\\_Armed\\_Forces\\_1980\\_\(Bolivia\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junta_of_Commanders_of_the_Armed_Forces_1980_(Bolivia))

<sup>407</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis\\_Garc%C3%ADa\\_Meza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Garc%C3%ADa_Meza)

<sup>408</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis\\_Garc%C3%ADa\\_Meza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Garc%C3%ADa_Meza)

the nation was on the brink of descending into civil war before new elections could take place. Given these circumstances, the military declared in September 1982 that, to avoid the cost of new elections and prevent further unrest, it would reconvene the legislature elected in 1980 and accept whoever it selected as the president.<sup>409</sup> According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were absent for this period (V-Dem PCLI, LIED). In 1981, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. For the year 1981, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/05/1982 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: Congress reconvened on 09/23 and reconfirmed the 1980 election results. Hernán Siles became president (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 16, Wagner 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 47). Although Siles had difficulties controlling the overall situation and the various political and institutional actors, he did not resort to extra-constitutional means but respected the hard-won democratic standards.<sup>410</sup> Due to social protests and economic mismanagement, president Hernán Siles Zuazo called an early election, which took place on 07/14/1985. In the second round of voting, Paz Estenssoro's Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) obtained most of the votes.<sup>411</sup> In line with other datasets like BMR, BR, GWF, HTW, MCM, PRC we code this regime period as democratic. According to our observations it is a defective democracy. Under Paz Estenssoro the political and civil liberties were restricted to gain control over the economic situation, Labor Unions were repressed. When protests arose, citizens were subjected to a curfew, and travel across the country was limited. Raids were conducted on universities and opposition gatherings, and numerous union leaders were abducted, subsequently being transported to prison camps in the Amazon until the strikes were halted.<sup>412</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of

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<sup>409</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hern%C3%A1n\\_Siles\\_Zuazo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hern%C3%A1n_Siles_Zuazo)

<sup>410</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hern%C3%A1n\\_Siles\\_Zuazo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hern%C3%A1n_Siles_Zuazo)

<sup>411</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Bolivia\\_\(1982%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bolivia_(1982%E2%80%93present)).

<sup>412</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V%C3%ADctor\\_Paz\\_Estenssoro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V%C3%ADctor_Paz_Estenssoro)

LIED. Elections since then have mostly been scored as competitive by LIED, free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI and as clean by their CEI. Per FH's scoring for the period until 1994, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. In 1995 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates Bolivia as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1996 the country is classified again as free with a score of 5 and from 1997 to 2001 it is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. As per FH's classification for 2002, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. From 2003 onwards, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. After a period during which political liberties were absent, LIED classifies political liberties as present from 1991 to 2004. After 2005 LIED codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies the presence of political liberties as ambiguous in 1982 and as present from 1983 to 2016. Since 2016 V-Dem's PCLI scores decreased into a range which we interpret as political liberties were somewhat present. From 1983 to 2008, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Between 2009 and 2014, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. On 10/12/2014, during Morales' second presidential term in office, he began to speak openly of communitarian socialism as the ideology that he desired for Bolivia's future.<sup>413</sup> At the same time, the Bolivian legislature (dominated by the incumbent party MAS) brought forward "a dubious legal reinterpretation" of Law No. 381 (promulgated in May 2013), that allowed Morales to run for a third term in 2014 and even ratified a ruling that paved the way for him to run for a fourth term in office (Sanchez-Sibony 2021:128). The parliament dominated by incumbent MAS party also issued laws to control and repress civil society (Sanchez-Sibony 2021: 129). Under Morales' presidential reign, electoral coercion on the local level was reported (Sanchez-Sibony 2021:124). On 11/10/2019 the 2019 Bolivian political crisis occurred after 21 days of civil protests following the disputed 2019 general election in which incumbent President Morales was initially declared the winner.<sup>414</sup> However, an audit by the OAS concluded that there were significant irregularities during the electoral process. 10/18/2020 was the final proposed date for the elections. Observers from the OAS, UNIORE and the UN reported that there were no

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<sup>413</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014\\_Bolivian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Bolivian_general_election)

<sup>414</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019\\_Bolivian\\_political\\_crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Bolivian_political_crisis)

fraudulent actions in the 2020 elections.<sup>415</sup> On 10/18/2020 presidential elections were held. Luis Arce (Movement Towards Socialism) won the elections with 55.1% of votes. Turnout was 88.4% and no irregularities were reported.<sup>416</sup> In addition, LIED classifies the elections as competitive except for 2019. Moreover, V-Dem's CEI underlines somewhat cleanliness except for 2019 when ambiguous outcomes are stated. V-Dem's EF&FI acknowledges free and fair elections. In 2019 ambiguous election conditions were given. Nevertheless, independent, and investigative journalists face harassment, and the judiciary is highly politicized and hampered by corruption.<sup>417</sup> On 06/26/2024, General Juan José Zúniga, attempted a military coup. He led units of the Military Police in an assault on the government palace. After forcing their way inside, he and a group of soldiers confronted President Arce, demanding that he transfer power to Zúniga. In response, President Arce commanded Zúniga and his men to stand down.<sup>418</sup> Upon hearing of the attempted coup, thousands of protesters took to the streets of La Paz to confront the Military Police. President Arce dismissed General Zúniga and appointed General José Sánchez as the new army chief. Sánchez ordered the coup units to stand down. Amid the rioting, soldiers arrested Zúniga and took him into custody, withdrawing from the palace after about five hours. Zúniga, once handcuffed, claimed Arce had orchestrated the coup to boost his image as a democracy defender. The government denies this, accusing Zúniga of evading responsibility. Zúniga and 19 other military leaders have been arrested, while others remain at large. Their court appearances are pending.<sup>419</sup> As per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. For 1983, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1984, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1985 to 1996, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Between 1997 and 2005, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 2006-2009, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate

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<sup>415</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019\\_Bolivian\\_political\\_crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Bolivian_political_crisis)

<sup>416</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bolivia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>417</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bolivia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>418</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/27/bolivia-foils-military-coup-attempt-all-you-need-to-know>

<sup>419</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/29/bolivias-president-accused-of-plotting-coup-against-himself-to-boost-popularity>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_Bolivian\\_coup\\_attempt?](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Bolivian_coup_attempt?)

constraints on the executive. During 2010-2012, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2013 to 2016, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the years 2018, 2019 and 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 2020, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 2022 and 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Alexander 1982, Centellas 2008, Corbett 1972, Gamarra 1997, Gamarra 2008, Klein 1969, Macmillan 2022, Malloy 1971, Sanchez-Sibony 2021, Times 1943, Wagner 1991)

## **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 03/03/1878]: In 1878, the Occupation by the Austrian-Hungarian Empire<sup>420</sup> began and until World War I the country was annexed into the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.<sup>421</sup> The Congress of Berlin, that aimed for the reorganization of the Balkan Peninsula after the Russo-Turkish war<sup>422</sup>, approved the occupation of Bosnia Vilayet, a first-level administrative division of the Ottoman Empire, mostly comprising the territory of the present-day state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>423</sup> By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin (07/13/1878), Bosnia and

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<sup>420</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina>

<sup>421</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina)

<sup>422</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Hungarian\\_rule\\_in\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Hungarian_rule_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina)

<sup>423</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnia\\_vilayet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnia_vilayet)

Herzegovina remained under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, but Austria-Hungary was granted the authority to occupy the province of vilayet of Bosnia and Herzegovina indefinitely, taking on its military defense and civil administration. The campaign to establish Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted from 07/29/1878 to 10/20/1878 and resulted in Austro-Hungarian victory.<sup>424</sup>

10/06/1908 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Austria, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Austria, Constitutional Monarchy]: On 02/20/1909 Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans came to an agreement concerning the annexation and the Ottomans accepted the takeover in exchange for a financial settlement. In 1910 the first constitution was proclaimed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that led to relaxation of earlier laws, elections and the formation of a parliament.<sup>425</sup> The Diet of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a representative assembly with competence over the Austro-Hungarian Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parliament had certain legislative authority, but its resolutions were subject to approval by the Austro-Hungarian government.<sup>426</sup>

01/12/1918 End Part of Other Country [Austria, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date, following World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Kingdom of Yugoslavia), with Bosnia and Herzegovina being a part of it, was declared.<sup>427</sup>

04/04/1941 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]: On this date, Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany's Hitler Regime.<sup>428</sup>

11/11/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the first elections after World War Two took place. Josef Broz Tito from the People's Front got 85% of the votes. On 11/29/1945 the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia (later Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was proclaimed. Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of its six republics.<sup>429</sup> On 09/14/1991 the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted in multi-party elections for the first time since 1990 (under universal suffrage). The governing coalition of Bosnia and Herzegovina collapsed after the parliament of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

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<sup>424</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Hungarian\\_campaign\\_in\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina\\_in\\_1878](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Hungarian_campaign_in_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_in_1878)

<sup>425</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian\\_Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian_Crisis)

<sup>426</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diet\\_of\\_Bosnia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diet_of_Bosnia)

<sup>427</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Yugoslavia)

<sup>428</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina#Kingdom\\_of\\_Yugoslavia\\_\(1918-41\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina#Kingdom_of_Yugoslavia_(1918-41))

<sup>429</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_Federal\\_Republic\\_of\\_Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia)

Herzegovina in Sarajevo passed a ‘memorandum on sovereignty’ on 10/15/1991 that was opposed by Bosnian Serb members. After the walkout of Bosnian Serb representatives, the memorandum was adopted.<sup>430</sup> A referendum on the independence at the beginning of 1992 followed. It was boycotted by many Serbs but ended with the majority of votes for independence. A conflict ensued, leading to Bosnian Serbs declaring the Republic of Srpska on 01/09/1992 within Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>431</sup> The claim was only partially recognized by the Bosnian government. LIED and V-Dem only start to provide data for Bosnia since 1992.

03/03/1992 End Part of Other country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start No Central Authority: On this date Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence. However, due to the outbreak of the civil war on 04/06/1992, no political regime was able to rule the whole country. Supported by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his idea of creating a Great Serbia, Bosnian Serbs forces started to attack Non-Serbian villages and people, including killing, raping and destroying their property, including a four-year siege of the capital Sarajevo.<sup>432</sup> According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to V-Dem’s PCLI the presence of political liberties was ambiguous for this period. LIED classified them as absent in this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

12/14/1995 End No Central Authority/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime [as (de facto) Protectorate by Croatia and Serbia]: The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the 1992-95 Bosnian War. The war parties agreed on a highly decentralized parliamentary republic. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two autonomous zones. The two entities were the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska. Special status was granted to the border region encompassing the town of Brčko, designating it as a distinct district. Although the various parts of the country are under a common central government, its authority is restricted to very limited powers.<sup>433</sup> On 09/14/1996, the first general elections were held since 1990. However, the parties involved in the DPA (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with its two constituent entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) had failed to establish the necessary prerequisites for elections. Consequently, given these

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<sup>430</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika\\_Srpska\\_\(1992%E2%80%931995\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika_Srpska_(1992%E2%80%931995))

<sup>431</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika\\_Srpska](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika_Srpska)

<sup>432</sup> <https://sfi.usc.edu/collections/bosnia-herzegovina>

<sup>433</sup> <https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/bosnia-and-herzegovina>

challenges, the elections were destined to validate the actual ethnic-based division of the country, which indeed materialized.<sup>434</sup> Moreover, the DPA made Bosnia and Herzegovina into an unacknowledged protectorate, characterized by elements of hegemony from neighboring Croatia and Serbia as co-signatories to the Agreement, wherein significant authority is vested in the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>435</sup> The Office of the High Representative (OHR), established by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), functioned as the highest political authority in the country and the chief executive officer for the international civilian presence. High Representatives were traditionally appointed from European Union countries, with their principal deputies hailing from the United States. The Principal Deputy High Representative's responsibilities included serving as the International Supervisor for Brčko, representing international interests in the Brčko District. The substantial powers and veto authority of the High Representative in Bosnian politics led to comparisons with a viceroy, highlighting the significant influence of this role.<sup>436</sup> Bosnian politics are generally assumed to be defined by corrupt patronage networks, certain foreign powers wield outsized influence as well as limited opportunities for political participation by citizens from other communities other than Bosnian, Serb, and Croat communities. The political sphere is moreover characterized by severe partisan gridlock.<sup>437</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classified elections as competitive since 1996. V-Dem's EF&FI rates them as free and fair between 1996 and 2004, before reducing the score to scoring them as only somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's CEI initially rated the elections as somewhat clean but reduced the score to speak of ambiguity in regards to electoral cleanliness since 2007. FH is more skeptical about the quality of the elections of the legislative and executive and rates them on a scale from 1 to 4 with a 2. International observers also raised concerns surrounding the elections on 10/07/2018, about the "integrity of the elections, including about a high number of ballots disqualified by the Central Electoral Commission (CIK)".<sup>438</sup> The assessment of the electoral regime differs significantly in different data sets. BMR considers the regime as democratic, LIED and RoW as an electoral democracy. HTW, MCM and CGV classify the regime as non-democratic.<sup>439</sup> As classified by FH for the regime period until 2000, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not

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<sup>434</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/elections-bosnia-and-herzegovina>

<sup>435</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina#Dayton\\_Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina#Dayton_Agreement)

<sup>436</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High\\_Representative\\_for\\_Bosnia\\_and\\_Herzegovina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Representative_for_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina)

<sup>437</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>438</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>439</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bolivia/freedom-world/2024>



free, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 2002 and 2003 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2004 to 2015, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. From 2016 onwards, Bosnia and Herzegovina receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Political liberties have been absent for the whole regime period according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present from 1996 to 1999 except for 1998 during which political liberties are coded as present. From 2000 to 2017 political liberties were present and from 2018 onward political liberties are somewhat present. For the year 1996, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1997 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Between 2005 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2015 and 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2018, V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate, while our classification of JCE alternates between robust (2018, 2022) and moderate constraints (2019-2021, 2023). GWF until the end of their observation period classifies the country as foreign-occupied. The general elections in 2022 were found to be competitive, however international observers reported media bias and the opposition claimed the election was marred by irregularities. After evidence came to light of voting fraud, the CIK ordered a recount. While Dodik won the presidency, illegally printed ballots were discovered and paired with the large number of disqualified ballots, the electoral integrity is questionable. Campaigns often used divisive and ethnically charged speech and candidates continue to be limited ethnically to Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. According to FH, the judiciary is formally independent, however lacks power and is generally ineffective, while being subject to political pressures and interreference.<sup>440</sup> According to our classification Bosnia and Herzegovina is an electoral hybrid regime between a highly defective democracy and an electoral autocracy.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>440</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/freedom-world/2023>

Additional sources (Kasapović 2010a)

## **Botswana**

[formerly known as Bechuanaland]

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [Start: 03/31/1885]: On 01/27/1884 Botswana (or Bechuanaland) was divided into two political entities divided by the Molopo River.<sup>441</sup> The northern part was declared a protectorate in 1884, as the Bechuanaland Protectorate, while the southern part, called British Bechuanaland, became a crown colony. In 1895, the latter was annexed into and administrated by Cape Colony (Morton/Ramsay 2018). The British governed Bechuanaland protectorate through the Office of the High Commissioner and its administrative headquarters were outside the territory (Morton/Ramsay 2018). Local administration was headed and executed by a Resident Commissioner who had less authority than a colonial governor (Morton/Ramsay 2018).<sup>442</sup> There was regular consultation between the British colonial officials and the local chiefs of the tribes who maintained self-governance and who wielded the ability to shape and mold policy in alignment with their personal objectives and there existed collaboration between the colonial administrators and the indigenous population (Makgala 2010). According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies the presence of political liberties as not really present until 1961 and ambiguous from 1962 to 1965, while according to LIED political liberties were absent for the colonial time. Male suffrage according to LIED was introduced in 1961. From 1900 to 1960, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

03/01/1965 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The first elections held under universal suffrage took place in 1965, prior

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<sup>441</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_Bechuanaland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Bechuanaland)

<sup>442</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bechuanaland\\_Protectorate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bechuanaland_Protectorate)

to independence.<sup>443</sup> Seretse Khama and the BDP won 80% of the vote and 28/31 seats in this competitive election before independence (Sillery 1974: 158-59). According to LIED the elections were not competitive. Whereas V-Dem's EF&FI scores the elections as free and fair, their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

09/30/1966 End (de facto) Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, Botswana became independent. The prime minister was replaced by a president elected by the legislature (renamed the National Assembly) and vested with executive powers (Morton/Ramsay 2018).<sup>444</sup> Among researchers it is disputed whether Botswana is democratic or autocratic. For instance, Mokopakgosi and Molomo (2000: 7) call Botswana a “de facto one-party state”. GWF classifies the regime as a party autocracy due to indications of an imbalanced environment despite contested elections, and due to the effective constraints on competition imposed by both formal and informal political regulations in Botswana (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 47-48). In addition, it is argued that the BDP has almost monopolized appointments to the civil service (Mokopakgosi/Molomo 2000). For over five decades since gaining independence, the BDP has consistently maintained a majority of no less than two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 48). GWF therefore classifies Botswana as a party autocracy. In the same line MCM addresses Botswana as a multiparty autocracy. However, HTW as well as LIED classify Botswana as a democracy. As classified by FH for 1972, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For the regime period between 1973 and 1978, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. In 1979 it is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. From 1980 to 1988 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. During the period from 1989 to 1992 Botswana is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. In the years 1993 and 1994 it is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. Per FH, for the regime period between 1995 and 2008, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4 once again, which we

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<sup>443</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Botswana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Botswana)

<sup>444</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana\\_2016?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2016?lang=en)

also place in the free category. From 2009 onwards, Botswana is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. According to LIED political liberties were present from 1988 to 2012, and absent from 2013 onward. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present since 1966. According to our standards, Botswana is over small parts of this regime period a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime and otherwise a clear case of a severely defective democracy. The elections were always declared as free, but not entirely fair, by international observers. In addition to deficits in the electoral process, deficits in the guarantee of political and civil rights can be traced. These include constraints on freedom of press and expression.<sup>445</sup> Since its independence, LIED classifies elections as competitive. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scored the countries elections as free and fair. Their CEI indicates that elections were somewhat clean until 1990 and clean afterwards. By 2019, the ongoing internal political conflicts and the dominance of personality-based leadership attributes remain obstacles to the formation of a cohesive opposition. The countries score in both the CEI and EF&FI dropped to their elections being classified as only somewhat free, fair and clean. In 2021, President Masisi appointed a commission to address electoral irregularities and to establish reforms.<sup>446</sup> During this regime period, according to Polity5's categorization, various periods regarding executive constraints can be identified. From 1967 to 1986, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Between 1987 and 1996, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 1997, according to Polity5, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. From 1967 to 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Between 1994 and 2019, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. During the years 2020-2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that

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<sup>445</sup> <https://bti-project.org/de/reports/country-report/BWA>;  
<https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/botswana/>

<sup>446</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/botswana/freedom-world/2022>

legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Baumhögger 1999, Emminghaus 2002, Lea/Rowe 2001, Makgala 2010, Mokopakgosi/Molomo 2000, Morton/Ramsay 2018, Robinson 1992, Sillery 1974)

## **Brazil**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 11/15/1889]: On 09/07/1822 Brazil became independent. On 08/29/1825 the independence was recognized by Portugal. On 11/15/1889 the Federal Republic of Brazil was proclaimed. In 1891, male suffrage was guaranteed in the Brazilian constitution excluding beggars, women, illiterates, lowest ranking soldiers and members of monastic orders.<sup>447</sup> An oligarchy, which controlled elections and selectively appointed the Brazilian presidency, held sway over the First Brazilian Republic.<sup>448</sup> The presidency alternated between politicians from the states of Minas Gerais and São Paulo in each election, following a system referred to as 'coffee and milk politics.'<sup>449</sup> According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the Brazilian elections during this regime period as not really free or fair. Their CEI scores them as not clean. According to V-Dem's PCLI the presence of political liberties was "ambiguous" in this time. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Until 1929, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1930, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. The established tradition was disrupted in 1929 when the sitting President Washington Luís, hailing from São Paulo, chose Júlio Prestes, another individual from the same state, as his successor.

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<sup>447</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>448</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_military_junta_of_1930)

<sup>449</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_military_junta_of_1930)

This departure from the norm involved not exchanging the position with a politician from Minas Gerais.<sup>450</sup>

10/24/1930 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the Brazilian Revolution started in which President Luís was deposed and a military junta took control. The junta consisted of General Augusto Tasso Fragoso, Admiral Isaías de Noronha, and General João de Deus Mena Barreto).<sup>451</sup> Fragoso, Barreto, and Noronha “declared themselves a ‘pacifying junta’ with a ‘moderating power’”.<sup>452</sup> Getúlio Dornelles Vargas, who spearheaded the revolution, communicated on 10/24 that the junta members would be ‘accepted as collaborators and not directors,’ that they ‘joined the revolution at the time when its success was assured’.<sup>453</sup>

11/03/1930 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date, the junta handed power over peacefully to Vargas as a provisional president. Although the leader of the revolution, the appointment of Vargas was the result of a consultation process between the junta and the revolutionaries. At the core of these revolutionaries were the states Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Paraíba (known as Liberal Alliance) along with their leading chief military officers and politicians. Some junta-appointed ministers were allowed to retain their posts, such as junta member Noronha.<sup>454</sup> Although Vargas dissolved the legislature, abrogated the 1891 constitution, and granted himself almost dictatorial powers, he was not able to pacify the Liberal Alliance and therefore prevent another revolution 1932 (known as Constitutional Revolution). Despite its military defeat, Vargas was forced to make concessions—most notably by calling for the election of a constitutional assembly. (Fausto 1986: 811, 827-28, Bethell 2008: 3, 17-18, Casey et al. 2020: 3).<sup>455</sup> According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI codes political liberties as not really present from 1930 to 1934. LIED outcomes were still coded as absent. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In this first period of Vargas fifteen-year rule, he neither had unlimited authority or a life-long term like in a personalist autocracy, but he was not a

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<sup>450</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_military_junta_of_1930)

<sup>451</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_military_junta_of_1930);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_Revolution\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Revolution_of_1930)

<sup>452</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_military_junta_of_1930)

<sup>453</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_military\\_junta\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_military_junta_of_1930)

<sup>454</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_Revolution\\_of\\_1930](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Revolution_of_1930)

<sup>455</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionalist\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutionalist_Revolution)

figurehead president chosen and guided by the military junta either. Therefore, the only possible classification is as a non-electoral transitional (multiparty) regime.

07/16/1934 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, the new constitution was promulgated and on 07/17/1934 the constitutional assembly elected the former provisional president Getúlio Vargas as president for a four-year term. Therefore Vargas “governed as president alongside a democratically elected legislature” until 1937.<sup>456</sup> In 1935 a militant communist uprising of 1935 led by Luís Carlos Prestes and leftist low-rank military tried to overthrow Getúlio Vargas’s government on behalf of the National Liberation Alliance but failed.<sup>457</sup> The suffrage was still restricted, for example for women and illiterates.<sup>458</sup> Besides the restricted suffrage, Vargas held such sway over the political landscape that a significant portion of the elected deputies tended to heed his guidance, even in the absence of more rudimentary forms of electoral coercion, which nonetheless persisted to some degree. (Loewenstein 1942: 20-21). The regime period is characterized by the constitution of 1934, the first one, which was crafted anew by directly elected deputies in a multi-party electoral process<sup>459</sup> and contributed substantially to the democratization of Brazil. But from the beginning Vargas was a huge critic, causing the constitution and constitutional reality to diverge.<sup>460</sup> Furthermore, a constitutional amendment was passed by the parliament (the former constituent assembly), which gave Vargas “quasi-dictatorial powers by way of “legal” authorization” (Loewenstein 1942: 29). According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive and V-Dem’s CEI as not clean and their EF&FI as not really free or fair. Therefore, Brazil has to be classified as an electoral autocracy. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/10/1937 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy: On this date in a self-coup President Getúlio Vargas overthrew backed by the military the

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<sup>456</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vargas\\_Era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vargas_Era)

<sup>457</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_communist\\_uprising\\_of\\_1935](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_communist_uprising_of_1935)

<sup>458</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_Constitution\\_of\\_1934](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Constitution_of_1934)

<sup>459</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Constitution\\_of\\_Brazil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Constitution_of_Brazil)

<sup>460</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_Constitution\\_of\\_1934](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Constitution_of_1934)

electoral regime. Following the coup, Brazil witnessed the establishment of a semi-fascist, authoritarian state, fashioned after the political models seen in European fascist countries (Putnam 1941, Casey et al. 2020).<sup>461</sup> During the Estado Novo, state autonomy ceased to exist as appointed federal officials took the place of governors, and patronage emanated from the president downwards. The dissolution of all political parties until 1944 further restricted opportunities for opposition organization.<sup>462</sup> Press censorship was enforced by the government, with propaganda being centrally coordinated by the Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP). Political liberties were absent for this period according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1938 to 1944, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. While Vargas ruled before and after 11/10/1937 there are many indicators that a regime change must be coded. One noteworthy sign is that the time span between 1930 and 1937 in Brazil is referred to as the Second Brazilian Republic, while the subsequent portion of the Vargas Era, spanning from 1937 to 1946, is identified as the Third Brazilian Republic or Estado Novo.<sup>463</sup> Unlike Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy there was no regime party in Brazil in this period and the regime did not hold elections. Hence, this non-electoral regime comes close to a personalist autocracy. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

10/29/1945 End Right-Wing (Corporatist) Autocracy/Start Military (Transitional) Autocracy: Growing political movements and democratic demonstrations forced Vargas to abolish censorship in 1945, release numerous political prisoners, and allow for the reformation of political parties, including the Brazilian Communist Party.<sup>464</sup> Under military pressure, Vargas resigned from office (Bethell 2008: 71-72, 83-84, Casey et al. 2020: 3).<sup>465</sup>

12/02/1945 End Military (Transitional) Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date presidential elections took place, which were won by Eurico Gaspar Dutra of the Social

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<sup>461</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1937\\_Brazilian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1937_Brazilian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>462</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/brazil/16.htm>

<sup>463</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vargas\\_Era#New\\_State\\_\(Estado\\_Novo\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vargas_Era#New_State_(Estado_Novo))

<sup>464</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945\\_Brazilian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Brazilian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>465</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Get%C3%BAlio\\_Vargas#Fall\\_from\\_power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Get%C3%BAlio_Vargas#Fall_from_power)



Democratic Party (PSD), whilst the PSD also won a majority of seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.<sup>466</sup> On 09/18/1946 the fifth constitution was adapted, underpinning the country's return to democratic rule. In 1946, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. On 10/03/1950 general elections were held. Getúlio Vargas, former autocratic president, and now candidate of the Brazilian Labour Party won.<sup>467</sup> Vargas attained the presidency through a direct popular vote, marking the first and only instance in his political career (Skidmore 1988: 81). The election was considered free and secret. He assumed office on 01/31/1951.<sup>468</sup> Much of the opposition, originally stemming from the protest against the Vargas dictatorship, experienced a sense of humiliation and anger as the former dictator regained power through the electoral process – a mechanism they had strived to reinstate. Unable to hinder his formal assumption of office through lawful channels, they were not inclined to embrace Vargas' invitations for involvement in his government during 1951 and 1952 (Skidmore 1988: 122-127). The military was suspicious about Vargas' presidency as well and demanded strict compliance with the constitution. But only a minor part of the military officers wanted to remove him immediately from all political activities. But still the military remained the ultimate authority in the Brazilian political system (Skidmore 1988: 100-108). However, in 1954 Brazil's democracy was on the brink of a breakdown. On 08/05/1954 there was an assassination attempt on journalist Carlos Lacerda, a staunch opponent of Getúlio Vargas, carried out by intimates of Vargas, without his knowledge. Afterwards a legal investigation into the assassination took place immediately. However, protests against Vargas formed in politics, the military and civil society. The military gave Vargas an ultimatum to resign. He refused to end his presidency early but agreed to take a leave of absence. On 08/24/1954 Vargas committed suicide (Skidmore 1988: 136-143). Since Café Fihlo, his vice president, assumed the office, the event is not classified as a breakdown of democracy. On 10/03/1955 presidential elections were held. Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira of the Social Democratic Party won.<sup>469</sup> Between 11/08/1955 and 11/11/1955 Carlos Coimbra da Luz became acting president, due to health issues of Café Fihlo. Luz was the next in line of the constitutional succession.<sup>470</sup> After recovering, that he had been removed from power on a temporary basis for health reasons, he tried to reassume presidential power but due to military pressure the congress

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<sup>466</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945\\_Brazilian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Brazilian_general_election)

<sup>467</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950\\_Brazilian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950_Brazilian_general_election)

<sup>468</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955\\_Brazilian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_Brazilian_presidential_election)

<sup>469</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955\\_Brazilian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1955_Brazilian_presidential_election)

<sup>470</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Luz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Luz)

and the supreme court denied it.<sup>471</sup> On 11/11/1954 the minister of defense feared acting president Luz was part of a civilian-military plot to block the president-elect from assuming office. The Minister deposed Luz and placed Ramos as acting president.<sup>472</sup> On 01/31/1956 de Oliveira took office.<sup>473</sup> On 10/03/1960 the last free and fair presidential election until 1989 were held. Jânio da Silva Quadros of the National Labour Party won and took office on 01/31/1961.<sup>474</sup> We classify that period as an electoral hybrid regime, because more or less free and fair presidential elections were held and respected, but the military as non-elected state actor played a crucial role during this period. Only LIED classifies this period as exclusive democracy, AF, BR, GWF and MCM as democracy. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI reached its highest score up to this point, scoring the elections as somewhat free and fair. The CEI scores their cleanliness as ambiguous. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present from 1946 to 1963. According to our classification Brazil in this period is a severely defective democracy. It is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. The veto power of the military contributes to this assessment. During this regime period, according to Polity5's categorization, various periods regarding executive constraints can be identified. From 1947 to 1960, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. From 1961 to 1962, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. In 1963, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the year 1946, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 1947 to 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/01[-03]/1964 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup backed by right-wing elements of the society ousted the elected government of President João Goulart because they feared his move to socialize large corporations and established a military junta to rule (McCann 1998, Skidmore 1988). The regime was marked by significant political repression, including censorship, suppression of political dissent, and widespread

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<sup>471</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caf%C3%A9\\_Filho](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caf%C3%A9_Filho)

<sup>472</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Luz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Luz)

<sup>473</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juscelino\\_Kubitschek](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juscelino_Kubitschek)

<sup>474</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960\\_Brazilian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960_Brazilian_presidential_election)

human rights abuses (Skidmore 1988). The most infamous of all Institutional Acts, was issued by dictator Artur da Costa e Silva, president at the time on 12/13/1968. With this act, the congress was de facto dissolved and civil rights cancelled. However, during the regime period, the degree of autocratization of the regime varied. From 1985 on, a scheduled vote of the electoral college, a soft-line military government reluctantly accepted the transfer of the presidency to a moderate civilian supported by the opposition party. Subsequently, a competitive congressional election took place in 1986, with the political opposition achieving a sweeping victory (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 17).<sup>475</sup> As classified by FH for the years 1972 and 1973, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1974 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH's evaluation for 1975 to 1977, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1978 Brazil is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1979 onwards, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were not really present in 1964, absent from 1965 to 1978 and again not really present from 1979 to 1984 while LIED still considers them as absent. Until 1981, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1982 to 1984, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1967 to 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1980-1984, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1964 and 1965, in 1966 executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held, in 1967 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, in 1968 and 1969 only executive elections were held, from 1970 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

01/15/1985 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The political transition on this date marked a pivotal moment in the return to democracy. This transition was characterized by the election of Tancredo Neves, a civilian, by an electoral college. Neves was chosen over a

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<sup>475</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964\\_Brazilian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1964_Brazilian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

candidate endorsed by the military, signaling a significant shift from military dictatorship to civilian rule. However, Neves tragically passed away before his inauguration on 04/21/1985. In accordance with constitutional protocol, José Sarney, the vice president-elect, assumed the presidency. Notably, Sarney had been a member of the party that supported the military regime but had joined Neves and the opposition in the period leading up to the transition (Skidmore 1988:250-260, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 48, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 17). On 11/15/1986, Brazil conducted parliamentary elections, marking the commencement of a period characterized by competitive electoral processes. Subsequent to these elections, the country's political landscape has been marked by significant polarization. Additionally, this period has been characterized by elevated levels of violent crime and persistent economic marginalization of minority groups. Furthermore, the issue of endemic corruption remains a critical challenge within the Brazilian political regime.<sup>476</sup> Brazil operates as a federal republic governed under a presidential system. The public elects the president for a four-year term and he can be reelected for a consecutive second term. The parliament, which is bicameral, consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies.<sup>477</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED rates the elections in this regime period as competitive and V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as clean, free and fair. As per FH's classification for 1985, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Between 1986 and 1987 the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Per FH's classification for 1988, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. In 1989 the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. For the period between 1990 and 1992 the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. According to FH, for 1993 until 2001 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Between 2002 and 2004 the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As per FH's classification for the period from 2005 to 2019, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. From 2020 onwards, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework.<sup>478</sup> According to LIED political liberties were present from 1990 to 2017 and absent from 2018 onward. V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were in an ambiguous state

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<sup>476</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>477</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>478</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024>

in 1985, somewhat present from 1986 and 1987 and as present since 1988 with the exception of 2021 coded as somewhat present. From 1987 to 1987, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. Since 1988, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. . For the year 1985, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1986 and 1987, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following two years, For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1990 to 2016, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. From 2017 to 2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. On 10/02/2022 general elections were held. The election concluded with a runoff in late October, resulting in Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party securing 50.9 percent of the vote compared to Bolsonaro's Liberal Party 49.1 percent. During the concurrent legislative polls, the Liberal Party secured the position of the largest party in both houses of the National Congress. Parties aligned with the non-ideological center constituted, at the same time, the largest group in the lower house. The strongly divided campaign was tainted by the spread of misinformation, forceful rhetoric, instances of harassment, and incidents of political violence.<sup>479</sup> Brazil functions as a democratic nation with competitive elections, fostering a politically polarized yet vibrant public dialogue. However, independent journalists and civil society activists encounter risks of harassment and violent attacks. Political violence remains prevalent, and the government faces challenges in addressing crime, disproportionate violence against minorities, and economic exclusion. Corruption continues to be endemic at the highest levels of government, with a recent decline in transparency exacerbating public disillusionment. However, persistent societal discrimination and violence against LGBT+ individuals further compound the country's challenges.<sup>480</sup>

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<sup>479</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>480</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024>

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Ames 2001, Arceneaux 2001b, Arceneaux 2001a, Cameron 1994, Domínguez 2002, Loewenstein 1942, Mainwaring 1986, Mainwaring 1995, McCann 1998, Philip 1984, Skidmore 1988, Stepan 1978, Wallerstein 1980)

## **British Virgin Islands**

01/01/1900 Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1672]: The Dutch established a permanent settlement on the main island (Tortola) by 1648, and by 1672 it was captured by the English and annexed to the British-administered Leeward Islands. The planters were granted civil government in 1773, with an elected House of Assembly, a partly elected Legislative Council, and constitutional courts.<sup>481</sup> The islands prosperity grew until the middle of the nineteenth century, when a combination of the abolition of slavery and agricultural demand in the British Empire changed.<sup>482</sup> In 1867 the constitution was surrendered and a legislature was appointed, an arrangement that lasted until 1902, when sole legislative authority was vested in the governor-in-council. In 1950 a partly elected and partly nominated Legislative Council was reinstated. In 1960 the islands gained separate colony status as crown colony. In 1967 the islands became more autonomous and were given a ministerial form of government with H. Lavity Stoutt as first chief minister.<sup>483</sup>

02/26/2002 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The British Overseas Territory Act of 2002 changed the status of the colony to that of overseas territory and granted British citizenship to its people. A new constitution promulgated in 2007 brought greater self-government to the islands.<sup>484</sup> The constitution provides for a unicameral House of Assembly (legislature) based upon representative democracy and a multi-party system. The head of state is the British monarch, who is represented in the territory by the governor. The politics of the British Virgin Islands takes place in the framework of a parliamentary representative democratic dependency with universal suffrage, whereby the Premier is the head of government, and of a multi-party

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<sup>481</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Virgin-Islands/Government-and-society>

<sup>482</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British\\_Virgin\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Virgin_Islands)

<sup>483</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Virgin-Islands/Government-and-society>

<sup>484</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/British-Virgin-Islands/Government-and-society>

system.<sup>485</sup> FH, LIED and V-Dem do not list the British Virgin Islands. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period. In 2022, an independent investigation into corruption revealed widespread issues within the territory's governance and recommended that London reestablish direct rule over the British Virgin Islands. Andrew Fahie, the Prime Minister and leader of the VIP party, was arrested, charged, and convicted of drug smuggling and money laundering.<sup>486</sup> The UK government decided against this step and instead entrusted the new government with resolving the reported issues. This new government is a government of national unity, involving the two biggest parties VIP and PVIM. It came together following the 2023 general elections which the VIP won and wherein the PIVM came in second.<sup>487</sup> The unity-government's progress in enacting crucial reforms to combat corruption has reportedly been mixed. Due to this, the governor of the BVI announced plans to seek more power over the territory to impose these reforms. This move was decried as an undemocratic power grab by BVI-politicians.<sup>488</sup> Defective Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Brunei**

[officially known as Brunei Darussalam]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 09/17/1888]: The Sultanate of Brunei was a powerful state in the early 16th century. This power vanished over time. On 09/17/1888 Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo became a British Protectorates by treaty (Paxton 1980). However, they retained significant authority over their internal governance. (Horton 1986). Article I of the treaty provided that: “The State of Brunei shall continue to be governed and administered by the Sultan [...] and his successors as an independent State, under the protection of Great Britain” (Crawford 2006). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties were absent for this time (LIED). 01/01/1906 End Autocratic Monarchy [as protectorate by United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]:

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<sup>485</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_the\\_British\\_Virgin\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_British_Virgin_Islands)

<sup>486</sup> <https://www.transparency.org.uk/british-virgin-islands-corruption-money-laundering-inquiry-latest-news>;

<sup>486</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew\\_Fahie](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrew_Fahie)

<sup>487</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\\_British\\_Virgin\\_Islands\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_British_Virgin_Islands_general_election)

<sup>488</sup> <https://www.bvibeacon.com/premier-fumes-governor-seeks-additional-powers/>

From 1906 on Britain effectively established indirect rule in Brunei (Heath-Brown 2015). Administration in Brunei was established through the Anglo-Brunei Treaty of 1905-1906, by which consent was given to receive a British officer, titled Resident. The Resident's advice was to be followed on all matters in Brunei, except those concerning the Muslim religion (Horton 1986: 353-354). Therefore, despite being categorized as a Protected State, Brunei did not possess true independence after 1906 (Crawford 2006). Therefore, the regime in this period is coded as an indirect rule colonial regime. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Additionally, political liberties remained absent according to LIED.

12/22/1941 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: Japanese forces entered Brunei on this date, shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor (Heath-Brown 2015: 238). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties were not present (LIED).

09/02/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The British Military Administration (BMA) took over the governance of Brunei in 1945 after Japan surrendered (Heath-Brown 2015: 238). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Therefore, we code this regime as a direct occupation regime. Besides, political liberties are still coded as absent by LIED.

09/29/1959 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: Britain granted Brunei internal autonomy in 1959. On 09/29/1959 a new constitution was promulgated with the Sultan as Supreme Head of State. When the British transferred power in 1959, it was predominantly handed over to the sultan rather than the people (Heath-Brown 2015: 238, Horton 1986: 372-372).<sup>489</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. This period is to be coded as Protectorate because Britain retained responsibility for defense and foreign affairs (Horton 1986) and thus, Brunei was semi-

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<sup>489</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brunei\\_2006?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brunei_2006?lang=en)



autonomous. As classified by FH for 1972 to 1976, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

01/01/1984 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: On 01/01/1984, the protectorate of the United Kingdom ended. Brunei operates as an autocratic monarchy, with executive power vested in the sultan. At the national level, there are no elected representatives, and the freedoms of press and assembly are noticeably restricted.<sup>490</sup> According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held since 1900, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Since 1959, no political liberties were present following LIED. V-Dem does not list Brunei in its database.

Autocratic Monarchy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Grotz 2004)

## **Bukhara**

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of Russian Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 05/21/1868]: The Emirate of Bukhara encompassed territory that is now part of contemporary Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. The Russian military invaded Bukhara in 1868 resulting in the Emirate becoming a Russian Protectorate.<sup>491</sup> After 1900, the emirate retained some level of autonomy in their internal matters. Nevertheless, the emirate remained under the authority of the Russian governor general in Tashkent, acting on behalf of Tsar Nicholas II. The Russian Empire exercised direct control over significant areas in Central Asia, permitting the emirate to govern a substantial portion of their traditional territories independently.<sup>492</sup> From 11/07/1917, when the Russian Soviet Republic was proclaimed<sup>493</sup>, the Khanate enjoyed a higher degree of independence. While Soviet power was consolidated in Turkestan during 1917-1918, the regimes in Bukhara and Khiva were openly hostile towards the Bolsheviks. In the following time the Slavic and European troops controlling Tashkent worked to remove the emir of Bukhara in 1920 (Becker 2004: 206, 211).

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<sup>490</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/brunei/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>491</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Uzbekistan/Russian-and-Soviet-rule>

<sup>492</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Uzbekistan#Entering\\_the\\_twentieth\\_century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Uzbekistan#Entering_the_twentieth_century)

<sup>493</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian\\_Soviet\\_Federative\\_Socialist\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Soviet_Federative_Socialist_Republic)

10/08/1920 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of RSFSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [RSFSR, Communist Ideocracy]: On this date the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic was proclaimed.<sup>494</sup>

12/28/1922 End Part of Other Country [RSFSR, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Part of Other Country [USSR, Communist Ideocracy]: With the establishment of the USSR, the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic became a part of the Soviet Union.<sup>495</sup> Between 08/19/1924 and 02/17/1924, the Republic was referred to as the Bukharan Socialist Soviet Republic (Bukharan SSR). In 1924, during the establishment of new national borders, the Bukharan SSR willingly voted to dissolve itself and merge into the newly formed Uzbek SSR. Bukhara is not treated by FH, LIED and V-Dem. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were present.

For the time after 08/19/1924 see **Uzbekistan**.

## **Bulgaria**

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of Ottoman Empire, Autocratic Monarchy] [Start: 07/13/1878]: On 07/13/1878, the Treaty of Berlin was signed and set up the autonomous state, the Principality of Bulgaria.<sup>496</sup> Thereby, Bulgaria, as we know it today, became de facto independent from the Ottoman Empire. However, the Ottoman Empire still controlled the foreign policy of Bulgaria. On 04/16/1879 the Tarnovo Constitution, the first Bulgarian constitution, was adopted. Under this constitution, Bulgaria was established as a hereditary monarchy with a unicameral parliamentary system where members were elected by the people.<sup>497</sup> The first prime minister was Todor Stoyanov Burmov, chosen on 07/17/1879.<sup>498</sup> On 09/30/1879 and 10/07/1879 elections for the unicameral parliament (National Assembly) were held.<sup>499</sup> In 1881, Prince Alexander I. influenced the Grand National Assembly to suspend the constitution, granting himself unlimited power for seven years. In 1888 the constitution was restored. According to our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections held during this time were ambiguous regarding freedom and fairness and were

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<sup>494</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bukharan\\_People%27s\\_Soviet\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bukharan_People%27s_Soviet_Republic)

<sup>495</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet\\_Union#Treaty\\_on\\_the\\_Creation\\_of\\_the\\_USSR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union#Treaty_on_the_Creation_of_the_USSR)

<sup>496</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Bulgaria\\_\(1878%E2%80%931946\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bulgaria_(1878%E2%80%931946))

<sup>497</sup> <https://www.parliament.bg/en/15>

<sup>498</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bulgaria/Treaties-of-San-Stefano-and-Berlin>

<sup>499</sup> <https://www.novinite.com/articles/226516/History+of+Parliamentary+Elections+in+Bulgaria>

according to their CEI not clean. LIED categorizes the elections accordingly as not competitive. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

10/05/1908 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: Bulgaria became independent from the Ottoman Empire de jure and a kingdom on this date.<sup>500</sup> The Russian Revolution of 1917 also had a great effect in Bulgaria, spreading anti-monarchist sentiments. Hence, Tsar Ferdinand agreed to abdicate in favor of his son Boris III, who assumed the throne on 10/3/1918. In the elections on 03/28/1920, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) obtained most votes and Stamboliyski established the inaugural truly democratic government in Bulgaria.<sup>501</sup> In a coup d'état Aleksandar Tsankov became prime minister on 06/09/1923.<sup>502</sup> Boris III was the monarch at this time, but the prime minister was in charge. Furthermore, elections were held in November 1923 which legitimated Tsankov's government.<sup>503</sup> V-Dem's EF&FI scores the Bulgarian elections during this time as somewhat free and fair. However, their CEI indicates that they were still not really clean and LIED continues to categorize the elections as not competitive. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were somewhat present from 1900 to 1912 and ambiguous from 1913 to 1933. Since 1900 LIED coded political liberties as absent. According to our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Until 1917, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Since 1918, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. From 1909 to 1930, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. From 1931 to 1933, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1934, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

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<sup>500</sup> That was 09/22/1908 according to the old calendar.

<sup>501</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Bulgaria\\_\(1878%E2%80%931946\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Bulgaria_(1878%E2%80%931946))

<sup>502</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandar\\_Tsankov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandar_Tsankov)

<sup>503</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandar\\_Tsankov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandar_Tsankov);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November\\_1923\\_Bulgarian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_1923_Bulgarian_parliamentary_election)

05/19/1934 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: In a coup d'état the Zveno and the Military Union with the help of the Bulgarian Army overthrew the Tsankov government.<sup>504</sup> In 1930, Zveno was established as a Bulgarian political organization by politicians, intellectuals, and officers from the Bulgarian Army.<sup>505</sup> Zveno was a palingenetic nationalist movement. It primarily consisted of radical civilians who had grown disenchanted with a government hindered by military control. The new regime dissolved all parties and political organizations like trade unions.<sup>506</sup> All their property got confiscated and severe sentences were provided for attempting to renew a party in any form or to establish a new party. Tsar Boris was reduced to the status of a puppet tsar as a result of the coup.<sup>507</sup> The new government introduced a corporatist economy, similar to that of Benito Mussolini's Italy.<sup>508</sup> Zveno supported an Integral Yugoslavia that included Bulgaria as well as Albania within it.<sup>509</sup> According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were absent during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/22/1935 End Military Autocracy/Start Autocratic Monarchy: On this date, exploiting rumors of the group's alleged intention to establish a republic, King Boris III, whose influence had dwindled, garnered support among military officers, initially backers of the Zveno government. Consequently, he ousted Georgiev and his administration.<sup>510</sup> After the coup the political process was overseen by the Tsar, yet a version of parliamentary rule was reintroduced, albeit without the reinstatement of political parties.<sup>511</sup> According to our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections were ambiguous regarding freedom and fairness and V-Dem's reflects that they were not clean. LIED still ranks them as not competitive. V-Dem's PCLI scores political liberties as not really present from 1934 to 1944 and LIED codes them as absent. Until 1942, as per Polity5's classification, the executive

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<sup>504</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1934\\_Bulgarian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1934_Bulgarian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat);

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zveno-Group>

<sup>505</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zveno-Group>

<sup>506</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zveno>

<sup>507</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris\\_III\\_of\\_Bulgaria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_III_of_Bulgaria)

<sup>508</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zveno>

<sup>509</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zveno>

<sup>510</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zveno-Group>

<sup>511</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris\\_III\\_of\\_Bulgaria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_III_of_Bulgaria)

wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Therefore, we classify this period as an autocratic monarchy. For 1936 and 1937, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is missing, which usually indicates that no parliament exists, and thus no legislative constraints on the executive are possible. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. While there is no V-Dem's LCE there was de facto a parliament in the whole regime period. Parliamentary elections were held in Bulgaria on 12/24/1939, with voting extending into January 1940 in some areas. Officially, the elections were conducted on a non-partisan basis, as the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Bulgarian Communist Party were banned. However, the process was closely controlled by Tsar Boris III, who by then wielded ultimate authority in the country. Despite the non-partisan framework, candidates affiliated with political parties did participate, with pro-government candidates ultimately securing the majority of seats.<sup>512</sup>

09/09/1944 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Communist Ideocracy: The Fatherland Front made up of Social Democrats, the Agrarian Union, Zveno (a nationalist group of officers), and the Communists seized the government immediately after the Soviet invasion. The communists did not dominate the coalition numerically but were better organized and more disciplined. They secured the Interior and Justice Ministries in the new government, which enabled them to repress opponents. Thousands were executed and sent to concentration camps during the first year. The Interior Ministry also gave the communists control of local government and the 1945 elections. While the initial prime minister belonged to the Social Democrat party, the communists proved more adept at influencing events, leading to an unequivocal communist dominance in the regime by the conclusion of 1945 (Van Dyke 1947:358-360, 364-369, Curtis 1992, Brunnbauer 2008:52, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 48-49). In 1945, universal suffrage including women and men serving in the army was instituted by the government of the Fatherland front.<sup>513</sup> Long-time dictator Zhikov, was deposed in a coup d'état by reform communists in November 1989. National Roundtable Talks held from January through March 1990 initiated a number of political reforms, including agreements on a new constitution and electoral rules (Curtis 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 48-49). According to our observations, only non-multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free Political liberties were

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<sup>512</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939\\_Bulgarian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939_Bulgarian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>513</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

absent for this period (V-Dem PCLI, LIED). Until 1988, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In 1989, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For the year 1945, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the following two years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 1948 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

06/10/1990 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date elections for the constitutional assembly were held. The reformed communist party, known as the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), emerged victorious in the elections (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 17, Marshall 2018e). On 08/01/1990, the parliament (National Assembly), still controlled by the BSP, chose Zhelev, leader of the opposition UDF, as president after the communist leader Mladenov resigned. Zhelev was a compromise candidate; a non-partisan prime minister was chosen in November 1990 to replace the BSP prime minister. This marks the end of the communist regime before new elections were held in 1991. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the election as competitive. V-Dem's CEI scores the elections as somewhat clean. Their EF&FI scores them as free and fair. As classified by FH for 1990, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For the years 1991 and 1992, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Per FH, for the period between 1993 and 1995, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. During 1996 and 2000 Bulgaria is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. From 2001 onwards the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. LIED classifies political liberties as absent until 2000 and as present from 2001 onwards. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present since 1990 except in 2018 the outcome was somewhat present. Based on

Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. On 10/13/1991 elections were won by the UDF, completing the transition (Curtis 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 48-49). A similar story is being told by FH, who list Bulgaria as partly free in 1990 and as free since 1991. Bulgaria's democratic electoral system features multiple parties vying for power, resulting in several shifts between rival parties in recent decades. However, the nation grapples with persistent challenges, including political corruption and organized crime. The political discourse is tainted by hate speech, particularly targeting minority groups and foreigners, predominantly emanating from smaller right-wing parties. Although the media landscape remains diverse, there is a growing concern about ownership concentration, leading news outlets to align coverage with the interests of their proprietors. Journalists, at times, encounter threats or violence while performing their duties. Discrimination against ethnic minorities, notably the Roma community, persists. Despite funding limitations and other hurdles, civil society groups have been active and exert influence in Bulgarian society.<sup>514</sup> In 2007 Bulgaria became part of the European Union. The Economist Intelligence Unit rated Bulgaria a “flawed democracy” in 2020.<sup>515</sup> Comparative regime data sets, namely BMR, CGV, LIED, MCM, PRC and RoW consistently classify the regime period from 1991 onwards as democratic. However, there are serious flaws of democracy and LIED as well as RoW classify the regime as the subtype of an electoral democracy. However, according to LIED competitive elections were held since 1991. V-Dem’s EF&FI and CEI continue to score the countries elections as free, fair and somewhat clean. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Between 07/09/2020 and 04/16/2021 mass anti-government protests took place because of allegations of corruption surrounding the prosecutorial office and several politicians, demanding for the resignation of Geshev and prime minister Borisov.<sup>516</sup> The protests ended on 04/16/2016, when the formal resignation of the 3rd Borisov government had been accepted by the new parliament.<sup>517</sup> From 05/12/2021 to 12/13/2021 two interim

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<sup>514</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>515</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgaria#History>

<sup>516</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>517</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%932021\\_Bulgarian\\_protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%932021_Bulgarian_protests)

governments were established after no party was able to form a government after the elections in April and July 2021. They were headed by Radev as interim president. General elections for the National Assembly were held in Bulgaria on 11/14/2021, coinciding with the presidential elections. They were the country's third parliamentary elections in 2021. A second round of the presidential elections were held on 11/21/2021 as no candidate was able to receive a majority of the vote in the first round.<sup>518</sup> The third round of polling election resulted in the consolidation of a coalition government under Prime Minister Kiril Petkov. Presidential candidate Radev, who had appointed two provisional governments during that year, won re-election in November with 65.8 % of the vote.<sup>519</sup> After further parliamentary elections in 2022 and 2023 in which coalition negotiations and the approval of a new government failed, the Bulgarian people prepare to go to what will be their 6th snap election since 2021<sup>520</sup>, with turnout rates dropping (in 2022 to a record low at 39%).<sup>521</sup> Bulgaria's election process is generally described as professional and impartial, although some flaws have been reported in past elections and since the end of communist rule in 1990, there have been multiple peaceful transfers of power between rival parties through elections. However, one weakness concerns the independence of media, which is substantially dependent on funding and thus pressured to run government-friendly material.<sup>522</sup>

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Brunnbauer 2008, Crampton 2005, Curtis 1992, Dellin 1957, Elklit 1994, Fish/Brooks 2000, Poppetrov 2001, Riedel 2010, Todorov 2010, Van Dyke 1947)

## **Burkina Faso**

[formerly known as Upper Volta]

01/01/1900 Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 09/05/1896]: The French gained power over the territory of today's Burkina Faso, by taking the city of Ouagadougou on 09/05/1896<sup>523</sup> and made Burkina Faso a protectorate.<sup>524</sup> While the country has been de facto a colony already before, including our start

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<sup>518</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021\\_Bulgarian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Bulgarian_general_election)

<sup>519</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>520</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024\\_Bulgarian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Bulgarian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>521</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_Bulgarian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Bulgarian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>522</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>523</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline\\_of\\_Ouagadougou](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Ouagadougou)

<sup>524</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina\\_Faso#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso#History)



date of 01/01/1900. On 03/01/1919 the country became officially a colony of France. In 1919, the colony of Upper Volta was established from regions that were formerly territories within the colonies of Upper Senegal and Niger, as well as the Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>525</sup> On 09/05/1932 the colony was dismantled and being split between the French colonies of Ivory Coast, French Sudan and Niger. Hence, the colonial status continued. However, the territory of Burkina Faso as such was dissolved.<sup>526</sup> On 09/04/1947, the colony was re-established as a French territory with its previous boundaries.<sup>527</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For this colonial time only outcomes between 1919 and 1931 were provided by LIED and V-Dem. V-Dem's JCE and LCE again provide data from 1947 onwards. During these years V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

05/30/1948 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this day, the first parliament of the Republic of upper Volta was elected with male suffrage. The territorial election was held alongside elections to the French National Assembly. In 1957, universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). On 12/11/1958 Burkina Faso attained self-governance as the Republic of Upper Volta. However, it was still governed by a French high commissioner until independence. On 04/19/1959 after a constitutional referendum, parliamentary elections were held. The constitution established a presidential system. The first political parties were banned in the first few months of 1960 (Grotz 1999: 123). Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the election as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI ranks the freedom and fairness of Burkinabe elections as ambiguous, during this period and the CEI scores them as not really clean. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present from 1947 to 1954 and ambiguous from 1955 onward. For most of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1960,

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<sup>525</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Upper\\_Volta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Upper_Volta)

<sup>526</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Upper\\_Volta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Upper_Volta)

<sup>527</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Upper\\_Volta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Upper_Volta)

V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/05/1960 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, independence was reached under a single party rule by the Voltaic Democratic Union-African Democratic Rally. Opposition parties were banned shortly before independence (Collier 1982:109, Englebert 1996:34-35). In December 1960, Maurice Yaméogo, the newly elected president of UDV/RDA, hindered the participation of opposition parties in the municipal elections and detained several opposition politicians (Englebert 1996:44, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49). As a result, the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1965, which reaffirmed Yaméogo and the UDV-RDA, lacked competitiveness (Grotz 1999: 123). Yaméogo also purged the UDV-RDA of his enemies.<sup>528</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. While LIED and the EF&FI did not change their scoring during this time, the CEI increased its score to ambiguous electoral cleanliness. Moreover, political liberties are considered absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1961 to 1965, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1966<sup>529</sup>, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/03/1966 End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: In the chaos of a nationwide strike, the military forced Yameogo to step down or face a civil war. General Lamizana took over afterward. In response to a general strike and upon the unions' request, the military, under the leadership of Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Lamizana, chose not to employ force against unarmed demonstrators. Instead, they intervened by suspending the constitution and establishing a new governing entity known as the Superior Council of the Armed Forces, composed of officers holding ranks above captain (Africa Confidential 1968:5, Englebert 1996:46). Later on, the composition of the regime was expanded to encompass civilian members as well (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49). Following Lamizana's declaration

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<sup>528</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice\\_Yam%C3%A9ogo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Yam%C3%A9ogo)

<sup>529</sup> V-Dem's reference date is January 1<sup>st</sup>.

that the military intended to establish only an interim regime, a liberalization of the Voltaian political system commenced four years later (Grotz 1999: 123-124). As a result, political parties were allowed again in November 1969 (Grotz 1999: 124). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Furthermore, political liberties are considered as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

06/14/1970 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date a referendum on a new constitution was held. The constitution sought to establish a dual executive system. On 12/20/1970 the first parliamentary elections since independence were held, which were won by UDV-RDA and led to a two-third majority in the parliament by this party (Grotz 1999: 124). Gerard Kango Ouedraogo became prime minister between 1971 and 1974.<sup>530</sup> But Lamizana stayed president without a popular mandate. Presidential election did not take place, because the power struggle between the speaker of parliament and the prime minister escalated in light of the planned presidential elections and led to Lamizana's self-coup (Grotz 1999: 124). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED claims that elections in this period have not been competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the 1970 election as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness and the CEI as not clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For 1971, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Between 1972 and 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Therefore, we classify this period as an electoral autocracy.

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<sup>530</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%A9rard\\_Kango\\_Ou%C3%A9draogo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%A9rard_Kango_Ou%C3%A9draogo)

02/08/1974 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military (Transitional) Autocracy: On this date a bloodless military coup took place, which was essentially a self-coup by President Lamizana against the government of Gerard Kango Ouedraogo. Lamizana dissolved the National assembly, suspended the constitution, and established a new government compromising himself as prime minister and eleven military officers and four civilians.<sup>531</sup> In contrast to the coup in 1966, this one did not rest on a broad social consensus (Grotz 1999: 124). On 06/14/1976, the people of Burkina Faso ratified a new constitution that marked the beginning of a four-year transition period towards full civilian governance. President Sangoulé Lamizana, a military officer, maintained his position as the leader of military or mixed civil-military governments. Following conflicts surrounding the 1976 constitution, a new constitution was drafted and ratified in 1977.<sup>532</sup> Part of it was the legalization of political parties.<sup>533</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Besides, political liberties were still absent according to LIED and ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1975 to 1977, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

04/30/1978 End Military (Transitional) Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections were held. The Voltaic Democratic Union-African Democratic Rally won the most seats, in total 28 out of 57. The new constitution restricted the number of allowed parties in parliament to three. Meaning only the three largest parties were allowed to participate in the assembly.<sup>534</sup> On 05/14/1978 presidential elections were held. They were the first multi-party presidential elections in the country's history. Because no candidate received more than 50% of the vote, a second round was held on 05/28/1978.<sup>535</sup> Sangoulé Lamizana was elected

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<sup>531</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974\\_Upper\\_Voltan\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Upper_Voltan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>532</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina\\_Faso#Lamizana's\\_rule\\_and\\_multiple\\_coups;](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso#Lamizana's_rule_and_multiple_coups;)  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangoul%C3%A9\\_Lamizana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangoul%C3%A9_Lamizana)

<sup>533</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/upper-voltaburkina-faso-1960-present/>

<sup>534</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978\\_Upper\\_Voltan\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Upper_Voltan_parliamentary_election)

<sup>535</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978\\_Upper\\_Voltan\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Upper_Voltan_presidential_election)

with 56% of the votes.<sup>536</sup> This election is widely regarded as one of the most democratic ever conducted in West Africa.<sup>537</sup> But still not only did the constitution restrict political competition, due to the number of allowed parties, but also the military continued to play an important role. Since independence the system has displayed a recurring pattern of authoritarian systems alternating with efforts to implement democratic governance (Grotz 1999: 123). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, the elections were not competitive. During these two years, V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI rates electoral cleanliness as ambiguous also. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI for this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

11/25/1980 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: With the support of labor and civil groups Colonel Zerbo overthrew recently elected president Lamizana. Zerbo established the *Comite Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National*. All key posts were granted to militaries (Englebert 1996:51-52). The 1966-80 regime is considered different from the earlier period because civilians were excluded from the ruling group. The period from 1980-82 is considered by GWF as a different regime because Lamizana's civilian coalition partners were excluded from the ruling group (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI in this period. In this period, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

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<sup>536</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/upper-voltaburkina-faso-1960-present/>

<sup>537</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangoul%C3%A9\\_Lamizana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sangoul%C3%A9_Lamizana)

11/07/1982 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A group of non-commissioned officers led by Colonel Some seized power after accusing Colonel Zerbo that he was turning the military into an agent of terror. Afterwards the Provisional People's Salvation Council junta was formed and Ouedraogo became the head of the junta (Englebert 1996: 53-54). The new government is treated as a different regime from Zerbo's because of a change in the rank of the group from which leaders could be chosen. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

08/04/1983 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: The army led by Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré launched a coup against the regime of Major Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo. Sankara created a Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR), a governing body consisting mostly of populist junior officers. Under Sankara the country was renamed from the colonial name of Upper Volta to Burkina Faso.<sup>538</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Regarding the political liberties they are considered as absent per LIED and V-Dem PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties.

10/15/1987 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: General Blaise Compaore launched a coup against Sankara. Sankara was killed by soldiers linked to Compaore. A few of Sankara's military allies were executed (Wilkins 1989: 375). The government of Compaore is treated as a new regime because Compaore changed the identity of the groups that could

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<sup>538</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas\\_Sankara](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Sankara)

influence policy and from which officials could be chosen. Leaders of the small parties that had collaborated with Sankara fled to exile, were repressed or merged into the new ruling single party, Organization for Popular Democracy – Labour Movement (ODP/MT), along with new parties representing some of the same political formations that had been excluded by Sankara after dominating politics in the sixties and seventies (Englebert 1996: 61-65). The CDRs were dissolved in early 1988. In short, the post-1987 regime included a much wider array of political actors but excluded some of those who had been important to Sankara's support base. In result its leftism had been muted. By 1990, the ruling FP included seven parties besides ODP/MT and most unions, which had been excluded by Sankara (Englebert 1996:65, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49-50). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED's and V-Dem's PCLI scores regarding the political liberties remained at an absent and an ambiguous level. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

12/01/1991 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: Compaoré implemented modest democratic changes in 1990. With the introduction of the new constitution in 1991, elections were held in December of that year.<sup>539</sup> These elections marked the first in the country since 1978, yet opposition parties boycotted them. The outcome resulted in the incumbent President Blaise Compaoré securing a victory as the sole candidate, despite a low voter turnout of only 27.3%.<sup>540</sup> In 1998, Compaoré achieved a resounding victory in the elections.<sup>541</sup> Again, the 1998 presidential elections were boycotted by the major opposition parties.<sup>542</sup> Presidential elections were regularly held in 2005 and 2010.<sup>543</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections during this period as not competitive. Until this point, V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Going forward, it increased to scoring the elections as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's CEI switched several times between

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<sup>539</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina\\_Faso#1987\\_coup\\_d'%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso#1987_coup_d'%C3%A9tat)

<sup>540</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Burkinab%C3%A9\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Burkinab%C3%A9_presidential_election)

<sup>541</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina\\_Faso#1987\\_coup\\_d'%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso#1987_coup_d'%C3%A9tat)

<sup>542</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998\\_Burkinab%C3%A9\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_Burkinab%C3%A9_presidential_election)

<sup>543</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Burkina\\_Faso#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Burkina_Faso#)

scoring the elections cleanliness as between ambiguous and not given during this period. As classified by FH for 1991, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the period between 1992 and 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Per FH's scoring during 1999 and 2003, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2004, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free and from 2005 onwards Burkina Faso is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present from 1992 to 1998 and as present from 1999 onward. Between 1992 and 1999, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Since 2000, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1992 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1999 to 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 2013, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2005 Compaoré ran a third time as candidate, although the constitution only allowed two terms. The Constitutional Court backed him and ruled that the constitutional amendment could not be applied retroactively. He won with 80% of the votes, but this time the opposition took part in the elections. One of the main political issues was the freedom of the press.<sup>544</sup> The presidential elections in 2010 were characterized by numerous allegations of fraud. Seven candidates registered, but Compaoré won again with 80% of the votes.<sup>545</sup>

10/31/2014 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Wide-spread protests against constitutional changes that would have allowed President Campaorè to extend his term in office resulted in a military coup. Initially, Campaoré resigned and the military under Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida (former leader of the presidential guard) took power. On 11/01/

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<sup>544</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Burkinab%C3%A9\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Burkinab%C3%A9_presidential_election)

<sup>545</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010\\_Burkinab%C3%A9\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Burkinab%C3%A9_presidential_election)



2014, the armed forces collectively supported Zida to assume leadership on an interim basis, leading the country towards the 2015 presidential election.<sup>546</sup>

11/17/2014 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: On this date, the military was pressured to install a civilian interim president. The civilian, Michel Kafando, was chosen to replace Zida as transitional head of state. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

09/16/2015 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the plans for transition were halted by members of the Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP), a military unit loyal to former president Campaoré, seized power, arresting acting president Kafando and prime-minister Zida. The RSP successfully took control of Ouagadougou and declared the formation of a new junta, led by General Gilbert Diendéré, tasked with overseeing the transition to new elections.<sup>547</sup> The junta failed to consolidate its authority across the country, and faced protests as well as intense pressure from regional leaders, and eventually from the regular army, to restore the transitional government. Protests and international pressure resulted in the release of Kafando and Zida and the restoration of civilian rule.<sup>548</sup>

09/23/2015 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: Only a week after the coup the junta was replaced by Michel Kafando who continued to govern on an interim basis leading a 25-member technocratic government and a National Transitional Council with Zida as his prime minister indicating dominating military influence of the planned transition (Lansford 2021: 232). The period between October 2014 and September 2015 is marked by two coups and two periods of political uprisings.

11/29/2015 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Defective Democracy: Roch Marc Christian Kaboré won the presidential election with 53.5 percent of the vote, defeating 13 other candidates (Lansford 2021: 232).<sup>549</sup> These elections, deemed the "freest and fairest" in the country's history, were conducted under universal suffrage.<sup>550</sup> Despite challenges

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<sup>546</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yacouba\\_Isaac\\_Zida](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yacouba_Isaac_Zida)

<sup>547</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015\\_Burkina\\_Faso\\_coup\\_attempt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Burkina_Faso_coup_attempt)

<sup>548</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015\\_Burkina\\_Faso\\_coup\\_attempt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Burkina_Faso_coup_attempt)

<sup>549</sup> <https://africanarguments.org/2015/12/how-burkina-faso-ensured-its-freest-and-fairest-ever-elections/>

<sup>550</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina\\_Faso\\_2012](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2012)

such as extreme poverty, terrorism, and corruption, civil society and the media stood as strong proponents of democracy and the safeguarding of civil liberties. While the judiciary was formally independent, it remained fragile and prone to influence from the executive branch.<sup>551</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. As classified by FH for the period until 2018, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. From 2019 onwards the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. According to LIED political liberties were absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. According to our observations it is a borderline case between a defective democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. From 2016 to 2021, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

01/24/2022 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, democratically elected President Kaboré was arrested by military soldiers. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was appointed as Interim President and on 02/2022 declared president by the Constitutional Council. The military junta approved a military-led transition for three years.<sup>552</sup>

09/30/2022 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a coup d'état removed Interim President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba over his alleged inability to deal with the country's Islamist insurgency. Captain Ibrahim Traoré took over as interim leader. Headed by Traoré, the army dissolved the interim parliament and suspended the constitution.<sup>553</sup> The event is coded as a regime change because the coup was launched by a different group in the military than the coup in January 2022. In September 2023 the military junta postponed elections intended for July 2024 indefinitely, citing security reasons.<sup>554</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which

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<sup>551</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/burkina-faso/freedom-world/2019>

<sup>552</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January\\_2022\\_Burkina\\_Faso\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2022_Burkina_Faso_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>553</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September\\_2022\\_Burkina\\_Faso\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_2022_Burkina_Faso_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>554</sup> <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/burkinafaso/>

aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED codes political liberties as absent for the entire coded period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties have been somewhat present since 2023. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Collier 1982, Robinson 1992)

**Burma** see **Myanmar**

## **Burundi**

[Ruanda-Urundi was a territory that was comprised of the later countries Ruanda and Burundi.]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 02/26/1885]: Ruanda and Urundi were two separate kingdoms in the Great Lakes region. The Burundi Kingdom was founded in 1680 under the leadership of the royal clan. On 02/26/1885 at the Berlin Conference, Burundi was defined as part of Germany's sphere.<sup>555</sup> In 1899, Germany established Ruanda-Urundi as part of the German East Africa protectorate (Cornwell/de Beer 1999: 84). For this time neither LIED nor V-Dem list Burundi in their data. While it was in name a protectorate, according to our coding rules it was a colony.

06/01/1916 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Belgium, Occupation Regime]: During World War I Ruanda-Urundi was occupied by Belgian forces, who established military rule in 1916 (Cornwell/de Beer 1999: 84). Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent for this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period,

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<sup>555</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin\\_Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_Conference)

which aligns with the observations of LIED. Therefore, we code this period as a direct occupation regime.

07/20/1922 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Belgium, Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Belgium as International Mandate]: From this date on, Ruanda-Urundi was administrated as a trust territory by Belgium under a League of Nations mandate. In 1946 Burundi became a UN trust territory (Cornwell/de Beer 1999: 84). We code this period as a directly ruled colony. It was not before 1961 that Belgium granted Ruanda-Urundi internal autonomy and agreed on legislative elections to be held after substantial pressure from the UN, accompanied by a promise that the Belgians would prepare the territory for independence (Cornwell/de Beer 1999: 85).<sup>556</sup> On 08/17/1961, prior to independence, the Belgian administration of the UN Trust territory introduced universal suffrage to women. This right was confirmed at independence.<sup>557</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For this period, political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For almost the entire regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 1961, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

12/21/1961 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Belgium, Liberal Democracy, as International Mandate]/Start Autocratic Monarchy [under internal autonomy]: Because Burundi was granted internal self-governance along with elections and the promise of independence from the international side, this period is coded as quasi-independent. On 07/01/1962 the Kingdom of Burundi restored its complete independence as a constitutional monarchy, where executive power was vested in the mwami, while legislative authority was granted to the parliament.<sup>558</sup> While the monarchy falls formally in the category constitutional, the monarchy selected and removed governments without parliamentary consultation, expanded its authority through various means, and appointed family members to crucial positions. Governments were structured to maintain a balance between Tutsis and Hutus (Lemarchand 1966:420-423, Lansford 2012e:205, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 50). While it is classified as a constitutional monarchy it is clearly an autocratic monarchy, being a borderline case between a constitutional and an autocratic monarchy. Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections

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<sup>556</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruanda-Urundi>

<sup>557</sup> [https://data.ipu.org/node/28/data-on-women?chamber\\_id=13353](https://data.ipu.org/node/28/data-on-women?chamber_id=13353)

<sup>558</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Burundi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Burundi)

were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the election as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections during this time as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. In 1962, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. Besides, LIED continued to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI changed into a range which we interpret as not really present. Since then, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 1962, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

07/08/1966 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: A military coup led by Captain Michel Micombero reduced the powers of the monarch. King Mwambutsa was replaced with his youngest son and coup leader Micombero became prime minister. In November 1966, a second coup led by Tutsi military officers, headed by Prime Minister Micombero, led to the official shift from a monarchy to a republic. Micombero assumed control, and the government became predominantly influenced by Tutsi officers and politicians. During this time, Hutus were systematically removed from the officer corps, as well as from the bureaucracy and political sphere, through purges carried out in 1966, 1969, and 1972 (Lemarchand 1974a:75, Lemarchand 1974b:87, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 50-51). On 11/28/1966 General Michel Micombero overthrew the monarchy and ousted king Ntare V. He appointed himself president of the new republic.<sup>559</sup> The National Revolutionary Council (NRC) headed by Michel Micombero took control of the government on 29/11/1966. The NRC confirmed the status of Union for National Progress (UPRONA) as the country's only legal political party on 11/30/1966. Under Micombero's rule an ideology known as "democratic centralism" was implemented, consolidating control over all national institutions and media, effectively establishing a military dictatorship.<sup>560</sup> Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held from 1967 to 1981, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Executive elections were held from 1982 onward and legislative elections from 1984 onward, which weren't multiparty. Since the center of the rule was the NRC and not UPRONA the regime is classified as a military autocracy. According to Polity5,

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<sup>559</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Burundi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Burundi)

<sup>560</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel\\_Micombero](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Micombero)

during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For the entire period both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classified political liberties as not present.

09/03/1987 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Bagaza was overthrown by Major Buyoya and a military junta was established to rule the country. Buyoya's government is considered a new regime because he initially dissolved the Tutsi ruling party and established an all-military ruling group of 31 officers, thus changing the identity of the group able to influence policy (Maher 2004:946, Lansford 2012e:205, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). In 1988, under the authoritarian regime of President Buyoya, a commission dedicated to the study of national unity was established, ensuring equal representation from both Hutu and Tutsi groups. The commission's findings led to the creation of a Charter on National Unity, which received approval through a national referendum in 1991. Following this, a Constitutional Commission was convened to draft a new constitution, which was subsequently endorsed in a 1992 referendum, thereby laying the groundwork for the national elections held in 1993 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 18). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations.

As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For this time LIED and V-Dem's PCLI considered political liberties as absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

06/01/1993 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date the first multiparty presidential elections took place. They were rated as free and fair by international observers and all candidates accepted the results.<sup>561</sup> Melchior Ndadaye, leader of the Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy (FRODEBU) defeated (Tutsi) incumbent President Pierre Buyoya. The election marked a turning point for Burundi, signifying the conclusion of the Tutsi-dominated state supported by the military since 1966 since Ndadaye was a Hutu (Maher

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<sup>561</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melchior\\_Ndadaye#Leader\\_of\\_FRODEBU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melchior_Ndadaye#Leader_of_FRODEBU)

2004:946, Lansford 2012e:206, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). Ndadaye was the country's first Hutu head of state, leading a pro-Hutu government.<sup>562</sup> He became president on 07/10/1993. Despite his efforts to bridge the ethnic divide, his reforms faced opposition from soldiers in the Tutsi-dominated army.<sup>563</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections in this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the 1993 election as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores it as not really clean. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were in an ambiguous state in this period. The reasons for classifying this period as an electoral hybrid regime become more apparent when viewed together with the period from 10/27/1993 onwards, as both periods are connected and were only interrupted by six days of military rule.

10/21/1993 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Ndadaye along with several other government leaders were killed by rebelling Tutsi-dominated military forces who went onto establish the Committee of Public Salvation junta which lasted for only six days. Ngeze was established as head of state by the junta.<sup>564</sup>

10/27/1993 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Due to public unrest and international opposition Ngeze stepped down with the rest of the junta, on this date, and passed power to the next highest-ranking civilian official who had survived the coup – Sylvie Kinigi, a Tutsi.<sup>565</sup> He became acting civilian prime minister and served from 10/27/1993 to 02/05/1994.<sup>566</sup> Kinigi's government was comprising of 15 of the 22 ministers before of the coup. However, the period was characterized by a civil war with ongoing violence between Hutu rebels and the Tutsi majority army, which led to human rights abuses. In early 1994, Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu, was elected president by the parliament after a modification of Article 85 to allow this indirect election. The parliament opposition, however, argued that this amendment was not in line with the constitution. Therefore, the matter was brought before the Constitutional Court, who ruled in favor of the opposition. Subsequently Kingi dismissed all Tutsi judges, the Hutu judges resigned. This led to violence in the capital. Consequently, Kingi reached a compromise with the opposition. Ntaryamira, was sworn in on 02/05/1994 as president and the ethnic Tutsi Anatole Kanyenkiko assumed the prime minister office.<sup>567</sup>

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<sup>562</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burundi>

<sup>563</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melchior\\_Ndadaye#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melchior_Ndadaye#)

<sup>564</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Burundian\\_coup\\_attempt#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Burundian_coup_attempt#)

<sup>565</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Burundian\\_coup\\_attempt#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Burundian_coup_attempt#)

<sup>566</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvie\\_Kinigi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvie_Kinigi)

<sup>567</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvie\\_Kinigi#Prime\\_Minister\\_of\\_Burundi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvie_Kinigi#Prime_Minister_of_Burundi)

However, both Ntaryamira and Juvénal Habyarimana, the president of Rwanda, also a Hutu, died together when their plane was shot down in April 1994. This event led to an increase in the number of refugees fleeing to Rwanda. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, a Hutu and the Speaker of Parliament, assumed the presidency in October 1994. A coalition government, comprising 12 out of the 13 parties, was formed. Kanyenkiko resigned, but remained in power until a new executive was confirmed. The outgoing prime minister and the new president maintained good working relations.<sup>568</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The 1993 election was not competitive (LIED). Moreover, V-Dem's CEI scored not really cleanliness. However, the overall election conditions were somewhat free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI the presence of political liberties was ambiguous. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. This regime in this period is classified as an electoral hybrid regime. However, the constitutional line of succession was respected, even during this turbulent period.

07/25/1996 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: With support from the populace and the military, on this date Buyoya overthrew the civilian government in a military coup d'état. It was justified by its lack of progress in stopping ethnic killings. In 1996, Hutu rebels killed over three hundred Tutsis, after which the third Hutu president, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, disappeared before a military takeover. Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, became the head of the new military government. He had already been in power from 1987 to 1992 and was now named interim president (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 74, Maher 2004:948, Lansford 2012e:206, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). It was the fourth such takeover of the Burundian government since the country's independence in 1962, and the second to result in Buyoya taking power. Despite the coup, the parliament Assembly and political parties continued to operate, albeit under constraints.<sup>569</sup> In the weeks immediately following the coup, more than 6.000 people were killed in the country.<sup>570</sup> Economic sanctions were also imposed by the international community because of the nature of Buyoya's return to power but were eased as Buyoya created an ethnically inclusive government. Buyoya established a new

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<sup>568</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvestre\\_Ntibantunganya](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sylvestre_Ntibantunganya)

<sup>569</sup> [https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human\\_rights/1996\\_hrp\\_report/burundi.html](https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/burundi.html)

<sup>570</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996\\_Burundian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Burundian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)



partnership in 06/1998 with the National Assembly, which was under the influence of the Hutu-supported Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). Subsequently, this move played a role in facilitating the emergence of the Arusha Accords in 2000. These Accords brought out a system of ethnic power-sharing, ultimately leading to the resolution of the Civil War in 2005.<sup>571</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In addition, LIED codes political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as ambiguous. In 1997, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Since 1998, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. In stark contrast to Polity5 for the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

11/01/2001 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date a transitional government under President Pierre Buyoya was formally inaugurated. Out of 26 cabinet portfolios, the Hutu groups got 14 and the Tutsi groups 12 ministries.<sup>572</sup> On 04/30/2003 another interim transitional government was established, following the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord. In accordance with the agreement, President Buyoya transferred power to his Hutu Vice President. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for the period until 2002 the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. From 2003 onward the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties remained absent (LIED) and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. Between 2002 and 2004, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 2005, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

07/04/2005 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date president Domitien Ndayizeye, who was the leader of the FRODEBU party, oversaw a competitive parliamentary election as mandated by the Peace Accord. The election resulted in a victory for the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CND-FDD) party (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). The 2005

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<sup>571</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre\\_Buyoya](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Buyoya)

<sup>572</sup> <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/implementation/powersharing-transitional-government-2003-14>

parliamentary elections were largely peaceful and deemed as generally fair, transparent and free by observers.<sup>573</sup> During the Burundian Civil War, the CNDD–FDD was the most significant rebel group active and became a major political party.<sup>574</sup> On 08/19/2005 indirect presidential elections were held. The National Assembly and Senate members were responsible for selecting the new president, who would serve a five-year term.<sup>575</sup> Pierre Nkurunziza, the only candidate representing the CNDD-FDD party, secured a resounding victory with a vote of 151-9.<sup>576</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED elections were competitive during this time. V-Dem’s CEI scores an ambiguous cleanliness, and the elections were somewhat free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Per FH’s scoring for 2005, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. From 2006 onward the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Regarding the political liberties they were absent according to LIED and ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

06/28/2010 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Before the second post-war presidential elections were conducted on this date, 250 opposition figures were arrested after the FNL had led a boycott of presidential and legislative balloting. Despite that, the communal elections in May 2010 were deemed free and fair by international observers, but there was no real competition. Due to further boycotts by the opposition, there was only one candidate in the presidential elections, which were different from 2005. The elections were won by incumbent Nkurunziza (CNDD–FDD) with 91.6% of the vote who held office since 2005 and thus was elected for another term (Lansford 2021: 242). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive since 2010. Since 2010 V-Dem’s CEI and V-Dem’s EF&FI scores dropped in a range that we interpret in the way

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<sup>573</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Burundian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Burundian_parliamentary_election)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Council\\_for\\_the\\_Defense\\_of\\_Democracy\\_%E2%80%93\\_Forces\\_for\\_the\\_Defense\\_of\\_Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Council_for_the_Defense_of_Democracy_%E2%80%93_Forces_for_the_Defense_of_Democracy)

<sup>575</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Burundian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Burundian_presidential_election)

<sup>576</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Burundian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Burundian_presidential_election)

that elections were neither free, fair, nor clean. Per FH's evaluation for the regime period until 2013, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 2014 onward, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies the presence of political liberties as ambiguous from 2010 to 2012, not really present in 2013 and 2014 and as absent from 2015 onward. From 2010 to 2014, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. Since 2015, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. For the years 2011 and 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 2013 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Although constitutional regulations limit a president's time in office to two terms, Nkurunziza was nominated again by the CNDD-FDD for a third term in 2015 which led to popular uprising and an attempted coup (Lansford 2021: 242). Again, a variety of parties boycotted the polling. Presidential elections took place on 07/21/2015, and Nkurunziza was re-elected for a third term. International observers described the elections as unfair and tainted (Lansford 2021:242). Ahead of the 2020 presidential elections, Nkurunziza endorsed Ndayishimiye as his successor, who was elected president with 71.5% of the vote in balloting on 05/20/2020 and was inaugurated on 06/18/2020 after the sudden early passing of Nkurunziza (Lansford 2021: 242).<sup>577</sup> The elections were deemed unfair. There were reports of irregularities on election day.<sup>578</sup> Despite his military background, there is no reason to believe that this period could be a military autocracy. One of the major traits of electoral politics in Burundi is the prevalence of ongoing incumbency which hinders oppositional parties from developing strong institutions and means to compete with their opponents. Thus, the incumbent party retains control over governance, the elections process and even public opinion (Palman 2012). Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>577</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89variste\\_Ndayishimiye](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89variste_Ndayishimiye)

<sup>578</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020\\_Burundian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Burundian_general_election)

Additional sources (Basedau 1999, Kirschke 2007)

## **Cambodia**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 10/17/1887]: On 08/11/1863 the French established a protectorate in Cambodia (Thomson 1945). A treaty was signed between the Cambodian King Norodom and the French under which the Cambodian monarchy was allowed to remain, but power was largely vested in a resident general. France also retained Cambodia's foreign and trade relations as well as military protection.<sup>579</sup> At the same time, Siam (modern Thailand) renounced its sovereignty over Cambodia and officially recognized the French protectorate in Cambodia.<sup>580</sup> On 10/17/1887 Cambodia became a colony as part of the newly created French Indochinese Federation under a governor-general (Tully 2005).<sup>581</sup> The Resident General assumed all powers by the King to collect taxes, issue decrees, and even appoint royal officials and choose crown princes. Therefore, from that time on, all powers were vested in the governor general and colonial bureaucracy.<sup>582</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

03/13/1945 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]: By agreement with Japan, the French Vichy government allowed Japanese troops to transit through French Indochina and to station troops in Northern Vietnam. In August 1941, however, Japanese troops occupied the French protectorate of Cambodia and established a garrison. The Japanese authorities allowed the French colonial officials to remain at their administrative posts.<sup>583</sup> On 03/09/1945, the Japanese staged a coup de force against the French (Tully 2005). On 03/13 King Norodom Sihanouk proclaimed an independent Kingdom of Kampuchea and served as prime minister.<sup>584</sup>

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<sup>579</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>580</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>581</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Indochina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Indochina)

<sup>582</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>583</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese\\_occupation\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_Cambodia)

<sup>584</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese\\_occupation\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_Cambodia);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

08/14/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Japan, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: The Japanese occupation ended with the official surrender of Japan in August 1945 and a new government was established with Son Ngoc Thanh acting as prime minister.<sup>585</sup>

10/16/1945 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date the French re-established colonial rule in Cambodia shortly after Japanese surrender in 1945 and Thanh was put under house arrest.<sup>586</sup> In 1946, France allowed the Cambodians to form political parties and to hold elections for a Consultative Assembly that would advise the monarch on drafting the country's constitution. Pre-independence Consultative Assembly elections were held in September 1946 in which the Democrats won 50 of 67 seats. In the December 1947 elections for the parliament, the Democrats won a large majority again.<sup>587</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Additionally, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate the absence of political liberties. For 1946, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1947, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

11/08/1947 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date Cambodia was declared a French associated state by the Franco-Khmer treaty. It granted Cambodia control over most internal matters and of most administrative functions while France retained a significant control over the judicial system, finances and customs and moreover, Cambodia was obliged to co-ordinate foreign policy matters with the High Council of the French Union (Tully 2005).<sup>588</sup> Legislative elections were held on 12/21/1947. Suffrage was limited to a literate minority of the male population with property rights. In Nohlens Elections Handbook, a precise percentage of registered voters for 1947 was not cataloged, however, in the years previous and after registered voters fluctuate between 15 and 20% of the total population.

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<sup>585</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese\\_occupation\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_Cambodia);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>586</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese\\_occupation\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_occupation_of_Cambodia);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>587</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>588</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

(Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001:63). Despite this, considering the strong restrictions on male and absence of female suffrage, this period is classified as an autocratic monarchy. The period is considered as a borderline case between a colony and a protectorate. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. For the year 1948, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the year 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1950, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1951, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1952, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1953, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

11/09/1953 Continuation Autocratic Monarchy [as independent country]: After a long struggle by Sihanouk, on 08/17/1953 France granted Cambodia full sovereignty and on 11/09/1953 the last French troops left Cambodian soil after 90 years of colonial rule (Tully 2005). According to the constitution Cambodia was supposed to be a constitutional monarchy. However, King Sihanouk suspended the constitution, dissolved the assembly, assumed the post of PM, and declared martial law before independence (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). Sihanouk came from the traditional royal family but had been chosen by the French over other potential royal claimant (Seekins 1987, Lansford 2012g:216). Control of residual matters affecting sovereignty, such as finances and foreign affairs were transferred completely to the Cambodian state in 1954.<sup>589</sup> In 1955, universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>590</sup> Since 1955, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the year 1954, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial

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<sup>589</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_protectorate\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_protectorate_of_Cambodia)

<sup>590</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1955 to 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1970, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1954 and 1955. No executive elections were present. From 1955-1961 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1962 until 1972 LIED classifies both executive and legislative elections as present, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Besides, political liberties maintained their absent score for the entire time following LIED. V-Dem's PCLI scores them as absent until 1949, as not really present from 1950 to 1959 and as ambiguous until 1970.

03/18/1970 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: A new civil-military ruling coalition was established following a coup orchestrated by Prime Minister General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak (Seekins 1990, Lansford 2012f: 215, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). The monarchy was abolished in October 1970 (Seekins 1990, Lansford 2012f: 216). On 03/11/1972, Nol took advantage of a crisis to remove Heng from the presidency and assumed it himself, further consolidating his executive power in the nation. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. LIED still codes political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI outcomes dropped back to what we interpret as not really present for this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/03[-09/17]/1972 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date the Khmer Republic conducted general elections, marking the first electoral process following the 1970 coup. The National Assembly elections were held on 09/03 featuring contestation between the Social Republican Party and Pracheachon (though the latter only fielded 10 candidates). The Republican Party and the Democratic Party boycotted the elections due to their objections to the new electoral law. The Social Republican Party emerged victorious, securing all 126 seats in the National Assembly with 99.1% of valid votes. Subsequently, the Senate elections took

place on 09/17, resulting in the Social Republican Party winning all 32 seats.<sup>591</sup> LIED categories it as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI & CEI indicate that the elections were not really free and fair as well as not clean. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the year 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. On 04/01/1975 Nol resigned and fled Cambodia as the Khmer rebels laid siege to Phnom Penh. His regime persisted with a series of short-lived military leaders but at this point the rebels had already taken control of the capital. According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Based on our observations, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, regarding the political liberties they are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI.

04/17/1975 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: The government surrendered on this date to the insurgency of the Khmer Rouge (Communist Party of Kampuchea, CPK). The Cambodian state was officially renamed Democratic Kampuchea. Norodom Sihanouk remained a figurehead head of government until 04/02/1976.<sup>592</sup> Between 1975 and 1978, around two million Cambodians died by execution, forced labor and famine under the rule of a very radical Communist regime (Chandler/Kiernan/Boua 1988). The government formally capitulated to the Khmer Rouge insurgency, leading to the establishment of a new governing body (Seekins 1990, Lansford 2012f:216, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51-52). In January 1976 a new constitution of Democratic Kampuchea was promulgated by the CPK. The Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly (KPRI) was supposed to be elected in direct general elections. The KPRI was to appoint a State Praesidium for a period of five years. The direct elections for the KPRI never took place. Rather, the Central Committee of the CPK appointed members of the KPRI and the State Praesidium. Pol Pot became prime minister of Democratic Kampuchean. Both the administrative and legal bodies were destroyed

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<sup>591</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972\\_Cambodian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Cambodian_general_election)

<sup>592</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Kampuchea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Kampuchea)



or at least restructured. Society, as defined by the constitution, consisted of workers, peasants, and all other working people of Kampuchea. Ideological aim of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot was to form the country into a nation of peasants.<sup>593</sup> From 12/25/1978, the armed forces of Vietnam invaded Cambodia. This was the first and only extended war between two communist regimes. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held for most of this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this period. Between 1976 and 1978, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

01/07/1979 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this date, Phnom Penh was captured by Vietnamese troops and Cambodian exiles. A more moderate communist regime took over. This is the only takeover from one variant of a communist ideocracy to another. However, due to intervention of China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the ASEAN countries the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was not recognized by the United Nations. Samrim was installed as leader of the Communist regime. Even though the country was also occupied by Vietnamese troops (Seekins 1990) the regime period is coded as a variant of a communist ideocracy. During this period, the UN seat for Kampuchea was occupied by a coalition government led by the Khmer Rouge (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52). On 04/29-30/1989 started to implement constitutional changes, for example the renaming of the People's Republic of Kampuchea into State of Cambodia (SOC) and laws on economic liberalization were passed.<sup>594</sup> On 10/15/1991, Civil war peace accords established by UN and regional nations interest forced the step down of Hun Sen as premier and the ascension of Sinaouk to the executive. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) dropped its commitment to communism and became more of a conservative-authoritarian party.<sup>595</sup> The Paris Peace Agreements were signed on 10/23/1991. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held from 1979 to 1980. From then on, according to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As

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<sup>593</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic\\_Kampuchea#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Kampuchea#)

<sup>594</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s\\_Republic\\_of\\_Kampuchea#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Republic_of_Kampuchea#)

<sup>595</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodian\\_People%27s\\_Party#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodian_People%27s_Party#History)

classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the communist period both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI considered political liberties as absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

05/23/1992 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [as International Mandate]: With the Paris Peace Agreements, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was formed. It took responsibility for the administration. Its aim was to restore peace and civil government, conduct free and fair elections and disarm Cambodia's fighting factions.<sup>596</sup> During this period the so called Supreme National Council embodied Cambodian sovereignty and represented the state internally and externally for this transition period. It was headed by Sihanouk and was composed of six members of the SOC and five of the resistance factions (Brown 1992: 91-93). According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Besides, political liberties are coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI outcomes increased to an ambiguous level. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren't multiparty, were held.

05/23/1993 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime [as International Mandate]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy: On this date the first post-war general elections were held, which lasted until 05/28/1993. Vote counting started a day later. The elections were organized and supervised by UNTAC.<sup>597</sup> The election resulted in a hung parliament, with FUNCINPEC, led by Sihanouk's son Ranariddh, emerging as the winning party. To maintain stability, a power-sharing agreement was reached, appointing both Ranariddh and Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party as interim co-Prime Ministers. This decision was made after the CPP threatened to secede part of the country if full power was transferred to FUNCINPEC.<sup>598</sup> On 09/24/1993, a new constitution was promulgated, which reinstated the monarchy and Norodom

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<sup>596</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_Nations\\_Transitional\\_Authority\\_in\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Transitional_Authority_in_Cambodia)

<sup>597</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Cambodian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Cambodian_general_election)

<sup>598</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodia#Modern\\_Cambodia\\_\(1993%E2%80%93present\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodia#Modern_Cambodia_(1993%E2%80%93present);)  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Cambodian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Cambodian_general_election)

Sihanouk returned as king.<sup>599</sup> After his reinstatement as king he formalized the power-sharing arrangement and appointed both co-Prime Ministers.<sup>600</sup> In the following years a power-struggle between the agenda of the king and the two Prime Ministers emerged. But it became evident that the power of the king to assert influence over national affairs shrank. Furthermore, the government faced resistance and a failed coup attempt in 1994. As tensions between the co-Prime Ministers and their parties FUNCINPEC and CPP increased, King Norodom Sihanouk tried to mediate.<sup>601</sup> This setup aligns well with the concept of a parliamentary monarchy, where the monarch serves more as a symbol of unity and continuity, while the elected parliament and its leaders handle the actual governance of the country. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. Elections during this period are being scored as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Their cleanliness is scored as ambiguous by V-Dem's CEI. According to FH, for the regime period until 1994, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the rest of the regime period the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED classifies political liberties for this period as absent. According to V-Dem PCLI the presence of political liberties was ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

07/06/1997 End (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: A disagreement between the two co-heads of state devolved into an armed conflict. President Norodom Ranariddh, the second son of King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and the royalist faction were ousted because of their alleged involvement with the Khmer rebels and Hun Sen, a former military commander, became the sole executive leader.<sup>602</sup> Different to the Report of the United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia<sup>603</sup>, we do not classify the regime change event on 07/06/1997 as a (military) coup.

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<sup>599</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cambodia\\_2008?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cambodia_2008?lang=en);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constituent\\_Assembly\\_of\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constituent_Assembly_of_Cambodia)

<sup>600</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FUNCINPEC#1993\\_elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FUNCINPEC#1993_elections)

<sup>601</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norodom\\_Sihanouk#Second\\_reign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norodom_Sihanouk#Second_reign)

<sup>602</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997\\_Cambodian\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Cambodian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>603</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20090723120200/http://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2007/07/27/cambodia-july-1997-shock-and-aftermath>

While this is certainly a borderline case between the two categories, the existence of different militias loyal to party factions and politicians<sup>604</sup> and the absence of a national army, led us to the classification of rebellion. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

07/26/1998 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections were held, which were contested by the opposition. The claim of irregularities was supported by international observers.<sup>605</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED no electoral competitiveness was achieved. From this point on, the V-Dem EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI scores the elections as not clean. During election day in 2003 voters in rural areas were intimidated by the CPP. The media landscape was dominated by the CPP.<sup>606</sup> The general elections on 07/28/2008 also fell short of international standards.<sup>607</sup> Elections in this period are generally considered to have been controversial with the CPP gradually increasing its power and majority in the National Assembly in order to rule without coalition, while the chances of opposition groups are step by step diminished. In early 2006, the CPP strengthened its grip on power by pushing through an amendment to the constitution via Parliament. This amendment allowed for a 50% plus one majority in the National Assembly to form a government, rather than the previous requirement of a two-thirds majority. This move aimed to decrease the party's dependency on FUNCINPEC or any other coalition partner in the future.<sup>608</sup> During the Senate elections on 01/29/2012, the CPP claimed 46 seats, whereas the SRP obtained 11 seats out of the 61-member chamber. The election faced criticism from monitoring groups due to a perceived lack of transparency. In a contentious vote on 07/28/2013, the CPP secured a

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<sup>604</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20090723120200/http://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2007/07/27/cambodia-july-1997-shock-and-aftermath> ; <https://archive.ph/20201207061702/https://www.economist.com/asia/1997/07/10/a-coup-in-cambodia#selection-739.262-741.2>

<sup>605</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998\\_Cambodian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_Cambodian_general_election)

<sup>606</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003\\_Cambodian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Cambodian_general_election)

<sup>607</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008\\_Cambodian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Cambodian_general_election)

<sup>608</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Cambodia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Cambodia)

diminished majority with 68 seats, while the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), a merger of the HRP and the SRP, gained 26 seats, totaling 55. Subsequently, Hun Sen was re-elected as the prime minister on 09/23 (Lansford 2021: 253). According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. V-Dem's PCLI states that the presence of political liberties was ambiguous until 2015 and not really present from 2016 onward for this period. Severe deficits in the electoral process and competition persisted during the whole period, therefore we classify this period as electoral autocracy in line with MCM, LIED, HTW and GWF, which all contest this period either (limited) multiparty or party-based autocracy. From 1999 to 2012, as per Polity5's classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. From 2013 to 2016, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

11/16/2017 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: Prior to legislative elections in 2018, the opposition party CNRP was dissolved on November 11/16/2017, and elected officials as well as members of parliament and locally elected figures either lost their positions or were banned from politics on the pretext of an alleged coup (Lansford 2021: 253). During the elections on 07/29/2018, the incumbent CPP won all seats in the National Assembly with 77.5% of the vote in the absence of any opposition. The elections have been criticized by international observers and opposition groups and described as deeply flawed and neither free nor fair.<sup>609</sup> Communal elections were held on 06/05/2022 in which members of 17 parties contested. In the absence of any opposition, Hun Sen was subsequently re-elected for another five-year and frequently uses the police and armed forces as means to coerce and squash the (Lansford 2012f: 253).<sup>610</sup> There is an assumption that Hun Sen himself has been consolidating power, increasingly centralizing authority, and individuals outside of his close circle exert minimal influence on policymaking.<sup>611</sup> However, following the election, there was a notable pattern of ongoing arrests of opposition supporters.<sup>612</sup> The regime in Cambodia in the period under review, that is beginning with the crackdown on the opposition in November 2017, meets

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<sup>609</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>610</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>611</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>612</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_Cambodian\\_communal\\_elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Cambodian_communal_elections)

the coding rules as a de-facto one-party rule. Although general elections were held in 2018, there was no competition allowed since the opposition party CNRP was permitted and thus voters had no real choice. Even though communal elections were recently conducted with a variety of parties contesting, this diversity does not reflect in the general elections on the national level. Government in Cambodia since 2018 is led by only one party whose representatives occupy all seats in the National Assembly and hold on executive power in governance through the position of prime minister Hun Sen (who himself rules for nearly 24 years by 2022). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. From 2017 onwards political liberties are still considered as absent by LIED. V-Dem's PCLI decreased to a not really present level. In 2017 and 2018, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 2023 the CPP won almost all parliament seats in an uncompetitive election process heavily bolstered by the instrumentalization of the media. Nepotism is prevalent, Hun Manet succeeding his father as the new prime minister in August 2023 and multiple cabinet members being the children of ex-ministers.<sup>613</sup> The CPP thus rules as a sole party and dominating all spheres of governance and the political process, while holding tight on the power they have gradually consolidated over the past decades.

One-Party Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Chandler/Kiernan/Boua 1988, Kiernan 2004, Kiernan 2008, Thomson 1945, Tully 2005)

## **Cameroon**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 07/14/1884]: From 07/14/1884 on, Cameroon was a protectorate of Germany. Regarding the form of rule, we classify it as a case of a colony because Germany controlled the internal affairs of Cameroon. Germany set up an administration for the colony first in the capital Buea and later in Youndé and subjugated local rulers. From 01/01/1901 the country was named Cameroon.

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<sup>613</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cambodia/freedom-world/2024>

08/06/1914 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Germany, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, Defective Democracy; France, Defective Democracy; Belgium, Defective Democracy]: During World War I, the Kamerun campaign took place in the German colony of Kamerun in Africa. British, French, and Belgian forces invaded the colony from August 1914 to March 1916, with additional skirmishes in British Nigeria. By spring 1916, the majority of German troops and the civil administration fled to the neutral colony of Spanish Guinea. Ultimately, the campaign ended in Germany's defeat and the partitioning of its former colony between France and Britain.<sup>614</sup>

07/20/1922 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Defective Democracy; France, Defective Democracy; Belgium, Defective Democracy]/Start (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate, United Nations trust territories]: Cameroon was under a League of Nations mandate until 12/13/1946 and afterwards a United Nations trust territory. Regarding the de facto form of rule, we classify this regime as a subcase of a colony under an international mandate. For the entire colonial period neither LIED nor V-Dem list Cameroon in their data.

01/01/1960 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as International Mandate, United Nations trust territories]/Start Electoral Autocracy: French Cameroon became independent as Republic of Cameroon. Independence started under a system that was formally democratic (Lansford 2021: 260). Universal suffrage was granted by the constitution of 1960 (Marshall 2018f).<sup>615</sup> On 05/05/1960 Ahmadou Ahidjo became president.<sup>616</sup> However, one of the largest anti-colonial parties, the UPC, was outlawed both before and after independence, and repression was extensive. On 10/01/1961 after unification with southern part of British Cameroon the Federal Republic of Cameroon was established with Ahidjo as president and John Ngu Foncha, prime minister of the former British region, as vice president (Lansford 2021: 260). Ahidjo's strategy of cooptation of the remaining opposition parties changed gradually into forced merger and the arrest of peaceful opposition leaders by June 1962 (LeVine 1971: 103-105, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52). LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent for this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were

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<sup>614</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamerun\\_campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamerun_campaign)

<sup>615</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Cameroon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Cameroon)

<sup>616</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Cameroon#Independence\\_and\\_the\\_Ahidjo\\_era\\_\(1960-1982\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cameroon#Independence_and_the_Ahidjo_era_(1960-1982))

limited. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

09/01/1966 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, the Cameroonian National Union (Union nationale camérounaise, UNC) was formed through a merger of the Cameroon Union (Union Camerounaise) and the Kamerun National Democratic Party, the major political parties, respectively, of the state of west Cameroon and the state of east Cameroon, and four smaller parties.<sup>617</sup> On 08/22/1983, a power struggle between former president Ahidjo, who remained leader of the sole party, and President Biya, who had succeeded him as president the previous year, ended in Ahidjo's resignation and exile. While the coalition that supported Ahidjo and from which officials were drawn was multi-regional and multi-ethnic, while Biya narrowed the group with political influence and concentrated power in his own ethnic group (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52).<sup>618</sup> While different from GWF the narrowing down of the ruling group does not mark a regime change according to the coding rules of this dataset the subtype changes on this date to one-party (Personalist) autocracy. In 1985 the UNC was renamed the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement. In 1990 opposition parties were legalized. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Any election up to this point is scored as not really free or fair by V-Dem's EF&FI and as not clean by their CEI. As classified by FH for the regime period until 1975, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 1976 onward the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties remained absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI declares them as absent until 1989 and as ambiguous until 1992. From 1967 and 1971, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Between 1972 and 1981, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In 1982 and 1983, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. Between 1984 and 1987, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Since 1988, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon\\_People%27s\\_Democratic\\_Movement#Cameroonian\\_National\\_Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon_People%27s_Democratic_Movement#Cameroonian_National_Union)

<sup>618</sup> <https://cameroonpostline.com/how-an-idyllic-ahidjo-biya-transfer-of-power-turned-sour>



03/01/1992 End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: On this date, the first multiparty elections were held, which were won by Biya.<sup>619</sup> However, these elections were criticized by European and US observers for alleged manipulation of the presidential balloting (Lansford 2021: 262). Biya also won all subsequent presidential elections in 1997, 2004 and 2011, amid persistent claims of widespread fraud in all cases (Turner 2022: 255). Biya won the 2018 presidential election with 71.3% of the vote. The election was marred by violence and low voter turnout (Turner 2022: 256) and described as a “farce” (O'Donnell/Gramer 2018). According to FH, military tribunals wield authority over civilians in instances of civil unrest or organized armed violence, and several intelligence agencies operate without being held accountable.<sup>620</sup> Routine practices include torture, ill-treatment of detainees, and the common occurrence of indefinite administrative or pretrial detention. In fact, military troops are recurrently deployed to stop opposition supporters from protesting against Biya.<sup>621</sup> While 1992 does not mark a regime change according to the coding rules of GWF because it was before and after a personalist regime by Biya the multiparty elections 1992 constitute a regime change according to the coding rules of this dataset. While there is a strong personalist element in the rule of Biya the coding rules of a personalist regime of this dataset are not fulfilled. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1992 on, the V-Dem EF&FI score fluctuates between no and ambiguous freedom and fairness. LIED classifies all elections as not competitive. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in the entire period, however, V-Dem's PCLI's classification fluctuates between indicating an ambiguous state of political liberties and pointing into the direction that they are somewhat present. In light of our observations and other indicators V-Dem's PCLI seems surprisingly positive in a comparative perspective. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>619</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul\\_Biya](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Biya)

<sup>620</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a6452c8c.html>

<sup>621</sup> [https://www.voanews.com/a/africa\\_cameroon-deploys-military-thwart-opposition-protesters/6195960.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_cameroon-deploys-military-thwart-opposition-protesters/6195960.html)

Additional sources (Mehler 1999a, Wache 1991)

## Canada

01/01/1900 (Monarchical) (Male) Defective Democracy [Start: 07/01/1867]: On 07/01/1867 Canada became a federated country<sup>622</sup>, a self-governing polity within the British Empire. In 1920, Canada enacted suffrage for federal elections for male and female citizens, with exceptions for Chinese Canadians and Aboriginal Canadians. We code this regime period as a defective democracy because of the restricted suffrage. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED identifies the elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI scores what we interpret as somewhat clean elections until 1917 and as ambiguous afterwards. Following V-Dem's EF&FI elections were free and fair until 1918 and were somewhat present afterwards. LIED does not recognize political liberties, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/06/1921 Continuation (Monarchical) Defective Democracy: On 12/06/1921 the first national legislative election with (almost) universal suffrage took place.<sup>623</sup> For provincial elections, female suffrage was established between 1916 (Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan) and 1940 (Quebec). Chinese Canadians, regardless of gender, were given suffrage in 1947, while Aboriginal Canadians were not allowed to vote until 1960, regardless of gender.<sup>624</sup> In 1876, Canada implemented the Indian Act to control and assimilate Indigenous peoples. It required Indigenous individuals to give up their Indian status through enfranchisement to vote in federal elections, often leading to cultural isolation and loss of Treaty rights. The government also forcibly revoked Indian Status in the 1920s and 1930s, advancing assimilation. Enfranchisement thus became a coercive tool for assimilating Indigenous populations.<sup>625</sup> For these reasons Canada is classified as a defective democracy until 1960. For the relevant period, elections were competitive per LIED. Elections were what we interpret as clean except between

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<sup>622</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Canada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Canada);

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada\\_2011?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011?lang=en)

<sup>623</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1921\\_Canadian\\_federal\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1921_Canadian_federal_election)

<sup>624</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>625</sup> <https://humanrights.ca/story/the-chaotic-story-of-the-right-to-vote-in-canada>

1926 and 1929 they were somewhat clean (V-Dem CEI). Elections were free and fair for the whole timeframe (V-Dem EF&FI). LIED classifies political liberties as absent until 1945 and as present from 1946 onward. V-Dem's PCLI codes political liberties as present for this period. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1922 to 1930, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For 1931-1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the remainder of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. On 03/31/1949, Newfoundland joined Canada in an act of self-determination, so from that date on, Canada includes the province of Newfoundland.<sup>626</sup>

03/31/1960 End (Monarchical) Defective Democracy/Start (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy: On this day, amendments were made to Section 14(2) of the Canada Elections Act, allowing status Indians to exercise their right to vote in federal elections without risking the loss of their Indian status.<sup>627</sup> On 12/11/1931 the Statute of Westminster gave Canada a higher sovereignty from the United Kingdom. Canada is a strong bicameral parliamentary democracy with regular elections and a multi-party system. Elections are free and fair and constitutional rights are guaranteed, with strong independent institutions to enforce them. In 2022 initiatives to make voting more accessible and improving on equal rights for LGBTQ+ people. Furthermore, despite ongoing discrimination and enduring economic, social, and political challenges for Black, Indigenous, and other marginalized Canadians, the federal government has recognized these issues and implemented certain measures to address them.<sup>628</sup> Political rights and civil liberties are respected in Canada, and freedoms of speech, expression and religion among others are guaranteed.<sup>629</sup> FH classifies Canada in the whole regime period as free.<sup>630</sup> According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as present for this period. A monarch remains the ceremonial head of state, thereby

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<sup>626</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland\\_\(island\)#Union\\_with\\_Canada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newfoundland_(island)#Union_with_Canada)

<sup>627</sup> <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/indigenous-suffrage>

<sup>628</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/canada/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>629</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/canada/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>630</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/canada/freedom-world/2024>

making Canada a parliamentary democracy embedded in a constitutional monarchy. Justin Trudeau has served as the prime minister of Canada since 04/11/2015. Trudeau called for snap elections in 08/2021 with the subsequent vote taking place on 09/20/2021. The center-left Liberal Party upheld its minority government.<sup>631632</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has consistently characterized the election as competitive. Since 1920, V-Dem's EF&FI has consistently scored electoral freedom and fairness as present. Their CEI also consistently scores elections as free. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Cape Colony**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [as (de facto) Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: 12/01/1872]: The Cape Colony (Cape of Good Hope) was a British Crown Colony (part of the British Empire) from 1806 to 1910 (Gwaindepi/Fourie 2020). However, the Cape Colony was granted self-governance (responsible government) in 1872 under Prime Minister John Molteno, after it was granted a constitution with an elected parliament (Oliver/Anthony 2005).<sup>633</sup> Responsible government did not mean self-governance in the sense of full internal autonomy (Burman 1981). However, in a comparative perspective it makes sense to classify the country de facto as a semi-sovereign protectorate and not a colony. Voting rights were not limited to race but were based on property. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. Therefore, no competitive elections were provided (LIED). This distinguished the Cape Colony from Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State (Trapido 1964).<sup>634</sup>

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<sup>632</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/canada/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>633</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape\\_Colony](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Colony)

<sup>634</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franchise\\_and\\_Ballot\\_Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franchise_and_Ballot_Act);

<https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01646/05lv01703.htm>

Nevertheless, the right to vote was severely restricted, which is why the regime is also classified as an electoral oligarchy. Besides, for this short period political liberties were absent (LIED). 05/31/1910 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [because of end of sovereign statehood]: On this date the province of Cape Colony was joined with three other provinces (Natal, the Orange Free State and Transvaal) under a single administration as the Union of South Africa with the status as a self-governing colony (Leacock 1910). FH and V-Dem do not consider Cape Colony in its data.

Additional sources (Saunders/Smith 1999)

### **Cape Verde**

[officially known since 10/24/2013 as Cabo Verde]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1462]: Around 1462 Portugal colonized Cape Verde and the islands were administrated by a Portuguese governor. However, the islands were uninhabited at that time (Lansford 2021: 282). The decline in the slave trade in the 19<sup>th</sup> century resulted in an economic crisis. With few natural resources and inadequate sustainable investment from the Portuguese, the citizens grew increasingly discontented with the colonial masters, who refused to provide the local authorities with more autonomy. The dissatisfaction accumulated in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Consequently in 1951, Portugal changed Cape Verde's status from a colony to an overseas province in an attempt to blunt growing nationalism.<sup>635</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent for the colonial time. From 1900 to 1973, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

12/30/1974 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Portugal, Non-Electoral Transitional Regime]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime [as Protectorate of Portugal, Non-Electoral Transitional Regime]: An agreement signed with Portuguese authorities on this

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<sup>635</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape\\_Verde](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Verde)

date provided for a transitional government prior to independence on 07/05/1975. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

06/30/1975 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start One-Party Autocracy [as Protectorate of Portugal, Liberal Democracy]: A 56-member National People's Assembly was elected on 06/30/1975, but only the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) participated (Lansford 2021: 282). The PAIGC was the sole legal party at the time, with voters being asked to approve or reject a PAIGC list of 56 members for the parliament.<sup>636</sup>

07/05/1975 Continuation One-Party Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date independence was attained as the Republic of Cape Verde (Lansford 2021: 282). Afterwards the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) established its one-party political system under universal suffrage.<sup>637</sup> In February 1990, the National Council of the ruling Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) officially supported a transition to multiparty rule. On 09/28/1990 The government implemented a constitutional revision that concluded one-party rule and instituted a multi-party semi-presidential system (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 19).<sup>638</sup> The elections are not considered competitive by LIED. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. During this period, V-Dem's EF&FI indicates that elections were somewhat free and fair. Their CEI indicates an ambiguous state regarding electoral cleanliness. Regarding the political liberties they are still coded as absent per LIED. V-Dem's PCLI is in a range that we interpret as an ambiguous state of political liberties until 1987 and pointing into the direction that they were somewhat present until 1990. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1976 to 1980, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1981-1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive

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<sup>636</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975\\_Cape\\_Verdean\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_Cape_Verdean_parliamentary_election)

<sup>637</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Cape\\_Verde](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Cape_Verde)

<sup>638</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape\\_Verde#Independence\\_\(1975\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cape_Verde#Independence_(1975))

were moderate. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Per FH's evaluation for 1975, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1976 onward, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH for 1990, the country scores once again between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

02/17/1991 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date competitive elections were held (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 19).<sup>639</sup> According to FH Cape Verde maintained stability as a democracy with competitive elections, featuring periodic transfers of power between rival parties. LIED has ever since categorized them as competitive. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Since 1991, V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI have consistently scored the countries elections as free, fair and clean. Per FH's scoring for 1991, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. From 1992 onward, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. LIED classifies political liberties as present from 1992 onward. V-Dem's PCLI codes political liberties as present in this entire period. From 1991 to 2000, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 2011, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. While civil liberties are generally safeguarded, the court system faces challenges due to overload, impacting access to justice, and crime remains a notable concern. Ongoing issues include persistent inequalities for women and migrant workers.<sup>640</sup> Compared to other African states, Cape Verde is relatively tolerant towards LGBT people, with decriminalized homosexuality and some anti-discrimination protections, but lacks rights like same-sex marriage, adoption, and protections against conversion therapies and medical interventions on intersex minors.<sup>641</sup> Cape Verde is a democracy with a dual executive. The system is characterized as a semi-parliamentary democracy that holds multi-party, competitive

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<sup>639</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991\\_Cape\\_Verdean\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Cape_Verdean_presidential_election)

<sup>640</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cabo-verde/freedom-world/2022>; <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cabo-Verde/Trade#ref54911>

<sup>641</sup> <https://database.ilga.org/cape-verde-lgbti>

elections. The judiciary is independent from the executive and legislative branch. The constitution, last revised in 1992, provides the basis of government and guarantees civil liberties and political rights.<sup>642</sup> In 2022 Cape Verde declared a state of social and economic emergency due to the effects of the war in Ukraine and of COVID-19 on food and other essential supplies. Notably, however, this did not lead to restrictions of civil liberties or political rights.<sup>643</sup> Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Clemente-Kersten 1999b)

## **Cayman Islands**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy as a dependency of Jamaica] [Start: 07/28/1670]: Because of the Treaty of Madrid, signed on 07/28/1670<sup>644</sup>, England formally assumed control of the Cayman Islands, along with Jamaica.<sup>645</sup> The Cayman Islands were initially declared a dependency of Jamaica in 1863, resembling a parish with appointed justices of the peace and elected vestrymen in their Legislature. From 1750 to 1898, the Chief Magistrate, appointed by the Jamaican governor, served as the administering official. In 1898, the Governor of Jamaica began appointing a Commissioner for the Islands.<sup>646</sup>

01/03/1958 Continuation (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: The dependency status officially ended in 1959 with the formation of the Federation of the West Indies, although the Governor of Jamaica retained authority over the Cayman Islands. From 1959, the day-to-day affairs were overseen by the Administrator, serving on behalf of the Governor.<sup>647</sup> On 08/12/1958 women's suffrage was introduced.<sup>648</sup>

08/06/1962 Continuation Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Jamaica achieved independence from the United Kingdom.

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<sup>642</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Cape\\_Verde](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Cape_Verde)

<sup>643</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cabo-verde/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>644</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Madrid\\_\(1670\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Madrid_(1670))

<sup>645</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman_Islands#History)

<sup>646</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cayman\\_Islands#Dependency\\_of\\_Jamaica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cayman_Islands#Dependency_of_Jamaica)

<sup>647</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cayman\\_Islands#Dependency\\_of\\_Jamaica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cayman_Islands#Dependency_of_Jamaica)

<sup>648</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage\\_in\\_the\\_Cayman\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_the_Cayman_Islands)



After Jamaica gained independence in 1962, the Cayman Islands returned to direct British rule.<sup>649</sup>

08/08/1972 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: In 1972, a significant level of internal autonomy was conferred through the adoption of a new constitution.<sup>650</sup> The constitution provided autonomy on most domestic issues.<sup>651</sup> In 1994, the constitution underwent revision, incorporating a bill of rights and introducing amendments to the regulations governing the Legislative Assembly, among various other modifications.<sup>652</sup> Additional modifications were added in 2001 and 2009, officially incorporating various elements of human rights legislation.<sup>653</sup> The UN Special Committee designates the Cayman Islands as one of the 16 non-self-governing territories. The existing Constitution of 2009 established a 19-seat parliament, elected every four years by the people who oversees domestic affairs. Seven elected Members of Parliament become government Ministers in a Cabinet led by the Governor, while the Premier is appointed by the Governor. The Governor, appointed by the King of the United Kingdom on the advice of the British Government, represents the monarch and holds extensive legislative and executive powers as outlined in the constitution.<sup>654</sup> The 2017 election was marked by uncertainty, following the collapse of the Cayman Democratic Party. Many of its former MPs ran as independents and were subsequently elected. The only party to secure seats in parliament was the People's Progressive Movement, but they won only seven out of the 19 seats.<sup>655</sup> In a complex process, the members of parliament agreed upon forming a government of national unity out of the PPM and independents that had previously been MPs for the CDM and some that had not been.<sup>656</sup> This shows that Cayman democracy is complicated yet resilient as the complex situation was resolved by ingenuity and compromise. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not list the Cayman Islands.

Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy] as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>649</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman_Islands#History)

<sup>650</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman_Islands#History)

<sup>651</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cayman-Islands/Government-and-society#ref54767>

<sup>652</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cayman-Islands/Government-and-society#ref54767>

<sup>653</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman_Islands#History)

<sup>654</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman\\_Islands#Government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cayman_Islands#Government)

<sup>655</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017\\_Caymanian\\_general\\_election?](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Caymanian_general_election?)

<sup>656</sup> <https://www.gov.ky/ourgovernment>

## Central African Republic

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 07/13/1894]: From 07/13/1894 France seized and colonized Ubangi-Shari (Haut-Oubangui).<sup>657</sup> On 07/01/1904, the territories of Haut-Chari and Haut-Oubangui were united to form Oubangui-Chari.<sup>658</sup> On 02/11/1906 the territory merged into Oubangui-Chari-Tchad. In 1920 French Equatorial Africa was established and Ubangi-Shari was administered from Brazzaville. Multiparty legislative elections were absent during this period (LIED). Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent, but both treat the Central African Republic only since 1920 in their dataset. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. 10/27/1946 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Direct Rule Occupation Regime]: The Constitution of the French Republic of 10/27/1946 granted French citizenship to inhabitants and established local assemblies consisting of French colonists and several African inhabitants.<sup>659</sup> According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. In 1957 universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). Political liberties were absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

12/01/1958 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Central African Republic was proclaimed an autonomous republic following a referendum on 09/28/1958.<sup>660</sup> In the territorial assembly election in Ubangi-Shari pre-independence on 03/31/1957 the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (Mouvement de l'Évolution Sociale de l'Afrique Noir – MESAN) led and founded by Barthélemy Boganda won all seats (Collier 1982:109, Decalo 1989:205).<sup>661</sup> Self-government under Boganda, who served as the country's

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<sup>657</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central\\_African\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic)

<sup>658</sup> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haut-Oubangui>

<sup>659</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central\\_African\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic)

<sup>660</sup> <https://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/central-african-republic-political-geography/central-african-republic>

<sup>661</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957\\_Ubangi-Shari\\_Territorial\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1957_Ubangi-Shari_Territorial_Assembly_election)

first prime minister and his nephew David Dacko, who became the republic's first president in 1960 (Lansford 2021: 286). The first steps of the new government were to draft a constitution. It borrowed many parts from the French constitution and was democratic in nature. The constitution was approved by the assembly on 02/16/1959. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for 04/05/1959, but the newly created electoral law basically hindered independents and opposition parties to participate. Therefore, MESAN was unopposed.<sup>662</sup> After its leader's (Boganda) death in 1959, the party split and Dacko became leader of MESAN (Mehler 1999b: 205). According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present in this period. For 1959, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

08/13/1960 End Electoral Autocracy [as Protectorate of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy: After two years of autonomy the Central African Republic became independent under the rule of the faction of MESAN led by Dacko. President Dacko established a political monopoly, suppressed the other faction of MESAN, jailed its leaders and banned all other parties in 1962 (Lansford 2021: 286, Collier 1982:109, Decalo 1989: 205, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52-53). Hence, the country was a one-party autocracy. In the presidential elections on 01/05/1964 Dacko was the sole candidate for MESAN and received officially 99.97% of the vote. Regarding to GWF, the rule of Dacko is classified as personalist. While it is according to the coding of this dataset a one-party autocracy it belongs to the subset of one-party (personalist) autocracies. Corruption, poor economic performance and rebellion plagued the country. LIED categorizes the election as not competitive since 1946. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Between 1946 and 1963, V-Dem's EF&FI scores the countries elections as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. LIED categorizes them as not competitive. LIED considers political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI varies between not really present and absent for this time. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1961 to 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints

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<sup>662</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barth%C3%A9lemy\\_Boganda#Internal\\_autonomy\\_and\\_MESAN\\_government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barth%C3%A9lemy_Boganda#Internal_autonomy_and_MESAN_government)

on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1964 and 1965, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/31/1965[-01/01/1966] End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, a military coup (Saint-Sylvestre coup d'état) staged by Colonel Jean-Bédél Bokassa, Chief of Staff and Commander of the Army, ousted Dacko, a cousin of Bokassa (Decalo 1989:207, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52-53). After the coup on 12/31/1965 Bokassa declared himself president, prime minister, and head of the sole political party, MESAN (Decalo 1989: 207-211, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). He established a new governing body known as the Revolutionary Council, nullified the existing constitution, and disbanded the parliament.<sup>663</sup> On 03/04/1972 Bokassa declared himself president for life.<sup>664</sup> On 12/04/1977 Bokassa coronated himself emperor and the country was renamed in Central African Empire. There is a consensus among historians and political scientists that Bokassa's rule was kleptocratic. He is estimated to have stolen billions of dollars from the Central African Republic during his reign. He used this money to fund his lavish lifestyle, including his coronation as emperor and his construction of a lavish palace. He also used the money to buy expensive gifts for himself and his family (Titley 1997). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/20/1979 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date Bokassa was overthrown by a coup by armed forces of exiles led by Dacko and backed by the French military invasion known as "Operation Barracuda" (Decalo 1989: 234-235). After the coup, Dacko was reinstalled as president (Decalo 1989: 234-238, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). On 03/15/1981, Dacko was reelected president of the Republic in a multiparty presidential election. By 09/21/1981, "Operation Barracuda" was over, and Dacko signed a provisional constitutional

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<sup>663</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del\\_Bokassa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del_Bokassa)

<sup>664</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del\\_Bokassa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del_Bokassa)

act (Colpus Dataset Case Narrative, 2021:233). The 1981 presidential election witnessed irregularities, sparking demands for annulment from opposition parties. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes it as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI lists it as not really free or fair and their CEI as not clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were absent in 1979 and ambiguous in 1980 and 1981. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. The oppositions outcry resulted in civil unrest and the subsequent delay of legislative elections. The suspension of political parties and widespread dissatisfaction then served as the pretext for a bloodless coup d'état (Mehler 1999b: 206). Therefore, we classify this period as electoral autocracy.

09/01/1981 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: General Kolingba ousted President Dacko in a bloodless coup and a Military Committee for National Recover (French: Comité Militaire pour le Redressement National, CMRN) was established and led by Kolingba (Decalo 1989: 240-241, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). Subsequently, the CMRN suspended the Constitution and restricted political party engagement.<sup>665</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. While LIED still codes political liberties as not present, V-Dem's PCLI scores them as ambiguous in 1981 and as not really present until 1986.

11/21/1986 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, a constitutional referendum was held in the Central African Republic, turning the country into a one-party state with the Central African Democratic Rally as the only legal party. Moreover, term limits of the presidency were removed, making Kolingba the automatically elected

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<sup>665</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981\\_Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Central_African_Republic_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

president. The referendum was a proved by 92.22% of voters with a 87.6% turnout.<sup>666</sup> Subsequently, in 1987 and 1988, partially unrestricted parliamentary elections took place; however, Kolingba prevented his two prominent political rivals, Abel Goumba and Ange-Félix Patassé, from participating.<sup>667</sup> Under Kolingba's leadership, the government remained under his direct authority, and he retained complete control over both the executive and legislative branches of the nation's governance.<sup>668</sup> LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. During this period, electoral freedom and fairness is scored as not really present by V-Dem's EF&FI. Their CEI scores the elections as not clean. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, political liberties were still absent (LIED). Following V-Dem's PCLI they were not really present until 1990 and ambiguous until 1992. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/25/1992 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the Central African Republic conducted general elections to select a President and National Assembly, marking the first instance of multi-party democracy since its restoration in 1991. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores the elections as somewhat free and fair while their CEI still scores them as not clean. Notably, the incumbent President, André Kolingba, finished last in the elections. However, the Supreme Court nullified the election outcomes due to extensive irregularities. Consequently, new elections were held the following year.<sup>669</sup> The international community pressed for competitive elections and change as well (Mehler 1999b: 206). According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI states that the presence of political liberties in this period was ambiguous. In 1993, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us

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<sup>666</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986\\_Central\\_African\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Central_African_constitutional_referendum)

<sup>667</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central\\_African\\_Republic#Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_under\\_Kolingba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic#Central_African_Republic_under_Kolingba)

<sup>668</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic/Authoritarian-rule-under-Kolingba>

<sup>669</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Central\\_African\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Central_African_general_election)

as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Because of the severe irregularities during these elections which led to the annulment, we classify this period as electoral autocracy.

09/19/1993 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the second round of multiparty presidential elections were held, Kolingba was defeated and subsequently resigned from his position. The first round of the elections took place on 08/22/1992 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53).<sup>670</sup> Patassé took office on 10/22/1993. This marked the first peaceful power transfer since independence.<sup>671</sup> He was reelected in 1999.<sup>672</sup> There were ongoing defects which led to political instability and severely constrained democracy in the Central African Republic. Although the elections were free and fair, because of the support of the UN, the electoral process was controlled by the government.<sup>673</sup> The political and civil liberties were violated. These included: violation of the right of physical integrity, restrictions of freedom of press and freedom of assembly. Furthermore, the judicial independence was restricted.<sup>674</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorized all elections during this time as competitive. Between 1993 and 2003, V-Dem's EF&FI first rose to scoring the countries elections as somewhat free and fair but later dopped back down to ambiguous. Their CEI rose briefly to scoring the elections as not really clean but also dropped back down to not clean. As classified by FH for the regime period until 1995, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For 1996 and 1997 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 1998 and 2000 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As classified by FH for the rest of the regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent in this period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies as ambiguous in 1993 and as somewhat present from 1994 onward. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints

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<sup>670</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/cf.html>

<sup>671</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Central\\_African\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Central_African_general_election)

<sup>672</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999\\_Central\\_African\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Central_African_presidential_election)

<sup>673</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ange-F%C3%A9lix\\_Patass%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ange-F%C3%A9lix_Patass%C3%A9);

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/731.htm>

<sup>674</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/731.htm>

on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/15/2003 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: General François Bozizé and a militia from Chad invaded the country and seized the capital (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). Patasse was out of the country at the time and no efforts were made to restore him to power. Bozizé rose to become a high-ranking army officer in the 1970s, under the rule of Bokassa.<sup>675</sup> Following Bozizé's assumption of power, he implemented a curfew and suspended the constitution.<sup>676</sup> On 03/16/2003, just a day after seizing control, he declared himself president of the Central African Republic. This move prompted France to deploy troops to safeguard foreign citizens, marking their first intervention in four years. Post-coup, Bozizé established a new faction within the Central African Armed Forces, known as the Republican Guard, comprised of individuals who supported his coup. This unit perpetrated numerous atrocities against civilians in the capital.<sup>677</sup> Following Bozizé's seizure of power, the Central African Republic Bush War erupted with the uprising led by Michel Djotodia's Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR). This conflict swiftly intensified, culminating in significant hostilities throughout 2004. In December 2004, a constitution endorsing a semi-presidential system and imposing a two-term limit was ratified through a referendum. Concurrently, on 12/30/2004, Bozizé emerged as one of five contenders cleared to participate in the presidential election set for early 2005. Subsequently, on 01/04/2005, Bozizé declared that three initially sidelined candidates would also be permitted to enter the race, although former president Patassé was not among either faction. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, political liberties are considered as absent by LIED. Whereas, V-Dem's PCLI codes them as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

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<sup>675</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois\\_Boziz%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Boziz%C3%A9)

<sup>676</sup> <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2003/03/17/rebel-leader-seizes-power-suspends-constitution>

<sup>677</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003\\_Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Central_African_Republic_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)



03/13/2005 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections took place, which were won by Bozizé.<sup>678</sup> The National Assembly authorized Bozizé to rule by decree for three months, from 01/01 to 03/31/2006.<sup>679</sup> In 2008, Bozizé opened a so-called “Inclusive Political Dialogue” with his rebel foes.<sup>680</sup> In the first round of the presidential election on 01/23/2011, President Bozizé was re-elected with 64% of the votes cast. In addition, 26 of the 35 deputies elected in the first round of legislative elections belonged to his party, the “Kwa Na Kwa” (Work Just Work - KNK), including President Bozizé himself and several family members. The opposition quickly denounced irregularities and demanded the cancellation of the election. The European Union, in a document released in March 2011, observed numerous irregularities and determined that the election held on 01/23/2011, raised doubts regarding its fairness and equity, which are fundamental to democratic elections. The period leading up to the election was characterized by intimidation, arrests, and constraints on the freedom of movement of those opposing the regime.<sup>681</sup> Until January 2013, his son held position of defense minister.<sup>682</sup> After dismissing his son, Bozizé took over the defense ministry himself.<sup>683</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED no competitive elections were held for the entire time. During this period, V-Dem’s EF&FI scores the freedom and fairness of elections as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were somewhat present in this period. Based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/24/2013 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date, the Muslim rebel coalition Séléka marched into Bangui and overthrew president Bozizé. Séléka launched a transition phase with Michel Djotodia as president but failed to stop

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<sup>678</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Central\\_African\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Central_African_general_election); [http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2059\\_05.htm](http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2059_05.htm)

<sup>679</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois\\_Boziz%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Boziz%C3%A9)

<sup>680</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-car-rebels-bozize-idUKBRE9010J120130102>

<sup>681</sup> <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/CENTRAL-AFRICAN-REPUBLIC-2010-2011>

<sup>682</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-car-rebels-bozize-idUKBRE9010J120130102/>

<sup>683</sup> <https://www.voanews.com/a/car-president-sacks-defense-minister/1576975.html>

the fighting in the country.<sup>684</sup> On 01/20/2014, the National Transitional Council chose Bangui mayor Catherine Samba Panza as interim president, following Djotodia's resignation on 01/10/2014. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED declares political liberties as absent for this time. V-Dem's PCLI varies between an ambiguous level in 2013 and a somewhat present level until 2016. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/30/2016 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the former prime minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected president. He was re-elected on 03/14/2020, but the opposition contested the election due to alleged fraud and irregularities. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals and confirmed his presidency, despite significant electoral flaws. Fighting between armed militant groups and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) continued throughout 2022, and the state authority outside the capital remains weak.<sup>685</sup> Touadéra sought to extend his presidency to a third term to which end he announced a constitutional reform in 2022. In this time, the court was marred by interference by a Russian diplomat, calling on the court chief to help Touadéra. Judicial independence is further hampered by corruption and various other factors including unpaid salaries. Touadéra secured a third term in a referendum with 61% turnout. However, the opposition widely claims that the voting procedure was marred by irregularities and accused the electoral institutions of not acting independently.<sup>686</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, LIED continues to classify the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI rates the countries elections as not really free or fair and their CEI scores them as not free. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI scores political liberties as somewhat present from 2016 to 2022 and as ambiguous in 2023. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For

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<sup>684</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/dix-ans-apres-le-coup-detat-la-republique>

<sup>685</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/central-african-republic/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>686</sup> <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-central-african-republic-approves-new-constitution-possible-third-term-for-touadera>

the year 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. During 2019 and 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2021 and 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the year 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Chad**

[Chad, in this form, only existed from this point onward. Due to the brief timeframe between 01/01/1900 and 09/05/1900, we have omitted additional entries for the Kanem-Bornu Empire, the Wadai Sultanate, and the Bagirmi Kingdom during this period.]

09/05/1900 Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 09/05/1900]: Before 09/05/1900, the territory of present-day Chad was composed of several precolonial political entities. The Kanem-Bornu Empire, one of the oldest Sahelian states, had dominated the region for centuries but had significantly weakened by the 19th century. The Wadai Sultanate (Ouaddaï) emerged as a powerful Islamic state in the 17th century and actively resisted French expansion. The Bagirmi Kingdom, once independent, had fallen under Wadai's influence. Additionally, various Arab and Fulani groups controlled trade networks, including the trans-Saharan slave trade. In the late 19th century, French colonial forces advanced into Central Africa, encountering resistance from local rulers. A decisive moment came on 04/22/1900, when French troops under Amédée-François Lamy defeated Rabih az-Zubayr, a Sudanese warlord who had established dominion over much of the region. With Rabih's death, France formally claimed Chad, on 09/05/1900 the Military Territory of the Lands and Protectorates of Chad as a protectorate (Paxton 1986). In July 1908, the occupied territory was

incorporated as a French possession in Middle Africa and administered as a part of French Equatorial Africa together with three other French colonies to the south – Oubangui-Chari, Middle Congo (present-day Congo-Brazzaville), and Gabon (Paxton 1986). French Equatorial Africa was put under the direction of a governor general stationed in Brazzaville. The governor general had wide-ranging control over the federation, including authority of external and internal security, economic and financial affairs, and all communications with the French minister of the colonies. During this period, Chad was not ruled by civilians, nor did it have separate colonial status.<sup>687</sup> On 03/01/1920 Chad became a separate colony when governance was transferred from military to civilian rule. Administration remained in the hands of the governor general in Brazzaville while lieutenant governors were expected to follow his orders.<sup>688</sup> In the framework of Overseas Reform Act passed by the French National Assembly in 1956, electoral reforms were made which expanded the pool of eligible voters and thus conceded a larger measure of autonomy.<sup>689</sup> Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as absent but their dataset only treat Chad since 1920. From 1920 to 1946, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period.

03/31/1957 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: In 1957, the Chadian Territorial Assembly elections were held. They were contested by a variety of Chadian parties and resulted in the establishment of the first African government in Chad under Gabriel Lisette. Although Chad received its first African government, Lisette himself was of African descent, who became a French colonial administrator and posted to Chad in 1946.<sup>690</sup> Lisette's coalition government was questioned by factions representing traditional rulers. He was deserted by a motion of no confidence prior to independence.<sup>691</sup> Chad remained part of French Equatorial Africa (EAF) until a constitutional referendum was held in 1958, across the French Union. The constitution

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<sup>687</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Chad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Chad)

<sup>688</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Chad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Chad)

<sup>689</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi-cadre\\_Defferre#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi-cadre_Defferre#)

<sup>690</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel\\_Lisette](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel_Lisette)

<sup>691</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel\\_Lisette](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel_Lisette)

that saw Chad becoming an autonomous republic within the French Union, was widely supported by Chad's political groups, and approved by 98.29% of voters. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

11/28/1958 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date French Equatorial Africa was terminated as a result of a referendum.<sup>692</sup> Also in 1958 universal suffrage was introduced.<sup>693</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

05/31/1959 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, parliamentary elections were held. The result was a victory for the Chadian Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien, PPT).<sup>694</sup> The PPT was a regional branch of the African Democratic Rally (RDA). François Tombalbaye was elected prime minister in March 1959. Swiftly, he reshaped the political system into a hierarchical, top-down structure centered around the president (Römer 1999: 221), which became formalized after independence. For example he initiated a campaign to assimilate members of the opposition into the PPT (Decalo 1980: 498-499, Collier 1990). On 08/11/1960 the country was granted independence with the PPT's leader, François Tombalbaye, an ethnic Sara, as its first president.<sup>695</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, LIED categorizes elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as freed and fair. Their CEI, however, rates them as only somewhat clean. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were absent in 1958, not really present in 1959 and 1960 and became absent again in 1961. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the

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<sup>692</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Chad#Territorial\\_assembly\\_under\\_France](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Chad#Territorial_assembly_under_France)

<sup>693</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>694</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959\\_Chadian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Chadian_parliamentary_election)

<sup>695</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_Chad](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Chad)

relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

04/14/1962 End Electoral Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: Tombalbaye launched a purge of the ruling PPT party a week before independence to remove potential rivals and their followers (Decalo 1980: 498-499, Collier 1990). The constitution, enacted on 04/14/1962,<sup>696</sup> established a single-party state with Tombalbaye's Parti Progressiste du Tchad – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (PPP-RDA; Chadian Progressive Party – African Democratic Rally) as the only legal party. Other political parties were dissolved. The Bureau Politique National (BPN) emerged as Chad's paramount political body. Despite its equal representation of Muslims and southerners, the BPN was notably controlled by the President (Römer 1999: 221). In order to garner support, Tombalbaye introduced direct presidential elections in 1969 and transformed the PPP-RDA into the Mouvement National pour la Révolution Culturelle et Sociale (MNRCS) in 1973 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1962 and 1963, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1964 to 1968, As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Between 1969 and 1972, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In 1973 and 1974, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. From 1963 to 1965, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period since 1972, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties are indicated as absent by both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI.

04/13/1975 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: President Tombalbaye was overthrown in a military coup and subsequently assassinated. Following his removal, a military

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<sup>696</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/72-chad-1960-present/>

junta known as the Conseil Supérieur Militaire, led by former chief of staff Felix Malloum, assumed power (Römer 1999: 222, Collier 1990, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53-54).<sup>697</sup> Malloum's inability to effectively handle the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT) led him to believe that his best option was to incorporate some of the rebels into his administration. In 1978, he formed an alliance with the rebel leader Hissène Habré, who assumed the role of prime minister within the government.<sup>698</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent.

03/23/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: Nigeria intervened in the civil conflict in Chad and arranged a new peace agreement. The agreement stipulated Malloum's resignation, which was carried out, and Goukouni Oueddei assumed power in a transitional regime. Rebel forces seized control of the capital (Collier 1990, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54). On 04/29/1979 the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), a peace-making body made up of four or more armed factions moved to remove Oueddei as its interim head and installed Shawa in his place. On 08/22/1979, there happened to be further peacemaking troubles and conflict led to the GUNT replacing Shawa with Oueddei as its interim leader. Oueddei proved to be an ineffective leader and peacemaker and on 06/07/1982 Habré-led FAN rebels drove him out of power. (Ali 1984:29, Byrnes 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In addition, for this transitional period, political liberties were absent (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). For the years 1980 and 1981, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1982, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-

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<sup>697</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad\\_under\\_F%C3%A9lix\\_Malloum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chad_under_F%C3%A9lix_Malloum)

<sup>698</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Chad#Military\\_rule\\_\(1975%E2%80%931978\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Chad#Military_rule_(1975%E2%80%931978))

Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/19/1982 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Personalist Autocracy: Habré resumed his fight against the Chadian government and Armed Forces of the North (FAN) won control of the capital N'Djamena.<sup>699</sup> On this date Habré formed a state council as new national government, further, on 10/21/1982 he nominated a new government and proclaimed himself president.<sup>700</sup> Following intense fighting in 1983-1984, Habré's FAN emerged victorious, with assistance from French troops.<sup>701</sup> Having become the country's new president, Habré created on 06/24/1984 a one-party dictatorship ruled by his National Union for Independence and Revolution (UNIR).<sup>702</sup> On 06/26 during the foundation congress, the delegates elected by acclamation President Hissène Habré chairman of the movement and proceeded to form, on Habré's proposals, a Central Committee composed of 80 members. It was ultimately Habré's personal leadership and authority that characterized this autocratic regime. Since 1985, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Furthermore, the state of political liberties is classified as absent by both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI for this regime period.

12/02/1990 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Military (Rebel) (Transitional) Autocracy: On this date, the Patriotic Salvation Movement led by former Habré regime official Idriss Déby, a military officer and politician, seized the capital, forcing Habré to flee and Déby ascended to power.<sup>703</sup> Déby was a member of the Bidayat clan of the Zaghawa ethnic group. He was purged by Habré after being suspected of plotting a coup, and was forced into exile in Libya.<sup>704</sup> Déby held the positions of president and commander in chief of the armed forces under the transitional national charter adopted at the conclusion of the CNS on 04/06/1993. The

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<sup>699</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiss%C3%A8ne\\_Habr%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiss%C3%A8ne_Habr%C3%A9);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed\\_Forces\\_of\\_the\\_North](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armed_Forces_of_the_North)

<sup>700</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FROLINAT>

<sup>701</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/Independence>

<sup>702</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiss%C3%A8ne\\_Habr%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiss%C3%A8ne_Habr%C3%A9)

<sup>703</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiss%C3%A8ne\\_Habr%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiss%C3%A8ne_Habr%C3%A9)

<sup>704</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idriss\\_D%C3%A9by](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idriss_D%C3%A9by)



transitional period was extended to 1996. A constitutional referendum was conducted on 03/31/1996 (Lansford 2021: 300).<sup>705</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, LIED continues to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI decreased a what we interpret as not really present in 1990 and as ambiguous from 1991 onward. From 1990 to 1992, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For 1991-1992, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/02/1996 End Military (Rebel) (Transitional) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, presidential elections were held. Although allegations of fraud were brought forward by the opposition, in the first round of the presidential election in June 1996, international observers were satisfied with the results and turnout of the election. Déby won presidential elections again in 2001, in elections described as relatively free and fair. However, observers emphasized alleged progovernment bias of the national electoral commission. In elections marked by previous restrictions of political liberties. Issues of de facto control by the MPS over the electoral commission and bias in the vote registration process were raised by the opposition (Lansford 2021: 300).<sup>706</sup> After term constraints were eliminated, Déby won the presidential elections again in 2006, 2011, 2016, and in 2021.<sup>707</sup> The whole political process in Chad from 12/18/2005 to 01/10/2010 was overshadowed by the second Chadian Civil war. Many rebel leaders were former allies of Déby, who turned against him after he decided to change the constitution to allow him to run for re-election.<sup>708</sup> In April 2011, Déby was reelected with 89 percent of the vote, in an election that was boycotted by the three main opposition candidates.<sup>709</sup> The electoral process was assessed as not free by Freedom House.<sup>710</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during this time are scored as not competitive by LIED, as

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<sup>705</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad\\_2018?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en)

<sup>706</sup> <https://www.africa-confidential.com/home/issue/id/132>

<sup>707</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idriss\\_D%C3%A9by](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idriss_D%C3%A9by)

<sup>708</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chadian\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(2005%E2%80%932010\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chadian_Civil_War_(2005%E2%80%932010))

<sup>709</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idriss\\_D%C3%A9by](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idriss_D%C3%A9by)

<sup>710</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd21a4bc.html>

not really free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI and not clean by their CEI. Political liberties were absent in this period according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous for this period. According to FH's classification for 1996 and 1997, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For 1998 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1999 onward the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. From 1996 to 2004, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 2005 to 2018, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

04/20/2021 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Déby was assassinated by rebels from Northern Chad. The Chadian army subsequently dissolved the parliament and formed a military junta, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by Mahamat Idriss Déby, which declared that it would take charge of the government.<sup>711</sup> On 04/27/2021 the military junta announced the formation of a transitional government headed by the civilian politician Albert Pahimi Padacké as prime minister.<sup>712</sup> With Déby's son hereditary succession of power of the presidential office at the same time maintaining as the position of the head of armed forces and 13 other military generals assuming power through the TMC and elections routinely delayed, we code the regime as a military autocracy and not as a non-electoral transitional regime. In June 2021 an 18-month extension of the transition was declared.<sup>713</sup> The regime has also, for instance, been characterized by Freedom House as a military regime.<sup>714</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Since 2021, political liberties are coded as absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by

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<sup>711</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional\\_Military\\_Council\\_\(Chad\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_Military_Council_(Chad));

<https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/101085/BREAKING-Chad-president-assassinated-by-militants-from-North>

<sup>712</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional\\_Military\\_Council\\_\(Chad\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_Military_Council_(Chad))

<sup>713</sup> <https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20220820-au-tchad-ouverture-du-dialogue-national-inclusif-pour-sortir-de-l-impasse-politique>

<sup>714</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chad>

us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Brody 2006, Byrnes 1988, Collelo 1988, Collier 1990, Reyna 2003, Römer 1999)

## Chile

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 02/12/1818]: On 02/12/1818, Chile declared its independence from Spain. From 1888 suffrage was introduced for men of any race over 21 who could read.<sup>715</sup> LIED classifies the regime period as an exclusive democracy, RoW as electoral autocracy and PRC as a semidemocracy. It was, however, not a full parliamentary democracy, seeing as the head of the executive was not elected by the legislature. Nevertheless, real power lay with the Congress while the president's role was rather ceremonial. The widely adopted laissez-faire policy led to a gap between political elite and citizens. The electoral system can be classified as clientelist and corrupt and was marked by bribery and intimidation.<sup>716</sup> Before the 1925 Constitution in Chile, the electoral system was governed by the Constitution of 1833. This earlier constitution was very restrictive in terms of suffrage. Voting rights were limited to men who met certain property or income requirements, effectively excluding a large portion of the population, particularly those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. This system favored the interests of the landed elite and wealthier citizens, limiting political participation to a small, privileged segment of society.<sup>717</sup> The 1925 Constitution of Chile, which replaced the 1833 Constitution, marked a significant step towards modernizing the Chilean state and its political system. However, it maintained certain requirements for voting. The right to vote was granted only to male citizens who were literate, at least 21 years old (or 18 if married) and met certain residency requirements.<sup>718</sup> According to the data of Vanhanen the percentage of the population who participated in elections lay between 3.8 and 4.4 percentage of the population in this period. It was not until later reforms in the 20th century that these restrictions were gradually lifted, paving the way for broader suffrage in Chile. Under the presidency of Juan Luis Sanfuentes

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<sup>715</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>716</sup> [https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Chile](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Chile)

<sup>717</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Chile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Chile);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chilean\\_Constitution\\_of\\_1833](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chilean_Constitution_of_1833)

<sup>718</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile\\_1925](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925)

(1915-1920) repressed strikes and opposition movements. The presidential elections of 1915 itself were contested for electoral fraud.<sup>719</sup> The problem of electoral fraud and political corruption had already been a problem under the presidency of Ramón Barros Luco.<sup>720</sup> On 12/23/1920, the reformist Arturo Alessandri became president. Political dissonance grew stronger as Congress repeatedly blocked his appeals. The conflict paralyzed Chile politically.<sup>721</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. 09/03/1924, military officers protested against the political class as well as low salaries. This is known as the “rattling of the sabers” incident. This led to the establishment of the September Junta.<sup>722</sup> Alessandri went into exile.<sup>723</sup> Until this point, LIED classifies elections as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. LIED classifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

09/11/1924 End Electoral Oligarchy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup by right-wing military against president Arturo Alessandri took place. The following military regime is also known as the September Junta.<sup>724</sup> Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period.

01/23/1925 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military movement of young officers, wrestled power from the previous September Junta. They had worried about the conservative restoration of Chilean society. The group organized a new junta, also known as the January Junta, which acted as an interim government. The Junta recalled

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<sup>719</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan\\_Luis\\_Sanfuentes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Luis_Sanfuentes)

<sup>720</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram%C3%B3n\\_Barros\\_Luco](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ram%C3%B3n_Barros_Luco)

<sup>721</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arturo\\_Alessandri](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arturo_Alessandri)

<sup>722</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruido\\_de\\_sables](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruido_de_sables)

<sup>723</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Chile#Parliamentary\\_era\\_\(1891%E2%80%931925\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Chile#Parliamentary_era_(1891%E2%80%931925))

<sup>724</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1924\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1924))

President Alessandri back to his post. It lasted until Alessandri's resumption of power on 03/20/1925.<sup>725</sup> Alessandri's return to power does not mark the beginning of a new regime but rather the continuation of the military autocracy seeing as power was handed to him by the junta and this had been the objective of the coup. Alessandri promulgated a new constitution which was approved by a plebiscite on 03/30/1925.<sup>726</sup> The constitution officially put an end to the parliamentary system and reestablished presidential power (Nohlen 2005).

10/01/1925 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: On this date, Alessandri resigned from the presidency. His vice-president, the civilian Luis Barros Borgoño, took over as acting president of an interim government.<sup>727</sup>

10/22/1925 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, the first direct presidential elections took place in Chile. They were the first elections to be held under the new 1925 constitution.<sup>728</sup> Under the 1925 constitution, direct secret suffrage had been extended. Nevertheless, women were still not able to vote (Nohlen 2005). Therefore, this period is categorized as a defective democracy. Emiliano Figueroa won the elections with 72% of the vote.<sup>729</sup> He made General Carlos Ibanez del Campo his Minister of the Interior. The latter was exerting more and more control over Figueroa, who decided to resign in order to avoid becoming Ibanez's puppet. According to the constitution Ibanez became vice-president, as Minister of the Interior, and announced the next elections.<sup>730</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, elections are classified as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Political liberties were absent per LIED and ambiguous per V-Dem's PCLI. In 1926, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For 1926, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

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<sup>725</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1925\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1925))

<sup>726</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arturo\\_Alessandri#Second\\_administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arturo_Alessandri#Second_administration)

<sup>727</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis\\_Barros\\_Borgo%C3%B1o](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Barros_Borgo%C3%B1o)

<sup>728</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925\\_Chilean\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925_Chilean_presidential_election)

<sup>729</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925\\_Chilean\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925_Chilean_presidential_election)

<sup>730</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Ib%C3%A1%C3%B1ez\\_del\\_Campo#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Ib%C3%A1%C3%B1ez_del_Campo#)

05/22/1927 End (Male) Defective Democracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, presidential elections were held following the resignation of President Emiliano Figueroa. The result was a victory for Interior Minister Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who ran as an independent and received 98% of the vote.<sup>731</sup> Ibáñez began to exercise dictatorial powers, using rule by decree (decretos con fuerza de ley), suspending parliamentary elections, instead naming politicians to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies himself. Political opponents were arrested and exiled, including his former ally Marmaduke Grove. His popularity, however, was helped by massive loans by American banks, which helped to promote a high rate of growth in the country. He constructed massive public works and increased public spending. He also created the Carabineros de Chile (police force) by unifying the previously disorganized police forces. Another significant achievement of Ibáñez's first administration was the signing of the 1929 Treaty of Lima, in which Chile agreed to return the Tacna Province to Peru, which had been seized during the War of the Pacific. His popularity lasted until after the 1929 collapse of Wall Street. At that point all loans were halted and called. Without the influx of foreign currency, Chile was heavily affected by the Great Depression. Ibáñez's large public spending did nothing to alleviate the situation, and his opponents, primarily the exiled Grove and Alessandri, began to plan a comeback. After a great wave of public unrest, Ibáñez left the country for exile, on 07/26/1931, after delegating his office to the president of the senate, Pedro Opat, who in turn resigned in favor of the interior minister, Juan Esteban Montero.<sup>732</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The scoring of LIED as well as V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI does not change in this period. Political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and as ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

07/26/1931 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Party) Regime: When the Ibanez administration collapsed on this date and Ibanez himself went into exile, President of the Senate Pedro Opat became acting vice-president and head of the interim government.

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<sup>731</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1927\\_Chilean\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1927_Chilean_presidential_election)

<sup>732</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Ib%C3%A1%C3%B1ez\\_del\\_Campo#First\\_presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Ib%C3%A1%C3%B1ez_del_Campo#First_presidency)

The next day, he resigned and passed power to Juan Esteban Montero, former Minister of the interior.<sup>733</sup>

10/04/1931 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Party) Regime/Start (Male) Electoral Autocracy: On this date, Montero was officially elected president with 64% of the vote.<sup>734</sup> The elections are considered as not competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scores them as not clean while V-Dem's EF&FI indicates somewhat free and fair election conditions. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

06/04/1932 End (Male) Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup took place in Santiago, where a coalition consisting of young socialists led by Eugenio Matte, air force personnel led by Colonel Marmaduke Grove, and army personnel loyal to former president Carlos Ibáñez del Campo under Carlos Dávila seized control of the Air Force base of El Bosque. Their demand was for President Montero to step down from office and as a result he resigned.<sup>735</sup> On the same night, the revolutionaries who had emerged victorious established a Government Junta, consisting of retired General Arturo Puga, Eugenio Matte, and Carlos Davila, with Colonel Grove serving as their Minister of Defense.<sup>736</sup> According to LIED, only executive elections were present, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present.

09/13/1932 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Party) Regime: On 09/13/1932, Davila resigned after having lost public support. He handed power to General Bartolomé Blanche.<sup>737</sup> In fear of a military uprising, the latter again transferred power to the president of the supreme court, Abraham Oyanedel Urrutia.<sup>738</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties.

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<sup>733</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro\\_Opaso](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro_Opaso)

<sup>734</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1931\\_Chilean\\_presidential\\_election#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1931_Chilean_presidential_election#)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_Republic\\_of\\_Chile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Republic_of_Chile);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan\\_Esteban\\_Montero#Presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Esteban_Montero#Presidency)

<sup>736</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_Republic\\_of\\_Chile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Republic_of_Chile);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan\\_Esteban\\_Montero#Presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Esteban_Montero#Presidency)

<sup>737</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1932\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1932))

<sup>738</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bartolomeo\\_Blanche\\_Espejo](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bartolomeo_Blanche_Espejo)

10/30/1932 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Party) Regime/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: Multiparty elections took place on this date and Abraham Oyanedel Urrutia handed over the president's office to the elected Arturo Alessandri Palma.<sup>739</sup> These elections marked the beginning of a period of consistently competitive elections. All existing parties were allowed to run in the elections between 1932 and 1973 (Keech 2004, Remmer 1984). Nevertheless, almost all presidents between 1932 and 1973 made use of emergency powers, notably also Alessandri. This limits the quality of the democracy (Keech 2004). The factors mentioned above as well as the fact that women were still not able to vote justify the classification of this period as a defective democracy. From 01/08/1949 on, universal suffrage for men and women aged 21 and above and able to read and write was granted. However, only from 1970 on men and women aged 18 and older could vote whether or not they could read.<sup>740</sup> According to UNESCO, approximately 19.9 percent of the total population was illiterate in 1952, thereby excluding nearly a fifth of the population from participating in voting (Educational 1957). Due to the exclusion of illiterates from voting between 1949 and 1970, and the significant portion of the population denied access to elections as a result, Chile cannot be regarded as a full democracy during that period. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From this point onward, LIED categorizes elections as competitive until 1972. V-Dem's EF&FI initially scored them as somewhat free and fair but upgraded them to free and fair in 1958. The same applies to their CEI which followed by increasing its score of electoral cleanliness from somewhat clean to clean in 1959. According to LIED political liberties were absent until 1959 and present from 1960 onward. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present from 1933 to 1946, ambiguous from 1947 to 1957, somewhat present from 1958 to 1963 and as present from 1964 onward for this period. From 1933 to 1957, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. From 1958 to 1963, according to Polity5, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. Since 1964, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1933 to 1969, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1970, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

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<sup>739</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham\\_Oyanedel\\_Urrutia](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abraham_Oyanedel_Urrutia)

<sup>740</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)



04/09/1970 Continuation Defective Democracy: On this date the first presidential elections under real universal suffrage took place.<sup>741</sup> As per FH's classification for 1972, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Political liberties were present in this period (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). However, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power, which indicates defects of democracy regarding executive constraints. During 1971 and 1972, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 1973, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

09/11/1973 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup ousted the elected government led by Salvador Allende (Drake 1997, Valenzuela 1978, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54). Allende died during an assault on the presidential palace, and a junta was composed of four high-ranking military officers. These were General Augusto Pinochet (Army), Admiral José Toribio Merino (Navy), General Gustavo Leigh (Air Force), and General César Mendoza (police).<sup>742</sup> The Christian Democratic, National, and Radical Democracy parties were placed in a state of "indefinite recess," while the Communists, Socialists, and Radicals were banned. In 1977, all parties were dissolved.<sup>743</sup> General Leigh, initially opposed to the consolidation of the legislative and executive branches under Pinochet, eventually faced dismissal from the regime in 1978. Air Force General Fernando Matthei replaced Leigh as a junta member.<sup>744</sup> Following a referendum that approved a new constitution, Pinochet took over as President on 03/11/1981. The junta remained as a legislative body under the presidency of Admiral Merino (Huneus 1998).<sup>745</sup> The junta engaged in a campaign against political opponents, leftists, and their family members. The Rettig Commission reported that 2.279 people disappeared and were killed for political reasons or by political violence, and 27.000 were incarcerated, often without trials.<sup>746</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period,

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<sup>741</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970\\_Chilean\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Chilean_presidential_election)

<sup>742</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Chile/The-military-dictatorship-from-1973>;  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1973\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1973))

<sup>743</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Chile/The-military-dictatorship-from-1973>;  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973\\_Chilean\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Chilean_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>744</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1973\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1973))

<sup>745</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1973\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1973))

<sup>746</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government\\_Junta\\_of\\_Chile\\_\(1973\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Junta_of_Chile_(1973))

the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified for 1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Besides, for this time, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. From 1973 to 1987, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In 1988, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In 1989, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/14/1989 End Military Autocracy/Start Liberal Democracy: In a plebiscite on 10/05/1988, 54.7 percent had rejected a further eight-year term for General Pinochet. Free and fair elections on 12/14/1989 marked a transition to democracy (Angell/Pollack 1990:2, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54).<sup>747</sup> Augusto Pinochet ceded the presidency on 03/11/1990 after a coalition of Parties for Democracy (the Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia) won the election (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 20). Patricio Aylwin Azócar took over the presidency (Lansford 2021: 311). Since then, Chile is a stable democracy with regular free and fair elections.<sup>748</sup> Since 2021 parts of southern Chile have been subject to a state of emergency due to conflicts between government forces and indigenous activists. A new progressive constitution was drafted by Chile's constitutional convention yet rejected by a majority in a national plebiscite.<sup>749</sup> In Chile's presidential regime, the president is both the head of state and of government. A multi-party system allows competitive elections. Institutions that regulate executive power such as the judiciary are independent and stable. FH classifies Chile as free in the whole regime period.<sup>750</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1989 elections are considered competitive by LIED, free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI and clean by Per FH, for 1989, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. From 1990 onward, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. V-Dem's CEI. Political liberties were present for this period (LIED, V-Dem PCLI). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive

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<sup>747</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989\\_Chilean\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Chilean_general_election)

<sup>748</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chile/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>749</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chile/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>750</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chile/freedom-world/2024>

was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (1978, Angell 1993, Barros 2002, Ensalaco 1995, Faundez 1997, García Méndez 1985, Huneus 1981, Huneus 1998, Pearce 1996, Remmer 1984, Remmer 1989, Siavelis 2008, Sigmund 1977, Spooner 1994, Spooner 2011, Thiery 2000, Valenzuela 1978, Valenzuela 1999, Weeks 2003)

## China

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 04/xx/1636]: China became sovereign in 1600 BC. In April 1636, Hong Taiji, leader of the Manchu, proclaimed the establishment of the Qing dynasty, marking the beginning of their rule.<sup>751</sup> In 1909 for the first time some kind of Chinese parliamentary elections took place, however, not in the modern sense. They were indirect election to an imperial Advisory Council, a preparatory body of the parliament created under the constitutional reform bought by the late Qing dynasty. Even if participation was extremely restricted, it is seen by some sources as the first popular election in Chinese history.<sup>752</sup> The monarchy was dynastic and absolute until 11/03/1911. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For this period, LIED states political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as what we interpret as not really present.

11/03/1911 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: On this date, the Qing dynasty issued the 'Doctrine of Nineteen Articles', which limited the emperor's absolute power and established a system of ministerial responsibility inspired by the British system from the imperial era. The doctrine expanded the power of the congress.<sup>753</sup> On 02/12/1912, empress

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<sup>751</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_China#Qing\\_dynasty\\_\(1636%E2%80%931912\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_China#Qing_dynasty_(1636%E2%80%931912));  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline\\_of\\_the\\_Qing\\_dynasty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Qing_dynasty)

<sup>752</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1909\\_Chinese\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1909_Chinese_parliamentary_election)

<sup>753</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nineteen\\_Articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nineteen_Articles)

Longyu signed an abdication decree on behalf of the Xuanton Emperor. This alteration marked the transition to a constitutional monarchy.<sup>754</sup> LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

01/01/1912 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: Only about three months later, on this date, Sun Yat-sen announced the establishment of the Republic of China in Nanking, and he was inaugurated as the Provisional President of the Republic. During February 1912, the Qing dynasty was toppled, and authority was transferred to Yuan Shih-kai, who served as both the president of the council of ministers and an official. The newly established regime granted Yuan Shih-kai substantial powers as president. Yuan was the leader of the Beiyang Army and used its power to gain more control. Therefore, this regime was known as the Beiyang government.<sup>755</sup> While the constitution nominally placed the government and the state under civilian control, the Beiyang generals effectively wielded authority over them. Therefore, we code this regime as a military autocracy.<sup>756</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED still codes political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI switched to an ambiguous level. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/01/1913 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: From December 1912 to January 1913, elections were conducted for the national assembly, resulting in a significant victory for the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as the "Chinese Nationalist Party".<sup>757</sup> The national assembly was the first elected legislature in the Republic of China. As voters chose electors, it was an indirect poll. It was a bicameral assembly; the senate was elected by provincial assemblies and representatives were directly elected.<sup>758</sup> The president was tasked

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<sup>754</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy\\_of\\_China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_China)

<sup>755</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_China\\_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))

<sup>756</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beiyang\\_government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beiyang_government)

<sup>757</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan\\_Shikai](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_Shikai);

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912\\_Chinese\\_National\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912_Chinese_National_Assembly_election)

<sup>758</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Assembly\\_\(Beiyang\\_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))

with selecting the 64 members who would represent Tibet, Outer Mongolia, and Overseas Chinese. Notably, this process involved the participation of over 300 civic groups, making it the most competitive nationwide elections in Chinese history.<sup>759</sup> Eligible to cast a vote were only adult males over 21 years of age who owned property, paid taxes, were educated and could prove a two-year residency in a particular county. About 4-6% of the population were able to register for elections.<sup>760</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really clean and fair while their CEI scores them as not lean. Although the subnational elections in 1912 exhibited some degree of competitiveness, suffrage was extremely restricted, and the prevalence of vote buying was significant. Only about one per cent of the population could vote. Furthermore, the regime resorted to repressive measures against political opponents. (Young 1983: 208-13, 222-24, 226, 231, 237-38, Sheridan 1983, Casey et al. 2020: 3-4). Less than one percent of the population voted in the indirect poll.

07/12/1913 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, Jianxi, as the first of many southern provinces, declared independence. These events occurred within the frame of the "Second Revolution". This was a revolt of the Southern Provinces as well as the Kuomintang against Yuan Shikai who had started to ignore the National Assembly's decisions soon after the elections. Additionally, Yuan Shikai assassinated Song Jiaoren, the leader of the Kuomintang, and arranged the assassination of several other Kuomintang politicians. When the Kuomintang started voicing their outrage over the power abuse of Yuan Shikai, he decided to use military action against them.<sup>761</sup> Yuan Shikai outlawed the Kuomintang and expelled them from the National Assembly.<sup>762</sup> On 01/10/1914, Yuan Shikai disbanded the National Assembly after it had lost its quorum due to the expulsion of the Kuomintang.<sup>763</sup> The second revolution had failed. Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army had beaten the revolt. The revolution cemented Yuan's power. To give his government seeming legitimacy, he promulgated the constitutional compact which gave him unlimited control over the Chinese army, finances, foreign policy and the rights of China's citizens.<sup>764</sup> Furthermore, it made him

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<sup>759</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918\\_Chinese\\_National\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918_Chinese_National_Assembly_election)

<sup>760</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912\\_Chinese\\_National\\_Assembly\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912_Chinese_National_Assembly_election)

<sup>761</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Revolution\\_\(Republic\\_of\\_China\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Revolution_(Republic_of_China))

<sup>762</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Assembly\\_\(Beiyang\\_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))

<sup>763</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Assembly\\_\(Beiyang\\_government\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government);)  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan\\_Shikai](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_Shikai)

<sup>764</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Revolution\\_\(Republic\\_of\\_China\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Revolution_(Republic_of_China))

de facto president for life.<sup>765</sup> On 12/12/1915 Yuan Shi-kai declared himself the emperor.<sup>766</sup> One day earlier, the National Assembly had unanimously voted for his ascending to the throne.<sup>767</sup> By declaring himself emperor, he tried to restore the Qing dynasty that had ended 1912.<sup>768</sup> This event does not mark an actual transformation towards a monarchy but rather a conferral of titles and extension of absolute power typical for personalist autocracies. Generally, the Republican period in Chinese history, spanning from 1912 to 1949, marked an interim phase between the Qing dynasty and the emergence of the Communist People's Republic of China (Elleman/Paine 2019).<sup>769</sup> On 12/25/1915 the so-called National Protection War or the Anti-Monarchy War began. In the Yunnan Province, independence had been declared and military operations were launched against the new emperor's army. The Guizhou and Guangxi provinces followed with a declaration of independence.<sup>770</sup> : On 03/22/1916, Yuan formally abdicated as emperor and restored the republic. However, he remained president, which was met with much resistance.<sup>771</sup> On 06/06/1916, Yuan passed away. The National Protection War ended on 07/14/1916.<sup>772</sup> According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Additionally, political liberties were absent (LIED) and indicate an ambiguous presence according to V-Dem's PCLI.

07/14/1916 End Personalist Autocracy/Start No Central Authority: Following Yuan's ousting and subsequent demise, the central government swiftly lost its grip on the provinces, resulting in the absence of an effective central authority (Young 1983: 253-54, Sheridan 1983: 284, 287-91, 296-303, 307-9, Nathan 1983: 256, 266, Casey et al. 2020: 4). The so-called Warlord Era began.<sup>773</sup> The control of the country was subsequently divided between military cliques and regional factions, resulting in a period of warlordism. The key actors in the highly fragmented

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<sup>765</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/china/20.htm>

<sup>766</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire\\_of\\_China\\_\(1915%E2%80%931916\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_China_(1915%E2%80%931916))

<sup>767</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire\\_of\\_China\\_\(1915%E2%80%931916\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_China_(1915%E2%80%931916))

<sup>768</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing\\_dynasty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing_dynasty)

<sup>769</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/china/20.htm>; <https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-China/The-early-republican-period>

<sup>770</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Protection\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Protection_War)

<sup>771</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan\\_Shikai](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_Shikai)

<sup>772</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Protection\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Protection_War)

<sup>773</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_China\\_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))

political landscape were mainly the Zhili clique, led by Cao Kun after 1919, and the Fengtian clique, both former members of the Beiyang army. Cao Kun was promised the vice-presidency by Duan Qirui during the 1918 national assembly elections, but the office remained vacant. As a result, Cao Kun experienced a sense of betrayal by Duan and engaged in battle, emerging victorious in 1920.<sup>774</sup> The first Zhili-Fengtian war broke out in 1922 and resulted in Zhili dominance.<sup>775</sup> During this period, the KMT tried to build a rival national government in Canton, led by Sun. He succeeded in taking the city with the help of the Soviets and agreed to build a coalition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), building a revolutionary base. Sun's goal was to unify China through a military campaign.<sup>776</sup> In 1918, new assembly elections were initiated. Seventeen provinces provided responses, while five southern provinces opted for a boycott. Delegates for Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai were appointed by Beijing. The voting process witnessed the open buying and selling of votes, with prices constantly fluctuating, and widespread instances of fraud and abuse.<sup>777</sup> This assembly, however, only came together until August 1920. In 1922, after the Zhili-Ahnui War and the victory of the Zhili clique led by Cao Kun, Li Yuanhong was appointed to the presidency in Beijing by the military leadership.<sup>778</sup> Yuanhong then summoned back the 1913 assembly, excluding the 1919 'extraordinary' additions, citing the same pretext that its three-year term had not been completed.<sup>779</sup> An alternative approach to code this period would be to code different political regimes on specific territories for China in this period. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Regarding political liberties they maintained to code them as absent (LIED) and as ambiguous (V-Dem PCLI). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1917, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1918 to 1920, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1921, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution,

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<sup>774</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao\\_Kun](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao_Kun)

<sup>775</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord\\_Era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord_Era)

<sup>776</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_China\\_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))

<sup>777</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Assembly\\_\(Beiyang\\_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))

<sup>778</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhili\\_clique](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhili_clique) [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li\\_Yuanhong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Yuanhong)

<sup>779</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Assembly\\_\(Beiyang\\_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))

can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. The following two years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/05/1923 End No Central Authority/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Cao Kun, a former general of the Beiyang Army and the leader of the Zhili clique, was elected president by the National Assembly. Subsequently, the constitution, which was hastily drafted by the assembly, was promulgated by Cao Kun in 1923.<sup>780</sup> Just as Li Yuanhong's takeover of the presidency was orchestrated, so was Yuanhong's eviction from office. The military successes of the Zhili clique led Cao Kun to aspire to become president, which led to the ouster of Li Yuanhong, but also brought disunity to the Zhili clique and led to the reunion of the enemies of the Zhili clique.<sup>781782</sup> In September of 1924, the Second Zhili-Fengtian War started, between the Fengtian and the Zhili clique. It ended with the Beijing Coup.<sup>783</sup> Cao Kun's term in office thus occurred in the turmoil of the War Lord Era. Hence, the Republic of China was still contested by different military cliques and a military-dominated culture characterized the political regime.<sup>784</sup> Therefore, the regime can only be classified as a military autocracy, since there were no popular multi-party/multi-candidate elections for president, the parliament, which had emerged from the 1913 elections and had been repeatedly reinstated, had questionable legitimacy, plus Cao Kun had a military background and had just won the preceding Zhili-Anui War as the leader of the Zhili-Clique. The regime classification as a military autocracy is further supported by the fact that AF also classifies it as a military autocracy. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED classifies the state of political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as what we interpret as ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

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<sup>780</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1923\\_Chinese\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1923_Chinese_presidential_election); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao\\_Kun](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao_Kun)

<sup>781</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li\\_Yuanhong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Yuanhong)

<sup>782</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhili\\_clique](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhili_clique)

<sup>783</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Zhili%E2%80%93Fengtian\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Zhili%E2%80%93Fengtian_War)

<sup>784</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord\\_Era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord_Era)



10/23/1924 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the Beijing Coup occurred.<sup>785</sup> The coup took place at a pivotal juncture in the Second Zhili–Fengtian War, enabling the pro-Japanese Fengtian clique to overcome the previously dominant Zhili clique.<sup>786</sup> Feng Yuxiang put Huang Fu into the president’s position.<sup>787</sup> On 11/24/1924 Duan Qirui was named the new Chief Executive of the nation by Zhang Zuolin, the leader of the Fengtian clique, who shared power with the leader of the coup Feng Yuxiang.<sup>788</sup> His government was reluctantly accepted by the Zhili and perceived as a neutral choice as Duan had no army of his own. In addition, the renaming of the President’s title from ‘President’ to ‘Chief Executive’ further weakened the office politically. Duan contacted Sun Yat-sen, with the goal of renegotiating a national reunification. Sun died in 1925, which cut off the negotiations. Thereafter, Duan’s government was extremely dependent on Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin. Duan was forced out of office in April 1926.<sup>789</sup> The reason was the Anti-Fengtian War – the last major civil war within the Republic of China.<sup>790</sup> The regime has to be classified as military autocracy because it exhibits essentially the same features as the previous regime, just under another clique. The only difference is that Duan Qirui itself did not have a military background but was dependent on the Fengtian clique and can therefore be seen as a figurehead president chosen by the military elite. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Besides, political liberties continued to be coded as absent (LIED) and as ambiguous (V-Dem PCLI).

04/20/1926 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: After the Anti-Fengtian War, Duan Qirui was succeeded by multiple presidents who came from different political cliques and parties, but none of them held office for long.<sup>791</sup> The period was marked by the Northern Expedition, “a military campaign launched by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Kuomintang (KMT) against the Beiyang government and other regional warlords in 1926. The purpose of the campaign was to reunify China, which had become

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<sup>785</sup> <https://omniatlas.com/maps/asia-pacific/19241023/>

<sup>786</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924\\_in\\_China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_in_China)

<sup>787</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feng\\_Yuxiang#Rise](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feng_Yuxiang#Rise); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huang\\_Fu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huang_Fu)

<sup>788</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang\\_Zuolin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Zuolin)

<sup>789</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duan\\_Qirui](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duan_Qirui)

<sup>790</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Fengtian\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Fengtian_War)

<sup>791</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_presidents\\_of\\_China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_China)

fragmented.”<sup>792</sup> The political situation was therefore very unstable. And it was only toward the end of the Northern Expedition that a national government could be installed.<sup>793</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED declares political liberties as not present. V-Dem's PCLI indicated an ambiguous status of political liberties until 1928, when the PCLI decreased into a range which indicates that political liberties were not really present.

10/10/1928 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Non-Electoral) One-Party Autocracy: On 10/10/1928, Chiang launched himself as the leader of the Nanjing Government. Between 1928 to 1949 during the Republican Era the Nationalist Party aka Kuomintang (KMT) was the sole party in a non-electoral regime.<sup>794</sup> The early achievements of the Nationalist Party were largely attributed to the assistance and counsel provided by the USSR, as well as their close cooperation with the Chinese communists from 1924 to 1927. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, leadership of the party gradually shifted to Chiang Kai Shek, who successfully brought the majority of China under its authority by curtailing or eliminating the regional warlords' autonomy between 1926 and 1928.<sup>795</sup> He led the “Northern Expedition” and fought against the Beiyang government. They succeeded in 1928, when the KMT had most of China under its control.<sup>796</sup> Subsequently, the so-called Nanjing decade began and lasted until 1937. Moreover, after his victory, Chiang expelled any Communists from the KMT.<sup>797</sup> This period was characterized by conflicts, between 08/01/1927 and 12/07/1949 the Chinese Civil war raged, with some interruptions.<sup>798</sup> The struggle ensued between the government led by the Kuomintang in the Republic of China and the forces of the Chinese Communist Party, culminating in the establishment of Communist control over mainland China.<sup>799</sup> Moreover, between 07/07/1937 and 09/02/1945 the Second Sino-Japanese War took place, starting with

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<sup>792</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern\\_Expedition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Expedition)

<sup>793</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/China/The-Northern-Expedition>

<sup>794</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuomintang>

<sup>795</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nationalist-Party-Chinese-political-party>

<sup>796</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern\\_Expedition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Expedition)

<sup>797</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_China\\_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))

<sup>798</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing\\_decade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_decade)

<sup>799</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese\\_Civil\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War)

the invasion of Japan.<sup>800</sup> In 1947 male suffrage was introduced.<sup>801</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Between 1928 and 1936, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. From 1946 to 1948, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 1929 to 1947, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1948 and 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the entire time LIED still states an absence of political liberties, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present.

01/21/1949 End (Non-Electoral) One-Party Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this day, Chiang Kai Shek gave power as a peacemaking concession to the communist rebels. Power was handed over to his vice president Li Tsung Jen. One day later Beijing fell to the Communist ending de facto the power of the old regime. On 10/01/1949 the People's Republic of China (PRC) was declared by Mao Se Tung (Shinn/Worden 1988, Leung 2002: xxix). The Communist Revolutionaries led by Mao Se Tung had defeated the last strongholds of the Republic forces and had established a transitional government placing Mao at its head. Since then, the Chinese Communist Party is ruling China as a one-party autocracy. In 1953, universal suffrage was officially granted under the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China when the First National Assembly (disbanded 2005) elections were held in 1947. But women were not explicitly enfranchised until 1953 thanks to the first Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China. The general populace can only vote for local elections.<sup>802</sup> Local people's congresses are directly elected, operating under the control of the CCP. People's congresses at higher levels, including the National People's Congress (NPC), the national legislature, are elected indirectly by the people's congress at the immediately lower level.<sup>803</sup> From 1978 to 1982, China transformed its economy with reforms such as industrial liberalization, and the establishment of Special Economic Zones. These changes aimed to attract private and foreign investment and experiment with market-driven policies. These reforms laid the foundation for China's rapid economic growth. Between 1982 and 1989, China implemented more economic reforms to

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<sup>800</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Sino-Japanese\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sino-Japanese_War)

<sup>801</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage)

<sup>802</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

<sup>803</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_China)

modernize its economy. These included decollectivization in agriculture, industrial liberalization, and the introduction of market-based price determination. From 1989 to 1991, China experienced a shift in its economic policies (Bramall 2008: 330). In spring 1989, a series of protests erupted in the country. These reached their climax on the night of June 3-4 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. By spring 1989, an increasing desire for political and economic reform was evident among society, especially among university students, prompted by a decade of significant economic growth and openness, exposing many Chinese to foreign ideas and lifestyles. What began as a mourning gathering for the death of reformist Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang turned into demands for political change, freedom of speech, and an end to corruption. Thousands occupied Tiananmen Square, leading the government to declare martial law and send in the military. On the night of 06/03/1989 to 06/04/1989, troops used tanks and live ammunition to disperse protesters, resulting in numerous casualties.<sup>804</sup> As a result, there was a pause in the Gilley policy of opening-up as the government prioritized stability. Additionally, there were cuts in government spending, and the transition to market socialism was halted temporarily (Bramall 2008: 330). In recent years, the regime under the leadership of CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has significantly tightened control over every facet of life and governance. This control extends over the state bureaucracy, media, and civil society. Xi Jinping's consolidation of power represents a level of centralization not witnessed in China for many years. After years of crackdowns on political dissent, independent NGOs, and human rights advocates, civil society has been greatly weakened.<sup>805</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were present during the specified period. From 1949 to 1965, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Between 1966 and 1968, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1969 to 1975, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Since 1976, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1950 to 1953, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1954 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Since

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<sup>804</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident>

<sup>805</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024>

2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, since 1949 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were constantly absent, except from 1986 to 1988 where V-Dem's PCLI is in a range which we interpret as not really present.

Communist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Bader 2011, Baum 1994, Gilley/Holbig 2010, Guo 2000, Hoffmann 1978, Landry 2008, Lin 2006, Saxonberg 2013)

## **Colombia**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy [Start: 08/08/1886]: On 07/20/1810 Colombia, the former Vice Royalty of New-Grenada, declared independence from Spain. On 12/17/1819 Colombia merged with Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador into the Republic of Colombia. Simón Bolívar became the first President of Colombia. On 11/19/1831 Gran Colombia dissolved creating a pact of Colombia with Panama as the Republic of New Granada. The constitution of 1853 introduced universal, direct, and secret suffrage (Jaramillo Pérez/Franco-Cuervo 2005: 299). On 05/22/1858 the Republic of New Granada was replaced to the Granadine Confederation under the 1858 constitution. On 05/08/1863 the Granadine Confederation was replaced to the United States of Colombia under the constitutional change of 1864. On 08/08/1886 Colombia was established in the current form as a republic. In 1886 the constitution was reformed to allow universal suffrage for municipal councils and departmental assemblies only. However, states and provinces had a lot of leeway when it came to implementation. Therefore, it seems that many still had literacy requirements. For presidential elections the indirect census suffrage (literacy and socioeconomic restrictions) was reintroduced (Engerman/Sokoloff 2005: 913, Jaramillo Pérez/Franco-Cuervo 2005: 299). In 1904 Rafael Reyes was elected president. His policies embodied a paradoxical mix of political reconciliation and authoritarianism.<sup>806</sup> He incorporated Liberals in the government, while at the same time strengthening the executive and therefore, centralizing power.<sup>807</sup> On 06/15/1910

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<sup>806</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/18.htm>

<sup>807</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/18.htm>

indirect presidential elections were held. The result was a victory for Carlos Eugenio Restrepo of the Republican Union.<sup>808</sup> In 1936 universal male suffrage was introduced.<sup>809</sup> While RoW classifies the regime before the elections of 1910 as a closed (non-electoral) autocracy and LIED as a one-party autocracy according to our classification the regime is an electoral oligarchy. While there were presidential elections most of the population had no voting rights. However, based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. LIED considers the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates not really cleanliness from 1900 to 1904, 1914 to 1925 and 1930 to 1938. Between 1905 and 1909 and 1926 and 1929 no cleanliness was achieved. For the remaining four years ambiguous outcomes are stated. The overall election conditions were not really free and fair from 1900 to 1909 and 1926 to 1929. Between 1910 and 1914 somewhat freedom and fairness is provided while for the other years ambiguous election conditions are stated (V-Dem EF&FI). Political liberties were coded as absent for this time per LIED. Following V-Dem's PCLI they were at a not really present level until 1904 and at an ambiguous level until 1938. From 1900 to 1903, according to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 1904 to 1929, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Since 1930, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 1900 to 1903, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1904 and 1905, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1906 to 1909, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

05/01/1938 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: The so-called Liberal Republic or Reformist Phase already started with the 1930s and as a result López Pumarejo (1934-1938) reintroduced universal male suffrage in 1936. The Conservative

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<sup>808</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1910\\_Colombian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1910_Colombian_presidential_election)

<sup>809</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage#cite\\_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37)

Period ended in 1930 with free elections and a peaceful takeover (Bushnell 1993: 181-182).<sup>810</sup> The presidential elections on 05/01/1938 were therefore the first elections since the amendment of the 1886 constitution with universal male suffrage. Eduardo Santos of the Liberal Party stood uncontested in the elections. The Conservative Party boycotted the elections and claimed “that they could not count on a fair election” (Bushnell 1993: 192). But they were also unable to nominate a candidate. In the presidential election 1942 López Pumarejo was reelected for his second term. The Conservative participated in the elections (Bushnell 1993: 192-193). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, according to LIED no electoral competitiveness was present. V-Dem’s CEI scores not really clean election until 1940. Since 1941 the elections are characterized with no cleanliness. V-Dem’s EF&FI classifies the overall election conditions as ambiguous during this time. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem’s PCLI, except in 1945 the outcomes increased to what we interpret as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 1939 to 1947, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1948, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Overall, the period was characterized by great social reforms, but also by economic crisis due to World War II and a split in the Liberal Party. In 1944 Lopez survived an attempted coup, but his political power diminished. Therefore, he resigned in 1946. The interim president Lleras Camargo tried to form a national union by appointing a cabinet consisting of Liberals and Conservatives. The nomination of Gabriel Turbay (Liberal Party) as candidate for the 1946 presidential elections led Jorge Eliécer Gaitán to run as independent candidate, thus splitting the Liberal Party. Gaitán enjoyed widespread support and resembled a populist (Bushnell 1993: 196-199).<sup>811</sup> Due to the split in the Liberal vote, Mariano Ospina Pérez a Conservative won the

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<sup>810</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/20.htm>; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage)

<sup>811</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/20.htm>

elections on 05/05/1946.<sup>812</sup> With the assassination of Gaitán on 04/09/1948 prior to the 1949 presidential elections, which he had probably won, a ten-year civil war broke out.<sup>813</sup>

11/09/1949 End (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: The incumbent Conservative president, elected into office, shuttered Congress shortly after a Liberal majority secured their seats. Declaring a state of siege, he imposed press censorship following a violent campaign that claimed the lives of numerous Liberal partisans. In retaliation, the Liberals opted to boycott the presidential election scheduled for 11/27/1949, resulting in the election of another Conservative president (Fluharty 1957, Henderson 1985: 138-140, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54). Laureano Gómez took office on 08/07/1950. He assumed extensive powers and restricted civil liberties in an effort to address the escalating violence and the potential return of power to the Liberals. Pro-labor laws enacted in the 1930s were nullified through executive decree, independent labor unions were dismantled, uncontested congressional elections were conducted, press censorship was enforced, executive control extended to the courts, and freedom of worship faced challenges as mobs targeted Protestant chapels. Gómez directed his repressive measures primarily against the Liberal opposition, labeling them as communist.<sup>814</sup> In 1953 a neofascist constitution was drafted, which would have enhanced the presidential powers even further.<sup>815</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. No competitive elections were held during this time (LIED). No cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI) and the overall election conditions were not really free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. V-Dem's PCLI scores political liberties as not really present for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the year 1950, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

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<sup>812</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946\\_Colombian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Colombian_presidential_election);

<https://www.britannica.com/place/Colombia/La-Violencia-dictatorship-and-democratic-restoration>

<sup>813</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La\\_Violencia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Violencia)

<sup>814</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/22.htm>

<sup>815</sup> <https://countrystudies.us/colombia/22.htm>



06/13/1953 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by General Rojas Pinilla toppled the conservative civilian government of Laureano Gómez. The reason was that the military was angry over the removal of several military officers. Pinilla established a government led by himself (Martz 1962:166-167, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54). In 1954 during the military autocracy of Pinilla women's suffrage was introduced.<sup>816</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. From 1953 to 1956, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. LIED still codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI fluctuates between what we interpret as not really present and as absent. In 1957 and 1958, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. From 1954 to 1957, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

05/10/1958 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: Following the coup, the two main parties, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party came on 05/10/1958 to an agreement on holding office for alternating periods of four years. The agreement, known as the National Front, was approved in a 1957 referendum<sup>817</sup> (Martz 1962:267, Hartlyn 1988: 60-65, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 54). Presidential elections were held in Colombia on 05/04/1958. They were the first presidential elections since 1949. The 1970 elections raised allegations of electoral fraud from supporters of former dictator Rojas, who ran as a third-party candidate (Lansford 2021: 339-340). The National Front restricted electoral participation to the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, with each party allocated 50% of the seats in both houses, whilst the Presidency alternated between the two parties.<sup>818</sup> As a result, the main contest in parliamentary elections was between factions within each party and only Conservative candidates ran for the presidency.<sup>819</sup> The regime is classified as a defective democracy due to the severe restrictions on competition. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. On 04/21/1974, the first general elections Colombia to elect the President, Senate and Chamber

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<sup>816</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage\\_in\\_Colombia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Colombia)

<sup>817</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958\\_Colombian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Colombian_presidential_election)

<sup>818</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958\\_Colombian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Colombian_presidential_election)

<sup>819</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970\\_Colombian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Colombian_general_election)

of Representatives after the end of the National Front agreement were held.<sup>820</sup> Since then, LIED classifies elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI classifies them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores their cleanliness as ambiguous. Corruption remained a substantial problem. The 'parapolitics' scandal, which linked many politicians to illegal paramilitary groups, resulted in the investigation, arrest, or conviction of more than 90 legislators by the close of the 2006-10 Congress. The 2014 legislative elections were defined by accusations of fraud, vote buying, and connections with criminals. Concerns of vote buying and other violations in both the first and second rounds also emerged in the 2018 elections.<sup>821</sup> The most recent parliamentary elections were held on 03/13/2022. The elections were described as generally peaceful and calm, however, candidates have raised concerns about voting irregularities during the legislative elections in March. However, officials attribute these issues to clerical errors and assert that there is no possibility of electoral fraud.<sup>822</sup> During the elections in June 2022, Gustavo Petro, an opposition candidate and former left-wing guerrilla member, emerged victorious, assuming the presidency. He went on to form a government characterized by a broad left-wing coalition, marking the inauguration of Colombia's first leftist administration since the reinstatement of competitive democracy.<sup>823</sup> Colombia for the whole regime period as free.<sup>824</sup> However, despite the Colombian constitution guaranteeing a broad array of civil liberties and political rights, the state faces challenges in enforcing them due to widespread organized crime and politically motivated violence, which at times lead to significant human rights abuses (McColm 1990). As per FH's classification for the period from 1972 to 1974, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Between 1975 and 1988, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. For the period from 1989 to 1994 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Per FH's scoring for the period between 1995 and 1997, Colombia is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1998 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From 1999 to 2004 it receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. As classified by FH from 2005 to 2021, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. In 2022 it is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret

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<sup>820</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974\\_Colombian\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Colombian_general_election)

<sup>821</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/colombia/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>822</sup> <https://www.dw.com/en/colombia-heads-to-the-polls-in-historic-election/a-61966789>

<sup>823</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/colombia>

<sup>824</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/colombia/freedom-world/2024>

as rather free in our framework. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this entire period. V-Dem's PCLI'S classification fluctuates between ambiguous and somewhat present from 1953 to 2008. From 2009 onward V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as present with the exception of 2020 and 2021, during which political liberties are coded as somewhat present. From 1958 to 1990, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive's authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. From 1991 to 1994, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Since 1995, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. From 1959 to 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1975-1978, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the years 1979 to 1981, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Between 1982 and 1990, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. For the year 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 1992, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. Left-wing guerrillas and right-paramilitary groups challenge the state's monopoly on violence, often impeding the freedom, independence, and effectiveness of the press and judiciary (Puddington et al. 2012). Nonetheless, Colombia has a history of multiple changes in government and peaceful transitions of power, although the particularly violent and tumultuous period between the 1990s and the early 2010s places it as a borderline case between a semi-democracy and democracy (Puddington et al. 2012).<sup>825</sup>

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>825</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_presidents\\_of\\_Colombia#Republic\\_of\\_Colombia\\_\(1886%E2%80%93present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_Colombia#Republic_of_Colombia_(1886%E2%80%93present))

Additional sources (Archer/Shugart 1997, Bejarano/Pizarro 2005, Cepeda Ulloa 2008, Fluharty 1957, Hartlyn 1988, Henderson 1985, Martz 1962, Peeler 1985, Whitehead 2001, Wilde 1978)

## Comoros

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of France, (Male) Defective Democracy] [Start: 04/26/1886]: On 04/26/1886 under the rule of Sultan Mardjani Abdou Cheikh, Mwali was placed under the protection of the French. In the same year, Sultan Said Ali of Bambao, one of the sultanates on Ngazidja, also sought French protection, leveraging it to assert his claim over the entire island. Subsequently, the Sultanates were entirely abolished when Mardjani and his ministers signed a treaty, accepting a French protectorate and thereby supplanting the authority of the other sultanates (Walker 2019, Walker 2022). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. For the year 1900, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/09/1908 End Autocratic Monarchy [as Protectorate of France, (Male) Defective Democracy]/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy]: On this date, France declared the Comoros a single territory (Mayotte and Dependencies) and attached it to the colony of Madagascar.<sup>826</sup> In 1909, Sultan Said Muhamed of Ndzwani relinquished his position in favor of French governance. Three years later, in 1912, the colony and protectorates were dissolved, leading to the islands becoming a province of the Madagascar colony.<sup>827</sup> The three islands (Ngazidja, Ndzuwani, Mohéli) which were proclaimed protectorates of France, were annexed by France in 1912 and joined with Mayotte and Dependencies in 1912. With neighboring Mayotte, they were administratively attached to Madagascar in 1914 (Turner 2005) and placed under the administration of the governor general of Madagascar.<sup>828</sup> The four

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<sup>826</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Said\\_Ali\\_bin\\_Said\\_Omar\\_of\\_Grande\\_Comore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Said_Ali_bin_Said_Omar_of_Grande_Comore)

<sup>827</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoros>

<sup>828</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/comoros/26153.htm>

islands were separated in 1947, when Comoros became a French overseas territory with a higher level of administrative autonomy and the entitlement to vote for one senator and one deputy to represent them in the French legislature in Paris. (Ciment 2007). This period is coded as colonial rule. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Regarding the political liberties they were absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. Both datasets show a gap between 1914 and 1945. Since 1946 political liberties were still coded as absent following LIED. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI classification switched to not really present since 1947. During this regime period (except the aforementioned data gap from 1914 and 1945, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/31/1957 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: Under colonial rule, universal suffrage for Comorians aged 21 and older was implemented through the Loi Cadre of 1956 (LIED). This was first applied in the elections for the Territorial Assembly (Assemblée Territoriale) in 1957 (Thibaut 1999: 246). On 12/01/1961 after the Comorian people chose to remain in the French Union by referendum, they were granted internal self-governance in 1961. There was a chamber of Deputies, which in turn elected a territorial president (Ciment 2007, Gaspart 1979, Turner 2005). In referendums held on each island on 12/22/1974, the three western islands voted for independence, while Mayotte voted to remain French (Ciment 2007, Gaspart 1979, Turner 2005). It is unclear to what extent the Comoros were able to determine their own internal affairs during this period. Due to the unclear factual situation, the Comoros were classified as a colony until independence. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Moreover, LIED still classifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as what we interpret as not really present. From 1958 to 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1970 and 1971, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1972 and 1973, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating

that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

07/06/1975 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, the Comorian parliament passed a resolution asserting independence. Ahmed Abdallah, leader of the Comoros Democratic Union, who had been elected in 1972 as president of the government council and Chief Minister of the Comoros, in turn, declared the establishment of the Comorian State and assumed the role of its inaugural president. The French government officially acknowledged the newly formed state.<sup>829</sup> Upon gaining independence, there were five prominent political parties: OUDZIMA, UMMA, the Comoro People's Democratic Rally, the Comoro National Liberation Movement, and the Socialist Objective Party.<sup>830</sup> As it is quite common for a former colonial regime, the Comoros had a well-structured system of government, but it was built on an extremely shallow foundation. Organized political groups and written political communications systems are virtually non-existent, suggesting a population that lacks experience and inclination towards participatory politics (Ostheimer 1973: 497). Therefore, we code this very short regime period as a defective democracy.

08/03/1975 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: President Ahmed Abdallah was overthrown by Bob Denard, a French mercenary working for Said Jaffar leading a group of six opposition parties.<sup>831</sup> Jaffar seated himself at the head of the National Council of the Revolution. Said Mohamed Jaffar, who emerged as the leader following the coup, was not a military officer himself. Instead, he was a political figure and a member of the United National Front. However, there was a strong involvement of military figures and mercenaries in its establishment and governance. Since the regime started by a military coup and there was a junta the regime is coded as a military autocracy. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political liberties are still coded absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present by V-Dem's PCLI.

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<sup>829</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoros#European\\_contact\\_and\\_French\\_colonisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoros#European_contact_and_French_colonisation);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed\\_Abdallah](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Abdallah)

<sup>830</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_the\\_Comoros](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Comoros)

<sup>831</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Comoros/Government-and-society>

01/02/1976 End Military Autocracy/Start Military (Rebel) Autocracy: On this date the Revolutionary Council of State headed by Ali Soilih, a Comorian socialist revolutionary, was established to govern the country. Soilih obtained significant authority under the provisions of a newly established constitution and was endorsed in a referendum with 95 percent of the vote on 10/28/1977.<sup>832</sup> He implemented socialist economic policies.<sup>833</sup> Soilih founded the 'Moissy,' a revolutionary youth militia trained under the guidance of Tanzanian military advisors. The Moissy represented a Comorian adaptation of Mao Zedong's Red Guards.<sup>834</sup> According to Encyclopedia Britannica Soilih "attempted to convert the country into a secular, socialist republic."<sup>835</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Due to the short period of time it remains unclear if the regime clearly would have been communist. Therefore, we classify it as a military (rebel) autocracy. As per FH, for this regime period, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Political liberties were absent per LIED and not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

05/13/1978 End Military (Rebel) Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Abdallah, who had been residing in exile in Paris, France, was the figurehead of a coup orchestrated by mercenary Bob Denard on 05/13/1978. Initially, Said Atthoumani assumed the position of "Chairman of the Politico-Military Directorate" for a brief period, after which Abdallah and Mohamed Ahmed took on the roles of "Co-Chairmen of the Politico-Military Directorate." On 07/22, their titles were modified to Co-Chairmen of the Directorate, and on 10/03, Abdallah became the sole chairman. However, Abdallah held little actual power and was essentially a puppet leader, while the true ruler was Denard, who served as the commander of the Presidential Guard.<sup>836</sup> According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were present after 1978, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for the period until 1982, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1983 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category and in 1984

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<sup>832</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/comoros-1975-present/>

<sup>833</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali\\_Soilih](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Soilih)

<sup>834</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali\\_Soilih](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Soilih)

<sup>835</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Comoros/Government-and-society>

<sup>836</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed\\_Abdallah#Second\\_presidency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Abdallah#Second_presidency)

it scores once again between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For the rest of the regime period the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Besides, LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classification continued to code political liberties as absent and as not really present. From 1978 to 1981, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. In 1982 and 1983, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. Since 1984, based on Polity5's assessment during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the year 1979, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1980 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/27/1989 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: On this date President Ahmed Abdallah was assassinated. Denard is widely believed to have had Abdallah assassinated after Abdallah attempted to dismiss him as the commander of the Presidential Guard. During Denard's 1999 trial in Paris for Abdallah's murder, he claimed that Abdallah was actually killed by Abdallah Jaffar during a coup led by Said Mohamed Djohar, the half-brother of Ali Soilih. However, Denard was acquitted due to a lack of evidence, as the judge deemed the prosecution's case against Denard as circumstantial. The day after the assassination, Djohar took control of the country. Denard tried to prevent Djohar from assuming the presidency, but France, deployed military forces to peacefully remove Denard and his mercenaries from Comoros.<sup>837</sup> “An interim government led by Chief of the Supreme Court Mohammed Djohar orchestrated competitive elections in March 1990 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 20). LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

03/04/1990 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, presidential elections were held, followed by a second round on 03/11. Originally scheduled for January, the elections were delayed, leading to protests.<sup>838</sup> Elections

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<sup>837</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed\\_Abdallah#Assassination](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Abdallah#Assassination)

<sup>838</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990\\_Comorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Comorian_presidential_election)



were initially held on 02/18 but were invalidated due to severe fraud (Thibaut 1999: 244-245). Despite Mohamed Taki Abdoukarim from the opposition National Union for Democracy in the Comoros receiving the most votes in the first round, the incumbent President Said Mohamed Djohar of the Comorian Union for Progress emerged as the winner with 55% of the vote in the second round. These elections marked the first multi-party elections in the Comoros since gaining independence.<sup>839</sup> A National Constitutional Conference was established in beginning of 1992. More than 20 parties participated. The constitution was approved on 06/07/1992 via referendum. On 11/22 and 11/29/1992 parliamentary elections were held. They were considered free and fair, although irregularities led to the repetition of the election in five constituencies (Thibaut 1999: 245). The two major parties, Union for Progress and the National Union for Democracy in the Comoros, boycotted the elections, since the government had refused to update voting lists and to end the detention of major political figures.<sup>840</sup> On 06/18/1993 Djohar dissolved the parliament and called for new elections. The parliamentary elections on 12/12 and 12/20/1993 were characterized by organizational irregularities. Nearly all opposition parties boycotted the second round. Overall, this period was marked by unstable political conditions (Thibaut 1999: 245). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during this period are classified as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI classifies electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not clean. Per FH's evaluation for 1990, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1991 and 1992 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the rest of the regime period, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

09/28/1995 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: Bob Denard struck a fourth time, this time overthrowing the regime of President Said Djohar. Djohar was imprisoned by Denard and his band of mercenaries for several days.<sup>841</sup> Within a week of

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<sup>839</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990\\_Comorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Comorian_presidential_election)

<sup>840</sup> [http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2069\\_92.htm](http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2069_92.htm)

<sup>841</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Said\\_Mohamed\\_Djohar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Said_Mohamed_Djohar)

the coup, on 10/05/1995 a French military intervention averted the breakdown of the constitutional order (Thibaut 1999) and forced the removal of Abdoukarim, the interim president installed by Denard. Prime Minister El-Yachroutu became acting president from 10/05/1995 until the return of Djohar on 01/26/1996.<sup>842</sup> Djohar spent the meantime until his return in January 1996 in exile in Réunion (Thibaut 1999). We classify the whole period, including the coup attempt by Denard as Non-Electoral Transitional Regime, because Denard was not part of the military. His allegiance was not bound to one state, it rather shifted during his lifetime several times. During his coup attempt the constitutional order did not collapse. According to FH, for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties were still coded as absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present following V-Dem's PCLI. Therefore, we do not classify the coup period separately as military autocracy or no central authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

03/06/1996 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date presidential elections took place, followed by a second round on 03/16. Mohamed Taki Abdoukarim emerged as the victor, despite having come in second during the 1990 elections, where he had secured the highest number of votes in the first round. Abdoukarim had previously served as the acting President in October 1995, following a failed coup led by Bob Denard (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 74-75).<sup>843</sup> Soon after his inauguration he began to restructure the political system towards Islamic authoritarianism. On 04/12/1996 he dissolved the Federal Assembly. A committee was supposed to draft a new constitution. The opposition boycotted the committee (Thibaut 1999). Ratified through a referendum on 10/20/1996, the reform narrowed party eligibility to those winning a minimum of two seats on each island in parliamentary elections. Furthermore, it strengthened the President's influence in various areas, including government formation, the appointment of governors, and the removal of restrictions on re-election(Thibaut 1999). On 11/06/1998 after the death of Abdoukarim, he was succeeded by Interim President Tadjidine Ben Said Massounde. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During these three years, electoral competitiveness is assessed to be present by LIED: V-Dem's EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness to be somewhat

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<sup>842</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Comoros#1989%E2%80%931996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Comoros#1989%E2%80%931996)

<sup>843</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996\\_Comorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Comorian_presidential_election)

present while their CEI scores the elections as not really clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present per V-Dem's PCLI in this period. According to our observations the regime in this period is an electoral hybrid regime. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

04/30/1999 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Prime Minister Massoude decided to delay mandatory elections and was subsequently ousted in a military coup. General Assoumani chaired the government afterwards. On 12/23/2001 a new constitution was approved by referendum, creating the Union of Comoros.<sup>844</sup> In 1999, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Between 2000 and 2001, based on Polity5's evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the years 2000 and 2001, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2002, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Despite the classification as a military autocracy V-Dem's PCLI scores a somewhat presence of political liberties while LIED continues to code them as absent.

03/10/2002 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The initial presidential elections held under the new constitution took place on two dates, namely 03/10 and 04/14/2002. In the primary election held on 03/10 on Grande Comore Island, Azali Assoumani emerged as the top candidate out of a pool of nine contenders, securing 39.81% of the total votes. Mahamoud Mradabi and Saïd Ali Kemal also qualified for the second round by obtaining 15.69% and 10.68% of the votes, respectively. However, Mradabi and Kemal claimed that there

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<sup>844</sup> <https://www.rulers.org/rulc3.html#comoros>

were irregularities during the primary and opted to boycott the subsequent poll on 04/14. Consequently, Azali Assoumani secured around 80% of the votes as the only candidate, thereby winning the election.<sup>845</sup> First parliamentary elections under the new constitution were held on 04/18/2004.<sup>846</sup> On 11/07/2010 presidential elections were held. Dhoinine was elected with 61 percent of the vote on 12/26 in the candidate run-off. The opposition alleged fraud and called for protests. International observers described the polls as ‘generally free and fair’ but also cited irregularities in the balloting. Several high-level were involved in substantial corruption scandals leading to a cabinet reshuffle in 2013 (Lansford 2021:354). Protests broke out after the first round of the 2015 parliamentary elections and eight protesters were shot by police during the uprising. President Azali was re-elected in 2019 in elections not considered as free nor fair and was boycotted by the opposition. Moreover, international election monitors (including from the AU) reported that the contest was defined significant irregularities. Additionally, journalists continue to face harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests.<sup>847</sup> He won a fourth term in the January 2024 elections, which saw a turnout of 16% amid an opposition boycott.<sup>848</sup> During this latest regime period, we see a gradual decrease in scoring by LIED and V-Dem. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. While LIED categorized elections as competitive in 2006, they stopped doing so in 2018. V-Dems EF&FI score has continuously dropped from attesting to somewhat free and fair elections in 2003 to elections that are not free at all in 2019. Their CEI similarly dropped from ambiguous electoral cleanliness in 2003 to no cleanliness in 2019 and counting. As classified by FH for 2002 and 2003, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 2004 and 2005 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2006 a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 2007 Comoros receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Per FH, for the period between 2008 and 2017, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 2018 and 2019, it is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2020 onward the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties maintained to be coded as absent by LIED and as somewhat present according to V-Dem’s PCLI until 2019. From 2020

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<sup>845</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006\\_Comorian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Comorian_presidential_election)

<sup>846</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004\\_Comorian\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Comorian_legislative_election)

<sup>847</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/comoros/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>848</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68002934>

onward V-Dem's PCLI indicates political liberties as ambiguous. From 2002 to 2003, according to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. From 2004 to 2017, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. In 2018, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the years 2003 and 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2005, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the years 2006-2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the following two years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2015 and 2016, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2017-2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Since 2019, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2024 continued.

### **Congo-Brazzaville**

[officially known as the Republic of the Congo]

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Defective Democracy] [Start: 08/01/1886]: On 08/01/1886 the republic of the Congo became the Colony of Gabon and Congo. On 04/30/1891 it became the colony of French Congo (Middle Congo and Gabon). On 01/15/1910 Middle Congo, Gabon, and Oubangui-Chari-Tchad (from 1916 Oubangui-Chari and Chad) form French Equatorial Africa (AEF). From 01/30/1934 to 12/31/1937, the region is within unitary AEF colony. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative

elections were present until 1945. LIED classifies multiparty legislative elections as present after 1945. Universal male suffrage was introduced in 1957 (LIED). Political liberties were indicated as absent according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. Furthermore, it should be noted that both LIED and V-Dem begin collecting data for Congo-Brazzaville only in 1903. From 1903 to 1946, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. On 11/28/1958 autonomy was gained as Republic of the Congo.

08/15/1960 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Under the leadership of Youlou, the UDDIA government gained independence, winning 84% of seats with 58% of the vote in the last pre-independence election. However, gerrymandering and other manipulations and repressions carried out by the pre-independence Youlou government resulted in de facto single-party rule (Byers/Bourgoin 2003, Marshall 2018g, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 55). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections have been categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections at that time as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent per LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

08/15/1963 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Communist Ideocracy: The small army, led by mostly French officers and NCOs, withdrew support from the government and transferred power to Massamba-Debat, who had been the president of the National Assembly before President Youlou forced him to resign (Decalo 1976: 140, 147-148). Massamba-Débat began steering the country toward a socialist and one-party system. He promoted the formation of the National Revolutionary Movement (Mouvement National de la Révolution, MNR). In 1964 the MNR was declared the sole legal political party, effectively transforming the Republic of the Congo into a one-party state. Massamba-Débat's government adopted Marxist-Leninist ideologies, nationalized key industries, and centralized political power. According to LIED, only legislative elections were present, albeit inconsistently, and they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the

executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1964 to 1967, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1968, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For this period, political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI.

08/04/1968 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Military Autocracy: President Massamba-Debat was overthrown in a short-lived coup. Poignet was sworn in as an interim president for one day before Massamba-Debat was allowed to return to power.

09/04/1968 End Military Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: The civilian president Alphonse Massamba-Debat resigned. Prime Minister Alfred Raoul served as acting head of state until 12/31/1968, when the CNR formally became the country's supreme authority and Captain Marien Ngouabi, as head of the CNR, assumed the presidency, leaving control in the hands of Ngouabi, who had gradually taken control of the government and defeated paramilitary forces loyal to the president during the preceding two months (Decalo 1976: 152-155).<sup>849</sup> Upon assuming office, President Ngouabi renamed the nation as the People's Republic of the Congo, proclaiming it as Africa's inaugural Marxist–Leninist state. Additionally, he established the Congolese Workers' Party (Parti Congolais du Travail, PCT) as the exclusive legal political entity in the country.<sup>850</sup> According to LIED, only legislative elections were present, albeit inconsistently, and they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. Until 1978, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. Since 1979, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the year 1969, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1970-1972, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1973 to 1976, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were

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<sup>849</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Republic_of_the_Congo_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>850</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marien\\_Ngouabi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marien_Ngouabi)

absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1977 and 1978, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1979 to 1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the year 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1991, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this regime period.

02/25/1991 End Communist Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime: The National Conference declared its sovereignty, which Sassou-Nguesso accepted, but faced demonstrations and widespread popular opposition. Eventually, Sassou-Nguesso and the PCT agreed to a National Conference where the opposition had control. The Conference selected Andre Milongo, a former World Bank official, to lead the interim government that would oversee the transition to democracy (Clark 1994: 50-53, Clark 1997a: 68, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 55, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 21-22). For the time of transition, LIED classifies no multiparty executive or legislative elections as present. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates the political liberties as somewhat present, LIED still codes them as absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

07/19/1992 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Non-Party) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: The transition was completed with the victory of one of the opposition parties in the multi-party legislative and presidential elections held in June and July 1992 (Clark 1994: 50-53, Clark 1997a: 68, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 55, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 22). "The Pan-African Union for Social Democracy (UPADS) - led by Pascal Lissouba, who won the



presidential election - won a plurality of seats.<sup>851</sup> He formed a government in coalition with the PCT. The third political force (Mouvement Congolais pour la Démocratie et le Développement Intégral, MCDDI) formed a oppositional coalition (Union for Democratic Renewal, URD) under the leadership of Bernard Kolélas (Fleischhacker 1999).<sup>852</sup> Even with organizational challenges and delays, the transition process led to what seemed like a peaceful transfer of power. However, shortly after the installation of the new government, its fresh institutions became gridlocked due to conflicting elite interests (Fleischhacker 1999). Essentially the political sphere was a tripolar system, consisting of MCDDI with the URD, UPADS and PCT. These parties were fundamentally opposed, and each aimed for supremacy. Because of a conflict about minister posts, the PCT joined the URD and therefore formed an anti-government coalition, which nominated its own Prime Minister. This conflict resulted in the dissolution of the National Assembly and new parliamentary elections in June 1993. The military was forced to intervene, to force the parties to build a national unity government in the meantime (Fleischhacker 1999). On 05/02 and 06/03/ 1993 parliamentary elections were held. The first round resulted in a victory for the UPADS and Pascal Lissouba. The opposition boycotted the second round and raised allegations of electoral fraud. The first Brazzaville-Congolese Civil War, which lasted from 11/02/1993 till 01/30/1994, broke out because of these unresolved claims of fraud.<sup>853</sup> The groundwork for a peaceful resolution was later established through the selective conduct of new elections, designed to rectify the shortcomings of the 1993 elections (Fleischhacker 1999). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections for this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Per FH, for 1992 and 1993, the country scores between 6 and 7, is categorized by FH as partly free, we interpret the total score as rather free. For the rest of the regime period, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Until 1996, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1997, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the

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<sup>851</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Republic_of_the_Congo_parliamentary_election)

<sup>852</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Republic_of_the_Congo_parliamentary_election);  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union\\_for\\_Democratic\\_Renewal\\_\(Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_Democratic_Renewal_(Republic_of_the_Congo))

<sup>853</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1993%E2%80%931994\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_the_Congo_Civil_War_(1993%E2%80%931994))

executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Due to the severe deficits in the electoral process, which even resulted in violence, we classify this period as electoral autocracy.

10/14/1997 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: Insurgents led by former president Sassou-Nguesso, who represented northern ethnic groups, succeeded in overthrowing a civilian government headed by Pascal Lissouba, with the backing of southern ethnic groups (French 1997, Bazenguissa-Ganga 1998, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 55). The militias launched a civil war against the regime. Shortly thereafter Nguesso declared himself president. Although Lissouba fled and Nguesso consolidated, fighting persisted for several years. Sassou-Nguesso named a new, broadly representative transitional government but abolished the position of prime minister and initially reserved the defense portfolio for himself (Lansford 2021: 377). From 01/05 to 01/14/1998, the government organized the National Forum for Reconciliation, Unity, Democracy, and the Reconstruction of the Congo. Over 1,400 participants attended the forum, although a majority of them were affiliated with parties or organizations associated with the FDU. The forum approved a "flexible" three-year transition plan towards democracy, which involved the drafting of a new constitution and conducting a national constitutional referendum. Subsequently, presidential and legislative elections were set to take place after this transition period (Lansford 2021:377). On 12/25/1999 peace agreements were signed under the auspices of President Omar Bongo of Gabon, ending the civil war, leaving 8.000-10.000 dead, around 800.000 displaced persons and a devastated country.<sup>854</sup> Some areas of the country were still under militia control, in January 2001 the government announced a "non-exclusive national dialogue" on a draft constitution, the peace plan, and national reconstruction. A constitutional draft was prepared and approved by the National Transition Council in September. The new basic law, which retained a strong presidency and a bicameral parliament, was endorsed by 84 percent of the voters in a public referendum on 01/20/2002 (Lansford 2021: 378). We classify this period as non-electoral transitional (multiparty) regime because the government of Sassou-Nguesso and the National Transition Council, which replaced an elected legislature, were formed without an electoral process. This period only ended with the presidential elections in 2002. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period.

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_Civil\\_War\\_\(1997%E2%80%931999\)#:~:text=The%20elections%20concluded%20with%20Pan,PCT\)%20Sassou%20Nguesso%20running%20third](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_the_Congo_Civil_War_(1997%E2%80%931999)#:~:text=The%20elections%20concluded%20with%20Pan,PCT)%20Sassou%20Nguesso%20running%20third)

According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH for the regime period until 1999, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. From 2000 onward the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Furthermore, political liberties continued to be coded as absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI decreased into a range which indicates that political liberties were not really present.

03/10/2002 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Presidential elections on this date mark the end of the transition period. Sassou-Nguesso, was elected for a seven-year term in the first presidential elections after the second civil war with low opposition participation. He gained 89.4 percent of the vote. Parliamentary elections were held on 05/26 and 06/20/2002 during which the president's PCT and the allied FDU won 83 seats, while indirect elections for the 66-seat Senate on 07/11 produced an even greater majority for the government (Lansford 2021:378). Serious irregularities were reported by the EU Election Observation Mission but did not impact the result.<sup>855</sup> Sassou-Nguesso was re-elected in 2009, 2016 and 2021, although he exhausted the two-term limit imposed by the previous constitution. However, a new constitution passed by referendum in 2015 allowed him to stand for re-election. Sassou-Nguesso now holds office for nearly 40 years based on repression of opposition. The recent elections on 03/21/2021 saw a boycott from an opposition group, voter intimidation and shutdown of the internet.<sup>856</sup> In 2024 a report by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index noted rampant corruption, commonplace repression of dissenters and a general lack of economic development. Poverty is continually increasing, now impacting over half the population despite economic growth in the oil-sector, on which the republic of Congo is largely dependent. The government has largely failed to provide basic needs and liberties to its people.<sup>857</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this regime period, LIED classifies any election as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair. Their CEI scores them as not clean. Per FH's evaluation for the regime period from

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_presidential\\_election#:~:text=Elected%20President&text=Sassou%20Nguesso%2C%20standing%20as%20the,a%20field%20of%20minor%20challengers.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Republic_of_the_Congo_presidential_election#:~:text=Elected%20President&text=Sassou%20Nguesso%2C%20standing%20as%20the,a%20field%20of%20minor%20challengers.)

<sup>856</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/republic-congo/freedom-world/2022>

<sup>857</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/COG>

2002 to 2005, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 2006 onward the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were coded as absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For 2003-2019, and for 2021-2022, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Bernault 1996, Decalo 1998)

**Cote D'Ivoire:** see **Ivory Coast**

### **Congo-Kinshasa**

[officially known as the Democratic Republic of Congo; formerly known as Zaire (1971 to 1997)]

01/01/1900 Autocratic Monarchy [Start: 02/26/1885]: On 02/26/1885, the Berlin Conference recognized the sovereignty and independence of the International Association of the Congo (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974, Oppenheim/Roxburgh 1920). Later in the same year, Belgian King Léopold II became head of the Congo Free State as sovereign and declared it neutral (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). Since in this period Congo-Kinshasa was directly ruled by Belgian King Léopold II in an absolutist manner we classify it as an autocratic monarchy – of the worst kind - and not a colony of Belgium. Since the whole territory was treated as a personal property it is an extreme case of an absolutist monarchy.<sup>858</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political liberties are

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<sup>858</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Free\\_State](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Free_State)

considered as not present by LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. From 1900 to 1903, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the year 1904, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1905 to 1907, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1908, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

11/15/1908 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Belgium, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this date, the Congo Free State was annexed by Belgium and became the Belgian Congo (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). The Congo Free State was merged by cession into Belgium and thus lost its status as a sovereign and independent member of the Family of Nations (Oppenheim/Roxburgh 1920). Multiparty executive and legislative elections were absent during this period per LIED. In 1957, universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). The Belgo-Congolese Round Table Conference held in January 1960 decided on a provisional constitution, the Loi Fondamentale. It implemented a federalist parliamentary system led by a strong dual executive, but it faltered in adequately delineating the roles of the President and Prime Minister (Schmidt/Stroux 1999).<sup>859</sup> On 05/22/1960, in order to create a government to rule the country following independence as the Republic of the Congo, general elections were held. The formal electoral campaign commenced on 05/11, overshadowed by chaos and acts of violence. Competing parties utilized tactics ranging from intimidation and sabotage of opponents' headquarters to outright murder. Such coercion was particularly rampant in regions heavily influenced by militant factions aligned with various parties.<sup>860</sup> The Mouvement National Congolais – Lumumba (MNC-L) won the majority of seats in Parliament. Patrice Émery Lumumba was confirmed as Prime Minister. Additionally, a senate was set up. The two chambers elected Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President.<sup>861</sup> This duality led to conflict between the conservative Kasa-Vubu and the leftist Prime Minister Lumumba.<sup>862</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Political

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<sup>859</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960\\_Belgian\\_Congo\\_general\\_election#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960_Belgian_Congo_general_election#)

<sup>860</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960\\_Belgian\\_Congo\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960_Belgian_Congo_general_election)

<sup>861</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960\\_Belgian\\_Congo\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960_Belgian_Congo_general_election)

<sup>862</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph\\_Kasa-Vubu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Kasa-Vubu)

liberties were absent for this period according to LIED and V-Dem's PCLI. For the year 1909, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

06/30/1960 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Belgium, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, the Belgian Congo gained independence as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Crawford 2006: 56-57). The coalition government led by Lumumba, which was elected in May of the same year, assumed power.<sup>863</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive (LIED). Moreover, no real cleanliness was achieved. Whereas V-Dem's EF&FI declares the election as free and fair. Joseph Kasa-Vubu became president. Lumumba was the leader of the Congolese National Movement (MNC), Kasa-Vubu represented Abako (Alliance des Ba-Kongo). On 07/05/1960, soldiers began to mutiny against their white commanders. The insurrection spread across the country. This marked the beginning of the so-called Congo Crisis.<sup>864</sup> On 07/11/1960, the wealthy Katanga province declared its independence from the Republic of the Congo, followed in August by South Kasai province.<sup>865</sup> Shortly after Belgium's departure from Congo, the government collapsed. On 07/15/1960, UN troops arrived in the country. The UN sent a mission to the Congo in order to fill the power vacuum. It took over administrative prerogatives in the Congo between 1960 and 1964 (Wilde 2001). Patrice Lumumba appealed for Soviet support. This led to a political split within the government. On 09/05/1960, Kasa-Vubu announced to the public that he had unilaterally dismissed Lumumba. The latter was not able to gather support for a dismissal of Kasa-Vubu, initiating a constitutional deadlock.<sup>866</sup> Political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous by V-Dem's PCLI.

09/14/1960 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a bloodless military coup led by Colonel Joseph Mobutu ousted Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to overcome the political deadlock (Lemarchand 1993, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 55). He initially replaced both Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu with a College of Commissioners-General.

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<sup>863</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrice\\_Lumumba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrice_Lumumba)

<sup>864</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#)

<sup>865</sup> <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/congo-decolonization>

<sup>866</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Political\\_disintegration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Political_disintegration)

Lumumba was put under house arrest and Kasa-Vubu resumed office in February 1961.<sup>867</sup> Over the ensuing five-year period, Kasa-Vubu presided over a series of ineffectual administrations.<sup>868</sup> Lumumba escaped house arrest and fled to Stanleyville where he hoped to rally support. He was captured on 12/01/1960.<sup>869</sup> For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

02/09/1961 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: The Soviets proposed a resolution to the UN Security Council demanding Lumumba's immediate release. The resolution failed on 12/14/1960. Lumumba was tortured and ultimately handed over to Katangese forces by whom he was executed near Élisabethville on 01/17/1961.<sup>870</sup> Due to an escalation of the situation in the Southern Provinces, the UN occupied South Kasai in April 1962. On 10/05/1962, government troops arrived in Bakwanga after a coup and helped end the South Kasai secession. On 12/24/1962, UN troops and the Katangese Gendarmerie clashed in Élisabethville. After a month of fighting, Tshombe surrendered on 01/17/1963 marking the end of the Katangese secession.<sup>871</sup> An attempt at political reconciliation followed the end of the Katangese secession. Negotiations culminated in the Luluabourg Constitution which elevated the powers of the president and ended the joint consultations between the president and the prime minister. Additionally, it increased the autonomy of the newly defined 21 provinces.<sup>872</sup> At the same time, political opposition was forming from exile in the neighboring Congo – Brazzaville. On 10/03/1963, the Comité National de Libération (CNL) was founded by Christophe Gbenye and Gaston Soumaliot, both exiled Lumumbists.<sup>873</sup> This marked the beginning of the Simba Rebellion. Soumaliot's army invaded South Kivu in late 1963 and took Uvira on 05/15/1964 with Fizi following shortly after. Additionally, Gbenye's forces were taking over in the North and a third rebel group, independent of Gbenye and Soumaliot, was revolting in Northern Katanga. By late 1964, the rebels had taken control of most of the North-Eastern territory.<sup>874</sup> They founded a rival socialist state named People's Republic of the Congo with a government in Stanleyville. Gbenye became President of the new State which was

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<sup>867</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Killing\\_of\\_Lumumba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Killing_of_Lumumba)

<sup>868</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph\\_Kasa-Vubu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Kasa-Vubu)

<sup>869</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Killing\\_of\\_Lumumba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Killing_of_Lumumba)

<sup>870</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Killing\\_of\\_Lumumba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Killing_of_Lumumba)

<sup>871</sup>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#United\\_Nations\\_escalation\\_and\\_the\\_end\\_of\\_the\\_Katangese\\_secession](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#United_Nations_escalation_and_the_end_of_the_Katangese_secession)

<sup>872</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luluabourg\\_Constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luluabourg_Constitution)

<sup>873</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simba\\_rebellion#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simba_rebellion#)

<sup>874</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simba\\_rebellion#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simba_rebellion#)

supported among others by China, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Tanzania.<sup>875</sup> Parallely, the new Luluabourg Constitution was approved in a constitutional referendum which ended on 07/10/1964. As a consequence, the country's name was changed to Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>876</sup> Kasa-Vubu appointed Tshombe as interim prime minister. The parliament was dissolved, and new elections were scheduled for 03/10/1965.<sup>877</sup> The rebels began to face local resistance and by the end of August 1964 they were losing territory to the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC). Tshombe engaged several mercenaries which were backed by the CIA. As a last attempt at remaining in control, the rebels held the remaining white population of Stanleyville hostage in November 1964. Within the framework of Operation Dragon Rouge, Belgian paratroops landed in Stanleyville on 11/24/1964 and quickly retrieved the hostages. Nevertheless, around 70 hostages and 1000 Congolese civilians were killed during the operation. While the aim of the paratroopers was not to drive the rebels out of Stanleyville, the intervention broke the last stronghold of the rebels. The leaders of the Simba Rebellion went into exile. Belgium was accused of neocolonialism in light of the intervention. Tshombe lost the support of Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu and was dismissed in October 1965.<sup>878</sup> Meanwhile elections had been held between 03/18/1965 and 04/30/1965.<sup>879</sup> Tshombe's party, the Convention Nationale Congolaise (CONACO) won the majority of the seats but many of the members soon formed the Front Démocratique Congolais (FDC). This put the government and parliament in a political deadlock.<sup>880</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive (LIED) and no real cleanliness was given (V-Dem CEI). However, according to V-Dem's EF&FI somewhat free and fair election conditions were provided. The regime in this period is classified as an electoral autocracy, as it is a continuation of the post-independence period. President Kasa-Vubu, legitimized by elections, held office with various unstable governments until 1965. Political liberties were still coded as absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. For the year 1962, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. From 1963 to 1964, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is

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<sup>875</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Kwilu\\_and\\_Simba\\_rebellions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Kwilu_and_Simba_rebellions)

<sup>876</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Attempted\\_political\\_reconciliation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Attempted_political_reconciliation)

<sup>877</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Attempted\\_political\\_reconciliation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Attempted_political_reconciliation)

<sup>878</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Suppression\\_and\\_Belgian\\_and\\_American\\_intervention](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Suppression_and_Belgian_and_American_intervention)

<sup>879</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election)

<sup>880</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Second\\_Mobutu\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Second_Mobutu_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)



classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1965, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

11/24/1965 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, commander of the armed forces Major General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, who named himself Mobutu Sese Seko, dissolved the civilian regime and proclaimed himself president of the Second Republic (Lansford 2021: 361). The bloodless coup was an attempt to overcome the political deadlock which had established itself after the 1965 elections. Mobutu installed a "régime d'exception" amounting to a state of emergency, declaring that democracy would return after five years.<sup>881</sup> Following the coup in 1965, the regime established by Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) was not characterized by a traditional military junta where power is shared among several high-ranking military officers. Instead, Mobutu, as the major general of the armed forces, centralized power around himself and maintained direct control over the government. Mobutu's regime was from the coup on more of a personalist autocracy rather than a collective military rule. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Regarding the political liberties, they continued to be coded as absent according to LIED.

V-Dem's PCLI classification fluctuates between what we interpret as not really present and as absent for this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1966, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while for the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent.

05/20/1967 End Military Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, General Mobutu Sese Seko founded the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR).<sup>882</sup> From the moment of its foundation, it was established as the de facto sole political party. Between 06/04/1967 and 06/16/1967, a constitutional referendum was held to adopt a new constitution proposed by Mobutu which was approved by 97.8% of voters.<sup>883</sup> It included the centralization of all power onto the president, the abolition of the limit on presidential terms and limited the number of

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<sup>881</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo\\_Crisis#Second\\_Mobutu\\_coup\\_d'%C3%A9tatia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congo_Crisis#Second_Mobutu_coup_d'%C3%A9tatia)

<sup>882</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular\\_Movement\\_of\\_the\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Movement_of_the_Revolution)

<sup>883</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1967_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_constitutional_referendum)

political parties to two.<sup>884</sup> The MPR was the only party allowed to nominate candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections held in November 1970. The party had no real ideology other than support for Mobutu. As such, it disappeared in short order when Mobutu was overthrown by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 1997, during the First Congo War.<sup>885</sup> This is why this period is coded as a personalist rather than a one-party autocracy. Mobutu dominated Zaire's political life and claimed the title "father of the nation". He adopted a policy of "authenticité" which aimed at a "Zaireanization" of the country and required all Zairians to adopt "authentic names". Mobutu renamed himself as Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga which translates roughly to "the all-conquering warrior who goes from triumph to triumph."<sup>886</sup> In 1971, Mobutu changed the name of the country to Republic of Zaire, Zaire being the original name of the Congo River which had changed over time and translation into English.<sup>887</sup> The new constitution of Zaire was promulgated on 08/15/1974. It solidified Mobutu's dictatorial control over the country and codified the MPR as the only legal party in the country. Mobutism was made state ideology and state power was defined as an extension of Mobutu's power.<sup>888</sup> The late 1970s were marked by invasions and battles with communist Katangese guerilla forces. While Zaire remained a one-party state during the 1980s, opposition was beginning to become more active.<sup>889</sup> It has to be noted that we only code regimes as personalist autocracies if the ruler has (almost) no constraints. This means "unlimited authority" in terms of Polity5. Until the 1990s, there is no doubt that this was the case during Mobutu's rule. However, Mobutu faced popular unrest and discontent in the population in 1990 that led him to announce an end to the one-party system and promise the introduction of a multi-party system which, however, was suspended for a substantial period. Unrest in the population led to a confrontation at the University of Lubumbashi on 05/11/1990, during which more than 50 student protesters were reportedly killed (Knutsen/Nygård 2015, Lansford 2021: 361-362). Within a year, Zaire saw the rise of over 100 parties, split into three main groups: the Mobutu bloc, led by the MPR; the anti-Mobutu bloc, led by UDPS, UFERI, and PDSC; and various smaller parties without clear stances. The anti-Mobutu coalition pushed for a National Conference, forming the Union Sacrée in July 1991. The Conference, led by Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, became the battleground between Mobutu's camp and the opposition. Etienne Tshisekedi of UDPS

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<sup>884</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaire#Constitutional\\_changes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaire#Constitutional_changes)

<sup>885</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu\\_Sese\\_Seko#Second\\_coup\\_and\\_consolidation\\_of\\_power;](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu_Sese_Seko#Second_coup_and_consolidation_of_power;)  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular\\_Movement\\_of\\_the\\_Revolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Movement_of_the_Revolution)

<sup>886</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaire#Mobutu>

<sup>887</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaire#Etymology>

<sup>888</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\\_of\\_Zaire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Zaire)

<sup>889</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaire#Growing\\_conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaire#Growing_conflict)

becoming Prime Minister in August 1992 marked a step toward democratization. A transitional constitution was adopted, limiting the President's powers and reinforcing human rights. However, Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi's government illegally in December 1992, maintaining control through a mix of reforms and repression. In 1993, political deadlock led to duplicated institutions. Eventually, negotiations merged the parliaments into the HCR-PT, dominated by pro-Mobutu forces. An interim constitution in April 1994 allowed Mobutu to remain in power. With French support, Kengo wa Dondo became Prime Minister in June 1994 as a compromise candidate (Schmidt/Stroux 1999). These last years of Mobutu's presidency can therefore no longer be clearly classified as personalist, and yet no reclassification is possible. There were still no multi-party or multi-candidate elections, Mobutu retained power despite the onset of transformative processes and could ultimately only be deposed by force in the course of the First Congo War. On 10/29/1996, Kinshasa declared a state of emergency in North and South Kivu as theretofore sporadic firefights between Rwandan and Zairean regular forces escalated into intense cross-border shelling (Lansford 2021: 363). Starting from the eastern region of Zaire, rebels, with assistance from foreign government forces led by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Rwandan Minister of Defense Paul Kagame, initiated an attack with the aim of ousting Mobutu from power. They joined forces with local individuals who opposed Mobutu, rallying behind Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and together they advanced westward toward Kinshasa. The rebellion gained momentum and received support from Burundi and Angola, eventually evolving into the First Congo War.<sup>890</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were present until 1970. From 1970 onwards LIED lists both executive and legislative elections as present, but they were not categorized as multiparty. While i.e. there were legislative elections in 1970, there was only one listed party and elections were tightly controlled. From 1967 to 1991, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, LIED codes political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as absent until 1990 and as not really present from 1991 to 1997.

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<sup>890</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu\\_Sese\\_Seko#Second\\_coup\\_and\\_consolidation\\_of\\_power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobutu_Sese_Seko#Second_coup_and_consolidation_of_power)

05/17/1997 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On 05/23/1997, Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kabila took the presidential oath of office on 05/17/1997, his forces known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), proclaimed victory against Mobutu on 05/29/1997. He announced that there would be a delay of two years before elections, stating that it would require at least that amount of time for him to establish order.<sup>891</sup> Therefore, he promised a referendum on a new constitution by the end of 1998 and new legislative and presidential elections by April 1999. Throughout his tenure, Kabila wielded both executive and legislative authority through the Alliance of Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire coalition.<sup>892</sup> On 08/02/1998, a rebellion broke out among the Banyamulenge community in Goma.<sup>893</sup> A cease-fire agreement was signed in July 1999, but renewed fighting quickly broke out between the RCD factions. Kabila was shot on 01/16/2001 and on 01/24/2001 Kabila's son, Major General Joseph Kabila, former chief of staff, was selected by the transitional legislature installed by Laurent Kabila in August 2000 to succeed his father (Lansford 2021: 364). UN peacekeepers (MONUSCO) were deployed by the UNSC. On 04/07/2003, Joseph Kabila was sworn in as transitional president.<sup>894</sup> By June 2003 all foreign armies except those of Rwanda had pulled out of Congo. A transitional government was set up until after the election. On 05/05/2005, the transitional legislature approved the draft of a new constitution (Lansford 2021: 365). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED still codes no presence of political liberties. Following V-Dem's PCLI the scores indicate a not really presence until 2001 before they increased towards an ambiguous level. From 1998 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. From 2000 to 2006, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

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<sup>891</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurent-D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9\\_Kabila#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurent-D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9_Kabila#)

<sup>892</sup> <https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/freehou/1999/en/95272>

<sup>893</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Congo\\_War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Congo_War)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional\\_Government\\_of\\_the\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo#:~:text=On%20July%2017%202003%2C%20the,sweating%20allegiance%20to%20President%20Joseph](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transitional_Government_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo#:~:text=On%20July%2017%202003%2C%20the,sweating%20allegiance%20to%20President%20Joseph)

07/30/2006 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the first round of presidential elections as well as the parliamentary elections took place. These were the first in 41 years after the overthrow of Mobuto. The elections themselves were relatively peaceful, however, chaos regarding the results led to armed clashes.<sup>895</sup> On 10/29/2006, run-off presidential elections were held after no candidate had been able to secure a majority in the first round.<sup>896</sup> International Observers described the elections as generally “free and fair” (Lansford 2021: 365). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the election as not competitive. According to V-Dem no cleanliness was given, but V-Dem’s EF&FI declares ambiguous election conditions. Joseph Kabila emerged victorious from the run-off election, but these results were rejected by Bemba. The Supreme Court declared the result to be rightful on 11/27/2006.<sup>897</sup> There were deficits not only in the electoral process but also in the guarantee of political and civil liberties during the first term of Kabila.<sup>898</sup> Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties were coded as absent per LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI scores political liberties as ambiguous with the exception of 2019 and 2020 for which political liberties indicated as somewhat present. On 11/28/2011, general elections were held amid widespread violence (Lansford 2021: 365). International Observers raised concerns about the transparency of the elections.<sup>899</sup> Election laws were changed by the government to prevent a facultative run-off which should have taken place on 02/26/2012. According to the constitution, no more than two presidential terms were allowed. Elections for Kabila’s successor were originally scheduled for 11/27/2016. When Kabila announced that a national census was needed to determine the number of voters before an election could be held, violent protests broke out on 09/19/2016. On 12/23/2016, an agreement was reached between Kabila and the opposition according to which Kabila would leave office before the end of 2017 and would not alter the constitution. The opposition would appoint the prime minister and the implementation of the deal would be overseen by opposition-leader Étienne Tshisekedi. On 12/30/2018, elections finally took place. Officially, Félix Tshisekedi won the election with 38.56% of the vote. However, Martin Fayulu claimed the results to be fraudulent. The Catholic

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<sup>895</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election)

<sup>896</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_general\\_election#Supreme\\_Court\\_decision](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election#Supreme_Court_decision)

<sup>898</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100475.htm>

<sup>899</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election)

Church, the SADC and the African Union agreed, that they believed Fayulu to be the winner of the election. According to a large-scale investigation by the Financial Times and Radio France Internationale, a revision of 86% of the votes revealed a win for Fayulu at 59.4%. Fayulu subsequently filed a court case with the Constitutional Court on 01/12/2019. On 01/19/2019, the court rejected Fayulu's claim. Tshisekedi was inaugurated on 01/24/2019.<sup>900</sup> He gradually managed to oust the last Kabila supporters from the government. General elections in December 2023 were won by incumbent Tshisekedi. Election observers claimed the procedure to be marred by irregularities and procedural problems and the EU observation mission was cancelled due to security risks. According to Reuters, the EU long-distance observation mission was met by raising numerous problems that hampered their efforts and transparency.<sup>901</sup> Repression, manipulation, corruption, and violence remain prevalent.<sup>902</sup> In addition to that, LIED considers the elections as not competitive since 2011. No real cleanliness was scored in 2011 and 2021. The remaining years are characterized by no clean elections (V-Dem CEI). During the entire time ambiguous election conditions are scored according to V-Dem EF&FI. From 2006 to 2015, according to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Between 2016 and 2018, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. From 2007 to 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the year 2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Clark 1997b, Crawford 2006, Decalo 1990b, Fleischhacker 1999, Ikambana 2007, Lansford 2021, Lemarchand 1993, Leslie 1993, Meditz/Merrill 1993, Oppenheim/Roxburgh 1920, Reyntjens 2009, Schmidt/Stroux 1999, Wilde 2001, Wrong 2000, Willoughby/Fenwick 1974, Zagel 2010)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018\\_Democratic\\_Republic\\_of\\_the\\_Congo\\_general\\_election#Constitutional\\_Court\\_appeal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_general_election#Constitutional_Court_appeal)

<sup>901</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-cancels-congo-election-observation-mission-2023-11-29/>

<sup>902</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/democratic-republic-congo/freedom-world/2024>

## Cook Islands

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy] [Start: xx/xx/1890]: The Cook Islands derive their name from Captain James Cook, who explored the islands in 1773 and 1777. However, the first European to reach the islands was the Spanish navigator Alvaro de Mendaña in 1595. The Cook Islands aligned with the United Kingdom in 1890, primarily due to concerns among British residents that France might occupy the islands, similar to its control over Tahiti.<sup>903</sup> Following some encouragement from New Zealand, leaders of the largest islands submitted a request for annexation, a process that was carried out in 1901.<sup>904</sup>

10/09/1900 End (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [as Protectorate of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Part of Other Country [United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy]: On the 8th and 9th of October 1900, seven documents of cession concerning Rarotonga and other islands were signed by their chiefs and residents. Simultaneously, a British proclamation acknowledged the cessions, officially declaring these islands as integral parts of Her Britannic Majesty's. Despite the inhabitants considering themselves British subjects, the Crown's title was uncertain, leading to the formal annexation of the island through a Proclamation dated 10/09/1900.<sup>905</sup>

06/11/1901 Continuation Part of Other Country [United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy as Part of Colony of New Zealand]: In 1901, through an Order in Council under the United Kingdom's Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895, the islands were incorporated into the Colony of New Zealand. This boundary adjustment took effect on 06/11/1901, establishing a formal relationship between the Cook Islands and New Zealand that has persisted since that time.<sup>906</sup>

09/26/1907 Continuation Part of Other Country [New Zealand, (Monarchical) Democracy]: On this date, New Zealand was granted nominal independence shifting into a dominion status (Yates 2014). Upon the implementation of the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 on 01/01/1949, Cook Islanders who held British subject status were automatically conferred New Zealand citizenship. The islands retained their status as a New Zealand

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<sup>903</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cook\\_Islands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cook_Islands)

<sup>904</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cook-Islands/History>

<sup>905</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cook\\_Islands#British\\_protectorate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cook_Islands#British_protectorate)

<sup>906</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cook\\_Islands#British\\_protectorate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cook_Islands#British_protectorate)

dependent territory until the decision by the New Zealand Government to bestow upon them the status of self-governance.<sup>907</sup>

08/04/1965 End Part of Other Country [New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of New Zealand, (Monarchical) Liberal Democracy]: In 1962, New Zealand presented the Cook Islands legislature with four choices for their future: independence, self-government, integration into New Zealand, or integration into a broader Polynesian federation. The legislature opted for self-government.<sup>908</sup> A constitution was officially proclaimed on 08/04/1965.<sup>909</sup> After the elections in 1965, the Cook Islands evolved into a self-governing territory in a free association with New Zealand. This arrangement granted the Cook Islands political independence while officially maintaining New Zealand sovereignty over them. The United Nations endorsed this political transition.<sup>910</sup> The Cook Islands operate as a representative democracy with a parliamentary system, maintaining an associated state relationship with New Zealand. Executive authority is wielded by the government, led by the Prime Minister. Legislative power is shared between the government and the Cook Islands Parliament. Despite being officially unicameral, the country effectively has two legislative bodies, with the House of Ariki serving as a de facto upper house. The political landscape features a multi-party system, and the judiciary operates independently of both the executive and legislative branches. The head of state is the monarch of New Zealand, which means de facto the monarch of the United Kingdom, represented in the Cook Islands by the King's Representative.<sup>911</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not list the Cook Islands.

(Monarchical) Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Costa Rica**

01/01/1900 Electoral Oligarchy [Start: 02/16/1902]: On 09/15/1821 Costa Rica declared independence from Spain and on 11/15/1838 Costa Rica achieved independence from Federal Republic of Central America (Marshall 2018h). The 1901-1902 Costa Rican general election occurred under growing political tensions. The authoritarian government of Rafael Yglesias was in direct confrontation with the opposition and had re-elected himself as single candidate

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<sup>907</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cook\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cook_Islands#History)

<sup>908</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cook\\_Islands#Recent\\_history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cook_Islands#Recent_history)

<sup>909</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cook\\_Islands#History](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cook_Islands#History)

<sup>910</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Cook\\_Islands#Recent\\_history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Cook_Islands#Recent_history)

<sup>911</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cook\\_Islands#Politics\\_and\\_foreign\\_relations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cook_Islands#Politics_and_foreign_relations)



in the previous election by a questionable constitutional reform. The liberal Republican Party represented the staunchest opposition, and the country was on the edge of civil war. However, Yglesias managed to negotiate with the moderate branch of the Republicans for a peaceful power exchange.<sup>912</sup> The next general elections were held on 04/01/1906. During this period, elections in Costa Rica were conducted indirectly. Initially, only male citizens who met certain criteria, such as income and literacy, were eligible to vote, resulting in approximately 60% of the male population being able to participate. These first-round voters selected Electors who had additional requirements, including property ownership or higher education, indicating a predominantly middle to high-class composition. The Electors then elected the President, members of Congress, and municipal authorities. However, this system allowed for pressure to be exerted on Electors to change their intended candidate. In one instance, after the initial round of voting, Fernández and Soto endorsed Zuñiga as the preferred option against González. In response, Ibarra, citing reasons of "public order," implemented martial law and exiled Fernández, Soto, and Zuñiga, who found themselves in New York. Eventually, after González was declared the president, they were permitted to return, although Zuñiga retired from politics.<sup>913</sup> The 1910 Costa Rican general election was held during the presidency of Cleto González Víquez on 04/07. This was the last time that indirect elections were held in Costa Rica as for the next one in 1913 the direct vote was implemented. Liberal lawyer Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno was elected for the first time (he will be re-elected two more times, the only person in Costa Rica's history who has been democratically elected three times). Jiménez was very popular in part because of his struggles against the United Fruit Company's abusive operations in the country. Jiménez was proclaimed candidate in the Teatro Variedades during the first Republican National Convention, Costa Rica's first primary election. Jiménez won easily over the other candidate, former president Rafael Yglesias who ruled an authoritarian, though short-lived, regime.<sup>914</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as first being somewhat and then of ambiguous freedom and fairness and not really clean. Political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present by V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the years 1901

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<sup>912</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901%E2%80%931902\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1901%E2%80%931902_Costa_Rican_general_election)

<sup>913</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1906\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1906_Costa_Rican_general_election)

<sup>914</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1909%E2%80%931910\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1909%E2%80%931910_Costa_Rican_general_election)

and 1902, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

05/08/1914 End Electoral Oligarchy/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On the 12/07/1913 general elections were held (women were not allowed to vote), the first elections since 1844.<sup>915</sup> They were also the first elections to have universal male suffrage, after economic and educational requirements were eliminated.<sup>916</sup> The congress selected Alfredo González as president.<sup>917</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections during this time as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For 1915 and 1916, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the year 1917, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

01/27/1917 End (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: The minister of war Federico Tinoco Granados organized with his brother the army commander José Joaquín Tinoco a military coup against González and took over power (McIlwraith 1917).<sup>918</sup> He was ruling Costa Rica in a violent way; to legitimize himself, elections were held in which oppositional candidates could not be voted for (Marshall 2018h).<sup>919</sup> On 08/12/1919, following the assassination of his brother, Tinoco sought refuge in exile, and an interim government organized elections that marked a significant shift towards the restoration of democracy (Lentz 1999: 108, Lehoucq/Molina Jiménez 2002: 89-90, Casey et al. 2020: 4). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on

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<sup>915</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfredo\\_Gonz%C3%A1lez\\_Flores](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfredo_Gonz%C3%A1lez_Flores)

<sup>916</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1913\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1913_Costa_Rican_general_election)

<sup>917</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1913\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election#cite\\_note-2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1913_Costa_Rican_general_election#cite_note-2)

<sup>918</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1917\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1917_Costa_Rican_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>919</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship\\_of\\_the\\_Tinoco\\_brothers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_of_the_Tinoco_brothers)

decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present, while LIED continues to classify them as absent.

07/17/1919 End Military Autocracy/Start (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, Costa Rica held general elections. Julio Acosta García from the Constitutional Party emerged as the winner in the presidential election, and his party secured a victory in the parliamentary election with 74.9% of the vote.<sup>920</sup> General elections took place in 1923, 1928, 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944 and 1948. Although elections were held regularly suffrage was restricted. Women, Afro-descendants and illiterates obtained the right to vote only in 1948. After losing the popular election on 04/25/1948, candidate Rafael Ángel Calderón supporters sparked a constitutional crisis by refusing to validate the presidential election of Otilio Ulate Blanco. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores elections during this time as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate until 1939 and in 1948, and robust during the remainder of this regime period.

03/12/1948 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start No Central Authority: On this date a civil war ensued, which removed Picado from effective power, although technically he completed his term abroad.<sup>921</sup>

04/24/1948 End No Central Authority/Start Military (Transitional) Autocracy: On this date the civil war ended. Picado and former president Calderon went into exile.

Figueres and the military junta, called the Founding Council, took control after the term of the appointed transitional president Santos León Herrera's expired on 05/08/1948<sup>922</sup> and the various factions of the civil war had been defeated or capitulated (Mauceri 1989: 205-206). The

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<sup>920</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1919\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1919_Costa_Rican_general_election)

<sup>921</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa\\_Rican\\_civil\\_war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa_Rican_civil_war)

<sup>922</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa\\_Rican\\_civil\\_war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa_Rican_civil_war)

constitution of 11/07/1949 granted women the right to vote.<sup>923</sup> Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED outcomes for political liberties still codes them as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as what we interpret as somewhat present

11/08/1949 End Military Autocracy/Start (Male) Defective Democracy: On this date, Figueres, who had assumed the role of interim president, transferred authority to Ulate, who had been elected in February 1948 but had not been acknowledged as the victor by the sitting president at the time (Cerdas 1990: 390, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 56). This handover is coded as a return to a male defective democracy. V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI classify elections as somewhat clean, free and fair between 1949 and 1953. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. According to LIED political liberties were absent in this period. V-Dem's PCLI codes political liberties as somewhat present in 1949 and as present from 1950 onward. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

07/26/1953 Continuation Defective Democracy: The elections on 07/26/1953 were the first in which women could vote.<sup>924</sup> However, in the elections of 1953 the losing sides in the civil war, mostly the Republicans (Calderón supporters) and the Communists, were unable to participate as the Republicans' party was disbanded and the Communist Party was constitutionally outlawed. For these reasons the regime is still classified as a defective democracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED continues to classify the countries elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI classify them as clean, free and fair since 1953. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to

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<sup>923</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernarda\\_V%C3%A1squez\\_M%C3%A9ndez](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernarda_V%C3%A1squez_M%C3%A9ndez)

<sup>924</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Costa_Rican_general_election); <https://ticotimes.net/2023/03/07/when-women-won-the-right-to-vote>

other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

02/02/1958 End Defective Democracy/Start Liberal Democracy: On this date free and fair general elections took place.<sup>925</sup> Since then, Costa Rica has a long-standing record of stable democracy, with a multi-party structure and frequent changes of power through trustworthy elections. Freedom of expression and association are well-protected, and the rule of law is generally upheld, despite occasional corruption scandals implicating presidents. Civil society as described as alive and vibrant with constitutional protections in place for civil liberties. Human as well as civil rights are guaranteed, access to information and the internet is provided.<sup>926</sup> However, the country continues to struggle with certain issues such as discrimination against Indigenous people, as well as land disputes involving Indigenous communities.<sup>927</sup> FH classifies Costa Rica for the whole regime period as free.<sup>928</sup> In April 2022 free and fair elections were held in which Rodrigo Chaves of the Social Democratic Progress Party (PPSD)<sup>929</sup> He has been criticized by media advocacy groups for vilifying journalists and restricting access to government information selectively. Nonetheless, freedom of press is generally maintained.<sup>930</sup> The scores of LIED, as well as V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI stay the same. As per FH's classification for this regime period, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Furthermore, since 1958 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate full political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Peeler 1985, Schultz 2000, Seligson/Muller 1987, Zovatto 2005)

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<sup>925</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958\\_Costa\\_Rican\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1958_Costa_Rican_general_election)

<sup>926</sup> <https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/costa-rica>

<sup>927</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/costa-rica/freedom-world/2022>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa\\_Rica\\_2020?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2020?lang=en)

<sup>928</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/costa-rica/freedom-world/2024>

<sup>929</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/costa-rica/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>930</sup> <https://rsf.org/en/country/costa-rica>

## Croatia

01/01/1900 Part of Other Country [Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 01/01/1527]: The Duchy of Croatia was formed in 626 and transformed in 925 into the Kingdom of Croatia under King Tomislav. On 01/01/1527 Croatia became part of the Austrian-Hungarian Habsburg Monarchy. From 1868 (until 10/29/1918) Croatia was part of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, a nominally autonomous kingdom within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was from then on associated with the Kingdom of Hungary within the dual Austro-Hungarian state. However, the Kingdom of Dalmatia remained a crown land in the Austrian part of the Empire.<sup>931</sup> Although Croatia had been provided with extensive internal autonomy with 'national features,' in practice, Croatian influence over crucial matters such as taxation and military affairs was limited and impeded by Hungary.<sup>932</sup> The Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia is a borderline case between a protectorate and a de facto part of the Hungarian Half of the Habsburg Empire. Since the kingdom had not much control over its internal affairs, we code it as a de facto part of the Hungarian Half of the Habsburg Empire.

10/29/1918 End Part of Other Country [Hungary, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date Croatia seceded from the Austrian-Hungarian Habsburg Monarchy and became part of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.<sup>933</sup> It was the first incarnation of a Yugoslav state founded on the Pan-Slavic ideology.<sup>934</sup> Already on 10/5-8 a non-elected People's Council was formed with a Central Committee and Presidency which governed the country.

12/01/1918 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]: The state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs joined the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro to form together the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. On 10/03/1929 the name of the country was changed by King Alexander I to Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

04/10/1941 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy: On this date the formally independent State of Croatia emerged. During its entire existence, the country was governed as a fascist one-party state by the Ustaša. It was a puppet regime of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy with limited sovereignty.<sup>935</sup> Hence,

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<sup>931</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Croatia\\_\(Habsburg\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Croatia_(Habsburg))

<sup>932</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom\\_of\\_Croatia-Slavonia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Croatia-Slavonia)

<sup>933</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State\\_of\\_Slovenes,\\_Croats\\_and\\_Serbs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Slovenes,_Croats_and_Serbs)

<sup>934</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State\\_of\\_Slovenes,\\_Croats\\_and\\_Serbs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Slovenes,_Croats_and_Serbs)

<sup>935</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent\\_State\\_of\\_Croatia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_State_of_Croatia)

this was a borderline case between an occupation regime and a sovereign regime. The case is somehow similar to the satellite states of the USSR after World War II, which are usually classified as independent in comparative research. For most of the relevant period (except 1942), V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1942, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

03/07/1945 End Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy/Start Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime]: On this date, the Provisional Government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia formed through the merger of the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia. Before the temporary government was formed, there were several meetings between Tito and Ivan Šubašić, the pre-war prime minister of Yugoslavia in London. On 11/11/1945, the first Yugoslav elections after World War II took place and the winner was Josip Broz Tito with the People's Front. On 11/29/1945 the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia (later Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), with Croatia being one of the six constituent republics was proclaimed.<sup>936</sup> In 1990 universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). Both LIED and V-Dem only start to provide data for Croatia since 1991.

05/19/1991 End Part of Other Country [Yugoslavia, Communist Ideocracy]/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the people of Croatia voted for independence.<sup>937</sup> Franjo Tuđman became Croatia's first president. On 06/25/1991 the parliament declared Croatia's independence from Yugoslavia. In 1991 the Croatian war of independence started; After the Declaration of Independence tensions between Croatian forces loyal to the government and the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav People's Army, supported by local Serb forces in Croatia escalated. The war cost the lives of over 20.000 people and ended 1995 in Croatian victory (Marshall 2018i).<sup>938</sup> On 06/15/1997 the second presidential elections were held since independence. Franjo Tuđman was reelected to a second five-year term.<sup>939</sup> The election were considered deeply flawed. The free and fair participation of opposition parties was restricted

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<sup>936</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_Federal\\_Republic\\_of\\_Yugoslavia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia)

<sup>937</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/HRV?cHash=17c2f8e8c5e9727cbe44e703cc448a30>

<sup>938</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian\\_War\\_of\\_Independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_War_of_Independence)

<sup>939</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997\\_Croatian\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Croatian_presidential_election)

under Tuđman and the Croatian Democratic Union.<sup>940</sup> The media was also restricted.<sup>941</sup> Classification of the electoral regime is mixed. RoW and HTW classify it as an electoral autocracy/multiparty autocracy, BMR as a non-democracy, AF as a personalist regime, PRC as a semidemocracy, CGC, GWF and MCM as a democracy. We classify it as a defective democracy, because elections were held and results respected, nonetheless the opposition could not participate under fair conditions. Therefore, in combination with the media restriction, deficits in the electoral process and deficits in political and civil liberties, justify the classification. When Tudjman became ill in November 1999, the Supreme Court appointed an interim president to preside over the government until multiparty elections could be held in February 2000. On this date, Franjo Tudman's death was officially declared.<sup>942</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1991 to 1996, LIED classifies elections as competitive. V-Dem's CEI and EF&FI score them as being of ambiguous electoral cleanliness as well as freedom and fairness. As classified by FH for 1991, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For the rest of the period, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous from 1991 to 1995 and as somewhat present from 1996 to 1999. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1992 to 1995, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the years 1996-1999, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. The following year, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. 01/03/2000 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, parliamentary elections led to the defeat of Tudman's HDZ and the formation of a government under Ivica Račan, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (former League of Communist of Croatia).<sup>943</sup> Presidential elections completed in February (first round on 01/24, a second round on 02/07 February) also resulted in the victory of opposition leader, Stjepan Mesic. Based on

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<sup>940</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/323.htm>

<sup>941</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tu%C4%91manism#Domestic>

<sup>942</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franjo\\_Tuđman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franjo_Tuđman)

<sup>943</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000\\_Croatian\\_parliamentary\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_Croatian_parliamentary_election)



our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections as competitive while V-Dems EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. General elections are routinely held for various government levels (national, county, municipality/city, European). Universal suffrage is ensured, and the voting process is both free and confidential. Numerous parties and independent lists compete for public office, and election results are uncontested by parties.<sup>944</sup> Croatia is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral system. Although civil liberties and political rights are guaranteed, corruption remains an issue. The head of state is the president, while the prime minister is head of government. In parliament eight seats are set for ethnic minorities, for example ethnic Serbs, in addition three parliamentary seats are reserved for citizens in the diaspora. Diverse representation in this way is supposed to be guaranteed, yet ethnic minorities in Croatia experience discrimination. Media operates generally free but declining freedom of the press due to threats against journalists remains a problem.<sup>945</sup> Per FH's scoring for 2000, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. From 2001 onward, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as present for this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 2001 to 2009, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Since 2010, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Kasapović 2010b, Osterberg-Kaufmann 2011, Zadošek/Maršić 2010)

## **Cuba**

01/01/1900 Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy] [Start: 01/01/1899]: During colonial rule by Spain for over 200 years, it was briefly occupied by Britain in the 18th century.<sup>946</sup> The Republic of Cuba in Arms was created by Cuban

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<sup>944</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/HRV?cHash=17c2f8e8c5e9727cbe44e703cc448a30>

<sup>945</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/croatia/freedom-world/2023>

<sup>946</sup> <https://www.rulers.org/rulc4.html#cuba>

revolutionaries who sought the independence of Cuba, occupied at that time by Spain. It was constituted on 04/10/1869, naming Carlos Manuel de Céspedes as its first president.<sup>947</sup> The Constituent Assembly of La Yaya, held on 10/10/1897, designated Bartolomé Masó as the new president of the revolutionary government, taking office on 10/30/1897. On 04/24/1898, Bartolomé proclaimed the document known as the Sebastopol Manifesto, where he stressed the slogan of independence or death to counteract the intrigues of the autonomist tendency. On 11/09/1898, the pro-independence government was dissolved by handing over its powers to the Assembly of Representatives of the Cuban Revolution gathered in Santa Cruz del Sur.<sup>948</sup> In 1898 the USA and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris ending the War. Under this treaty, coming into effect on 04/11/1899, Spain ceded Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the USA.<sup>949</sup> However, on 01/01/1899 the first occupation of Cuba by the USA took place.<sup>950</sup> Municipal elections were held in Cuba on 06/16/1900. The elections were held under the auspices of the US military government with a system of restricted suffrage.<sup>951</sup> While only a small fraction of the population participated, we still code this period as an indirect rule occupation regime since the ruling elite participated in the government of the country. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period. Political liberties were coded absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present following V-Dem's PCLI. For 1900, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

05/20/1902 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Defective Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On this date, the Republic of Cuba emerged as an independent state (Lansford, 2021: 412). However, based on the Platt Amendment, the USA retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs and to supervise its finances and foreign relations (Suter/Nohlen 2005).<sup>952</sup> It is a borderline case between a protectorate and a sovereign state. This continued until most of the Platt Amendments were repealed by the Cuban-American

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<sup>947</sup> <https://www.rulers.org/rulc4.html#cuba>; [https://www.ecured.cu/Rep%C3%BAblica\\_de\\_Cuba\\_en\\_Armas](https://www.ecured.cu/Rep%C3%BAblica_de_Cuba_en_Armas)

<sup>948</sup> [https://www.ecured.cu/Rep%C3%BAblica\\_de\\_Cuba\\_en\\_Armas](https://www.ecured.cu/Rep%C3%BAblica_de_Cuba_en_Armas)

<sup>949</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Paris\\_\(1898\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Paris_(1898)); <https://www.rulers.org/rulc4.html#cuba>

<sup>950</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_Military\\_Government\\_in\\_Cuba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Military_Government_in_Cuba)

<sup>951</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900\\_Cuban\\_local\\_elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1900_Cuban_local_elections)

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[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Cuba\\_\(1902%E2%80%931959\)#US\\_occupation,\\_1906%E2%80%931909](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Cuba_(1902%E2%80%931959)#US_occupation,_1906%E2%80%931909)

Treaty of Relations in 1934 (Lansford 2021: 412).<sup>953</sup> The Constitution of 1901 implemented a representative democratic system, founded on the separation of powers and universal suffrage for men aged 21 and above. Nevertheless, the democratic system and elections as a form of self-governance struggled to solidify. The Cuban political landscape continued to be marked by personalism and corruption, especially evident in the local oligarchy involved in the sugar trade and foreign companies. These entities, through military coups and dictatorships, collectively wielded control over the political, social, and economic sectors (Suter/Nohlen 2005: 195). Tomas Estrada Palma assumed office unopposed in 1902, as the electoral commission was filled with his supporters, and his primary rival withdrew from the candidacy (Aguilar 1993: 36, 39-40, Lentz 1999: 112, Suchlicki 2001: 33, Casey et al. 2020: 4). In 1904 the first parliamentary elections took place, two parties – the Republicans and the National Liberals – contested. The elections were described as a farce. Both factions aimed to secure victory through *el copo*, which refers to fraudulent tactics designed to prevent minority representation (Hugh 1971: 472). Some candidates achieved more votes than were cast. The Liberals lost the elections and deadlocked the legislative by nonattendance. General elections were held in Cuba on 12/01/1905 and were won by Tomás Estrada Palma who became the country's first president (Hugh 1971: 472-473).<sup>954</sup> Palma faced severe allegations of vote rigging leading to rebellions and the collapse of the regime.<sup>955</sup> On 09/28/1906, after Estrada Palma appealed to the U.S. for intervention against a revolt led by the Liberal Party, but Washington declined, leading to his resignation (Maurer 2013: 64, Aguilar 1993: 41, Lentz 1999: 112, Suchlicki 2001: 36, Casey et al. 2020: 4). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. 09/29/1906 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Electoral Oligarchy]: On this date, the USA intervened in Cuban affairs based on the Cuban

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<sup>953</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platt\\_Amendment#](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platt_Amendment#)

<sup>954</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1905\\_Cuban\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1905_Cuban_general_election)

<sup>955</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1905\\_Cuban\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1905_Cuban_general_election)

American Treaty of Relations of 1903 by sending military troops establishing a U.S. provisional government.<sup>956</sup> The provisional government lasted until the elections in 1908.<sup>957</sup> Although elections were held during this period, however, the male suffrage was severely restricted. However, we code this period as an indirect rule occupation regime. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period. For this time political liberties were coded absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as somewhat present (V-Dem PCLI).

11/14/1908 End Indirect Rule Occupation Regime [by USA, Electoral Oligarchy]/Start Electoral Autocracy: José Miguel Gómez won the presidential election running under the Liberal Coalition banner on 11/11/1908.<sup>958</sup> Following the election of Gómez, U.S. officials judged the situation in Cuba as sufficiently stable to withdraw the military troops, a process that was completed in February 1909.<sup>959</sup> However, the U.S. continued intervening in Cuban affairs.<sup>960</sup> As before 1906 this is a borderline case between a protectorate and a sovereign state. From 01/28/1909 Cuba was clearly sovereign. Jose Miguel Gomez, the candidate of the Liberal Party, was elected as the U.S. started preparing to withdraw from its second occupation of Cuba. He assumed office on 01/28/1909. The Miguel Gomez administration violated democratic institutions and engaged in repression. Conservative Party politicians continued to rule after Gomez stepped down in 1913. The 1916 election was marred by fraud. In 1924, incumbent president Zayas backed General Gerardo Machado who won the election. In 1927, Machado pushed through the Constitutional Assembly the extension of presidential terms to six years and an invitation to accept a new term in power. In 1928, Congress passed an Emergency Law prohibiting opposition nominations of presidential candidates. Machado was reelected on 11/01/1928 unopposed (Aguilar 1993: 42-46, 50-51, Perez 1993: 60, Casey et al. 2020: 4-5). While most regime datasets covering this period agree that it was autocratic, BMR coded the period from 1909 to 1916 as democratic. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political

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<sup>956</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional\\_Government\\_of\\_Cuba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_Cuba)

<sup>957</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional\\_Government\\_of\\_Cuba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_Cuba)

<sup>958</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1908\\_Cuban\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1908_Cuban_general_election)

<sup>959</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional\\_Government\\_of\\_Cuba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_Cuba)

<sup>960</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic\\_of\\_Cuba\\_\(1902%E2%80%931959\)#Machado\\_era](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Cuba_(1902%E2%80%931959)#Machado_era)

liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. From 1909 to 1927, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1928 to 1932, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

08/12/1933 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Military coup led by senior officers ousted President Gerardo Machado (Aguilar 1993: 53, Perez 1993: 66-67, Lentz 1999: 114). The first leader of the post-Machado government was Carlos M. Cespedes. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period.

09/04[-05]/1933 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: The military coup led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, by unofficial sergeants, corporals and other soldiers which was aided by student activists in the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario deposed Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada as president, installing a new government led by a five-man coalition, known as the Pentarchy of 1933.<sup>961</sup> After only five days, the Pentarchy gave way to the formal presidency of Ramón Grau.<sup>962</sup> The new government incorporated three political factions: Antonio Guiteras represented the revolutionary left wing, Batista was the head of the traditionalist right wing, and Grau was the bridge between the two and representative of the national reform wing.<sup>963</sup> During the 100-day government of Grau on 02/01/1934, Cuban women received the vote.<sup>964</sup> Batista became the head of the armed forces. From mid-September 1933 until 1940, Batista and his fellow officers did not rule directly and instead appointed and removed several formal heads of government (Aguilar 1993: 54-55, Perez 1993: 66-77, Casey et al. 2020: 5). On 11/18/1934, the junta named Carlos Mendieta President of Cuba.<sup>965</sup> According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present after 1936. However, these "multiparty elections" were heavily controlled and restricted by the military, with little to no chance for the opposition, and thus cannot be seen as fair and free. Moreover, LIED codes political liberties in this time as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI indicates a somewhat present level for them. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive

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<sup>961</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban\\_Revolution\\_of\\_1933](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Revolution_of_1933)

<sup>962</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban\\_Revolution\\_of\\_1933](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Revolution_of_1933)

<sup>963</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One\\_Hundred\\_Days\\_Government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Hundred_Days_Government)

<sup>964</sup> <https://cubanstudiesinstitute.us/this-day-in-cuban-history/february-3-1934-article-38-of-a-new-constitution-extended-the-suffrage-to-cuban-women/>

<sup>965</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Mendieta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Mendieta); [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos\\_Hevia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Hevia)

encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1934 to 1939, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 1940, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

07/14/1940 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: On this date, Fulgencio Batista, who ran for the People's Socialist Coalition won the presidential election. The following period is a borderline case between defective democracy and electoral autocracy. In almost all datasets including BMR, GWF, Polity5 and PCR covering the regime period is considered democratic. The only exception is RoW who classifies the regime as an electoral autocracy.<sup>966</sup> The 1940 constitution instituted a comprehensive system of checks and balances, securing the judiciary's autonomy.<sup>967</sup> The regime is a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and a defective democracy. While there were severe defects of democracy especially considering a lack of constraints on the executive, there was an alternation in power through elections in this period and no systematic electoral fraud (Perez 1993: 79, Domínguez 1998: 115, Casey et al. 2020: 5). In the 1944 presidential elections on 10/10/1944, opposition candidate Ramón Grau won the presidential election for the Auténtico-Republican Alliance banner. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, elections in this period were competitive. During this period, LIED categorizes Cuban elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair, however, their CEI scores them as not really clean. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. V-Dem's PCLI codes political liberties as present from 1940-1950 and as somewhat present in 1951 and 1952. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/10/1952 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: Retired General Fulgencio Batista ran for president again in 1952. Faced with impending defeat in the presidential elections just three months before they were scheduled, Batista seized power in a military coup led by junior officers. He ousted the outgoing president, Socarras, and the coup resulted in Batista's return to the presidency (Suchlicki 2001, Gott 2005:146, Lansford 2021:412,

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<sup>966</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1940\\_Constitution\\_of\\_Cuba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1940_Constitution_of_Cuba)

Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 56). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Regarding the political liberties they are still coded as absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as somewhat present in 1952 and as ambiguous until 1954. According to our coding rules it is a military autocracy. However, the classification of the regime is disputed. CGV classify it as a military regime from 1952 to 1958. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

01/11/1954 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, presidential elections took place, which were not free and fair. They were won by Batista. The main opposition candidate, Ramón Grau, withdrew his candidacy before election day.<sup>968</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during this phase are characterized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair and their CEI scores them as not clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

01/01/1959 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Communist (Military) Ideocracy: On this date, Batista fled the country, and Fidel Castro and his insurgent forces took Havana. In the aftermath, Castro and his ruling group installed a communist regime (Domínguez 1998: 130-131, Lansford 2021: 412, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 56). Initially, Castro's 26<sup>th</sup> of July Movement Underground and leaders of the anti-Batista political opposition formed an interim government. Judge Manuel Urrutia became president, and José Miró Cardona became prime minister. On 02/16/1959, Castro became prime minister of the revolutionary government, replacing Miró Cardona. On 07/16/1959, Castro forced President Manuel Urrutia to resign, and Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, linked with the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) became president.<sup>969</sup> Subsequently, Castro institutionalized communist rule and formed alliances with the Soviet Bloc and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this

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<sup>968</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954\\_Cuban\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Cuban_general_election)

<sup>969</sup> <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/post-revolution-cuba/>

period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Until 1975, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1976, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH since 1972, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

11/02/1976 Continuation as Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy: On this date, the first parliamentary elections since the Cuban Revolution took place. In our dataset this is coded as a change in subtype from a communist military ideocracy to a communist one-party ideocracy. On 07/31/2006, Raúl Castro was named acting head of state and elected president on 02/24/2008. He was succeeded by Miguel Díaz-Canel on 10/10/2019. Despite this leadership change, Cuba's regime type has not changed. The government continues to outlaw political pluralism, suppresses dissidents, and restricts basic liberties. The only elections with multiple candidates are those for municipal assemblies, but campaigning is prohibited. A new constitution was enacted on 04/10/2019 and identifies the PCC as the only legal political party.<sup>970</sup> Raúl Castro Ruz retired in 2021 during a party congress and was succeeded by Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. Elections in March 2023 saw record low turnout rates at 75%<sup>971</sup> and incumbent president Miguel Díaz-Canel was reelected unanimously by the parliament, which continued to pass laws that limit civil liberties and political rights in 2023.<sup>972</sup> Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were constantly absent since 1960. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Between 1976 and 2005, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 2006 to 2017, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In 2018, the executive's power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive

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<sup>970</sup><https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-world/2022>;

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba\\_2019?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019?lang=en)

<sup>971</sup> <https://apnews.com/article/cuba-elections-national-assembly-voter-turnout-b36c16e04f1177d9d1ec555c492e6faa>

<sup>972</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-world/2024>



were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Domínguez 2003, Gelius 2013, Hoffmann 2009, Horowitz/Suchlicki 2003, Lievesley 2004, Mesa-Lago 1993, Saxonberg 2013)

## **Curaçao**

01/01/1900 Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 07/29/1634]: Curaçao was originally inhabited by Arawak people who migrated from the South American mainland. European explorers first arrived on the island in 1499, and it was subsequently settled by the Spanish. Later, on 07/29/1634,<sup>973</sup> the Dutch invaded the island, took control of Curaçao and transformed it into a significant trading hub for the Dutch West India Company.<sup>974</sup> Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Curaçao faced multiple assaults by the British, with notable attacks occurring in 1800, 1804, and during the period from 1807 to 1815. After the Napoleonic wars concluded in 1815, stable Dutch governance was reinstated, and the island became part of the colony of Curaçao and Dependencies.<sup>975</sup>

03/27/1949 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: On 03/27/1949 the first elections under universal suffrage took place.<sup>976</sup>

12/15/1954 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]/Start Liberal Democracy [as Part of Netherland Antilles as Protectorate of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: In 1954, Curaçao, along with other Dutch Caribbean colonies, was united to create the Netherlands Antilles.<sup>977</sup> The political system of the Netherlands Antilles was based on a parliamentary representative democracy. The Prime Minister served as the head of government, and the country had a multi-party system. The government held executive authority, while legislative power was shared between the government and parliament. The judiciary operated independently of the executive and legislative branches. The Netherlands Antilles had significant autonomy in most areas, with the exceptions being defense, foreign affairs, and the

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<sup>973</sup> <https://www.curacaohistory.com/1634-the-conquest-of-curacao>

<sup>974</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Curacao>

<sup>975</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch\\_colonial\\_rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch_colonial_rule)

<sup>976</sup> <https://www.curacaohistory.com/1949-universal-suffrage>

<sup>977</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch\\_colonial\\_rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch_colonial_rule)

Supreme Court.<sup>978</sup> Growing dissatisfaction with Curaçao's perceived subservient position in its relationship with the Netherlands, persistent racial discrimination, and an increase in joblessness due to layoffs in the oil sector, culminated in a series of riots in 1969.<sup>979</sup>

10/10/2010 Continuation Liberal Democracy [as Protectorate of Netherlands, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Curaçao gained autonomy like Aruba. Unlike the Netherlands, Curaçao is not in the EU, so it doesn't have to follow EU law or use the euro. However, as overseas territories (OCT or LGA in Dutch) linked to the Netherlands, these islands can access European funds. Also, residents in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands have Dutch and European citizenship.<sup>980</sup> Curaçao, as a component of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, operates under a system of parliamentary representative democracy. The monarch of the Netherlands serves as the head of state, represented on the island by a governor, while the Prime Minister of Curaçao fulfills the role of the head of government. The government holds executive authority, and legislative power is shared between the government and the parliament. Curaçao enjoys substantial autonomy in most areas, with specific exceptions defined in the "Kingdom affairs" section of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.<sup>981</sup> In the 2021 election, the previously opposition MFK-party won a simple majority, taking first place from the previously governing PAR-party.<sup>982</sup> In a coalition government with the PNP-party, MFK leader Gilmar Pisas was made prime minister of Curaçao. He had previously been interim prime minister for some months in 2017. No irregularities in the voting were reported.<sup>983</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. FH, LIED and V-Dem do not have Curacao in their dataset.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## Cyprus

01/01/1900 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Electoral Oligarchy as Protectorate] [Start: 06/04/1878]: Since 06/04/1878 by the Cyprus Convention, Cyprus was a British Protectorate, given to Britain by the Ottoman Empire.<sup>984</sup> Initially hopeful for prosperity, democracy, and national liberation, the Cypriots embraced British rule in

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<sup>978</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_the\\_Netherlands\\_Antilles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_the_Netherlands_Antilles)

<sup>979</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch\\_colonial\\_rule](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Dutch_colonial_rule)

<sup>980</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Cura%C3%A7ao#Autonomous\\_status](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cura%C3%A7ao#Autonomous_status)

<sup>981</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura%C3%A7ao#Government>

<sup>982</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime\\_Minister\\_of\\_Cura%C3%A7ao](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prime_Minister_of_Cura%C3%A7ao)

<sup>983</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilmar\\_Pisas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilmar_Pisas)

<sup>984</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus\\_Convention](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_Convention)

anticipation of gradual improvements. However, their optimism waned as they encountered disappointments. The British burdened them with high taxes to compensate the Sultan for conceding Cyprus to them. Furthermore, the Cypriot people were denied the opportunity to participate in the island's administration, as all authority was concentrated in the hands of the High Commissioner and London.<sup>985</sup> On 11/11/1914 Cyprus was annexed by the British and put under a military administration status.<sup>986</sup> With this action Cyprus became officially a part of the British colonial empire. On 03/10/1925, Britain declared it as the Crown colony of British Cyprus, establishing an undemocratic constitution for the island.<sup>987</sup> Cyprus was governed directly by British colonial authorities. Attempts to introduce representative institutions were limited and often ineffective. The Legislative Council had restricted powers and was frequently overshadowed by the colonial administration. The parliament, when it existed, served more as a façade. Hence, LIED is not completely wrong when it states that there were no multiparty legislative elections during this period (LIED). Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem's PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

12/07/1959 (de facto) Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]: Following the Zurich and London Agreements, a constitution was established providing for a bicomunal government. Elections were held, and the parliament had substantial powers over internal affairs. The indigenous population gained significant influence, and the parliament was effective in governance, although tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots persisted. This period marked a shift to indirect rule until independence on 08/16/1960. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified

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<sup>985</sup>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Cyprus\\_\(1878%E2%80%93present\)#Protectorate\\_of\\_Cyprus\\_\(1878%E2%88%921914\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cyprus_(1878%E2%80%93present)#Protectorate_of_Cyprus_(1878%E2%88%921914))

<sup>986</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Cyprus\\_\(1878–present\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cyprus_(1878–present))

<sup>987</sup> <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/europerussiacentral-asia-region/british-cyprus-1914-1960/#:~:text=Cyprus%20was%20proclaimed%20a%20British,Cyprus%20on%20November%2030%2C%201926;>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Cyprus\\_\(1878%E2%80%93present\)#Protectorate\\_of\\_Cyprus\\_\(1878%E2%88%921914\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cyprus_(1878%E2%80%93present)#Protectorate_of_Cyprus_(1878%E2%88%921914))

by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

08/16/1960 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start Defective Democracy: On this date British rule ended with the signing of the Zurich agreements and the Republic of Cyprus became independent. Already prior to independence the legislative elections of 07/31/1960 took place. The elections introduced universal suffrage.<sup>988</sup> The 1960 constitution established a myriad of civil and political liberties taking into account the representation of the Turkish- and Greek-Cyprian ethnic communities. It also promulgated a robust system of checks and balances.<sup>989</sup> On 12/21/1963 an armed conflict was triggered.<sup>990</sup> Constitutional amendment proposed by President Makarios was not accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots. This led to fighting from 1963-1964. UN peacekeepers intervened. Greek and Turkish parties collapsed, and ethnic fighting went on. The Cypriot Turks set up a separate community in Northern Cyprus. The crisis led to the discontinuation of Turkish Cypriot involvement in administration, coupled with assertions of its loss of legitimacy. In certain regions, Greek Cypriots obstructed the movement and access of Turkish Cypriots to government premises, while others voluntarily withdrew under the guidance of the Turkish Cypriot administration. Consequently, Turkish Cypriots began residing in enclaves. Makarios unilaterally restructured the republic, resulting in the division of Nicosia by the Green Line, established by in 1964 deployed United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).<sup>991</sup> On 12/28/1967 the Turkish-Cypriot community declared the establishment of the Turkish-Cypriot Provisional Administration.<sup>992</sup> On 02/25/1968 presidential elections took place and President Makarios III was reelected. On 07/05/1970 free and fair multi-party elections were conducted, yet the Turkish-Cypriot community abstained from participating in the legislative election, leaving the 15 designated seats for the Turkish community uncontested.<sup>993</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as of ambiguous electoral cleanliness. As per FH's classification for this regime period since 1972, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Political liberties

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<sup>988</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960\\_Cypriot\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1960_Cypriot_legislative_election);

[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus\\_2013?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en)

<sup>989</sup> [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus\\_2013](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013)

<sup>990</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypriot\\_intercommunal\\_violence#Crisis\\_of\\_1963%E2%80%931964](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cypriot_intercommunal_violence#Crisis_of_1963%E2%80%931964)

<sup>991</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus#Independence\\_and\\_inter-communal\\_violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus#Independence_and_inter-communal_violence)

<sup>992</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern\\_Cyprus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Cyprus)

<sup>993</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970\\_Cypriot\\_legislative\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970_Cypriot_legislative_election)

were coded absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI for this period. From 1961 to 1962, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. From 1968 to 1973, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

07/15/1974 End Defective Democracy/Start Military Autocracy: The military regime in Greece engineered a coup against Markarios III in an effort to solidify their position in Cyprus in the face of Turkish Invasion threats, tensions with the Markarios regime, and ethnic unrest. The nationalist Nikolas Sampson was installed in the wake of the military coup as president. In response to the coup, on 07/20/1974 Turkey invaded the island taking control of the north and dividing Cyprus along what became known as the Green Line, However, the military regime that had appointed Sampson collapsed on 07/23 July and he handed over power to Glafkos Klerides.<sup>994</sup> Due to the very short period of the military regime it is not included in the country-year dataset. For this short regime period political liberties continued to be coded as absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as somewhat present according to V-Dem's PCLI.

07/23/1974 End Military Autocracy/Start Defective Democracy: The military regime led by Sampson came to an end, resulting in the restoration of democracy in the southern part of the island. Meanwhile, Turkish-Cypriots established a de facto government in the northern region. On 11/15/1985 Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party (UPB), proclaimed the statehood of the Turkish region of Cyprus. The formal declaration of independence set the stage for the enactment of a new democratic constitution in the same year (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 23). The Republic of Cyprus operates as a democracy with de jure sovereignty encompassing the entire island. However, in practice, the government exercises control solely over the southern, predominantly Greek-speaking part of the island. The northern region is governed by the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a recognition acknowledged solely by Turkey.<sup>995</sup> Cyprus is a presidential democracy with a unicameral system, consisting of the House of Representatives. The president serves as head of government and head of state. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections are considered competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as clean,

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<sup>994</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974\\_Cypriot\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Cypriot_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>995</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/cyprus/freedom-world/2023>

free and fair. According to FH, for 1974 and 1975, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 1976 and 1981 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. From 1982 onward the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. LIED classifies political liberties as absent until 1989 and present from 1990 onward. In contrast, V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present in 1974 and 1975 and became present in 1976. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the years 1975 and 1976, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Between 1977 and 1988, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 1989 and 1990, V-Dem's JCE is again interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1991 to 2002, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. In the timeframe 2003-2006, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 2007-2008 as well as 2017-2018, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. From 2009 to 2016, and again in 2019, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since 2021, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

Additional sources (Schober 2010, Solsten 1991)

## **Cyprus, Northern**

07/23/1974 Start Defective Democracy: On this date, Turkish-Cypriots established a de facto government in the northern region of Cyprus. On 06/20/1976, Northern Cyprus conducted

general elections. Rauf Denktaş, representing the National Unity Party, was elected as president. Additionally, the National Unity Party secured 30 out of the 40 seats in the National Council. On 11/15/1985 Denktash, the head of the Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party (UPB), proclaimed the establishment of statehood for the Turkish sector of Cyprus. This formal declaration of independence set the stage for the enactment of a new democratic constitution in 1985 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 23). Since the Turkish invasion of 1974, Cyprus has remained divided, with the northern third declared as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by its Turkish Cypriot inhabitants. The United Nations deems this declaration legally invalid and urges the withdrawal of Turkish troops that intervened in support of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Despite its unilateral declaration of independence in 1983, the government of Northern Cyprus has received diplomatic recognition only from Turkey and lacks recognition from the international community.<sup>996</sup> From 1975 to 2005, Rauf Denktaş served as president, actively seeking international recognition for Northern Cyprus as a fervent nationalist. However, this stance became a significant hindrance to reconciliation efforts, particularly when the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union. In 1993, Northern Cyprus underwent multi-party parliamentary elections that ousted the long-ruling National Unity Party in favor of a coalition between the Democratic Party and the Republican Turkish Party (CTP). Despite this change, a new coalition formed in August 1996 between the National Unity Party and the Democratic Party, remaining in power for the next eight years. In 2003, the CTP and DP established a new government, appointing CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat as the new Prime Minister.<sup>997</sup> In 2004, the Annan Plan received the support of two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots in a referendum but was rejected by nearly three-quarters of Greek Cypriots. The plan aimed to establish the United Cyprus Republic, but the Greek Cypriot rejection meant only they could enjoy EU membership benefits. Despite this, attitudes toward Turkish Cypriots have begun to shift internationally. The Republic of Cyprus government continues to uphold embargoes on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) despite the vote outcome. In October 2020, Ersin Tatar, representing the National Unity Party (UBP), became the 5th president of the TRNC, winning against the incumbent president Mustafa Akıncı in the presidential elections.<sup>998</sup> According to Freedom House, civil liberties are generally maintained, and the multiparty political system is largely democratic, although it has faced increasing interference from the Turkish government. Ongoing issues include corruption, discrimination against minority

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<sup>996</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Northern\\_Cyprus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Northern_Cyprus)

<sup>997</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Northern\\_Cyprus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Northern_Cyprus)

<sup>998</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Northern\\_Cyprus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Northern_Cyprus)

communities, and human trafficking.<sup>999</sup> The TRNC rests heavily dependent on Turkey, especially in the domains of economy and military. The currencies used in the TRNC are the Turkish Lira and the Euro. The main trading partner is Turkey and about half the population now are nationalistic Turkish immigrants.<sup>1000</sup> We classify Northern Cyprus as an independent country, however, the heavy dependence on Turkey raises the question, of whether to classify it as a de facto Turkish protectorate. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 1981-1985 designates the territory as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As per FH's classification for 1986-1988, the territory receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Per FH, for the years 1989 to 1991, the territory is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. As classified by FH for 1992- 1999, the territory is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. According to FH, for the years 2000 to 2019, the territory is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. As per FH's classification for the rest of the regime period, the territory receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. LIED and V-Dem do not register Northern Cyprus in their data. Defective Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

## **Czechoslovakia**

01/01/1900 Part of other country [Austria, Constitutional Monarchy] [Start: 08/11/1804]: The territory of today's Czech Republic was under control of the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Empire.<sup>1001</sup> Both countries have a long common history. For the first time united from 1253 until 1276 under the reign of Ottakar II of Bohemia. They later joined again, with the inheritance of rule over the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary in 1526 under Ferdinand I of Austria, under the Habsburg dynasty. In addition to Vienna, Prague also became Habsburg capital and residency. As conflicts between Protestants and Catholics culminated in 1618, the Roman Catholic forces of the Austrian empire defeated the Protestants at the 'Battle of the White Mountain' on 11/08/1620, and emperor Ferdinand II of Austria was able to reassert Habsburg authority over the territory. The country lost its status as a kingdom and was henceforth

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<sup>999</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/northern-cyprus>

<sup>1000</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkische\\_Republik\\_Nordzypern#Wirtschaft](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkische_Republik_Nordzypern#Wirtschaft)

<sup>1001</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_the\\_Czech\\_lands](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Czech_lands)



subjected to the absolutist rule of the Habsburgs.<sup>1002</sup> On 08/11/1804, following the founding of the Austrian Empire, the territory was subordinated to it.<sup>1003</sup>

10/28/1918 End Part of other country [Austria, Constitutional Monarchy]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On this date the Czechoslovak National Council in Prague declared the independence of Czechoslovakia. Both LIED and V-Dem only start to provide data for Czechoslovakia since 1918. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

06/05/1919 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: Due to the postponement of the national parliamentary elections from 1919 to 1920, the municipal elections of 07/15/1919 were de facto the founding elections of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Constitution adopted on 02/29/1920 guaranteed the universal vote for every citizen including women to every electable body.<sup>1004</sup> However, already the municipal elections of 1919 and the parliamentary elections of 1920 guaranteed these rights. The parliament (National Assembly) had the authority for legislative proposals and was entrusted with supervisory control over both the executive and judiciary branches. National minorities were ensured special safeguards; in regions where they constituted 20% of the population, individuals from minority communities were granted unrestricted rights to use their language in everyday activities, schools, and dealings with authorities.<sup>1005</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during that period are categorized as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. LIED classifies political liberties as present until 1937 and as absent in 1938. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were present until 1937 and somewhat present in 1938. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. From 1920 to 1929, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

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<sup>1002</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bohemia>

<sup>1003</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian\\_Empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_Empire)

<sup>1004</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s\\_suffrage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage)

<sup>1005</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First\\_Czechoslovak\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Czechoslovak_Republic)

09/30/1938 End Liberal Democracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: From this date on, following the Munich Agreement, political liberties were compromised as Nazi influence grew. This period is classified by us as Minimal Political Liberties. LIED continues to code political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as what we interpret as somewhat present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

03/16/1939 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy and Hungary, Military Autocracy]: On 03/14/1939, the remaining portion (referred to as the "rump") of Czechoslovakia was dismantled with the establishment of the Slovak State. The next day, Hungary occupied and took over the remainder of Carpathian Ruthenia. Then, on the following day, the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was declared.<sup>1006</sup> According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For the German occupation, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent.

04/03/1945 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Germany and Hungary, Direct Rule Occupation Regime]/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: Following World War II, the pre-war Czechoslovakia was restored, except for Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which was taken over by the USSR and merged with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.<sup>1007</sup> However, Czechoslovakia fell under the Soviet sphere of influence, a factor that heavily influenced any plans or strategies for post-war reconstruction.<sup>1008</sup> The Third Republic came into being in April 1945 with the creation of the Košice Programme. In Košice, the formation of the new National Front government took place, rooted in discussions dating back to 1943. Beneš retained the presidency, while Zdeněk Fierlinger assumed the role of prime minister, with Klement Gottwald serving as deputy prime minister. The National Front coalition was characterized by the predominance of three socialist parties—KSCĚ, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and Czechoslovak National Social Party. The Slovak Popular Party was prohibited due to collaborationist associations with the Nazis.<sup>1009</sup> The government moved back to Prague after its liberation on 05/10. Political liberties are coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. For the year 1946, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-

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<sup>1006</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovakia#Munich\\_Agreement,\\_and\\_Two-Step\\_German\\_Occupation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovakia#Munich_Agreement,_and_Two-Step_German_Occupation)

<sup>1007</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovakia#Communist\\_Czechoslovakia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovakia#Communist_Czechoslovakia)

<sup>1008</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third\\_Czechoslovak\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Czechoslovak_Republic)

<sup>1009</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third\\_Czechoslovak\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Czechoslovak_Republic)

Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. 05/26/1946 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, mostly free and fair parliamentary elections were held. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia emerged as the largest party, winning 114 of the 300 seats. Following the elections, Communist leader Klement Gottwald formed a coalition government. However, the Communists gradually tightened their grip on the country. During the rule, the Communists' reprisals against other parties increased. Despite holding only a minority of portfolios, the communists managed to assume control over crucial ministries such as information, internal trade, finance, and interior (which encompassed the police apparatus). Utilizing these ministries, they suppressed non-communist opposition, positioned party members in influential roles, and established a firm foundation for a takeover endeavor. Their efforts were further amplified through media and police channels. The announcement of the reactionary plot, initially declared by Gottwald during the KSČ Central Committee meeting in November 1947, was propagated nationwide through the communist press.<sup>1010</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are categorized as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores their electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI in this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the year 1947, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

02/25/1948 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy: In a situation of increasingly extreme communist tactics, the 12 non-communist ministers resigned. The Communist party took over complete power. The following elections were controlled and won by the communists (Kohut 1989). On 08/20/1968 Soviet leaders grew suspicious of Dubcek's reforms and openings in the Czech political system and decided to invade and remove him from power. Svoboda was appointed as an interim president in the aftermath of Dubcek's

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<sup>1010</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third\\_Czechoslovak\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Czechoslovak_Republic)

removal. However, this is not classified as a regime change but the prevention of a possible regime change initiated by Dubcek (Kohut 1989). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1948 to 1967, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. Since 1969, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH for this regime period since 1972, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the communist period, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent except in 1968 when it indicates that political liberties were not really present.

12/09/1989 End Communist (One-Party) Ideocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime: On 12/04/1989 the communist regime leadership resigned in response to massive protests, general strikes and internal discord. This led to the dissolution of the Communist Party and the first government not dominated by Communists (Velvet Revolution). The conservative leadership of the Czech Communist Party abdicated, leaving a rump group to negotiate the transfer of power. The first "government of national understanding" was dominated by leaders of the two main opposition movements: the Civic Forum that had emerged in the Czech lands and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence (Bernhard 1993: 324-325, Friedheim 1993: 483). LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

06/08[+09]/1990 End Non-Electoral Transitional (Multiparty) Regime/Start Liberal Democracy: After the general election in June 1990, the majority of key positions in the national government were occupied by Civic Forum leaders, while Public Against Violence dominated in the Slovak regions. These divisions eventually resulted in the split into two separate countries (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 24). The failure to address the Czech-Slovak conflict in 1992 led to a constitutional deadlock, undermining the federation's functionality. Despite this, political parties in both the Czech lands and Slovakia were free to organize and participate in the political arena. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during that period are categorized as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free,

fair and clean. The establishment of a twelve-member Constitutional Court in early 1992 marked a significant milestone in establishing a system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In 1992, three years following the conclusion of the 1989 velvet revolution that terminated 41 years of Communist rule, Czech and Slovak leaders initiated concrete measures to dissolve the 74-year-old Czecho-Slovakian federation. The results of free and fair elections held in June accelerated the dissolution process, culminating in the federation's dissolution by 01/01/1993 (McColm 1993). Per FH, for this regime period between 1990 and 1992, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive.

01/01/1993 End Czechoslovakia [Liberal Democracy]: On this date the ultimate dissolution of the federation culminated after free elections in June 1992 accelerated the separation process. For the time afterwards see **Czech Republic** and **Slovakia**.

Additional sources (Bernhard 1993, Bradley 2000, Braghiroli 2007, Coakley 1986, Gawdiak 1987, Friedheim 1993, Heimann 2009, Kohut 1989, McDermott/Stibbe 2006, Paul 1983, Saxonberg 2001, Zinner 1963)

## **Czech Republic**

[also known under its official short name Czechia]

01/01/1993 Start Liberal Democracy [as Czech Republic]: After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, on this date, the Czech Republic became independent.<sup>1011</sup> The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy where political freedoms and civil liberties are generally upheld. Nevertheless, the nation has encountered various corruption scandals and political conflicts in recent times, which have impeded regular legislative processes. The emergence of illiberal rhetoric and the growing influence of influential business entities in the political landscape have

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<sup>1011</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution\\_of\\_Czechoslovakia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dissolution_of_Czechoslovakia)

become more apparent.<sup>1012</sup> Women possess the right to vote in the Czech Republic since its creation.<sup>1013</sup> In January 2023, presidential elections took place in the Czech Republic, leading to the victory of Petr Pavel. Miloš Zeman, the incumbent president, was unable to run due to term limits. The election campaign was characterized as divisive by the media. The election result was seen as a show of support for the West amid the War in Ukraine and is anticipated to enhance Czech relations with the European Union and the United States.<sup>1014</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has always categorized Czech elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI has consistently scored elections as free and fair, with the exception of the phase from 2018 to 2021 where they were scored only somewhat free and fair. V-Dem's CEI has always scored them as clean. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. LIED and V-Dem's PCLI classify political liberties as present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2024 continued.

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<sup>1012</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/czech-republic/freedom-world/2022>;  
[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech\\_Republic\\_2013?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en)

<sup>1013</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/czech-republic/freedom-world/2022>

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